Faith & the Word

Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book I: On Sin, Mortal and Venial

Chapter 9: That venial sin is by its nature distinguished from mortal is shown from the Scriptures

Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book I. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).

Now at last we come to the establishing of the true judgment, from whose establishment not only will all the above-said errors be plucked up by the root, but there will also be refuted the judgments of those writers who in some measure have departed from the common doctrine of the theologians and of the Church. It is to be proved by us, then, that venial sin is by its own nature distinguished from mortal; and that, without any relation either to predestination, or to the mercy of God, or to the state of the regenerate, it is of such a kind that it deserves punishment indeed, but not eternal; and offends God, but not unto the dissolution of friendship. This will be proved first from the Scriptures; then from the ecclesiastical definitions; next from the doctrine of the Fathers; last from reason.

As to the first: in Matthew 5 we read thus: whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment. And whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council. And whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire. In this place the Lord does not look to predestination, nor discuss what the divine mercy can or will do; but he adjudges the things themselves, and the measure of the sins. Now he makes three degrees of anger: one, of that which is so light that it bursts forth into no word; another, of that which is somewhat graver, yet reaches not to open reviling; a third, of that which is gravest, and brings forth manifest reviling. For although the inward anger can at times be gravest and yet be dissembled outwardly, nevertheless ordinarily, the greater it is, the more it betrays itself; and therefore the Lord calls that the lightest anger which is manifested by no outward sign. As to what is said in the second degree — whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca — it is not altogether certain what it properly signifies. St. Augustine, book 1 On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount, chapter 9, and St. Gregory, book 21 of the Morals, chapter 5, write that it is an interjection of one angered, which signifies nothing determinately, but only expresses that the mind is stirred. Which interpretation is probable, above all since Augustine says he received it from the Hebrews. For although such an interjection is not found in the Scriptures, nor in the Hebrew and Chaldee dictionaries which now exist, yet it could have been in use at that time and afterward have grown obsolete; nor again is it necessary that absolutely all words be found in dictionaries. Finally, that that word was not translated into Greek or Latin is an argument that nothing is properly signified by it. But St. Jerome, in the commentary on this place, noted that the word Raca signifies an empty man; for from the verb ruq, which is to empty, comes the noun req, empty, and, an aleph being added after the manner of the Syrians, it becomes raqa. But what the same author adds — that in this place it signifies a man empty of brain — is not without difficulty: both because in the Scriptures that word is not easily found in this sense, and because to call a man empty of brain seems no less a reviling than to call him a fool. And I cannot contain myself from touching briefly, in this place, the follies of Theodore Beza. For he, in the annotation on this place, reprehends the Hebrew version of this Gospel for having, in place of Raca, ra‘a — because (as he says) it is a greater reviling to call a man ra‘a, that is, evil, than fool; and yet he himself suspects that Christ in his own tongue said rasha‘ for that which we have as Raca — not observing that a greater reviling is signified by the word rasha‘ than by the word ra‘a, for the former signifies impious, the latter evil, and is very often taken not for evil, that is, wicked, but for thin, or deformed, or lean — to omit that the letter shin is not rendered in Latin by Ch, but by Sc, or by S simply, as is evident in the words Hosanna, Salomon, Sabaoth, Sabbath, and the like. It is probable, then, that raca in this place signifies a man empty of wealth, or of dignity, or at least vain and idle; for in these significations that word is found in the Scriptures, and it wounds far less than the word fool. But whatever be the proper signification of that word, this suffices us in this place: that a less grave sin is designated by raca than by “thou fool.” Now to these three degrees of sins answer three liabilities: of the judgment, of the council, and of hell fire. And he is called liable to the judgment (as St. Augustine rightly explains in the place noted above) who has done something whence he can be called into judgment, that his cause may be sifted. He is called liable to the council whose fault is certain, but it is doubtful how great it is and what punishment it deserves; and therefore the judges come together in council to define the measure of the punishment. He is called liable to hell fire whose fault, and the measure of the fault, and thereby also the gravity of the punishment, is certain. And that by the gehenna of fire is signified eternal death in the lower world, Hilary, Augustine, Chrysostom, and Theophylact teach in the commentary on this place. Jerome says nothing in this place, but in the commentary on chapter 10, on those words, fear him that can destroy both soul and body in hell, he writes that by the name of gehenna in the Gospel eternal punishments are always signified. From these things, then, an argument of this kind is framed. Manifest reviling, Christ being witness — nay, judge — makes one liable to hell fire, and thereby is a mortal sin. Anger expressed by the sound of the voice, but not reaching to the evil of reviling, makes one liable to the council — that is, it is not agreed whether it deserves gehenna, but it is worthy either of that punishment or of a lesser. There are found, therefore, certain sins which are too light to deserve the gehenna of fire. For to what purpose would a council be convened to discern whether some fault should be punished with the gehenna of fire, if all faults deserved the gehenna of fire? There are, then, some faults which by the divine judgment are to be visited only with temporal punishment. Again, the anger which has burst forth by no external sign makes one liable not to the council, but to the judgment — that is, it is not agreed whether it deserves some punishment, or none; from which it follows that without doubt, if it deserves punishment, it deserves temporal, not eternal — since it is a lighter fault than that would be about which there could be doubt whether it deserved temporal or eternal punishment. Nor does Beza's annotation on this place of the Gospel seem worthy of an answer. For he writes that unequal sins are here described by the Lord, and that it is less to be made liable to the judgment than to the council, and to the council than to hell fire; yet he adds that all sins, though unequal among themselves, deserve death, because the Apostle writes, Romans 6, that the wage of sin is death. But if by death the Apostle understands the same as Christ by gehenna — since he opposes it to eternal life, saying, the wages of sin is death… the grace of God, life everlasting — it cannot be that all sins deserve death unless all deserve gehenna; and we have already demonstrated, from Christ's sentence, that not all sins make one liable to the gehenna of fire. The wage of every sin, then, is not death, but only of that sin which is opposed to grace and friendship with God, of which the Apostle was speaking. And so to the diverse degrees of sins which are described by the Lord there answer not diverse degrees of torments in gehenna, as Beza judges — for if it were so, the Lord would not rightly have said of the third degree alone, “shall be in danger of hell fire” — but there answer diverse degrees of punishments, of which some are eternal, others temporal, others most brief. And so much for the first testimony of Scripture.

