Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book I: On Sin, Mortal and Venial
Chapter 11: The same is proved from reason
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book I. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
And now, that certain sins are by their nature venial, and thereby are not so grave as to effect the guilt of everlasting death, can be confirmed by these arguments drawn from natural reason.
The first argument. If venial sins were by their nature mortal, and were only not imputed to the faithful on account of the faith which they have, certainly to unbelievers they would altogether be imputed, and would be mortal. But that is manifestly false and absurd; therefore it will also be false and absurd that venial sins are by their nature mortal. The major is conceded by the adversaries, nor does it need any proof: for if faith alone is the cause why some sins are venial, without doubt all sins will be mortal to those who lack faith. The minor of the argument, then, is proved. For in the same kind of sin the believer offends God more gravely than the unbeliever; since the believer is more bound to study perfection of life than the unbeliever, being both endowed with greater light, and having received from God more benefits, more remedies against sin, and, in fine, more helps. And that servant (says Christ, Luke 12) who knew the will of his lord, and prepared not himself, and did not according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes. But he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes. And unto whomsoever much is given, of him much shall be required: and to whom they have committed much, of him they will demand the more. Likewise Hebrews 10: How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, by which he was sanctified, and hath offered an affront to the Spirit of grace? And contrariwise the same Apostle teaches that the sins of unbelievers, on account of ignorance, are lighter, when he speaks thus of himself in the first epistle to Timothy, chapter 1: I obtained… mercy… because I did it ignorantly in unbelief. Wherefore deservedly St. Thomas, in the 1-2, question 89, article 3, writes that it is irrationally said that those motions of sensuality which in the faithful are venial sins are in unbelievers mortal — since the dignity of the person does not lessen, but increases, the account of the fault. And truly, who could grasp that an idle word should be to some unbeliever a mortal sin, but to me venial — when I have read that God said in express words, Of every idle word that men shall speak, they shall render an account in the day of judgment, while he has known nothing of the kind; and when I am, beyond all comparison, more bound to study perfection than he? Since therefore it agrees neither with the Gospel nor with right reason that the venial sins of the faithful should be mortal to unbelievers, it follows that they are venial to unbelievers also, and thereby are venial by their nature, not from conjunction with faith or from any other extrinsic reason.
The second argument. If we would speak properly, a sin is not venial because God does not impute it unto the guilt of eternal death; but God does not impute it unto the guilt of eternal death because it is venial. For that is called venial which is worthy of pardon, or in which there is something on account of which it ought to be punished more mildly. I ask, then, what that is which makes some sin worthy of pardon, and not imputed by God unto the guilt of death. They will answer: it is faith, with which that sin stands together. But again I ask: why does one sin stand together with faith and is venial, while another excludes faith and is mortal? They will answer: because the former is involuntary, the latter voluntary; for that, as we said above, Philip Melanchthon and the other Lutherans teach. But what is this else than to refer the difference of mortal and venial sins to the very notion and nature of sin, and to deny in word what in fact thou art compelled to affirm? For to be voluntary or involuntary pertains to the very nature and notion of sin: since a sin, the more voluntary it is, the more it is a sin; the less voluntary, the less a sin; and if it be in no way voluntary, it will be in no way a sin, as we taught above from Augustine.
The third argument, from St. Thomas, 1-2, question 87, article 3, and part 3, question 86 [al. 87], article 4. Venial sin by its nature does not place in a man an aversion from God, since it is not repugnant to charity, as is clear. But eternal punishment is not owed to sin save by reason of aversion from the eternal good, which is God. Therefore venial sin by its nature is not of such a kind as to make a man guilty of everlasting torment.
