Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book I: On Sin, Mortal and Venial
Chapter 14: The objections drawn from natural reason are dissolved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book I. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
There still remain a few objections, which are drawn from natural reason itself.
The first objection: any fault whatever can justly be punished by God with the punishment of death, both temporal and eternal; therefore any fault whatever is by its nature mortal, and venial by the sole mercy of God. The antecedent is proved: for the evil of even the lightest fault is greater than any evil of punishment, even the gravest; therefore any fault whatever can justly be punished with any punishment whatever, even that of eternal death. The antecedent of this latter argument is proved: because any punishment, however grave, is rather to be undergone than any sin, even the lightest, to be perpetrated; for otherwise sin would at some time be licit — which can in no way be, since it is a contradiction that something be sin and be licit. I answer: God can indeed do with his own things whatever pleases him, and not only slay the man who has sinned venially, but even reduce him to nothing; yet if he did that, he would prove himself Lord, not judge. “For,” as St. Augustine says, book 3 against Julian, chapter 18, “God is good, God is just: he can deliver some without good merits, because he is good; he cannot condemn anyone without evil merits, because he is just.” So we too can learn: God is good, God is just; he can reward some above their desert, because he is good; he cannot punish anyone above his desert, because he is just. Wherefore we deny what is assumed in that antecedent: that God can justly punish any sin whatever, even venial, with the gravest of all punishments, which is eternal death. To the proof we answer: a fault, even the lightest, is indeed a greater evil than any punishment whatever, even the gravest. For fault is evil simply, and in no way eligible; but punishment is an evil to him who is punished, yet not simply — nay, it must even be called good and just, and is eligible for avoiding the evil of fault. But it is not on that account that the greatest punishment is owed to the lightest fault, because punishment from its kind is a lesser evil than fault. For there is not owed to fault, from the notion of justice, some greatest evil simply, but the evil of punishment, which has a proportion with the evil of the fault — so that to a grave fault a grave punishment, to a graver a graver, to the gravest the gravest, and contrariwise to a light fault a light, to a lighter a lighter, to the lightest the lightest punishment answers. And so, though death is rather to be met, if the option be given, than an idle word to be uttered, yet an idle word uttered will not have to be avenged with everlasting death — the torment with which parricides and adulteries, and other crimes of the same kind, are avenged.
The second objection. Venial sin has an infinite malice, and is worthy of infinite hatred; therefore it deserves by its nature an infinite punishment. The antecedent is proved: for venial sin ought not to be committed for the obtaining of any good whatever, even infinite; therefore venial sin is not less hateful than an infinite good is lovable; but an infinite good is worthy of infinite love; therefore venial sin is worthy of infinite hatred; venial sin, then, has infinite malice, as an infinite good has infinite goodness. I answer: venial sin has not infinite malice, since it does not turn a man away from God, the highest and infinite good. For this is the cause why mortal sin is said to have infinite malice: that it changes the last end, and brings it about that a man, God being left — who truly is infinite — is turned to a created thing as to his last end. And that venial sin ought not to be committed for the obtaining of an infinite good, the reason is not that it too is an infinite evil, but that it is simply evil, so that it can in no way become good, and thereby is not eligible, nor a means for gaining any good.