Two other testimonies are had in Matthew 23 and Luke 6, in which places the Lord compares certain sins to things by their nature lightest, others to things gravest. Blind guides (says Matthew 23), who strain out a gnat, and swallow a camel. Here we see certain sins compared to gnats, others to camels; for the Lord arraigns the Pharisees for easily transgressing the gravest precepts of the law while most diligently observing the minute ones, and thus studiously guarding against the lightest sins while perpetrating the greatest without scruple. And it is agreed that between a gnat and a camel there is so great a difference from the nature of the thing that there seems to be almost no proportion between them. Again, Luke 6: why seest thou the mote in thy brother's eye: but the beam that is in thy own eye thou considerest not? Certainly between a mote and a beam there is, from the nature of the thing, so great a difference that a mote can be lightly carried, while a beam is unbearable, and not only destroys the eye, but even crushes the whole body of a man, if it be laid upon him. But if all sins by their nature were worthy of everlasting death, who would believe that some could be so extenuated by the Lord himself as to be compared with a mote and a gnat — above all when others were compared by the same Lord to camels and beams?

There is another testimony, Luke 12: I say to thee, thou shalt not go out thence, until thou pay the very last mite. By the last mite the Fathers understand the minute and lightest sins, for which satisfaction must be made in the prison of purgatory, unless in this life they have been purged or released. Tertullian, in the book On the Soul, chapter 17 [al. 58], by the last farthing, or mite, expounds each small offense to be purged before the resurrection. Origen, homily 35 on Luke, says that they pay the last farthing who owe a little, and are detained in the prison up to a fixed time. Jerome, in the commentary on chapter 5 of Matthew: “This is what he says: thou shalt not go out of the prison until thou pay even the minute sins.” Finally Cyprian, book 4, epistle 2, Ambrose in the commentary on chapter 12 of Luke, and Eusebius of Emesa (or rather Caesarius of Arles), homily 3 on the Epiphany, write that by the last farthing are understood those sins which after this life are expiated in the purgatorial places — which without doubt are venial; for he who departs from this life with mortal sin straightway receives the wage of sin, namely everlasting death. Now then, since the debt of one mite is least, and in no tribunal can anyone be condemned to death for so slight a debt, if the Lord rightly compared venial sins with such a debt, it follows that venial sins by their nature in no way deserve eternal death.

Moreover the Apostle Paul, 1 Corinthians 3, compares venial sins to things by their nature lightest — wood, hay, stubble: if any man build upon this foundation, gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble: Every man's work shall be manifest; for the day of the Lord shall declare it, because it shall be revealed in fire; and the fire shall try every man's work, of what sort it is. If any man's work abide, which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward. If any man's work burn, he shall suffer loss; but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire. In which place (as Ambrose expounds, sermon 20 on Psalm 118; Jerome, book 2 against Jovinian; Augustine, book 21 On the City of God, chapter 26; Gregory, book 4 of the Dialogues, chapter 39; and others) the Apostle signifies by gold and silver and precious stones the perfect and praiseworthy works, which, examined in the judgment of God, earn nothing but a reward; by wood, hay, and stubble, the useless works, worthy of reprehension, but venial, which indeed bring loss and need purgation, yet do not make one fall from salvation. But blessed Paul would never have compared venial sins with hay and stubble unless they were in very truth, as St. Gregory speaks in the place noted, minute and lightest sins; for sins by their nature mortal would rather have had to be compared to iron, or bronze, or lead (as the same Gregory says in the same place).

