Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book III: On the Sin of the First Man
Chapter 10: That the sin of the first man was in a certain manner the gravest of all sins, yet not absolutely
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The last question about the sin of the first man is wont to be whether it was the gravest of all sins. Now the common response of the Doctors is that it was the gravest of all sins not absolutely, but according to something. See St. Thomas, in 2-2, question 163, article 3, and the other theologians on 2 Sentences, distinction 21.
And indeed, that it was not absolutely the gravest of all sins can easily be proved. For that sin is called absolutely graver which according to its species is graver; that absolutely gravest which according to its species is gravest. But that is graver according to its species whose object is contrary to a greater good; and therefore, since nothing is to be preferred to the love of God, and no virtue is more excellent than charity, it comes about that nothing among evils is worse than the hatred of God. Now the sin of the first man was not properly hatred of God, but pride, disobedience, infidelity — which are properly opposed not to charity, but to humility, obedience, and faith.
But that according to something that sin was the gravest of all sins, St. Augustine demonstrates from a threefold head. First, from the facility of not sinning, which was greater in Adam than ever in other men. For he had one precept only, and that a most light one; he had many things to impel him to keep it — the authority of God commanding, and most grave punishments set before the transgressor; he lacked the concupiscence which would lead to sinning. But let us hear the words of Augustine, book 14 of the City of God, chapter 12: “This precept about not eating of one kind of food, where so great an abundance of others lay at hand — so light to observe, so brief to retain in memory, especially where desire did not yet resist the will (which afterwards followed from the punishment of the transgression) — was violated with so much the greater injustice, as it could be kept with the easier observance.” And in the same book, chapter 15: “For where a great punishment of disobedience was set forth, and a thing easy was commanded by the Creator, who can sufficiently explain how great an evil it is not to obey in an easy thing, both to the command of so great a power and to so great a terrifying punishment?”
The second reason is drawn from the ingratitude of the first man, who enjoyed the highest felicity in paradise. For now we have the greatest benefits from God, but partly in faith, as the benefit of the incarnation, partly in hope, as everlasting felicity — whence it comes that we know them very little; and moreover the benefits are now mingled with scourges, and the consolations with tribulations. Wherefore it is not so much to be wondered at if in this darkness and this exile many desert God and turn aside to temporal goods. But Adam had very many benefits of God, the greatest light, no tribulations, no ignorance — and yet he deserted God. “Because” (says St. Augustine, book 14 of the City of God, chapter 15) “contempt was shown to God commanding — who had created man, who had made him to his own image, who had set him over the other animals, who had established him in paradise, who had bestowed on him abundance of all things and of health — a just condemnation followed.” And book 21, chapter 12 [al. 17]: “But eternal punishment for this reason seems hard and unjust to human perceptions: because in this weakness of dying perceptions there is wanting that perception of the highest and purest wisdom by which it might be perceived how great a wickedness was committed in that first transgression. For the more man enjoyed God, with so much the greater iniquity did he forsake God; and he became worthy of eternal evil, who destroyed in himself a good which could have been eternal.”