The fourth argument. If by its nature any offense whatever dissolved the friendship of God, by the same reasoning it would dissolve any other friendship; for what belongs to a thing from its nature belongs always and everywhere. But among men a grave and capital offense is far distant from a light and venial one: for he who wounds a friend either unwarily, or in a most light matter, is not reckoned, in the judgment of the prudent, to have given a sufficiently just cause for dissolving the friendship; and truly he would be held most foolish who for any little offense whatever should become an enemy to his friend, and should wish to pursue him even unto death. Therefore neither will any fault whatever, from its nature, dissolve that friendship also which stands between us and God; nor is it in any way probable that immoderate laughter, or an idle word, is by its nature such as to make a man otherwise just and a friend of God worthy of the perpetual hatred of God and everlasting torment.
The fifth argument. Sin is not said univocally of the mortal and the venial, but by a certain analogy; and hence venial sin is not perfectly sin, as the mortal is, but imperfectly, as Albert, St. Bonaventure, and others rightly teach, on book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 42, and St. Thomas, 1-2, question 88, article 1, reply to the first. Therefore there is not owed to it the punishment of eternal death, which is simply and perfectly punishment — or rather, the gravest of all punishments. The antecedent of this argument, which alone can come into controversy, I prove by this reason. For constituting sin two things above all are required: that it be voluntary, and against the law, as we demonstrated at the beginning of this book. But every venial sin either is not perfectly voluntary, or is not perfectly against the law; therefore there is no venial sin which is perfectly and simply a sin, but imperfectly, as we said, and in a certain respect. The minor is declared and proved. For venial sin is threefold, as we said above: it is either venial from its kind, as an idle word; or from the imperfection of the work — and this either from surreption, as a not fully deliberated desire of an illicit thing, or from the smallness of the matter, as the theft of one obol, or of another thing valued at no price, or the vilest. The venial sin from surreption, then, is not perfectly voluntary, hence not perfectly sin. But the venial sin from smallness of matter is indeed perfectly voluntary, but not perfectly against the law. For the law does not forbid the theft of one obol in particular, but forbids theft in general; and because the end of the commandment is charity, he who forbids theft forbids the injury and wounding of the neighbor; and the theft of a notable thing, by which the neighbor is simply wounded, he forbids simply; the theft of a least thing, by which the neighbor is not wounded save in a certain respect, he forbids only in a certain respect. And what we have said, for example's sake, of the law forbidding theft, the same is to be understood of the other like laws. Wherefore the venial sin from imperfection of the work is not perfectly against the law, hence not perfectly sin. Finally, the venial sin from its kind can be perfectly voluntary, and perfectly against a law, if there be some special law about it; but that law will not be perfectly, and in rigor, a law, so to speak. For since (as we said — or rather as the Apostle says) the end of the commandment is charity, and commandments are measured from their end, if some commandment be constituted about a thing which pertains very little to that end — as if by a special commandment it were provided that no one speak an idle word — that commandment could not be perfectly, and in rigor, and (as some speak) antonomastically, a law. Thus we see that all venial sins either are not perfectly voluntary, or are not perfectly