Let there come to these the testimony of the Apostle St. James, who in the first chapter of his epistle distinguishes temptation from sin, and sin from crime: every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured. Then when concupiscence hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin. But sin, when it is completed, begetteth death. Where St. James does not distinguish the motion of concupiscence into involuntary and voluntary, nor say that every voluntary motion is mortal sin and every involuntary one venial, as Philip Melanchthon would have wished. But he distinguishes three motions of concupiscence: one involuntary, by which one is incited to sin without any consent of his own, when he says, every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured — and this motion the Apostle does not say is sin, but the cause of sin, if, namely, consent come to it. The second motion he will have to be imperfectly voluntary, when he adds: then when concupiscence hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin. And that this motion is imperfectly voluntary, and hence a sin, but venial, is evident: because it is named sin, and yet is distinguished from the sin completed and begetting death; from which we understand that this second motion is not completed sin, nor begets death, and thereby is not mortal sin. The third, finally, he adjoins as perfectly voluntary; and that this motion is mortal sin the Apostle declares, saying: but sin, when it is completed, begetteth death. Nor indeed ought we to suspect that completed sin is here called only the sin perpetrated in deed — as though illicit desires could not be named mortal sins unless they be fulfilled in deed. For since among the first ten precepts of the law are distinctly named, as two diverse commandments, Thou shalt not commit adultery, and, Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife; and since the Lord in the Gospel, Matthew 5, said, whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart: it cannot be doubtful that the completed sin, begetting death, is the concupiscence to which perfect and completed assent is given, though it never be fulfilled in deed. Nor can the Lutherans answer that that sin of which St. James speaks — when he says, when concupiscence hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin — is venial by the mercy of God, because it is not imputed to the faithful, and not such by its nature. For they say that those things only are not imputed which are plainly involuntary; but this of which we speak is not altogether involuntary — for otherwise St. James could not have distinguished the concupiscence alluring and bringing forth sin from the sin itself which is brought forth by that concupiscence; since (as we said a little before) it cannot be feigned how concupiscence should bring forth sin except by drawing consent from the will.

Let there come last two places in which the Scriptures speak of certain sins far more mildly than they are wont to speak of those which by the consensus of all are deadly sins. Matthew 12: every idle word that men shall speak, they shall render an account for it in the day of judgment. It is assuredly one thing that an idle word is not without fault, and therefore to be sifted in the day of judgment; another: Go into everlasting fire; Bind his hands and feet, and cast him into the exterior darkness; Depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity — and other things of that kind which occur everywhere in the Gospels. Ephesians 5: But fornication, and all uncleanness, or covetousness, let it not so much as be named among you, as becometh saints: Or obscenity, or foolish talking, or scurrility, which is to no purpose; but rather giving of thanks. For know you this and understand, that no fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person (which is a serving of idols), hath inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God. Not rashly did the blessed Apostle, when he had pronounced that six kinds of sins are to be guarded against — those, namely, which among the gentiles were scarcely acknowledged as sins: fornication, uncleanness, covetousness, obscene words, foolish talking, and scurrility — adjoin of the three former only that they who do such things have no inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God. For he wished, namely, to teach that the three latter ought indeed to be foreign to the sanctified mouth of the faithful, yet are not from their kind such as exclude from the inheritance of Christ and of God. Nor has that any place here which the adversaries are wont to say — that there are certain venial sins which do not exclude from the kingdom of God, but that these are not such by their nature, but by the mercy of God not imputing them. For, as we have often said, they acknowledge those only as venial, and say those only are not imputed, which are involuntary; but the sins of which Christ and Paul here treat are voluntary — namely, words idle, less than honorable, foolish, scurrilous.

Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT  IX. 

Peccatum  veniale  natura  sua  distingui  a  mor¬ 
tali,  ostenditur  ex  Scripturis.  . 

Nunc  tandem  ad  veram  sententiam  com¬ 
probandam  accedimus,  ex  cujus  comproba¬ 
tione  non  solum  supradicti  errores  omnes 
radicitus  evellentur,  sed  etiam  refutabuntur 


(l)  Matth.  V,  22.  -  (2)  !d.  XXV,  41.  -  (3)  Gal.  V,  21. 


230 


LIBER  I. 


sententiae  eorum  scriptorum,  qui  a  communi 
Theologorum,  et  Ecclesiae  doctrina  qm.  /is 
ratione  discesserunt.  Probandum  igitur  no¬ 
bis,  peccatum  veniale  ex  natura  sua  distin¬ 
gui  a  mortali ,  ac  sine  ulla  relatione  vel  ad 
prcedistinationem,  vel  ad  misericordiam  Dei, 
vel  ad  statum  renatorum,  esse  ejusmodi,  ut 
poenam  quidem  mereatur,  sed  non  aeternam  ; 
et  Deum  offendat,  sed  non  usque  ad  amici- 
tiae  dissolutionem.  Id  primum  probabitur 
ex  Scripturis  ;  tum  ex  definitionibus  eccle¬ 
siasticis  ;  deinde  ex  doctrina  Patrum;  po¬ 
stremo  ex  ratione. 