The third objection: venial sin can never be remitted; but a sin which is never remitted can always be punished; therefore venial sin can always be punished. Hence, that it is punished temporally, and not forever, is not from its nature, but from the mercy of God. The major of this argument is proved: for venial sin cannot be remitted without the grace of God; but what God does from grace he can without doubt not do; therefore he can never remit the venial sin. And the argument can be confirmed from the judgment of St. Thomas, who in the 1-2, question 87, article 5, writes that venial sins, in men condemned to the lower world, are punished with everlasting torment. I answer: venial sin can never be remitted; but this arises not from the nature of the sin itself, but from elsewhere. Now two things can be considered in sin. First, the deformity, or spot, which from sin is left in the soul. Second, the guilt of punishment on account of the injury done to God. And the deformity which mortal sin brings forth arises from the loss of the grace of God, which is as it were a certain light and life of the soul itself; and because no one can call himself back from death, therefore mortal sin, which takes away the principle of life — that is, grace — is by its nature in a certain manner irremissible: for it leaves nothing in the man whence he could of himself rise again; and if perchance he rises, that comes from the peculiar and great mercy of God. But venial sin does not exclude the grace of God, does not take away the principle of life, but only in some manner hinders the fervor of charity; and therefore it does not properly effect a spot or deformity in the soul. And if that privation of fervor is to be called a deformity, it can easily be taken away by an act of love, which indeed is in the power of the just man, endowed with the habit of charity. Wherefore venial sin, as touching the spot or deformity, is not by its nature irremissible, but remissible, since it leaves charity in the man, by whose act it can easily be remitted. But if venial sin be in a sinner, it will be irremissible in him so long as the mortal sin is not remitted; but this will be by accident — namely by reason of the subject — because that man, deprived of the grace of God and of spiritual life, cannot perform any act of charity by which he might blot out the venial sins. And as touching the guilt: mortal sin of itself induces the guilt of everlasting punishment, as of itself it is irremissible. For an everlasting deformity ought not to remain without everlasting punishment — that the beauty which by fault is perpetually taken from the works of God may be perpetually repaired by the comeliness of justice. But contrariwise venial sin, as it is not of itself and by its nature irremissible, so it does not of itself and by its nature induce the guilt of everlasting punishment, but of temporal — though by accident it can come to pass that it be punished through all eternity, as we have said it comes to pass by accident that at times it is never blotted out through all eternity.
From these things we answer to the form of the proposed argument. And first we concede that venial sin can never be remitted, and always be punished — but by accident, as we said, not of itself; whereby also the confirmation from the authority of St. Thomas is solved. But to that which was objected in the proof of the major (venial sin cannot be remitted without grace; but what God does from grace he can not do; therefore he can never remit venial sin), we answer that grace in the argument is taken either for the habit of grace inhering in the soul, or for the liberal condonation of the punishment. And if it be taken for the habit of grace, we deny not that without grace sin cannot be remitted; but that grace the just man, who has to purge his venial sin, already has; hence he needs no new infusion of grace, but it will suffice him if from that very grace which he has he elicit some act of love. But if grace be taken for the liberal condonation of the punishment, we confess that God can, absolutely, not condone the punishment — for what he does from grace he can not do; yet since he has promised in express words in the Gospel the gift of remission, if we too shall have forgiven our debtors — For if you will forgive men their offences (says Matthew 6:14), your heavenly Father will forgive you also your offences — assuredly, if not absolutely, certainly by reason of the promise and the pact he will not be able not to remit, if we too shall have forgiven, and shall have said to him, as he himself taught us: Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors. And so St. Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 13, says that in the judgment mercy is to be rendered to the good merits of the just: for they who work well merit that God mercifully indulge them, if, charity remaining, they have offended in anything. Add last, that if God willed not to condone, but altogether to exact, the punishment of a venial sin from him who had purged the venial fault itself through an act of love, he could exact only a temporal, not an everlasting punishment. Wherefore, even if there were no pact of God with us concerning the remission of the punishment, it would still be clear that venial sin by its nature does not induce the guilt of everlasting punishment. And let this be the term of this disputation.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XIV. Diluuntur objectiones ex naturali ratione petita;. Supersunt adhuc pauca} quaedam obje¬ ctiones, quae ex ipsa naturali ratione ducun¬ tur. Prima objectio : Quaelibet culpa juste pot¬ est a Deo puniri poena mortis et temporalis, et aeternse; igitur quaelibet culpa natura sua mortalis est, et sola Dei misericordia venia¬ lis. Antecedens probatur. Nam malum cul¬ pae etiam levissimae majus e§t quolibet malo poenae etiam gravissimae; igitur juste potest quaelibet culpa puniri quavis poena etiam mortis aeternae. Antecedens hujus argu¬ menti posterioris probatur, quia potius sub¬ eunda est quaevis poena quamvis gravissima, quam peccatum aliquod etiam levissimum perpetrandum ; nam alioqui peccatum ali¬ quando licitum esset, quod nullo modo fieri potest, cum repugnantia sint, aliquid esse peccatum, et esse licitum. Respondeo : potest quidem Deus de rebus suis facere quicquid libuerit, et non solum hominem qui venialiter peccavit interficere, sed etiam in nihilum redigere: tamen si id faceret, Dominum se probaret, non judicem: « Nam, » utS. Augustinus ait lib. iii. adver¬ sus Julianum, cap. 18, « bonus est Deus, justus est Deus, potest aliquos sine bonis meritis liberare, quia bonus est : non potest quemquam sine malis meritis damnare, quia justus est. » Ita possumus, et nos discere, bonus est Deus, justus est Deus. Potest ali¬ quos supra condignum remunerari, quia bo¬ nus est : non potest quemquam supra condig¬ num punire, quia justus est. Quare nega¬ mus quod in antecedenti illo assumitur, posse Deum juste punire peccatum quodli¬ bet etiam veniale, pcena omnium gravissima, qua} est mors ceterna. Ad probationem respondemus, culpam quidem etiam levissimam esse majus ma¬ lum, quam sit poena quaecumque etiam gra¬ vissima. Nam culpa est malum simpliciter, et nullo modo eligibilis : poena autem est malum illi, qui punitur, non tamen simpli¬ citer, quin etiam bona et justa dici debet, et est eligibilis ad vitandum malum culpae. Sed non ideo debetur maxima poena levissi¬ ma} culpae quia pcena ex genere suo minus est malum, quam culpa. Non enim debetur culpae ex ratione justitiae maximum aliquod malum simpliciter, sed malum poenae ; quod cum malo culpae proportionem habet, ita ut gravi culpae gravis pcena, graviori gravior, gravissimae gravissima, et contra levi levis, leviori levior, levissimae levissima poena re¬ spondeat. Itaque tametsi mors potius oppe¬ tenda sit, si optio detur, quam otiosum ver¬ bum proferendum, non tamen otiosum ver¬ bum prolatum sempiterna morte vindican¬ dum erit, quo supplicio parricidia, atque adulteria, aliaque ejusdem generis crimina vindicantur. Altera objectio. Peccatum veniale infini¬ tam habet malitiam, estque infinito odio dig¬ num ; igitur infinitam poenam ex natura sua meretur. Probatur antecedens, nam non debet peccatum veniale committi ad quocl- vis bonum, etiam infinitum adipiscendum, ergo non minus est odibile peccatum ve¬ niale, quam sit amabile bonum infinitum ; bonum autem infinitum infinito amore dig¬ num est ; ergo peccatum veniale infinito odio dignum est ; habet igitur peccatum ve¬ niale infinitam malitiam, sicut bonum infini¬ tum infinitam bonitatem. Respondeo : peccatum veniale non habet malitiam infinitam, cum non avertat homi¬ nem a Deo summo, atque infinito bono. Ea enim causa est, cur peccatum mortale dica¬ tur infinitam malitiam habere, quia mutat ultimum finem, ac facit, ut homo relicto 216 LIBER I. Deo, qui vere est infinitus, in rem creatam ut in suum finem ultimum convertatur. Quod autem non oporteat peccatum veniale committere ab bonum infinitum adipiscen¬ dum, non ea est ratio, quia sit ipsum etiam malum infinitum, sed quia est simpliciter malum ; ut non possit ullo modo fieri bo¬ num, ac per hoc non sit eligibile neque me¬ dium ad ullum bonum consequendum. Tertia objectio : Peccatum veniale potest nunquam remitti : atqui peccatum, quod nunquam remittitur, semper puniri potest: igitur peccatum veniale semper puniri pot¬ est. Proinde quod temporaliter, et non in aeternum puniatur, non est ex natura ejus, sed ex misericordia Dei. Propositio hujus argumenti probatur. Nam peccatum veniale remitti non potest sine gratia Dei : quod au¬ tem ex gratia Deus facit, potest sine dubio non facere ; igitur potest veniale peccatum nunquam remittere. Et confirmari potest ar¬ gumentum ex sententia S. Thomse, qui in 1. 