Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book V: The Nature of Original Sin
Chapter 7: The third error, which is common among the Lutherans, is refuted from the Scriptures
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
It follows that we confute, by the testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers, the error of the Lutherans and Calvinists set forth in chapter 5. We assert, then, that the corruption of nature, or concupiscence, such as remains after Baptism in the regenerated, is not the sin of origin — not only because it is not imputed, but also because it cannot be imputed, since it is no sin of itself, or from its nature.
The first argument for confirming this opinion can be drawn from those words of St. James, chapter 1: Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured. Then when concupiscence hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin. But sin, when it is completed, begetteth death. For here we see four things distinguished by the Apostle: concupiscence — that is, the power of desiring, prone to evil — and its three motions: suggestion, delectation, and consent. For so the theologians name those motions, after Gregory, homily 16 on the Gospels, and Bede, in the commentary on this place. Suggestion is that first apprehension of the delightful thing, which draws away and allures the soul; and if it draw to delectation with some imperfect consent, the second motion follows, of which James says: Concupiscence, when it hath conceived — that is, when it hath allured — bringeth forth sin. Finally, if the suggestion, delectation being adjoined, draw to perfect consent, the third motion exists, of which the Apostle says: But sin, when it is completed, begetteth death. For by completed sin is not to be understood only the sin of work, but whatever sin to which the full assent of the will has come. For it cannot be doubted that the desire of an adulterer, if it be voluntary, begets death, since the Lord says, Matthew 5: Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart. And the reasoning is the same of other like things. Now, then, concupiscence — that is, the prone power — and its first motion blessed James does not call sin; the imperfect birth — that is, delectation not fully deliberated — he calls sin, but not mortal; finally, the perfect birth — that is, desire with full consent — he defines to be plainly mortal sin. Calvin, book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 3, §12, and Beza, in the annotations on this place, answer that blessed James, in those words “bringeth forth sin,” speaks of the sins of works, or actual sins; but that it does not follow that concupiscence, or to lust, is no sin, though it be not a sin of work, or actual. But against this their explication fight, first, the words following: But sin, when it is completed, begetteth death. For the sin of work is ordinarily wont to be fully deliberated, and is called completed by all. Why, then, did blessed James distinguish the sin of work from completed sin, saying: But sin, when it is completed, begetteth death? Calvin answers that with James completed sin is called the whole course of the sinful man, which being finished, nothing remains but the punishment of eternal death. But James speaks not of the whole course of the sinner — that is, of all his sins together — but of single sins, as is plain from those words: Let no man, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God. For here without doubt he speaks of a particular temptation, which exists in a man at a definite time; for that is what the “when” signifies. And of this same he speaks when he subjoins: But every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured. For St. James commands that, when some temptation rises, no one refer it to God, but to his own flesh. And of that very particular temptation he subjoins that it brings forth sin; and of that same sin he affirms that, when it is completed, it begets death. But since it is agreed well enough that not every sin, however perfect and completed, straightway and in very deed leads through to the eternal death which is in the other life, it follows that the Apostle speaks of the death of the soul which happens in this life, when the soul is bereft of the grace of the Lord. The sin, then, that begets death is any mortal sin whatever, whether it be of work, or of tongue, or of desire. Next, there is no reason why Calvin should will “sin,” put absolutely — when it is said, Concupiscence, when it hath conceived, bringeth forth sin — to be restricted to the sin of work. For since the sin of the mouth, as blasphemy or perjury, and of the heart, as the voluntary desire of another's wife, is no less sin, nor less forbidden in the Decalogue, than theft or another sin of work, by what right could the word sin, put absolutely, be restricted to the sin of work alone? The sin, then, which concupiscence brings forth is every actual sin, whether of heart, or of mouth, or of work; but that, if it have the full consent of the will, is called completed and mortal; if not, it is named imperfect and venial. They will say, perhaps: if the sin which concupiscence brings forth is actual sin, what hinders that concupiscence itself also be true sin — if not actual, at least original? But when the adversaries say that concupiscence is sin, they speak either of its first motion, which by the Fathers is called suggestion, or of the proneness of the concupiscible power to evil. If they speak of the suggestion, that cannot be called original sin, because it is a certain action, and hence, if it were sin, it would be actual; and we have already shown that it is not actual sin. If they speak of the proneness, by the same reasoning it is proved that it is no sin. For if that proneness were sin, whether