Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book I: On Sin, Mortal and Venial
Chapter 1: On the definition of sin
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book I. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Concerning sin many things are disputed by the theologians which seem not to make much to our matter. Wherefore, these being omitted, we shall deliver only the definition and the partition, the cause, and the differences of sin, which are necessary, or at least very useful, for explaining those controversies which we have in hand.
It is to be observed, then, at the outset, that sin and vice are not the same. For sin is the name of an evil operation, which is opposed to the operation of virtue; but vice is the name of an evil habit, which is opposed to virtue as virtue signifies a habit. For in this, evil things surpass good: that they abound more in words. For to signify the action of virtue we have no proper word, and therefore we use the name of virtue to designate both the action and the habit; but to signify the action which is born of vice we have very many words — sin, crime, offense, wickedness, outrage, disgrace, fault, error, and others. And that vice is the name of a habit, not of an action, can be understood from bodily things, whence names are wont to be transferred to spiritual. For we say there is a vice in a horse when he has some permanent quality on account of which he often either stumbles, or shies, or cannot be held by the bridle; but if that happen by chance once or twice, the horse is not on that account called vicious. Wherefore Aristotle rightly, in book 7 On Morals, chapter 8, compares vice with dropsy, which is a permanent thirst; and St. Augustine, in the book On the Perfection of Justice, chapter 2 [al. 4], says that vice is like the crookedness of a leg, sin like the limping.
Vice, then, being passed over — of which we are not at present to dispute — sin is thus defined by St. Augustine, book 2 On the Consensus of the Evangelists, chapter 4: “Sin is the transgression of the law.” Which definition is most general, and fits all sins — not only of morals, but also of nature and of art; for sin is nothing else than to decline and depart from the rule. Which St. John also taught most briefly, in the first epistle, chapter 3, in these words: sin is iniquity — and more clearly in Greek, he hamartia estin he anomia. But sin in morals, of which alone we treat, the same St. Augustine defines, book 22 against Faustus, chapter 27: something said, or done, or desired against the eternal law. Which definition the theologians have received with great applause, and not undeservedly. For since two things are found in sin — the substance, which is the material, and the notion itself, which is the formal of sin — Augustine embraced both in that definition. The substance of sin is some voluntary action, or the voluntary omission of an action; the notion of sin is the very declining and departing from the rule in that action or its omission. And since there are three general instruments of actions — heart, tongue, hand — and again three kinds of actions, one plainly spiritual, as desires; another plainly bodily, as deeds; another partly spiritual, partly bodily, as words: therefore St. Augustine, to comprehend whatever is material in sin, said that sin is something said, or done, or desired. He made no mention of omission, because definitions ought to be brief, and the negation is gathered from the affirmation. Further, the notion of sin, and indeed the very formal of sin, Augustine indicated when he said, “against the eternal law.” Nor would he say “against reason,” as the philosophers speak; nor “against the law of God,” as St. Ambrose speaks, book On Paradise, chapter 8; nor “against law” simply; but “against the eternal law” — that he might, namely, comprehend all laws, and the very root of laws. For every law, both natural and positive — and the positive both of God and of men — is therefore a law because it agrees with the eternal law, which is the very reason of God, the highest and most perfect rule; nor is any true law anything else than a certain shadowing and participation of the eternal law. One thing seems wanting in Augustine's definition — that mention should be made in it of the voluntary. For not any saying, deed, or desire whatever, but a voluntary saying, deed, or desire against the eternal law, is sin: “So far,” says Augustine in the book On True Religion, chapter 14, “is sin a voluntary evil, that it is in no way sin if it be not voluntary.” But not without cause did Augustine here pass over the voluntary; for it could easily be gathered from the other parts of the definition, since nothing is properly against the law but what is voluntary — for law is properly given only to those who have the use of free choice.
