Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book IV: On Original Sin
Chapter 10: Arguments drawn from reason are dissolved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book IV. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
It now remains that we briefly dissolve those arguments which are drawn from reason.
The first objection: The justice of Christ profits nothing to those who do not believe; therefore also the sin of Adam harms nothing to those who do not sin. But infants do not sin, seeing that (the Apostle being witness, Romans 9) they do nothing of good or evil; therefore the sin of Adam harms infants nothing. Augustine answers, book 3 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 2, that the justice of Christ profits nothing to those who believe in no way — that is, neither by their own will nor by another's; and in the same manner the sin of Adam harms nothing to those who have sinned in no way — that is, neither by their own nor by another's will. Now infants indeed do, or have done, nothing by their own will, as the Apostle writes, Romans 9; yet they sinned by another's will, when he sinned in whom all sinned, as the same Apostle testifies, Romans 5.
The second objection: God remits one's own sins; it is not, then, credible that others' are imputed by him. The same Augustine answers, in the same book, chapter 8, that God remits their own sins to those regenerated by the spirit, not to those generated by the flesh; and that he does not impute sins altogether others', but those which, though they be called others' because committed by another's will, yet can also be called one's own, because they cleave in those to whom they are imputed. And that original sin is rightly called both another's and one's own we have taught above more than once.
The third objection: It pertains to the notion of true sin that it be voluntary; but the sin of origin is not voluntary to the little ones, since it was (as has already been said) committed by another's will; therefore the sin of origin is not truly sin to the little ones. I answer: sin is taken in two ways. For both the evil action is called sin; and the guilt and stain which, the act passing, reside in the soul of him who sinned, are nonetheless called sin. The voluntary, then, pertains of itself to the notion of the evil action; but to the notion of the guilt and stain it pertains only by reason of their cause: for whether he will or nill who has perpetrated an evil action by free will, he contracts guilt and stain by sinning. Now in infants we posit not an evil action, but only the guilt and stain; and thereby a will of their own is not required in order that infants draw original sin from their parents, but another's suffices. And so St. Augustine, book 2 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 28, and book 1 of the Retractations, chapters 13 and 15, and in other places, when it is asked how original sin is voluntary, answers that it is voluntary by the will of the first parent. Yet because the guilt and stain flow forth from the evil action, and cannot cleave in those to whom the evil action in no way pertains, therefore St. Augustine in many places teaches that Adam, when he first sinned, bore the person of the whole human race, and that the precept about not eating the forbidden fruit bound not only Adam, but equally all who were in his loins — so that, as the grace conferred on that first man pertained to all his posterity, so also the transgression of that precept should pertain to all his posterity. “Whence” (says Augustine, book 3 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 7) “neither can that be clearly said — that the sin of Adam harmed even those not sinning — since Scripture says, In whom all have sinned. Nor are those sins so called others' as though they pertained not at all to the little ones. For in Adam all then sinned, when in his nature, by that power implanted in him whereby he could beget them, they were all still that one man; but they are called others' because they were not yet living their own lives, but whatever was to be in the future offspring the life of the one man contained.” If it move anyone why God willed that the sin of Adam should be so imputed to all his posterity as if all had wrought the same sin, we shall answer, with St. Augustine, book 5 against Julian, chapter 3, and with St. Bernard, in sermon 1 on the first Sunday after the octave of the Epiphany, that this judgment of God is just, but hidden: “Ours” (says Bernard) “is the fault of Adam, because, though in another, yet we sinned; and it was imputed to us by the just, though hidden, judgment of God.” Add that original sin, even if it is voluntary to us insofar as Adam, when he sinned, bore the person of the whole nature, yet among all sins has the least of the voluntary; and therefore it is less grave in the notion of the voluntary than any venial sin whatever, though it is in the notion of evil most grave, since it deprives man of the grace of God and of everlasting felicity. See St. Thomas, part 3, question 1, article 4; and on 2 Sentences, distinction 33, question 2, article 1, ad 2; and On Evil, question 5, article 1, in the response to the ninth.
The fourth objection: If the sin of origin were drawn from the parents through generation, wedlock would seem to be evil, seeing it would be the cause of sin. To this argument St. Augustine answered in the two books which he entitled On Marriage and Concupiscence. The sum of the solution is this: that it is not of itself from wedlock that the offspring is born with sin, but by accident. For the offspring is not born with sin because it is born from the conjunction of man and woman, which is proper to wedlock (for even in the state of innocence there would have been the conjunction of man and woman, and yet the offspring would have been born without sin); but because it befell the nature which is propagated through wedlock that it was corrupted and vitiated by the first parent. Wherefore spouses, while they beget children, do indeed propagate a corrupted and vitiated nature; but the fault of that corruption pertains not to them, but to the first man.