actual or original, it would be so, forsooth, because it seems to fight with the law of God, as the adversaries say — and especially Calvin, book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 3, §10, and Chemnitz, in the Examination of session 5 of the Council of Trent, page 454. But if the proneness were sin because it seems to fight with the law of God, much more would its act, though altogether involuntary, be sin, since the act fights more with the law than the proneness to the act. But we have from the doctrine of the Apostle that an act of concupiscence altogether involuntary is no sin, as we showed above; it is effected, then, that concupiscence itself — that is, the proneness to the evil act — is no sin at all. And this our explication is confirmed by testimonies on the Apostle's words from Augustine, Cyril, and Bede — to omit the other Fathers meanwhile. St. Augustine, book 6 against Julian, chapter 5 [al. 3]: “But when the Apostle James says: Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured; then concupiscence, when it hath conceived, bringeth forth sin — assuredly in these words the offspring is discerned from her who bears. For she who bears is concupiscence; the offspring is sin. But concupiscence does not bear unless she has conceived; she does not conceive unless she has allured — that is, unless she has obtained the assent of the will to perpetrating the evil.” St. Cyril, book 4 on John, chapter 51: “A certain pleasure runs before every sin, and fervent cupidity is wont to allure to offences; which sits before the act of sinning, and seizes the consent of the mind, persuading that by this way one must easily come whither we hanker. Which the true disciple of Christ shows, saying: Let no one who is tempted say that he is tempted by God; for God tempts no one, but every one is tempted, drawn away and seduced by his own cupidity. Then cupidity, after it has conceived, brings forth sin; and the completion begets death.” Certainly, if a certain pleasure runs before every sin, and if the cupidity that allures to evil sits before the act of sinning, then the titillation and incitement itself, even joined with delectation, is not sin of the true name, unless in some manner it obtain the consent of the mind. But if the titillation, which is a certain act, is not sin, much less can the proneness to that act be sin. Bede, in the commentary on this place, distinguishes suggestion from delectation, and delectation from consent; and says that suggestion alone, unless it draw to delectation, not only does not bring forth sin, but contrariwise brings forth the crown of life, according to the word of the same Apostle in the same place: “Blessed is the man that endureth temptation; for when he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life.”
The second principal argument is taken from chapter 7 of the epistle to the Romans, where blessed Paul speaks thus: “Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. For I know that there dwelleth not in me — that is to say, in my flesh — that which is good.” For by these words the Apostle teaches openly enough that concupiscence in a justified man is not properly sin, which could make him guilty. For first he says that the motion of concupiscence is not his own work, and thereby cannot be imputed to him. For by what right could that be imputed to me which is not mine? Then he adds that such an evil is not in himself, but in his flesh; and it is agreed that the flesh is not capable of sin properly so called. But against this Calvin objects, book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 1, §9, and chapter 2, last section, and Beza, in the annotations on chapter 7 of the epistle to the Romans, that in this seventh chapter flesh is taken for the whole man, such as he is according to corrupted nature. Which Beza proves, in the annotations on this place, because blessed Paul numbers the mind among the most corrupted parts, 1 Timothy 6 and elsewhere, and in Ephesians 4 commands the spirit of our mind to be renewed. I answer: in many places of the divine Scripture, without doubt, by flesh are understood all the powers, both lower and higher, corrupted through sin; whence also we see, in Galatians 5, heresies numbered among the works of the flesh. And so we do not deny that the mind also was corrupted through sin. But in chapter 7 to the Romans we deny that flesh is taken for the whole man, and we assert that it is taken for the one part only, which embraces the lower powers. For first, if by flesh were understood the whole man, Paul would not truly say: It is not I that do it. For how does he himself not do what his flesh and his mind — that is, his whole self — does? But if, reason resisting, which is the chief part of man, the lower part alone works, it can truly be said: It is not I that do it. Next, when the Apostle says: “I know that there dwelleth not in me — that is, in my flesh — that which is good” — to what purpose is that correction, “in me, that is, in my flesh,” if that evil of which he speaks is in the whole man? Third, does not the Apostle in express words distinguish the flesh from the mind — that is, one part of man from the other — when he says: “I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind”? and: “I myself, with the mind serve the law of God; but with the flesh, the law of sin”? But (says Beza) the mind is not considered by the Apostle simply, as the adversaries do, but as it is opposed to the members, because it consents to the law of God, which happens in the regenerated alone. And so he will have “mind” taken in this place for the mind renewed through grace, which is opposed to the members — that is, to the whole man, such as he is of himself, or from the corruption of nature; and he proves it because in Colossians 2, where