Let these things suffice in this place on the definition of sin. This alone is to be observed by the way: that such is the ignorance, or the impudence, of some of the Lutherans, that they do not fear to number Augustine's definition — his name suppressed — among errors; and that for no other cause than that they found the same definition among Catholic writers. Tilman Heshusius, who styles himself Bishop of Samland, in the book on the six hundred errors of the Papists, in the fourth place, number one: “The Papists,” says he, “for the most part define sin in this manner: that it is something said, or done, or desired against the law of God.” And in number two: “They urge as an unmoved rule: sin is so far voluntary that it is not sin if it be not voluntary.” Then, some other sentences of this kind being enumerated, he subjoins an antidote, as against poisons. But either Heshusius knew not that these are the sentences of St. Augustine, or he knew. If he knew not, he must be very ignorant, since these sentences are most celebrated, and known to almost all. If he knew, he is most impudent, since he did not hesitate to contemn so great a Doctor — and that above all in a matter in which (as the same Augustine himself speaks, in the place cited, On True Religion, chapter 14) no fewness of the learned, no crowd of the unlearned, dissents. Yet we give him thanks that, while he condemns Augustine's sentences as errors of the Papists, he concedes that Augustine was a Papist.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT PRIMUM De peccati definitione. De peccato multa a Theologis disputan¬ tur, quae non videntur inultum ad rem no¬ stram facere. Quare iis omissis, definitionem solum, et partitionem, causam, et discri¬ mina peccati trademus, quae necessaria, vel certe valde utilia sunt ad eas controversias, quas habemus prae manibus, explicandas. Est igitur initio animadvertendum, non esse idem peccatum, et vitium. Peccatum enim est nomen operationis malas, quae oppo¬ nitur operationi virtutis : vitium autem est nomen habitus mali, qui opponitur virtuti, ut virtus habitum significat. In hoc enim mala bonis praestant, quod vocabulis magis abundant. Nara ad significandam actionem virtutis nullam habemus propriam vocem, et idcirco utimur nomine virtutis tum ad actionem, tum ad habitum designandum. Ad significandam autem actionem, quae nascitur cx vitio, habemus plurimas voces, peccatum, jcrimen, delictum, scelus, facinus, flagitium, culpam, erratum, et alia. Esse autem vitium nomen habitus, non actionis, ex corporali¬ bus rebus intelligi potest, unde nomina ad res spirituales transferri solent. Dicimus enim vitium esse in equo, quando habet permanentem aliquam qualitatem, ob quam saepe aut cespitat, aut terretur, aut fraeno retineri nequit : sed si casu id accidat semel, atque iterum, non propterea dicitur equus vitiosus. Quocirea recte Aristoteles in vn. lib de moribus, cap. 8. vitium comparat cum hydropisi, quae est sitis permanens. Et S. Augustinus in lib. de perfectione Justitiae, cap. 4. simile esse dicit vitium curvitati ti¬ biae, peccatum autem claudicationi. Praetermisso igitur vitio, de quo non est nobis in praesentia disputandum, peccatum sic definitur a S. Augustino lib. ii de con¬ sensu Evangelistarum, cap. 4 : « Peccatum est transgressio legis. » Quae definitio gene¬ ralissima esi, et convenit in peccata omnia non solummorum, sed etiam naturae, et artis. Nihil est enim aliud peccatum, nisi declinare, ac recedere a regula. Quod etiam brevissime docuitS. Joannesin epist. 