The fifth objection (for Julian used to say): He who is born does not sin; he who begot does not sin; he who created does not sin. Through what crevices, then, among so many safeguards of innocence, dost thou feign that sin entered? St. Augustine answered, book 2 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 28: “Why seekest thou a hidden crevice, when thou hast a most open door? By one man, says the Apostle, sin entered into this world.” And in the same book, chapter 26: “The voluntary sin of the first man is the cause of original sin.” And so, to the argument of Julian, the consequence could be denied. For although neither the father who generates, nor the son who is born, nor God who created, is the cause of original sin, yet it does not follow that there is no cause of that sin, since the Apostle says: By one man sin entered into this world.
The sixth objection: Often he who begets has been justified from sin; in what way, then, does he pass over into his son a sin which he himself has not? St. Augustine answers, book 2 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapters 25, 26, and 27, and in other places, that a man regenerated in Christ, and thereby justified, does not generate carnal offspring according to that in which he is regenerated — that is, according to the Spirit — but according to that which he has of the old state — that is, according to the flesh; and for that cause the offspring is born not holy, but a sinner. He applies similitudes in book 6 against Julian, chapters 2 [al. 5] and 3 [al. 7]: of the wild olive, which, grafted into the olive, becomes olive, and yet from its seed is born not an olive, but a wild olive; likewise of the Hebrews, who, though they are circumcised, yet beget uncircumcised sons. Another solution could be applied. For a man generates one like himself in species, not in individual — that is, he communicates to his son the things which are common to the whole human nature, not those which belong to himself as such a person. For although a father sometimes pours over some personal accidents into his son, yet this is neither necessary, nor does it always happen. Now, then, a justified man, when he begets a son, does not communicate to him justice, which is a personal accident, but nature, such as it is in himself after the sin of Adam; and that is corrupted and vitiated.
The seventh objection: If the sin of origin were drawn through generation, it would certainly be a natural vice; but this is very absurd — both because it would have to be attributed to God, the author of nature, to whom all natural things are attributed; and because what is natural cannot properly be sin; and finally, because deliverance from the sin would have to be despaired of. I answer that the sin of origin can in some manner be called natural, according to that of the Apostle, Ephesians 2: We were by nature children of wrath; for it is both drawn from birth, and is a vice of the nature rather than of the person, as we said above. Yet it is not natural as though it were a part of nature, or had proceeded from nature; for it is a certain privation and defect, and that flowed not from nature, but from the free will of the first man. From which it follows, first, that it must be referred not to God, but to the disobedience of Adam, as to its proper cause. It follows next that it can properly be called sin; for those natural vices cannot properly be called sins which are not referred to the liberty of choice — such as blindness, deafness, and any monstrosity contracted from birth. It follows last that the deliverance from this sin is not to be despaired of. For that this disease be cured, nature is not to be destroyed, but perfected — which that heavenly physician can easily do, who came to seek and to save that which had perished. And so St. Augustine, book 2 against Julian, chapter 1 [al. 9]: “Nor is the perfection of virtue to be despaired of, through the grace of him who can change and heal the nature vitiated from its origin.”
The eighth objection: Sin is defined as something said, or done, or thought against the eternal law. But infants can neither say, nor do, nor think anything. I answer that by those words is defined sin as it is taken for the act of sin, not for the guilt and stain which remain when the act has passed. Now in infants we say there is not the act of sin, but the guilt and stain, as we taught above.
The ninth objection: If men are born evil, and subjected to the power of the devil, then the devil seems to be their creator. For God would not create those whom he would subject to the power of the devil. I answer that, as to men being born evil and subjected to the power of the devil, the cause is not in the creator of nature, but in its corrupter. For God both at the beginning created nature good, and now propagates what is good in it; but the vice befell it from the sin of the first man, and it is the vice which subjected it to the unclean spirit. “We” (says Augustine, book 3 [al. 2] against Julian, chapter 2 [al. 10]) “say that not the devil, but the true and truly good God, is the creator of men, working ineffably clean things from unclean — although no man is born clean, and therefore, until he be cleansed by the Holy Spirit, is compelled to be under the unclean spirit.”