we read, “puffed up by the sense of his flesh,” in Greek for “sense” there is “nous,” that is, mind; and in Romans 8 the same mind of the flesh is called the prudence of the flesh. But this objection concludes nothing. For we admit that the mind is considered by Paul as renewed through grace, and we consider it in the same way; but we deny that it is opposed to the whole man. For the consequence is that he opposes the renewed mind to the part not renewed — that is, to the flesh, whose redemption we still await. And it is confirmed, fourth, because what the Apostle here said — that the evil is in his flesh — he said more clearly in Romans 6, that that evil is in the mortal body; and in this very chapter 7: Who shall deliver me from the body of this death? But by the mortal body it is certain that all the parts of man cannot be understood, but the one only. Fifth, because what he says — with the mind I serve the law of God — he had said a little before: I am delighted with the law of God, according to the inward man. And we understand from chapter 4 of the later epistle to the Corinthians that the outward man is the corruptible body, and the inward is the rational soul: But though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day. Sixth, because, although flesh is sometimes taken for the whole man, yet when “flesh” is said in the evil sense, this word is not employed in the Scriptures except when the impious are treated of, whose mind obeys the flesh: as Genesis 6, My spirit shall not remain in man… because he is flesh; John 3, That which is born of the flesh, is flesh; Galatians 5, The works of the flesh are fornication, etc.; 1 Corinthians 15, Flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God. And in those places also which Beza had cited, where mind or prudence is attributed to the flesh, the impious are treated of. But the justified, because they strongly resist the desires of the flesh, are not only not called flesh, but are even said not to be in the flesh, as is plain from chapter 8 to the Romans. Wherefore, since in the whole of chapter 7 the Apostle speaks of himself and of others justified, without doubt by flesh he understands not the whole man, but only the lower part of man. Let the authority of St. Augustine come to this, who everywhere so expounds these places, and especially in book 1 against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, chapter 10, and in the whole first book On Marriage and Concupiscence, in which book, chapter 6, he speaks thus: “There man, the law of God being first transgressed, began to have in his members another law fighting against his mind, and felt the evil of his own disobedience, when he found the disobedience of his own flesh most deservedly paid back to himself.” Add lastly that, even if we were compelled to understand by the name of flesh all the powers of the soul, even in Romans 7, yet it would altogether have to be said that the name of flesh in the justified does not pertain to the will or mind, except as to certain first undeliberated motions. For the Apostle most openly opposes the consent of the will to the desires of the flesh. And so even in this way concupiscence would have its seat only in a part of the soul which is not capable of sin properly so called. For neither the lower part, nor the higher as it forestalls with its motion the judgment of reason, is capable of sin properly so called. For there only can there be sin properly so called, where there can be justice properly so called; but justice properly so called cannot be in the lower part, nor in the higher as it forestalls the judgment of reason; therefore neither sin properly so called.
The third argument can be drawn from the testimony of blessed Paul in the epistle to the Romans, chapter 8, where he speaks thus: There is now therefore no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus. In which place, when in chapters 6 and 7 he had said many things about concupiscence, which he had called now sin by metonymy, now the law of the members, he at length concludes that nothing is to be feared by those justified in Christ, even if they still feel that concupiscence in their members, fighting against the law of the mind. Nor does he so much signify that there is no condemnation to the justified in Christ on account of concupiscence, as that there is nothing in them worthy of condemnation, or that there is no cause of condemnation. For that they were not yet actually and in very deed condemned was plain, because the sentence of damnation is not passed until after this life. We have, then, from this place that concupiscence, such as remains in the reborn, is not sin from its nature. The adversaries commonly answer — Luther, Calvin, Chemnitz, and the rest — that the Apostle said that there is no condemnation to the reborn on account of concupiscence, not because it is not worthy of condemnation, but because God remitted its guilt in Baptism. But this response is not solid, for many causes. For first, if the adversaries truly believed that the guilt is remitted in Baptism, they would consequently have to confess that there is nothing in the reborn which has the true notion of sin. For the guilt, both by the testimony of St. Augustine and by their own confession, is that which is properly called sin. For thus speaks St. Augustine, book 1 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 26: “This it is not to have sin — not to be guilty of sin.” And Philip, in the Commonplaces, as we cited above, under the title On Sin, taught that the formal element of sin is the guilt. Which same thing Calvin indicates, book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 3, §11, when he says that, the guilt being remitted, the matter of sin remains in the man. But certainly, the form of a thing