Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book III: On the Sin of the First Man
Chapter 8: That the first sin of Adam could not have been venial
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
By occasion of the words of St. Augustine, who writes that Adam judged he would sin venially if he violated the law of the Lord, another question is wont to be treated: namely, whether the first sin in the state of innocence could have been venial. And indeed there are not wanting those who judge it could have come to pass that the first sin of the first parents was venial. For so Scotus teaches, on 2 Sentences, distinction 21, and certain few others who follow him. But the graver theologians teach the contrary: as St. Thomas, in 1-2, question 89, article 3; Albert, St. Bonaventure, Richard, Durandus, Giles, and others, on 2 Sentences, distinction 21; and Alexander of Hales, in the Summa of Theology, part 2, question 104, number 6.
Now of this matter there is a twofold reason, of which the one is drawn from the effect, the other from the cause, and each is corroborated by the authority of St. Augustine. The former reason, then, is this: that if venial sin had place in the state of innocence, it would follow that fear and sorrow also would have place in that state. For punishment follows fault; and because venial fault does not take away the grace and friendship of God, neither would it in the state of innocence have taken away original justice, nor cast man out of the paradise of pleasure; there would then have been in paradise, and in that state of felicity, some punishment, and thereby fear and sorrow. Which is most absurd, as St. Augustine teaches, book 14 of the City of God, chapter 10.
The latter reason, which is drawn from the cause, is this. Venial sin is such either from surreption or from its own kind. Again, what is from surreption either arises from the appetite of the flesh forestalling reason, as the imperfect desire of an adulterer; or from the will itself forestalling the perfect deliberation of reason, as an imperfect motion of infidelity. But what is venial from its own kind, as an officious lie, always arises from some inordinate love or fear, and thereby from some rebellion of the lower part against the higher, or of the will itself against reason. But in the state of innocence there could be no rebellion of one part against another, nor could it come to pass that the lower appetite should forestall the will, or the will reason. For original justice effected this: that the perfect subordination of the lower part to the higher should remain; and moreover there was in man no error, no difficulty; therefore no way, no entrance lay open to sin, original justice remaining in man. But that justice could not be lost save through mortal sin: for venial sin, then, there could be no place in the state of innocence.
Hence St. Augustine, book 14 of the City of God, chapter 10: “There was in paradise,” says he, “a tranquil avoidance of sin; which remaining, no evil at all from any other quarter rushed in to sadden. Or did they perchance desire to touch the forbidden tree for eating, but feared to die — and thereby both desire and fear already then perturbed those men even in that place? Far be it that we should suppose this to have been, where there was no sin at all.” And in the same book, chapter 26: “As in paradise there was no heat or cold, so in its inhabitant no offense of the will came about from desire or fear; there was nothing at all sad, nothing emptily glad; true joy was perpetuated from God, toward whom charity blazed from a pure heart and a good conscience and an unfeigned faith; and between the spouses there was a faithful companionship from honest love, a concordant watchfulness of mind and body, and a keeping of the commandment without stain.”
The arguments which are wont to be made against this opinion are both easy and rightly solved by Cajetan in the commentary on St. Thomas, 1-2, question 89, article 3; and for that cause I have judged that they should be passed over by me.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT VIII. Primum A dami peccatum non potuisse esse veniale. Occasione verbarumS. Augustini, qui scri¬ bit Adamum existimasse se venialiter pecca¬ turum, si legem Domini violaret, tractari solet alia quaestio, videlicet : An primum peccatum in statu innocentiae potuerit esse veniale. Et quidem non desunt qui existi¬ ment fieri potuisse, ut primum peccatum primorum parentum veniale esset. Ita enim Scotus docet in 2. sentent. distin. 21 et alii quidam pauci, qui eum sequuntur. Sed gra¬ viores Theologi contrarium docent, ut S. Thora. in 1, 2. quoest. 89. art. 3. Albertus, S. Bonavent. Richardus, Durandus, .Egi- dius, et alii, in 2. sentent. distin. 21. et Ale¬ xander Alensis in Summa theologica part. 2. quaest. 104. num. 6. Hujus autem rei. Duplex est ratio, quarum altera ducitur ab effectu : altera a causa, et utraque sancti Augustini auctoritate corro¬ boratur. Prior igitur ratio est, quia si pec¬ catum veniale in statu innocentiae locum haberet, sequeretur etiam timorem, ac do¬ lorem in eo statu locum habiturum. Culpam enim sequitur pccna, et quia culpa venialis non tollit gratiam, et amicitiam Dei, neque in statu innocentiae originalem justitiam sus¬ tulisset, neque homine ex paradiso voluptatis ejecisset, fuisset utique in paradiso et in sta¬ tu illo felicitatis aliquo pceno, ac per hoc timor, et dolor. Quod esse absurdissimum, docet S. Augustinus lib. xiv. de Civit. Dei, cap. 10. Posterior ratio, quae a causa ducitur, talis est. Peccatum veniale, aut tale est ex subre¬ ptione, aut ex genere suo. Rursus quod ex subreptione est, aut oritur ex appetitu carnis praeveniente rationem, ut imperfe¬ ctum desiderium adulteri : aut ex ipsa vo¬ luntate praeveniente perfectam rationis deli¬ berationem, ut imperfectus motus infidelita¬ tis. Quod autem est veniale ex genere suo, ut mendacium officiosum, semper oritur ex aliquo inordinato amore vel timore, ac per hoc ex aliqua rebellione partis inferioris a superiore, vel ipsius voluntatis a ratione. At in statu innocentiae nulla esse poterat rebel- (1) Rom. VII, 11; Sap. VI, 3; Sap. XIV, 11; Dant. XIII, 56. CAPUT IX. 810 lio partis unius ab altera, neque fieri pote¬ rat, ut appetitus inferior voluntatem, aut vo¬ luntas rationem praeveniret. Id enim efficie¬ bat justitia originalis, ut perfecta subordina- tio maneret partis inferioris ad superiorem ; et praeterea nullus erat in homine error, nulla difficultas, ergo nulla via, nullus aditus patebat peccato, manente in homine originali justitia. Ea vero justitia nisi per mortale peccatum amitti non poterat : peccato igitur veniali nullus in statu innocentiae locus esse poterat. Hinc S. Augustinus lib. xiv. de Civit. Dei, cap. 10 : (i Erat, inquit, in paradiso devita¬ tio tranquilla peccati, qua manente nullum omnino aliunde malum, quod contristaret irruebat. An forte cupiebant prohibitum lig¬ num ad vescendum contingere, sed mori metuebant : ac per hoc et cupiditas et metus jam tunc illos homines etiam in illo pertu- babat loco ? absit ut hoc existimemus fuis¬ se, ubi nullum erat omnino peccatum ». Et in eodem lib. cap. 26 : « Sicut in paradiso nullus aestus, aut frigus, sic in ejus habita¬ tore nulla ex cupiditate vel timore accede¬ bat voluntatis offensio, nihil omnino triste, nihil erat inaniter laetum ; gaudium verum perpetuabatur ex Deo, in quem flagrabat charitas ex corde puro, et conscientia bona, et fide non ficta. Atque iiTter se conjugum fida ex honesto amore societas, concors mentis corporisque vigilia, et mandati sine labe custodia. » Argumenta, quae contra hanc sententiam fieri solent, et facilia sunt, et a Cajetano re¬ cte solvuntur in commentario S. Thom. 1,2. quaest. 89. art. 3. et ea de causa praetereun¬ da mihi esse censui.