1. cap. 3. his ver¬ bis : Peccatam est iniquitas. Et clarius graece otgapTfa lati avopua. At peccatum in moribus, de quo solo nos agimus, definit idem S. Augustinus lib. xxil. contra Faustum, cap. 27 : dictum, vel fa¬ ctum, vel concupitum contra legem asternam. Quam definitionemTheologi magno applausu receperunt, nec immerito. Nam cum duo quaedam in peccato reperiantur, substantia, quae est materiale, et ratio ipsa, quae est for¬ male peccati : utrumque Augustinus ea defi¬ nitione complexus est. Substantia peccati (I) Joan. III. 244 LIBER I est actio aliqua voluntaria, vel voluntaria actionis omissio. Ratio peccati est ipsa de¬ clinatio, et recessio a regula in illa actione, vel ejus omissione. Et quoniam tria sunt instrumenta generalia actionum, cor, lingua, manus, et rursus tria sunt genera actio¬ num, unum plane spiritualium, ut desiderio¬ rum, aliud plane corporalium,. ut factorum; aliud partim spiritualium, partim corpora¬ lium, ut verborum : propterea S. Augusti¬ nus ut comprehenderet quidquid est in pec¬ cato materiale, dixit, peccatum esse dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum. Non meminit autem omissionis, quia definitiones debent esse breves ; et negatio ex affirmatione colli¬ gitur. Porro peccati rationem, atque adeo ipsum formale peccati indicavit Augustinus cum ait, contra legem aeternam, nec dicere voluit, contra rationem, ut loquuntur philosophi, neque contra legem Dei, ut loquitur S. Am¬ brosius lib. de paradiso, cap. 8; neque con¬ tra legem simpliciter, sed contra legero aeter¬ nam, nimirum ut comprehenderet omnes leges, et ipsam legum radicem. Siquidem omnis lex tum naturalis, tum positiva, et positiva tum Dei, tum hominum, ideo est lex, quia congruit cum lege aeterna, quae est ipsa Dei ratio summa, ac perfectissima regula; neque est aliud quaelibet vera lex, nisi adumbratio quaedam, atque participatio legis aeternae. Unum desiderari videtur in Augustini de¬ finitione, ut videlicet voluntarii mentio in ea fieret. Non enim quodvis dictum, factum, concupitum, sed dictum, factum, concu¬ pitum voluntarium, contra legem aeter¬ nam, est peccatum: « Usque adeo», in¬ quit Augustinus in lib de vera .religione, cap. 14, « peccatum voluntarium est ma¬ lum, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit voluntarium. Sed non sine causa hoc loco Augustinus voluntarium praetermisit. Poterat enim ex aliis partibus definitionis facile col¬ ligi. Siquidem non est proprie contra legem, nisi id quod est voluntarium. Neque enim lex proprie datur, nisi iis, qui habent usum liberi arbitrii. Haec de definitione peccati hoc loco suffi¬ ciant. Illud solum obiter observandum est, tamtam esse aliquorum ex Lutheranis impe¬ ritiam, vel impudentiam, ut Augustini defi¬ nitionem, tacito ejus nomine, inter errores numerare non vereantur, idque non alia de causa, nisi quia eamdem definitionem apud scriptores Catholicos invenerunt. Tilmannus Heshusius, qui se Episcopum Sambiensem vocitat, in libro de sexcentis erroribus Pon¬ tificiorum, loco quarto, numero primo ? « Pontificii, inquit, hoc modo definiunt ple¬ rumque peccatum, quod sit vel dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum centra Dei legem. » Et numero secundo : « Tamquam immotam, inquit, regulam urgent, usque adeo volun¬ tarium est peccatum, ut non sit peccatum, si non sit voluntarium. » Deinde enumeratis aliis aliquot ejusmodi sententiis, antidotum tamquam contra venena subjungit. At vel ignorabat Heshusius has esse S. Augustini sententias, vel non ignorabat. Si ignorabat, valde imperitus sit necesse est, cum hae sint sententiae celeberrimae, ac fere omnibus notae. Si non ignorabat, impuden- tissimus est, cum tantum Doctorem contem¬ nere non dubitaverit, ac praesertim in ea re, in qua (ut ipse idem Augustinus loquitur loco citato, de vera religione, cap. 44.) nulla Doctorum paucitas, nulla indoctorum turba dissentit. Agimus tamen gratias, quod dum Augustini sententias, ut Pontificiorum errores damnat, Augustinum Pontificium fuisse concedit.