being taken away, the notion or nature of that thing does not remain, since the form is the chief part of the nature — nay, is the very notion and quiddity of the thing. Next, the guilt is altogether inseparable from that which by its nature is worthy of eternal damnation, such as the adversaries will have concupiscence to be. For the guilt, which by Augustine is called sin, and by Philip the formal element of sin, is not the mere ordination to punishment — for that is good, and from God — but is the worthiness or desert of punishment, as St. Augustine calls it: “No one is born” (says he, on Psalm 50) “without drawing punishment, and drawing the desert of punishment.” Further, that guilt, as Philip rightly teaches in the place noted, is a relation, whose proximate foundation is the evil act, or the iniquity. But a relation cannot be separated from its proximate foundation, because it follows naturally and necessarily from the foundation itself. For it cannot be that he who has begotten a son should not be his father, and that he who has been begotten by another should not be his son; because, the generation being posited, which is the foundation, there necessarily follows in the begetter paternity, in the begotten sonship. In the same way, because the crime — for example, of homicide — is the foundation of the guilt, it cannot be that he who has committed homicide should not be guilty — that is, worthy of punishment — even if perchance the judge will not punish him; and then especially can the guilt not be separated from the crime, when the act or desire of homicide still remains. Now, then, if concupiscence, even in the reborn, were by its nature a thing worthy of everlasting death, as the adversaries commonly teach, and (as Philip confesses) the proximate foundation of that relation which is called guilt, certainly the guilt could in no way be severed from it. For how can the guilt — that is, the worthiness and desert of punishment — be separated from that thing which by its nature is worthy of punishment and deserves punishment? Therefore, if blessed Paul by condemnation understands the guilt, it evidently follows that either the testimony of the Apostle is false, or that is true which we say: that concupiscence in the reborn is not by its nature a thing worthy of punishment, nor has the true and proper notion of sin. Third, even if we conceded that it could be that concupiscence were a thing worthy of everlasting death, and yet the guilt were taken from it, still it is certain from the divine Scriptures that God never remits the guilt while its foundation remains. For the judgment of God is according to truth, Romans 2. And: Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity: thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie, Psalm 5. And: To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike, Wisdom 14. Finally, Ezechiel 18, God demonstrates that his ways are equal, because, the iniquity remaining, he punishes; it being removed, he pardons. Wherefore, if in very truth concupiscence in the reborn (as the adversaries would have it) were an iniquity worthy of everlasting death, the Apostle would never have said: There is now therefore no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus. For he would not so quickly have forgotten what he had said before — that the judgment of God is according to truth. Fourth, that particle “therefore,” when the Apostle says, There is now therefore no condemnation, etc., signifies that that sentence is deduced from the preceding words. But in the preceding words blessed Paul had not said that God does not impute concupiscence, or condones its guilt; but he had shown that the involuntary motions of concupiscence are not sins, and cannot be imputed to a man. For that (as we said above) is what that of Romans 7 signifies: “For the good which I will, I do not; but the evil which I hate, that I do. And if I do that evil which I hate, it is no more I that work it, but sin that dwelleth in me.” For if it can truly be said (as without doubt it can) of an involuntary motion of concupiscence, “It is not I that work it,” assuredly such a motion cannot be imputed to us, seeing we are not its authors — it is done in us, but not by us. And if that motion cannot be imputed to us, much less (as we said above) can the proneness to that motion be imputed to us. Since, then, through Baptism we have not only the remission of all sins, but also grace by which we may strongly and stoutly resist the law of the flesh, and therefore concupiscence in the reborn has not the notion of fault, but only of punishment and sickness — therefore blessed Paul says: There is now therefore no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus; and he subjoins a reason like the former: Who, says he, walk not according to the flesh. From these things is rejected also the response of Illyricus, who, when he saw that what Luther, Philip, and Calvin had said about the remitted guilt was not smoke enough, added another response in the Apology for the Antwerp Confession, chapter 3: namely, that there is no condemnation to those who are in Christ, not simply and of itself, but by accident — there coming to it, namely, the assiduous petition of the remission of sins, both actual and of concupiscence itself. Which response of Illyricus is most absurd. For neither ought the reborn to pray for the remission of concupiscence, as St. Augustine in express words teaches, book 1, chapter 13, against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians; in epistle 200 to Asellicus; and in the book On the Perfection of Justice; nor can it be admitted without impiety that the sentence of the Apostle is not true simply and of itself, but only by accident — for thence it would follow that simply and of itself it is false.