Quod  attinet  ad  primum,  Matth.  v.  sic  le¬ 
gimus  :  Quid  irascitur  fratri  suo,  reus  erit  ju¬ 
dicio  ;  qui  dixerit  raca,  reus  erit  concilio;  qui 
dixerit  fatue ,  reus  erit  gehennee  ignis  (1).  Hoc 
loco  non  respicit  Dominus  praidestinationem* 
neque  discutit,  quid  possit,  aut  velit  divina 
misericordia  ;  sed  res  ipsas  dijudicat,  et  pec¬ 
catorum  mensuram.  Facit  autem  tres  gradus 
iracundiae,  unum  ejus,  quae  ita  levis  est,  ut 
in  vocem  nullam  erumpat ;  alterum  ejus, 
quae  paulo  gravior  est,  non  tamen  pervenit 
usque  ad  apertum  convicium;  tertium  ejus, 
_  quae  gravissima  est,  et  manifestum  convicium 
parit.  Quamvis  enim  possit  interdum  iracundia 
interior  esse  gravissima,  et  tamen  dissimu¬ 
lari  extex-ius ;  nihilominus  ordinarie  quo  est 
major,  eo  se  magis  prodit,  et  ideo  Dominus 
levissimam  iracundiam  vocat  eam,  quae  non 
manifestatur  ullo  signo  exteriore. 

Quod  vero  dicitur  in  secundo  gradu  :  Qui 
dixerit  fratri  suo  raca,  non  est  omnino  certum 
quid  proprie  significet.  S.  Augustinus  lib.  i. 
de  sermone  Domini  in  monte,  cap.  9.  et  S. 
Gregorius  lib.  xxi.  Moral.  cap.  5.  scribunt, 
esse  interjectionem  irascentis,  quae  nihil  de- 
teimiinate  significet,  sed  solum  exprimat  ani¬ 
mum  esse  commotum.  Quae  interpretatio 
piebabilis  est,  praesertim  cum  dicat  Augu¬ 
stinus,  se  id  accepisse  ab  Hebraeis.  Quamvis 
enim  non  inveniatur  in  Scripturis  ejusmodi 
inteijectio,  neque  in  Dictionariis,  Ilebxaicis, 
et  Chaldaicis,  quae  nunc  extant,  potuit  tamen 
eo  tempore  fuisse  in  usu,  ac  deinde  obsole¬ 
visse  :  neque  etiam  necesse  est  in  Dictiona¬ 
riis  omnes  omnino  voces  invenii-i.  Denique 
quod  ea  vox  translata  non  fuerit  in  G  ne  cum 
aut  Latinum,  argumento  est,  nihil  ea  piopiie 
significari.  Caeterum  S.  Hieronymus  in  com¬ 
mentar.  hujus  loci  annotavit  vocem  Raca,  si¬ 
gnificare  hominem  vacuum.  Nam  a  verbo 


■pvi  quod  estcvacuare,  fit  nomen  pT  vacuus, 
et  addito  s  more  Syrorum,  fit  api. 

Sed  quod  addit  idem  auctor  hoc  loco  sig¬ 
nificare  hominem  vacuum  cerebi-o,  non 
caret  difficultate  ;  tum  quia  in  Scripturis  non 
facile  invenitur  ea  vox  in  hoc  sensu  ;  tum 
quia  vocai'e  hominem  vacuum  cerebro,  non 
videtur  esse  minus  convicium,  quam  si  vo¬ 
cetur  stultus.  Non  possum  autem  me  conti¬ 
nere,  quin  Theodori  Bezax  ineptias  hoc  loco 
paucis  perstringam.  Is  enim  in  annotatione 
ad  hunc  locum  versionem  IIebi'aieam  hujus 
Evangelii  reprehendit,  quod  pro  Raca  habeat 
5-59*1,  quia  (ut  ipse  dicit)  majus  convicium 
est  vocare  hominem  ;*;3H,  id  est,  malum, 
quam  fatuum,  et  tamen  ipse  idem  suspicatur 
Christum  sua  lingua  dixisse  90*5,  pro  eo  quod 
nos  habemus  Raca;  neque  animadvertit  ma¬ 
jus  convicium  significari  per  vocem  901, 
quam  per  vocem  illa  enim  impium 

sigidficat,  haec  malum,  et  saepissime  accipi¬ 
tur  non  pro  malo,  id  est,  sceleixito,  sed  pro 
tenui,  aut  deformi,  aut  macilento,  ut  omit¬ 
tam  quod  littera  &  non  redditur  latine  per 
Ch,  sed  per  Sc,  aut  per  S,  simpliciter,  ut  pa¬ 
tet  in  vocibus,  Hosanna,  Salomon,  Sabaoth, 
Sabathum,  et  similibus.  Probabile  igitur  est, 
raca  hoc  loco  significax*e  hominem  vacuum 
opibus,  aut  dignitate,  aut  certe  vanum  et 
otiosum.  Nam  et  in  his  significationibus  in¬ 
venitur  ea  vox  in  Scriptuins,  et  longe  minus 
l«dit,  quam  vox  fatuus.  Sed  quidquid  sit  de 
propria  significatione  ejus  vocabuli,  illud 
nobis  hoc  loco  satis  est,  minus  grave  pecca¬ 
tum  desexabiper  raca  quam  per  fatue. 