against a law which is perfectly and in rigor a law. And because what is not perfectly voluntary is by that very fact also not perfectly against the law, save materially, therefore the theologians rightly say that venial sins, of whatever kind at last they be, are not against the law, but beside the law. All of which can be confirmed by this reasoning too. If venial sin were perfectly and properly against the law, it would follow that a just man, as soon as he has committed some one venial sin, is truly and perfectly a transgressor of the law, and thereby guilty of all the heavenly precepts, according to that of the Apostle James: whosoever… offend in one point, is become guilty of all, James 2. But that this is false and most absurd is agreed from this: that Scripture calls men simply holy, and just, and observers of the divine law, even when they lack not venial sins. For of Zachary and Elizabeth Luke writes thus, chapter 1: they were both just before God, walking in all the commandments and justifications of the Lord without blame. And that these did not lack venial sins even then, when (the Evangelist witnessing) they were walking in all the commandments of the Lord, cannot be doubted, since the Apostle John says of himself and his like: If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, 1 John 1; and another Apostle: In many things we all offend, James 3. Finally, venial sins do not exclude charity — for otherwise they could not be in just men, since (Augustine witnessing, book On Nature and Grace, last chapter) charity is true and perfect justice; and he that loveth… hath fulfilled the law, as the Apostle says, Romans 13. He, then, is not a transgressor of the law who has only venial sins; nay rather, even with these present, he is said to fulfill the law. Wherefore venial sins are not properly against the law, nor perfectly and simply sins.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XI. Idem probatur ex ratione. Jam vero peccata quaedam ex natura sua venialia esse, ac per hoc non esse tam gra¬ via, ut reatum sempiternae mortis efficiant, his argumentis ex naturali ratione ductis confirmari potest. Primum argumentum. Si peccata venialia ex natura sua essent mortalia, et solum fide¬ libus ob fidem, quam habent, non imputa¬ rentur; certe infidelibus omnino imputaren¬ tur, et mortalia essent. Id vero manifeste falsum, atque absurdum est : igitur falsum quoque, et absurdum erit, peccata venialia ex natura sua esse mortalia. Propositio ab ad¬ versariis conceditur, neque ulla probatione eget. Nam si sola fides causa est cur peccata aliqua sint venialia, sine dubio peccata omnia mortalia erunt iis, qui fide carent. Assumptio igitur argumenti probatur. Nam in eodem genere peccati gravius Deum fide¬ lis, quam infidelis offendit ; siquidem fide¬ lis magis tenetur perfectioni vitee studere, quam infidelis, cum et majori lumine sit praeditus, et plura a Deo beneficia, plura contra peccatum remedia, plura denique ad¬ jumenta receperit : Ille servus ( ait Christus Lucae xii. )qui cognovit voluntatem Domini sui, et non praeparavit, et non fecit secundum voluntatem ejus , vapulabit multis : qui autem non cognovit , et fecit digna plagis, vapulabit paucis. Omni autem , cui multum datum est, multum quaeretur ab eo ; et cui commendave¬ runt multum, plus petent ab eo. Item ad He- br. x : Quanto magis (inquit Apostolus) puta¬ tis deteriora mereri supplicia , qui filium Dei conculcaverit, et sanguinem testamenti pollutum duxerit, in quo sanctificatus est, et spiritui gratiae coutumeliam fecerit (1) ? Contra vero idem Apostolus docet, peccata infidelium ob ignorantiam, esse leviora, cum de se ita lo¬ quitur in epist. priore ad Timotheum, cap. i : Misericordiam consecutus sum, quia ignorans feci in incredulitate (2). [ (I) Luc. XII. 47. Heb. X, 19. - (2) l Tim. 1, 16. LIDER L 230 Quare merito S. Thomas in 1. 2. qurnst. 