The fourth principal argument is taken from those testimonies of the Scriptures which teach that through Baptism there is made a true remission of sins — so that not only is the debt of punishment condoned, but the stains also are washed away, purged, blotted out, taken away, etc. But since we treated this whole argument at length in the second tome, On the Sacraments, book 1 On Baptism, chapter 13, we have therefore judged it superfluous to repeat it in this place.
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CAPUT VII. Refutatur ex Scripturis tertius error, qui est apud Lutheranos communis. Sequitur, ut errorem Lutheranorum et Calvinistarum 5. cap. expositum, Scripturae et Patrum testimoniis confutemus. Asserimus igitur, naturae corruptionem, sive concupiscentiam, qualis remanet post Baptismum in regeneratis, non esse pccca- tum originis, non solum quia non imputatur, '»05 sed etiam quia imputari non potest, cum nul¬ lum sit ex se, vel ex natura sua peccatum. Primum argumentum ad hanc sententiam confirmandam duci potest ab illis verbis S. Jacobi, cap. r : Unusquisque tentatur a con¬ cupiscentia sua abstractus, et illectus. Deinde concupiscentia cum conceperit, pant peccatum ; peccatum vero cum consummatum fuerit gene¬ rat mortem (I). Hic enim quatuor res distin¬ gui videmus ab Apostolo, Concupiscentiam, id est, potentiam appetendi pronam ad ma¬ lum, et tres ejus motus, suggestionem, de¬ lectationem, et consensum. Sic enim eos motus appellant Theologi post Gregorium homil. 16. in Evangelia, et Bedam in com¬ mentario hujus loci. Suggestio est prima illa apprehensio rei delectabilis, quae abstrahit, et illicit animam, et siquidem trahat ad delectationem cum ali¬ quo imperfecto consensu, sequitur secundus motus, de quo dicit Jacobus : Concupiscen¬ tia, cum conceperit, id est, cum illexerit, parit peccatum. Denique si suggestio adjun¬ cta delectatione, trahat ad perfectum con¬ sensum, existit tertius motus, de quo dicit Apostolus : Peccatum vero cum consumma¬ tum fuerit, generat mortem. Non enim per consummatum peccatum intelligi debet so¬ lum peccatum operis, sed quodeumque pec¬ catum, cui plenus accesserit voluntatis as¬ sensus. Nam dubitari non potest, quin desi¬ derium adulteri, si voluntarium sit, generet mortem, cum Dominus dicat Matth. v : Qui viderit mulierem ad concupiscendam eam, jam moechatus est eam in corde suo. Et eadem est ratio de aliis similibus. Jam igitur concupiscentiam, id est, poten¬ tiam, pronam, et primum ejus motum non appellat B. Jacobus peccatum. Partum im¬ perfectum, hoc est, delectationem non plene deliberatam, peccatum vocat, sed non mor¬ tale; denique partum perfectum, hoc est, desiderium cum pleno consensu, peccatum plane mortale esse definit. Calvinus lib. m. Instit. cap. 3. §. 13. et Beza in annotationibus ad hunc locum re¬ spondent, beatum Jacobum illis verbis, parit peccatum, loqui de peccatis operum, sive actualibus : non autem sequi, ut concupi¬ scentia, sive concupiscere nullum sit pecca¬ tum, quamvis peccatum operis, vel actuale non sit. At contra hanc eorum explicationem pu¬ ti) Jacob. I, \A. - (2) Mattb. V, 28. m liber V. gnant primum verba sequentia : Peccatum vero cum consummatum fuerit, generat mor¬ tem. Nam peccatum operis, ordinarie plene deliberatum esse solet, et consummatum ab omnibus dicitur. Cur ergo beatus Jacobus peccatum operis distinxit a peccato consum¬ mato, dicens : Peccatum autem cnm consum¬ matum fuerit , generat mortem ? Respondet Calvinus, peccatum consum¬ matum apud Jacobum dici totum cursum hominis peccatoris, quo finito' nihil restat, nisi supplicium mortis aeternae. At Jacobus non loquitur de toto cursu peccatoris, id est, de omnibus peccatis simul, sed de singulis peccatis, ut perspicuum est ex illis verbis : Nemo