The tenth objection: Sin has its seat not in the flesh, but in the soul; but the soul is not drawn from Adam — or, if it is drawn, it is drawn not by propagation, but by imitation. This argument always seemed to Augustine most difficult, and almost insoluble; for which cause also he could never certainly persuade himself that souls are created from nothing, and not drawn from the parents. And since there are not wanting in our time those who judge that one must stick in that doubt of St. Augustine, we have therefore resolved, in the following chapter, to explain the question of the origin of the soul a little more plainly, and then at last to discourse of the manner in which sin is transmitted, and to respond to the objection proposed.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT X. Diluuntur argumenta ducta ex ratione. Hestat nunc ut argumenta illa breviter di¬ luamus, quae ducuntur ex ratione. Prima objectio. Christi justitia non creden¬ tibus nihil prodest, igitur et peccatum Adami non peccantibus nihil obest : infantes autem non peccant, quippe qui (Apostolo teste) ad Roman. ix : Nihil boni vel mali agunt (I) ; igitur peccatum Adami infantibus nihi obest. Respondet Augustinus lib. iii de peccat, me- rit. et remiss. cap. 2. Christi justitiam nihil prodesse iis, qui nullo modo, hoc est, nec sua voluntate, nec aliena credunt, et ad eumdem modum peccatum Adami nihil abes¬ se iis, qui nullo modo, hoc est, nec sua, nec aliena voluntate peccarunt. Porro infantes nihil quidem agere , vel egisse voluntate propria, ut Apostolus scribit ad Roman. ix. tamen aliena volvntate peccasse , cum ille peccavit , in quo omnes peccaverunt , ut idem Apostolus testatur ad Roman. v. Secunda objectio. Deus remittit peccata propria ; non igitur credibile est ab eo im¬ putari aliena. Respondet idem Augustinus in eodem lib. cap. vm, Deum remittere peccata propria spiritu regeneratis, non carne gene¬ ratis : nec imputare peccata omnino aliena, sed ea, quae tametsi aliena dicantur, quia aliena voluntate commissa sunt, tamen etiam propria dici possunt, quia in iis haerent; quibus imputantur. Sic autem originale pec¬ catum et alienum et proprium recte dici, su¬ pra non semel docuimus. Tertia objectio. Ad rationem veri peccati pertinet, ut sit voluntarium : atqui peccatum originis non est voluntarium parvulis, cum sit (ut jam dictum est) aliena voluntate com¬ missum ; igitur peccatum originis parvulis non est vere peccatum. Respondeo : pecca¬ tum bifariam sumitur. Nam et actio mala dicitur peccatum ; et reatus, ac macula, qua? transeunte actu resident in anima ejus, qui peccavit, peccatum nihilominus appellantur. Voluntarium igitur ad rationem actionis ma¬ lae per se pertinet, ad rationem autem reatus et maculae pertinet, nisi ratione causae suae, sive enim velit, sive nolit, qui actionem ma¬ lam voluntate libera perpetravit, reatum et maculam peccando contrahit. Porro in in¬ fantibus1 non actionem malam, sed reatum dumtaxat, et maculam ponimus, ac per hoc non requiritur voluntas propria, ut infantes peccatum originale a parentibus trahant, sed sufficit aliena. Itaque S. Augustinus lib. ii. de nuptiis et concupiscentia cap. 28. et lib. i retract. c. 13. et 15. et aliis in locis, cum quaeritur, quemadmodum peccatum originale sit vo¬ luntarium, respondet, esse voluntarium vo¬ luntate primi parentis. Quia tamen reatus, et macula ex mala actione dimanant, neo possunt in iis haerere, ad quos actio mala nullo modo pertinet, ideo S. August. multis in locis docet, Adamum, cum primum pecca¬ vit, totius humani generis gessisse personam, (1) Roiu. IX, U. LIBER IV. 338. et pr®ceptum de pomo vetito non edendo, non solum Adamum, sed omnes, qui in lum¬ bis ejus erant, pariter obligasse, ut sicut gratia primo illi homini collata, ad omnes posteros pertinebat, ita etiam praecepti illius transgressio ad omnes posteros pertineret : « Unde (inquit Augustinus lib. m. de pecca¬ torum meritis [et remissione cap. 7.) nec illud liquide dici potest, quod peccatum Ad® etiam non peccantibus nocuit, cum Scri¬ ptura dicat, In quo omnes peccaverunt. Nec sic dicuntur ista aliena peccata, tamquam omnino ad parvulos non pertineant. Siqui¬ dem in Adam omnes tunc peccaverunt, quando in ejus natura illa insita in qua eos gignere poterat, adhuc omnes ille unus fue¬ runt, sed dicuntur aliena, quia nondum ipsi agebant vitas proprias, sed quidquid erat in futura propagine, vita unius hominis con¬ tinebat. » Si quem moveat, cur Deus voluerit, ut peccatum Adami ita posteris omnibus impu¬ taretur, ac si omnes idem peccatum patra¬ vissent, respondebimus cum S. Augustino lib. v. adversus Julianum cap. 3. et cum S. Bernardo in serm. 1. de Domin. 1. post oc¬ tavas Epiphani®, judicium hoc Dei justum esse , sed occultum : « Nostra est (inquit Bernardus) Adami culpa, quia etsi in alio, nos tamen peccavimus ; et nobis justo Dei judicio imputabatur, lic et occulto. » Adde quod originale peccatum, et si voluntarium nobis est, quatenus Adam cum peccavit, to¬ tius natura; personam gessit* tamen inter omnia peccata minimum habet de volunta¬ rio, et ideo minus grave est in ratione vo¬ luntarii, quam quodlibet veniale, quamvis sit in ratione mali gravissimum, cum privet hominem gratia Dei, ac sempiterna felicita¬ te. Vide S. Thomam 3. par. qu®st. 1 art. 4. et in 2. Sentent. distinet. 33. qusest. 2. art. 1. ad 2 et de malo, qu®st. 5. art. 1. in re¬ sponsione ad 9. Quarta objectio. Si peccatum originis per generationem a parentibus traheretur, vide¬ retur malum esse conjugium, quippe quod esset causa peccati. Respondit ad hoc argu¬ mentum sanctus Augustinus duobus libris, quos inscripsit de nuptiis et concupiscentia. Summa solutionis hsec est, non esse per se ex coiljugio, quod proles nascatur cum pec¬ cato, sed per accidens. Non enim ideo proles cum peccato nascitur, quia ex conjunctione viri et foemin® nascitur, quod est proprium conjugii (nam etiam in statu innocentia; fuis¬ set conjunctio viri et fremin®, et tamen pro¬ les sine peccato nata fuisset) : sed quia acci¬ dit natur®, qu® per conjugium propagatur, ut a primo parente corrupta ac vitiata fue¬ rit, quare conjuges, dum filios gignunt, natu¬ ram quidem corruptam ac vitiatam propa¬ gant : sed ejus corruptionis -culpa non ad ipsos, sed ad primum hominem pertinet. Quinta objectio. Non peccat (dicebat enim Julianus) iste qui nascitur, non peccat ille qui genuit, non peccat ille qui condidit. Per quas ergo rimas inter tot pr®sidia innocen¬ ti® peccatum fingis ingressum? Respondit sanctus Augustinus lib. ii. de nuptiis et con¬ cupiscentia cap. 28 : « Quid qu®ris, inquit, latentem rimam, cum habeas apertissimam januam ? Per unum hominem, ait Apostolus, peccatum in hunc mundum intravit. » Et in eodem libro cap. 26 : « Voluntarium pecca¬ tum hominis primi originalis est causa pec¬ cati. » Itaque ad argumentum Juliani ne¬ gari poterat consecutio. Quamvis enim non sit peccati originalis causa pater, qui gene¬ rat, nec filius, qui nascitur, nec Deus, qui condidit : tamen non sequitur, nullam esse causam ejus peccati, cum Apostolus dicat : Per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit. • Sexta objectio. Sffipe qui gignit, a peccato justificatus est, quo pacto igitur trajicit pec¬ catum in filium, quod ipse non habet ? Re¬ spondet S. Augustinus lib. ii. de peccatorum meritis et remissione c. 23. 