His  autem  tribus  gradibus  peccatorum 
respondent  tres  reatus,  judicii,  concilii,  et 
gehennae  ignis.  Et  quidem  x-eus  judicii  dici¬ 
tur  (ut  recte  explicat  S.  Augustinus  loco  su- 
pra  notato)  qui  aliquid  fecit,  unde  in  judicium 
vocari  possit,  ut  causa  ejus  discutiatur.  Reus 
concilii  dicitur,  cujus  culpa  certa  est,  sed 
ambiguum  quanta  sit,  et  quam  pcenam  me¬ 
reatur,  et  ideo  judices  inter  se  conveniunt 
in  concilium,  ut  definint  poenae  mensuram. 
Reus  gehennae  ignis  dicitur,  cujus  culpa  et 
mensura  culpae ,  ac  per  hoc  etiam  poenae 
gravitas  certa  est.  Significari  autem  per  ge¬ 
hennam  ignis,  mortem  aeternam  apud  inferos 
docent  in  commentario  hujus  loci  Hilaiius, 
Augustinus, Chrysostomus,  etTheophylactus. 
Hieronymus  hoc  loco  nihil  dicit,  sed  in  com¬ 
mentario,  cap.  10.  in  illa  verba :  Timete  eum, 


(1)  Matth.  V.  22. 


CAPUT  IX. 


qui  potest  aniinnm  et  corpus  perdere  in  gehen¬ 
nam  (1),  scribit,  nomine  gehenna:  semper 
in  Evangelio  significari  poenas  aeternas. 

Ex  his  igitur  conficitur  argumentum  ejus- 
mod  :  Manifes:um  convicium,  teste  vel  ju¬ 
dice  Christo,  facit  reum  gehennae  ignis,  ac 
per  hoc  est  peccatum  mortale.  Iracundia, 
sono  vocis  expressa,  sed  ad  malum  convicii 
non  pertingens,  facit  reum  concilii,  id  est, 
non  constat  an  mereatur  gehennam,  sed  aut 
ea  poena,  aut  minore  digna  est.  Inveniuntur 
igitur  peccata  quaedam,  quae  leviora  sunt, 
quam  ut  gehennam  ignis  mereantur.  Quor¬ 
sum  enim  cogeretur  concilium  ad  discernen¬ 
dum  num  aliqua  culpa  gehenna  ignis  pu¬ 
nienda  esset,  si  omnes  culpae  gehennam  ignis 
mirerentur  ?  Sunt  igitur  culpae  aliquae,  quae 
divino  judicio  sola  poena  temporali mulctan- 
dae  sunt.  Itursus  iracundia,  quae  nullo  signo 
externo  foras  erupit,  non  facit  reum  concilio, 
sed  judicio  ;  hoc  est,  non  constat,  an  merea¬ 
tur  poenam  aliquam,  an  nullam;  ex  quo 
sequitur,  ut  sine  dubio,  si  poenam  meretur, 
temporalem,  non  aeternam  mereatur,  cum  sit 
levior  culpa,  quam  ea  esset,  de  qua  dubium 
esse  poterat,  temporale  ne  supplicium,  an 
aeternum  mereretur. 

Neque  digna  videtur  responsione  annotatio 
Bezae  ad  hunc  locum  Evangelii.  Scribit  enim 
inaequalia  peccata  hic  describi  a  Domino,  et 
minus  esse  reum  fieri  judicio,  . quam  concilio, 
et  concilio,  quam  gehennae  ignis :  addit  ta¬ 
men,  omnia  peccata, quamvis  inter  se  inaequa¬ 
lia,  mortem  mereri, quia  stipendium  peccati 
mortem  esse  scribit  Apostolus  ad  Rom.  vi. 
At  si  per  mortem  idem  intelligit  Apostolus, 
quod  per  gehennam  Christus, 'cum  eam  vitae 
aeternae  opponat,  dicens :  Stipendium  peccati 
mors,  gratia  Dei  vita  aeterna  (2),  fieri  non  po¬ 
test,  ut  omnia  peccata  mortem  mereantur, 
nisi  gehennam  omnia  mereantur.  Jam  autem 
demonstravimus  ex  Christi  sententia  non 
omnia  peccata  reum  facere  gehennae  ignis. 
Non  igitur  stipendium  est  omnis  peccati  mors, 
sed  ejus  tantum  peccati,  quod  opponitur  gra- 
tiaj  et  amicitiae  cum  Deo,  de  quo  Apostolus 
loquebatur.  Itaque  diversis  gradibus  pecca¬ 
torum,  qui  describuntur  a  Domino,  non  re¬ 
spondent  diversi  gradus  suppliciorum  in  ge¬ 
henna,  ut  Beza  existimat,  quia  si  ita  esset, 
non  recte  Dominus  de  solo  tertio  gradu  di¬ 
xisset,  reus  erit  gehennae  ignis;  sed  respondent 
diversi  gradus  suppliciorum,  quorum  alia 


£3  i 

sint  aeterna,  alia  temporalia,  alia  brevis¬ 
sima.  Atque  haec  de  primo  testimonio  Scri¬ 
pturae. 