The third reason is taken from the injury of the human race. For a sin in the same species is so much the greater, the more it harms. But there was never any sin which harmed more than the sin of Adam — seeing it delivered the universal race of men to condemnation. “Hence” (says Augustine, in the place cited) “the universal mass of the human race was condemned; since he who first committed this was punished, together with that stock which had been rooted in him.” See the same Augustine, in the Enchiridion, chapters 26 and 27.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
s CAPUT X. Peccatum primi hominis fuisse aliquo modo peccatorum omnium gravissimum , non tamen absolute. Ultima questio de peccato primi hominis esse solet, an fuerit peccatorum omnium gra¬ vissimum. Est autem communis Doctorum responsio, non absolute, sed secundum ali¬ quid omnium peccatorum fuisse gravissimum. Yide S. Thomam in 2. 2. q. 163. art. 3. et caeteros Theologos iu 2. sentent. dis¬ tinet. 21. Et quidem, quod non fuerit omnium pec¬ catorum absolute gravissimum, facile pro¬ bari potest. Illud enim peccatum absolute dicitur gravius , quod secundum speciem suam est gravius. Illud absolute gravissimum, quod secundum speciem suam est gravis¬ simum. Illud autem secundum speciem suam est gravius, cujus objectum majori bono contrarium est, et ideo cum nihil sit amori Dei praeferendum, nullaque sit virtus charitate praestantior, efficitur ut nihil sit in malis de¬ terius odio Dei. Porro peccatum primi homi¬ nis non fuit proprie odium Dei, sed superbia, inobedientia infidelitas, quae non charitati, sed humilitati, obedientiae, ac fidei proprie opponuntur. Quod autem secundum aliquid peccatum illud peccatorum omnium gravissimum fue-r rit, demonstrat S. Augustinus ex triplici ca¬ pite. Primum ex falicitate non peccandi, quae major fuit in Adam, quam in aliis hominibus unquam. Ilabuit enim praeceptum unum tan¬ tum, idque levissimum ; habuit multa, quae ad servandum impellerent, Dei jubentis au¬ ctoritatem, et gravissimas poenas transgres¬ sori propositas : caruit concupiscentia, quae ad peccandum induceret. Sed Augustini verba audiamus, lib. xiv. de civit. Dei, cap. 12 : « Hoc, inquit, de uno cibi genere non comedfendo, ubi aliorum tanta copia subjacebat, tam leve praeceptum ad obser¬ vandum, tam breve ad memoria retinendum, ubi praesertim nondum voluntati cupiditas resistebat, quod de poena transgressionis posteasubsecutumest, tanto majore injustitia violatum est, quanto faciliore posset obser¬ vantia custodiri. » Et in eodem lib. cap. 15: « Ubi enim magna est inobedentiae poena proposita, et res a creatore facilis imperata, quisnam satis explicet, quantum malum sit non obedire in re facili, et tantae potestatis imperio, et tanto terrenti supplicio ? » Altera ratio ducitur ab ingratitudine pri* mi hominis, qui summa felicitate in paradi¬ so fruebatur. Nunc enim maxima a Deo be¬ neficia habemus, sed partim in fide, ut bene¬ ficium incarnationis, partim in spe, ut sem¬ piternam felicitatem, ex quo fit, ut parum admodum illa cognoscamus : deinde admi¬ sta nunc sunt beneficia flagellis, et consola¬ tiones tribulationibus. Quocirca non est adeo mirum, si in his tenebris et in hoc exilio multi Deum deserant, et ad temporalia bona declinent. At Adam plurima habuit Dei bene¬ ficia, maximum lumen, nullas tribulationes, nullam ignorantiam, et tamen Deum deseruit : « Quia (inquit S. Augustinus lib. xiv. de Civit. Dei, cap. 15.) contempus est Deus ju¬ bens, qui hominem creaverat, qui ad suam imaginem eum fecerat, qui caeteris animali¬ bus praiposuerat, qui in paradiso constituerat, qui rerum omnium copiam, salutisque prae¬ stiterat etc., justa damnatio subsecuta est. » Et lib. xxi. cap. 17 : Sed poena aeterna ideo : » dura, et injusta sensibus videtur humanis, quia in hac infirmitate moribundorum sen¬ suum, deest ille sensus altissimae, purissi- maeque sapientiae, quo sentiri possit, quan¬ tum nefas in illa prima praevaricatione com¬ missum sit. Quanto enim magis homo frue¬ batur Deo, tanto majore iniquitate dereliquit Deum, et factus est malo dignus aeterno, qui hoc in se peremit bonum, quod esse posset aeternum. » Tertia ratio sumitur a laesione generis hu¬ mani. Peccatum enim in eadem specie tan¬ to majus est, quanto pluribus nocet. Nullum autem fuit unquam peccatum, quod pluribus LIBEK Ili. 322 noceret, quam peccatum Adae. Siquidem uni¬ versum genus bominum damnationi addixit: « Hinc est (inquit Augustinus loco citato) universa generis humani massa damnata, quoniam qui hoc primitus admisit, cum ea, quae in illo fuerat radicata, sua stirpe puni¬ tus est.» Videeumdem Augustinum in Enchi- rid. cap. 26. et 27.