89. art. 5. scribit, irrationabiliter dici mo¬ tus illos sensualitatis, qui in fidelibus pecca¬ ta sunt venialia, in infidelibus esse mortalia, cum dignitas personas non minuat, sed au¬ geat rationem culpas. Et sane quis capiat, verbum otiosum infideli alicui peccatum esse mortale, mihi autem veniale, cum ego di¬ sertis verbis Deum dixisse legerim : De omni verbo ostioso, quod l oculi fuerint homines , reddent rationem in die judicii. Ille autem ni¬ hil ejusmodi noverit : et cum sine ulla com¬ paratione magis tenear ego perfectione stu¬ dere, quam ille ? Igitur cum non sit Evan- gelio, neque rectae rationi consentaneum, ut peccata fidelium venialia, mortalia sint infi¬ delibus, sequitur ut etiam infidelibus sir.t venialia, ac per hoc ex natura sua, non ex conjunctione cum fide, vel alia ratione ex- trinseca sint venialia. Secundum argumentum. Si proprie loqui velimus, non ideo peccatum aliquod est ve¬ niale, quia Deus illud ad reatum mortis ae¬ ternae non imputat, sed ideo Deus ad reatum mortis aeternae non imputat, quia veniale est. Veniale siquidem dicitur quod est venia dignum, sive in quo aliquid est, cur mitius puniri debeat. Quaero igitur quid illud sit, quod facit ut peccatum aliquod sit venia dig¬ num, et ad reatum mortis a Deo non im¬ putetur. Respondebunt, esse fidem, cum qua peccatum illud simul consistit. Sed rursus quaero, cur peccatum aliquod cum fide si¬ mul consistat, et sit veniale, aliud fidem ex¬ cludat, et sit mortale. Respondebunt, quia illud involuntarium est, hoc voluntarium. Id enim, ut supra diximus, Philippus Mclanch- thon, et caeteri Lutherani docent. At quid est hoc aliud, nisi discrimen peccatorum mortalium et venialium ad ipsam peccati ra¬ tionem et naturam referre, et verbo negare quod re ipsa affirmare cogaris? nam volun¬ tarium esse vel involuntarium, ad ipsam peccati naturam et rationem pertinet. Siqui¬ dem peccatum, quo magis est voluntarium, eo magis est peccatum ; quo minus est vo¬ luntarium, eo minus est peccatum ; etsi nullo modo voluntarium sit, nullo modo peccatum erit, ut supra ex Augustino docuimus. Tertium argumentum ex S. Thoma 1. 2. quaest. 87. art. 3. et 3. part, quaest. 80. art. 4. Peccatum veniale ex natura sua non po¬ nit in homine aversionem a Deo, cum non repugnet charitati, ut perspicuum est. At pcena aeterna non debetur peccato, nisi ra¬ tione aversionis a bono aeterno, quod est Deus. Igitur peccatum veniale ex natura sua non est ejusmodi, ut reum faciat hominem supplicii sempiterni. Quartum argumentum. Si natura sua quae¬ vis offensio dissolveret amicitiam Dei, eadem ratione dissolveret quamvis aliam amicitiam Quod enim ex natura rei convenit, semper et ubique convenit. At multum distat offen¬ sio gravis et capitalis a levi et veniali inter homines. Qui enim amicum vel incaute lae¬ dit; vel in re levissima, judicio prudentium non censetur solvendae amicitiae satis justam causam dedisse, et sane stultissimus habere¬ tur, qui ob quamcuinque offensiunculam ini¬ micus amico efficeretur, cumque usque ad mortem insectari vellet : igitur eam etiam amicitiam, quae nobis cum Deo intercedit, non dissolvet ex natura sua quaelibet culpa ; neque ullo modo probabile est risum immo¬ deratum, aut verbum otiosum ex natura sua tale esse hominen alioqui justum, et Dei ami¬ cum dignum efficiat perpetuo odio Dei, et sempiterno cruciatu. Quintum argumentum. Peccatum non di¬ citur univoce de mortali et veniali, ser per analogiam quamdam ; et proinde peccatum veniale non est perfecte peccatum sicut mor¬ tale, sed imperfecte, ut recte docent Albcr- lus, S. Bonaventura, et alii, in 2. Sentent. dist. 42. et S. Thomas. in 1. 2. quaest. 