Alia  duo  testimonia  habentur  Mat.  xxm. 
et  Luc.  vi.  in  quibus  locis  Dominus  peccata 
quaedam  comparat  rebus  natura  sua  levissi¬ 
mis,  alia  vero  gravissimis.  Luces  caeci  (inquit 
Mat.  xxm)  excolantes  culicem,  camelum  autem 
glutientes  (3).  Hic  videmus  peccata  quaedam 
conferri  culicibus,  alia  camelis  :  arguit  enim 
Dominus  Pharisaeos,  quod  gravissima  prae¬ 
cepta  legis  facile  transgrederentur,  minuta 
vero  diligentissime  observarent,  atque  ita 
peccata  levissima  studiose  caverent,  maxima 
vero  sine  scrupulo  perpetrarent.  Constat  au¬ 
tem  inter  culicem  et  camelum  tantum  esse 
ex  natura  rei  discrimen,  ut  nulla  fere  inter 
ea  proportio  esse  videatur. 

Rursus  Luc.  vi :  Quid,  inquit,  vules  festucam 
in  oculo  fratris  lui,  trabem  autem,  quae  in  ocu¬ 
lo  tuo  est,  non  consideras  (4)?  Certe  inter  festu¬ 
cam  et  trabem,  tanta  ex  natura  rei  differentia 
est,  ut  festuca  leviter  portari  queat,  trabs 
autem  sit  importabilis,  et  non  solum  oculum 
destruat,  sed  etiam  totum  corpus  hominis 
opprimat,  si  illi  imponatur.  Si  autem  omnia 
peccata  ex  natura  sua  morte  sempiterna 
digna  essent,  quis  credat,  ita  quaedam  ab 
ipso  Domino  extenuari  potuisse,  ut  cum  fe¬ 
stuca  et  culice  conferrentur,  praesertim  cum 
alia  camelis,  et  trabibus  ab  eodem  Domino 
fuerint  comparata? 

Est  aliud  testimonium  Lucae  xir:  Dico  tibi, 
non  exies  inde,  donec  etiam  novissimum  minu¬ 
tum  reddas  (0).  Per  novissimum  minutum  in- 
telligunt  Patres  peccata  minuta  et  levissima, 
pro  quibus  in  carcero  purgatorii  satisfacien¬ 
dum  est,  nisi  in  hac  vita  purgata  vel  relaxata 
fuerint.  Tertullianus  in  lib.  de  anima,  cap. 
xvn,  per  novissimum  quadrantem,  sive  minu¬ 
tum,  exponit  modica  quaeque  delicta  pur¬ 
ganda  ante  resurrectionem.  Origenes  homil. 
33.  in  Lucam,  dicit,  eos  reddere  novissimum 
quadrantem,  qui  modicum  debent,  et  usque 
ad  certum  tempus  detinentur  in  carcere. 
Hieronymus  in  comment.  ad  cap  v.  Matth.  : 
«  Hoc  est,  inquit,  quod  dicit,  non  egredieris 
de  carcere,  donec  etiam  minuta  peccata  per¬ 
solvas.  »  Denique  Cyprianus  lib.  iv.  epist.  2. 
Ambrosius  in  commentar,  ad  cap.  xii.  Lucae, 
et  Eusebius  Emissenus  (seu  potius  Caesarius 
Arclatensis)  homil.  3.  de  Epiphania,  scribunt, 
per  novissimum  quadrantem  intelligi  ea  pec- 


(1)  Matth.  X,  28.  -  (2)  Rom.  VI,  21.  —  (3)  Matth.  XXIII,  24.-  (4)  Luc.  VI,  41.  -  (5)  Luc.  XII,  59. 


232 


UBER  I. 


cata,  quae  post  hanc  vitam  in  locis  purgato¬ 
riis  expiantur,  qua)  sine  dubio  venialia  sunt. 
Nam  qui  cum  peccato  mortali  decedit  ex  hac 
vita,  continuo  stipendium  peccati,  mortem 
videlicet  sempiternam  accipit.  Jam  igitur 
cum  debitum  unius  minuti  minimum  sit,  ne¬ 
que  in  ullo  tribunali  pro  tam  exiguo  debi¬ 
to  ullus  damnari  possitjad  mortem,  si  Domi¬ 
nus  peccata  venialia  cum  tali  debito  recte 
comparavit,  sequitur,  ut  peccata  venialia  ex 
natura  sua  mortem  aeternam  nulla  ratione 
Mereantur. 