cum tentatur dicat, quoniam a Deo ten- talur. Hic enim sine dubio loquitur de tenta- tione particulari, quae certo tpmpore in ho¬ mine existit. Id namque significat illud, cum. Et de hac eadem loquitur, cum subjungit : Unusquisque vero tentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus et illectus. Jubet enim S. Jacobus, ut cum exurgit aliqua tentatio, nemo illam referat in Deum, sed in carnem suam. Ac de illa ipsa particulari tentatione subjungit, quod peccatum pariat, et de illo eodem pec¬ cato affirmat, quod cum consummatum fue¬ rit, generat mortem. Quia vero satis constat, non quodlibet peccatum, quamvis perfectum et consummatum, perducere continuo, ac re ipsa ad mortem aeternam, quae est in alia vita, sequitur, ut loquatur Apostolus de morte animae, quae fit in hac vita, cum gratia Domini anima destituitur. Peccatum igitur generans mortem, est quodlibet peccatum mortale, sive sit operis, sive linguae, sive de¬ siderii. Deinde nulla est ratio cur peccatum abso¬ lute positum, cum dicitur : Concupiscentia cum conceperit, parit peccatum, Calvinus re¬ stringi velit ad peccatum operis. Nam cum peccatum oris, ut blasphemia, vel perjurium, et cordis, ut desiderium voluntarium conju¬ gis alienae, non minus peccatum sit, ncc mi¬ nus prohibeatur in Decalogo, quam furtum, vel aliud peccatum operis, quo jure vocabu¬ lum peccati, absolute positum, ad solum operis peccatum restringi poterit? Peccatum igitur quod concupiscentia parit, est omne peccatum actuale, sive cordis, sive oris, sive operis; sed illud, si plenum habeat consen¬ sum voluntatis, consummatum, et mortale dicitur; sin autem, imperfectum et veniale nominatur. Dicent fortasse, si peccatum, quod concu¬ piscentia parit, est peccatum actuale, quid prohibet, cur ipsa concupiscentia non sit etiam verum peccatum, si non actuale, sal¬ tem originale ? At cum adversarii dicunt, concupiscen¬ tiam esse peccatum, vel loquuntur de primo ejus motu, qui dicitur a Patribus suggestio, vel de pronitate potentiae concupiscibilis ad malum ; si de suggestione loquuntur, illa non potest dici peccatum originale, quia est actio quaedam et proinde si peccatum esset, actu¬ ale esset. Et jam ostendimus eam peccatum actuale non esse. Si loquuntur de pronitate, eadem ratione probatur, eam nullum esse peccatum. Nam si pronitas illa peccatum esset, sive actuale, sive originale, ideo nimirum esset, quia pug¬ nare videtur cum lege Dei, ut adversarii dicunt, ac praesertim Calvin, lib. m. Institut. cap. 3. §. 10. et Kemnitius in Examine 3. sess. Concilii Tridcnt. pag. 434. At si proni¬ tas peccatum esset, quia pugnare videtur cum lege Dei, multo magis actus ejus, quam¬ vis omnino involuntarius, esset peccatum, cum magis pugnet cum lege actus, quam pronitas ad actum. Habemus autem ex do¬ ctrina Apostoli, actum concupiscentiae om¬ nino involuntarium nullum esse peccatum, ut supra ostendimus : efficitur igitur, ut con¬ cupiscentia ipsa, id est, pronitas ad actum malum, nullum sit omnino peccatum. Et confirmatur haec nostra explicatio testimo¬ niis Apostolicis ex Augustino, Cyrillo etBeda, ut alios Patres interim omittamus. S. Augustinus lib. vi. adversus Julianum, cap. 3 : « Sed, inquit, cum dicit Apostolus Jacobus, unusquisque tentatur a concupi¬ scentia sua, abstractus et illectus. Deinde concupiscentia cum conceperit, parit pecca¬ tum : profecto in his verbis partus a pariente discernitur. Pariens enim est concupiscen¬ tia, partus peccatum. Sed concupiscentia non parit, nisi conceperit; non concipit, nisi illexerit, hoc est, ad malum perpetrandum obtinuerit voluntatis assensum. » S. Gyrillus lib. iv. in Joannem, cap. oi : « Voluptas quaedam, inquit, ante omne pec¬ catum praecurrit, et fervens cupiditas ad de¬ licta solet allicere, quae ante peccandi actum