26. et 27. et in aliis locis, hominem regeneratum in Christo, ac per hoc justificatura, non generare, car¬ nalem prolem secundum id, quod est rege¬ neratus, id est, secundum Spiritum, sed se¬ cundum id, quod habet de vetustate, id est, secundum carnetn : et ea de causa prolem non sanctam, sed peccatricem nasci. Adhi¬ bet similitudines lib. vi. in Julianum cap. 2. et 3, oleastri, qui insertus in oleam, fit olea, et tamen ex ejus semine non olea nascitur, sed oleaster. Item Hebr®orum, qui circum¬ cisi cum sint, filios tamen gignunt incircum- cisos. Posset adhiberi alia solutio. Generat enim homo sibi similem in specie, non in indivi¬ duo, hoc est, communicat cum filio qu® toti natur® human® communia sunt, non ea qu® sibi ut tali person® conveniunt. Tam¬ etsi enim aliqua accidentia personalia trans¬ fundat aliquando pater in filium, tamen id neque necessarium est, nec semper fit. Jam igitur homo justificatus, cum filium gignit, cAPrr xt. non ooraraunicat cum eo justitiam, quae est accidens personale, sed naturam, qualis est in se post Adae peccatum; ea vero corrupta et vitiata est. Septima objectio. Si peccatum originis traheretur per generationem, certe naturale vitium esset : atqui hoc est valde absurdum, tum quia Deo naturae auctori tribuendum esset, cui tribuuntur omnia naturalia ; tum quia quod naturale est, proprie peccatum esse non potest ; tum demum, quia despe¬ randa esset liberatio a peccato. Respondeo, peccatum originis aliquo modo naturale dici posse juxta illud Apostoli ad Ephes. ii : Era¬ mus natura filii irae (i); nam et a nativitate trahitur, et est vitium naturae potius quam personae, ut upra diximus : non tamen est naturale, quasi sit pars naturae, aut ex natu¬ ra produxerit. Est enim privatio quaedam et defectus, isque non ex natura, sed ex libera primi hominis voluntate manavit. Ex quo sequitur primo, ut non in Deum, sed in Adami inobedientiam, ut in propriam causam relerri debeat. Sequitur deinde, ut peccatum proprie dici possit : illa enim na¬ turalia vitia, peccata proprie dici nequeunt, quae in libertatem arbitrii non referuntur, qualia sunt caecitas, surditas, et quaevis monstrositas a nativitate contracta. Sequi¬ tur postremo, non esse desperandam hujus peccati liberationem. Non enim ut hic mor¬ bus curetur, destruenda natura, sed perfi¬ cienda, quod facile potest medicus ille coele¬ stis, qui venit quaerere, et salvum facere quod perierat. Itaque S. Augustinus lib. ii. in Julianum cap. 1 : « Nec perfectio, inquit, est desperanda virtutis, per ejus gratiam, qui ex origine vitiatam mutare potest, et sanare naturam. » Octava objectio. Peccatum definitur, di¬ ctum, vel factum, vel cogitatum contra le¬ gem alternam. At infantes nec dicere, nec facere, nec cogitare aliquid possunt. Re¬ spondeo, definiri per ea verba peccatum, ut accipitur pro actu peccati, non autem pro reatu et macula, quae remanent transeunto actu. Porro in infantibus non actum pecca¬ ti, sed reatum et maculam inesse dicimus ut supra docuimus. Nona objectio. Si nascuntur homines mali, et dibaoli potestati subjecti , igitur videtur diabolus conditor eorum. Nec enim Deus conderet, quos diaboli potestati subji¬ m ceret. Respondeo, quod homines nascantur mali, et diaboli potestati subjecti, non esse causam in conditore naturae, sed in corru¬ ptore, Deus enim, et initio naturam bonam condidit, et nunc quod in ea bonum est, propagat ; porro vitium accidit illi ex pec¬ cato primi hominis, et ipsum est vitium, quod eam spiritui immundo subjecit : « Nos (inquitAugustinuslib.il. in Julianum cap. 2.) dicimus, non diabolum, sed Deum ve¬ rum, et vere bonum esse hominum condito¬ rem, munda de immundis ineflabiliter ope¬ rantem, quamvis hominum nemo mundus nascatur, et ideo donec mundetur Spiritu sancto, sub spiritu immundo esse coga¬ tur. » Decima objectio. Peccatum non in carne, sed in anima sedem habet : sed anima non trahitur ex Adamo, aut si trahitur, non pro¬ pagatione, sed imitatione trahitur. Hoc argumentum semper Augustino dif¬ ficillimum, ac pene insolubile visum est. Qua etiam de causa nunquam certo sibi persuadere potuit, animas creari ex nihilo, non a parentibus trahi. Et quoniam non desunt tempore, qui in ea S. Augustini du¬ bitatione haerendum esse censeant, ideo in sequenti capite, quaestionem de animae ori¬ gine paulo planius explicare, et tunc demum de modo, quo peccatum traducitur, disse¬ rere, et ad objectionem propositam respon* dere decrevimus.