Adhaec  Apostolus  Paulus,  I  Corinth.  m, 
peccata  venialia  rebus  natura  sua  levissimis 
comparat,  ligno,  fceno,  stipulis  :  Si  quis , 
inquit,  superaedificat  supra  fundamentum  hoc, 
aurum ,  argentum,  lapides  pretiosos,  ligna , 
fcenum,  stipulam,  uniuscujusque  opus  mani¬ 
festum  erit.  Dies  enim  declarabit,  quia  in  igne 
revelabitur ,  et  uniuscujusque  opus  quale-sit 
ignis  probabit.  Si  cujus  opus  manserit  quod 
super  aedificavit,  mercedem  accipiet  :  si  cujus 
opus  arserit,  detrimentum  patietur,  ipse  autem 
salvus  erit,  sic  tamen  quasi  per  ignem.  Quo  loco 
(ut  exponunt  Ambrosius  sermon  20.  in  Psalm. 
118.  Hieronymus  lib.  ii.  adversus  Jovinia- 
num,  Augustinus  lib.  xxi  de  civitate  Deicap. 
26.  Gregorius  lib.  i.  Dialogorum  cap.  39  et 
alii)  significat  Apostolus  per  aurum  et  argen¬ 
tum,  et  lapides  pretiosos,  opera  perfecta  et 
laudabilia,  quae  in  judicio  Dei  examinata,  ni¬ 
hil  nisi  mercedem  promerentur :  per  lignum, 
fcenum,  et  stipulas  opera  inutilia  et  reprehen¬ 
sione  digna,  sed  venialia,  quae  detrimentum 
quidem  adferant  et  purgatione  indigeant, 
non  tamen  a  salute  excidere  faciant.  Nun¬ 
quam  autem  B.  Paulus  peccata  venialia  cum 
fceno  et  stipulis  comparasset,  nisi  revera  es¬ 
sent,  ut  loquitur  S.  Gregorius  loco  notato, 
peccata  minuta,  atque  levissima.  Peccata 
enim  ex  natura  sua  mortalia  ferro  potius, 
aut  a)ri,  vel  plumbo  (ut  ibidem  idem  Grego¬ 
rius  dicit)  comparanda  fuissent. 

Accedat  his  testimonium  S.  Jacobi  Aposto¬ 
li,  qui  in  1.  cap.  sua)  epistola)  distinguit  ten- 
tationem  a  peccato,  et  peccatum  a  crimine  : 
Unusquisque,  inquit,  lentatura  concupiscentia 
sua  abstractus,  et  illectus.  Concupiscentia  vero 
cum  conceperit,  parit  peccatum  :  peccatum 
vero  cum  consummatum  fuerit,  generat  mor¬ 
tem  (1).  Ubi  S.  Jacobus  non  distinguit  motus 
concupiscentia)  in  involuntarium,  et  volun¬ 
tarium  :  nec  dicit  omnem  motum  volunta¬ 


rium  esse  peccatum  mortale,  omnem  invo¬ 
luntarium  esse  veniale,  ut  Philippus  Melan- 
chthon  voluisset.  Sed  distinguit  tres  motus 
concupiscentia)  ;  unum  involuntarium,  quo 
quis  ad  peccatum  incitatur,  sine  ullo  suo 
consensu,  cum  ait  :  Unusquisque  tenlalur  a 
concupiscentia  sua  abstractus  et  illectus  ;  et 
hunc  inotum  non  dicit  Apostolus  esse  pecca¬ 
tum,  sed  causam  peccati,  si  nimirum  accedat 
consensus.  Alterum  motum  vult  esse  imper¬ 
fecte  voluntarium,  cum  addit  :  Concupiscen¬ 
tia  vero  cum  conceperit,  parit  peccatum.  Esse 
autem  hunc  motum  imperfecte  voluntarium, 
et  proinde  peccatum,  sed  veniale,  patet,  quia 
nominatur  peccatum,  et  tamen  distinguitur 
a  peccato  consummato,  et  mortem  generan¬ 
te.  Ex  quo  intelligimus  hunc  secundum  mo¬ 
tum  non  esse  peccatum  consummatum,  nec 
generare  mortem,  ac  per  hoc  non  esse  pecca¬ 
tum  mortale.  Tertium  denique  adjungit  per¬ 
fecte  voluntarium,  ct  hunc  motum  esse  pec¬ 
catum  mortale,  declarat  Apostolus,  dicens  : 
Peccatum  vero  cum  consummatum  fuerit,  ge¬ 
nerat  mortem. 