88. art. 1. ad 1. Igitur non debetur ei pcena mortis aeternae, qua; est simpliciter et per¬ fecte poena, vel potius poenarum omnium gravissima. Antecedens hujus argumenti, quod solum in controversiam venire potest, hac ratione probo. Ad peccatum constituendum duo potissimum requiruntur, ut sit voluntarium, et contra legem, ut initio hujus libri demon¬ stravimus ; peccatum autem veniale omne aut non est perfecte voluntarium, aut non est perfecte contra legem ; igitur nul¬ lum est veniale peccatum, quod perfecte et simpliciter sit peccatum, sed imperfecte, ut diximus, et secundum quid. Assumptio declaratur, et probatur. Nam peccatum veniale triplex est, ut supra dixi¬ mus ; aut enim est veniale ex genere suo, ut verbum otiosum : aut ex imperfectione operis, et hoc vel ex subreptione, ut deside¬ rium illicitae rei non plene deliberatum vel ex parvitate materiae, ut furtum unius oboli vel alterius rei, nullo, aut vilissimo pretio aestimatae. Peccatum igitur veniale ex su- CAPUT XII. 237 breptione non est perfecte voluntarium, proinde nec perfecte peccatum. Peccatum autem veniale ex parvitate materiae, est qui¬ dem perfecte voluntarium, sed non perfecto contra legem. Lex enim non prohibet fur¬ tum unius oboli in specie, sed prohibet fur¬ tum in genere. Et quia finis praecepti est charitas, qui prohibet furtum, prohibet injuriam et laesionem proximi, et furtum quidem ' rei notabilis, quo simpliciter proxi¬ mus laeditur, prohibet simpliciter ; furtum rei minimae, quo proximus non laeditur, nisi secundum quid, non prohibet, nisi secun¬ dum quid. Quod autem de lege prohi¬ bente furtum exempli causa diximus, idem de caeleris similibus legibus intelligendum est. Quare peccatum veniale ex imperfectio¬ ne operis non est perfecte contra legem, proinde nec perfecte peccatum. Denique peccatum veniale ex genere suo esse potest perfecte voluntarium, et perfecte contra legem, si lex aliqua specialis de eo sit, sed ea lex non erit perfecte, et in rigore lex, ut sic loquamur. Nam cum (ut diximus, vel potius ut Apostolus dicit ) finis praecepti sit charitas, et ex fine mensurentur prae¬ cepta, si quod praeceptum constituatur de re, quae parum admodum ad eum finem per¬ tineat, ut si speciali praecepto caveatur nc quis verbum otiosum loquatur, id praece¬ ptum non poterit esse perfecte, et in rigore, atque (ut «liqui loquuntur) antonomastice lex. Ita videmus omnia peccata venialia, aut non esse perfecte voluntaria, aut non esse perfecte contra legem, quae perfecte et in rigore sit lex. Et quia quod non est perfecte voluntarium, hoc ipso etiam non est perfecte contra legem, nisi materialiter ; propterea recte dicunt Theologi peccata venialia, cu- juscumque tandem generis sint, non esse contra legem, sed praeter legem. Quod totum hac etiam ratione confirmari potest. Si peccatum veniale perfecte ac pro¬ prie esset contra legem, sequeretur hominem justum statim atque unum aliquod pecca¬ tum veniale commisit, esse vere ac perfecte legis praevaricatorem, et per hoc reum om¬ nium coelestium praeceptorum, juxta illud Apostoli Jacobi : Qui offendit in uno , factus est omnium reus , Jacobi ii. (1). Hoc autem falsura, et absurdissimum esse constat ex eo, quod Scriptura vocat homines simpliciter sanctos, et justos, et legis divinae observa¬ tores, etiam cum peccatis venialibus non carent. Nam de Zacharia, et Elizabeth sic scribit Lucas c. i : Erant autem justi ambo ante Deum , incedentes in omnibus mandatis et justificationibus Domini sine querela (2). Hos autem caruisse peccatis venialibus etiam tunc, cum (teste Evangelista) incedebant in omnibus mandatis Domini, dubium esse non potest, cum apostolus Joannes de se, et sui similibus dicat : Si dixerimus, quia peccatum non habemus , nos Ipsos seducimus, I. Joan. i (3). Et alius Apostolus : In multis offendi¬ mus omnes, Jacobi iii (4). Denique peccata venialia non excludunt charitatem, nam alioqui in hominibus justis esse non possent, cum (teste Augustino lib. de natura et gratia, cap. ult.) charitas sit ve¬ ra, perfectaque justitia : Qui autem diligit, legem implevit, ut Apostolus ait Roman. xiii (3). Non igitur legis praevaricator est, qui sola habet peccata venialia, quin potius iis etiam praesentibus legem implere dicitur. Quare non suntpeccata venialia proprie con¬ tra legem, neque perfecte simpliciterque peccata.