2. quaest. 87. art. S. scribit, peccata ve¬ nialia in hominibus ad inferos condemnatis sempiterno supplicio puniri. Respondeo : peccatum veniale potest nun¬ quam remitti, sed non oritur id ex natura ipsius peccati, sed aliunde. Possunt autem duo quaedam in peccato considerari. Primo deformitas, sive macula, quae ex peccato re¬ linquitur in anima. Secundo reatus poenae ob injuriam Deo factam. Et quidem deformi¬ tas, quam parit peccatum mortale, oritur ex amissione gratiae Dei, quae est quasi lux quaidam, et vita ipsius animae ; et quia ne¬ mo potest se ipsum a morte revocare, ideo peccatum mortale, quod tollit principium vitae, id est, gratiam, ex natura sua est quo¬ dammodo, irremissibile. Nihil enim relin¬ quit in homine, unde per se resurgere possit, sed si forte resurgit, id fit ex peculiari, et magna Dei misericordia. At peccatum ve¬ niale non excludit gratiam ■ Dei, non tollit principium vitae, sed tantum impedit aliquo modo fervorem charitatis, et ideo proprie non efficit maculam seu deformitatem in anima : quod si deformitas dicenda sit priva¬ tio illa fervoris, ea facile tolli potest per a- ctum dilectionis, qui quidem est in potestate hominis justi, et habitu charitatis praediti. Quare peccatum veniale, quod attinet ad maculam seu deformitatem, non est ex na¬ tura sua irremissibile, sed remissibile, cum relinquat in homine charitatem, ex cujus actu facile remitti potesf. Quod si in homine peccatore sit veniale peccatum, in eo irremissibile erit, donec non remittitur peccatum mortale. Sed hoc erit per accidens, nimirum ratione subjecti, quia videlicet homo ille gratia Dei et vita spirituali privatus, non potest actum ullum charitatis efficere, quo peccata venialia de¬ leat. Quod autem attinet ad reatum, pecca¬ tum mortale per se inducit reatum poen® sempiternae, sicut per se est irremissibile. Neque enim debet deformitas sempiterna sine poena sempiterna manere, ut pulchri¬ tudo, qum de operibus Dei per culpam per¬ petuo tollitur, per decorem justitiae perpetuo reparetur. Coutra autem veniale peccatum quemadmodum non est per se et ex natura sua irremissibile, ita non inducit per se et ex natura sua reatum poenae sempiternae, sed temporalis : quamvis per accidens fieri pos¬ sit, ut per omnem aeternitatem puniatur sicut per accidens fieri diximus, ut aliquando per omnem aeternitatem minime deleatur. Ex his ad formam argumenti propositi respondemus ; ac primum concedimus pec¬ catum veniale posse nunquam remitti, et semper puniri, sed per accidens, ut diximus, non per se. Ex quo etiam solvitur confirma¬ tio ex auctoritate S. Thomae. Ad illud autem, quod objiciebatur in pro¬ batione propositionis, (peccatum veniale re¬ mitti non potest sine gratia, quod autem ex gratia Deus fecit, potest non facere : igi¬ tur potest veniale peccatum nunquam re¬ mittere), respondemus, vel gratiam in ar¬ gumento sumi pro habitu gratiae in anima inhaerente ; vel pro liberali condonatione poenae. Et quidem si accipiatur pro habitu gratiae, non negamus absque gratia pecca¬ tum remitti non posse; sed eam gratiam jam habet homo justus, qui peccatum ve¬ niale purgare debet, proinde non eget nova infusione gratiae, sed satis illi erit, si ex ipsa gratia, quam habet, actum aliquem dile¬ ctionis eliciat. Si vero gratia accipiatur pro liberali condonatione poenae, fatemur posse Deum absolute non condonare, poenam, quod enim ex gratia facit, potest non facere; sed tamen cum promiserit disertis verbis in Evangelio donum remissionis, si et ipsi re¬ miserimus debitoribus nostris : Si enim re¬ miseritis hominibus (inquit Matth. vi, 14) pec¬ cata eorum, dimittet et vobis pater vester coe¬ lestis delicta vestra. Profecto si non absolute, certe ratione promissionis et pacti non pote¬ rit non remittere, si et nos remiserimus, ei- CAPUT XIV. 247 que dixerimus, ut ipse nos docuit : Dimitte nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris Itaque S. Augustinus in libro de corrept. et gratia cap. 43. dicit, in judicio misericordiam bonis meritis justo¬ rum esse reddendam. Merentur enim qui bene operantur, ut Deus misericorditer in- dulgeat, si quid manente charitate delique¬ rint. Adde postremo, quod si vellet Deus non condonare , sed omnino exigere pcenam pec¬ cati venialis ab eo, qui culpam ipsam venia¬ lem per actum dilectionis purgasset, tempo¬ ralem tantum, non autem sempiternam exi¬ gere posset.fQuocirca etiamsi nullum esset pactum Dei nobiscum de remissione poenae, adhuc tamen perspicuum esset, peccatum veniale ex natura sua non inducere reatum pcenae sempiternae. Atque hic sit hujus dis¬ putationis terminus. CONTROVERSIARUM DE AMISSIONE GRATLE SIVE DE STATU PECCATI