Neque  vero  suspicari  debemus,  peccatum 
consummatum  hoc  loco  dici  solum  peccatum 
opere  perpetratum,  quasi  desideria  illicita 
mortalia  peccata  nominari  non  possent,  nisi 
opere  compleantur.  Nam  cum  inter  prima 
decem  praecepta  legis  distincte  nominentur, 
tanquam  duo  diversa  mandata  :  Non  moecha¬ 
beris,  ct  :  Non  concupisces  uxorem  proximi 
tui,  et  cum  Dominus  in  Evangelio  Matth.  v. 
dixerit:  Qui  viderit  mulierem  ad  concupiscen¬ 
dum  eam,  jam  moechatus  est  eam  in  corde 
suo (3). Dubium  essenon  potest, quinpeccatum 
consummatum,  et  generans  mortem,  sit 
concupiscentia,  cui  perfectus  et  consummatus 
adhibetur  assensus,  tametsi  nunquam  opere 
compleatur.  Neque  respondere  possunt  Lu- 
therani,  peccatum  illud,  de  quo  S.  Jacobus 
loquitur,  cum  ait  :  Concupiscentia  cum  con¬ 
ceperit,  parit  peccatum,  esse  peccatum  venia¬ 
le  ex  misericordia  Dei,  quia  videlicet  fideli¬ 
bus  non  imputatur,  non  autem  esse  tale  ex 
natura  sua.  Nam  ipsi  solum  ea  dicunt  non 
imputari,  qua)  sunt  plane  involuntaria.  Hoc 
autem,  de  quo  loquimur,  non  est  omnino  in¬ 
voluntarium  :  nam  alioqui  non  potuisset  dis¬ 
tinguere  S.  Jacobus  concupiscentiam  illi¬ 
cientem,  et  parientem  peccatum  ab  ipso  pec¬ 
cato,  quod  ab  ea  concupiscentia  paritur.  Si¬ 
quidem  (ut  paulo  ante  diximus)  non  potest 


(I)  i  Corinth.  111,  12.  -  (2)  Jacob.  I,  14.  -  (3)  Mattii.  V.  28. 


CAPUT  X. 


233 


fingi,  quemadmodum  concupiscentia  peeea- 
tum,  pariat,  nisi  eliciendo  a  voluntate  con¬ 
sensum. 

Accedant  ultimo  duo  loca,  in  quibus  de 
peccatis  quibusdam  longe  mitius  Scripturae 
loquuntur,  quam  de  iis  loqui  soleant  qua) 
sunt  omnium  consensu  peccata  lethalia, 
Matth.  xii  :  De  omni  verbo  otioso,  quod  locuti 
fuerint  homines,  reddent  rationem  in  die  judi¬ 
cii  (1).  Aliud  profecto  est,  verbum  otiosum  non 
esse  sine  culpa,  et  ideo  discutiendum  in  die 
judicii,  aliud  vero  :  Ite  in  ignem  aeternum  ; 
Ligatis  manibus  et  pedibus  ejus,  projicite  eum 
in  tenebras  exteriores  ;  Discedite  a  me  omnes 
operarii  iniquitatis,  et  alia  id  genus,  qua)  pas- 
sim  occurrunt  in  Evangeliis.  Eplies.  v  :  For¬ 
nicatio,  et  omnis  immunditia,  aut  avaritia, 
nec  nominetur  in  vobis,  sicut  decet  Sanctos, 
aut  turpitudo,  aut  stultiloquium,  aut  scurrili¬ 
tas,  qux  ad  rem  non  pertinet  sed  magis  gratia¬ 
rum  actio .  Hoc  enim  sciole  intelli gentes,  quod 
omnis  fornicator,  aut  immundus,  aut  avarus, 
quod  est  idolorum  servitus,  non  habet  hxredita- 
tem  in  regno  Christi  et  Dei  (2).  Non  temere  B. 
Apostolus  cum  sex  peccatorum  genera  caven¬ 
da  esse  pronuntiasset,  qua)  videlicet  apud 
g<yitiles  vix  pro  peccatis  agnoscebantur,  for¬ 
nicationem,  immunditiam,  avaritiam,  turpia, 
verba,  stultiloquia  et  scurrilitatem,  de  tribus 
prioribus  tantum  adjunxit,  eos,  qui  talia 
agunt,  non  habere  hmreditatem  in  regno 
Christi  et  Dei.  Nimirum  enim  docere  vole¬ 
bat,  tria  posteriora  debere  quidem  esse  alie¬ 
na  ab  ore  sanctificato  fidelium,  non  tamen 
ex  genere  suo  talia  esse  qua)  excludant  ab 
haereditate  Christi  et  Dei. 

Neque  hic  locum  habet  quod  adversarii 
dicere  solent,  qua)dam  esse  peccata  venialia, 
quae  non  excludant  a  regno  Dei,  sed  ea  non 
esse  talia  ex  natura  sua,  sed  ex  misericordia 
Dei  non  imputante.  Nam,  ut  saipc  diximus, 
ea  sola  venialia  ipsi  agnoscunt,  ac  non  impu¬ 
tari  dicunt,  quae  sunt  involuntaria.  At  pecca¬ 
ta,  de  quibus  hic  agunt  Christus  et  Paulus, 
voluntaria  sunt,  videlicet  verba  otiosa,  mi¬ 
nus  honesta,  stulta,  scurrilia.
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