insidet, et mentis consensum arripit, per¬ suadens facile hac via veniendum esse quo gliscimus. Quod verum Christi discipulus os¬ tendit, dicens : Nemo qui tentatur, dicat a Deo se tentari, neminem enim Deus tentat, sed unusquisque a sua cupididate abstractus, CAPUT VII. 407 atque seductus, tentatur. Cupiditas deinde, postquam conceperit, parit peccatum, porro consummatio mortem generat. » Certe si ante omne peccatum voluptas quaedam praecurrit, et si cupiditas ad malum alliciens, ante peccandi actum insidet, non est veri nominis peccatum ipsa titillatio et incitatio, etiam cum delectatione conjuncta, nisi aliquo modo consensum mentis obtineat. Quod si titillatio, quae actus quidam est, pec¬ catum non est, multo minus pronitas ad eum actum, peccatum esse poterit. Beda in commentario hujus loci distinguit suggestionem a delectatione, et delectatio¬ nem a consensu ; ac dicit, solam suggestio¬ nem, nisi trahat ad delectationem, non so¬ lum non parere peccatum, sed e contrario parere coronam vita;, juxta verbum ejusdem Apostoli in eodem loco : « Beatus vir qui suffert tentationem, quoniam cum probatus fuerit, accipiet coronam vitae. » Secundum argumentum principale sumi¬ tur ex cap. 7. epist. ad Boman. ubi B. Paulus sic loquitur : « Nunc autem non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum. Scio enim quia non habitat in me, id est, in carne mea, bonum. » His enim verbis satis aperte docet Apostolus, concupiscentiam in homine justificato non esse proprie peccatum, quod reum facere possit. Nam primum dicit, mo¬ tum concupiscentiae non esse suum opus, ac per hoc non posse sibi imputari. Quo enim jure mihi imputari possit, quod meum non est? Deinde addit hujusmodi malum non esse in se, sed in carne sua. Constat autem carnem non esse capacem peccati proprie dicti. Sed contra objiciunt Calvinus lib. ii. Instit. cap. i. §. 9. et cap. 2. §. ult. et Beza in an- notationib. ad 7. cap. epistolae ad Romanos, in hoc 7. cap. epist. ad Rom. carnem accipi pro toto homine, qualis est secundum natu¬ ram corruptam. Quod probat Beza in anno¬ tationibus ad hunc locum, quia Beatus Pau¬ lus inter corruptissimas partes mentem nu¬ merat I. ad Timoth. vi. et alibi, et adEphes. iv, jubet renovari spiritum mentis nostrae. Respondeo, in multis locis divinae Scri¬ pturae sine dubio per carnem intelligi omnes potentias tum inferiores, tum superiores per peccatum corruptas. Unde etiam videmus ad Galatas quinto, inter opera carnis haere- ses numerari. Itaque non negamus etiam mentem per peccatum fuisse corruptam. Cae- terum in 7. cap. ad Roinan. negamus, car¬ nem sumi pro toto homine, atque asserimus, accipi pro altera parte tantum, quae vires in¬ feriores complectitur. Nam in primis si per carnem intelligeretur totus homo, non vere diceret Paulus : Non ego operor illud. Quo¬ modo enim non ipse operatur, quod ejus caro et animus, hoc est, ipse totus, operatur? Sin autem reluctante ratione, quae est potissima hominis pars, sola pars inferior operetur, vere dici potest, Non ego operor illud. Deinde cum Apostolus dicit : « Scio, quia non habitat in me, id est, in carne mea, bo¬ num. Quorsum attinet illa correctio, in me, id est, in carne mea : » Si in toto homine est illud malum, de quo loquitur? Tertio, nonne Apostolus disertis verbis distinguit carnem a mente, id est, unam partem hominis ab al¬ tera, cum dicit : « Video aliam legem in membris meis , repugnantem legi mentis meae ? et ego ipse mente servio legi Dei, carne autem legi peccati. » At (inquit Beza) mens non consideratur ab Apostolo simpliciter, ut adversarii faciunt, sed it opponitur membris, quia legi Dei con¬ sentit, quod in solis regeneratis accidit. Ita¬ que vult, mentem accipi hoc loco pro mente renovata per gratiam, quae opponitur mem¬ bris, id est, toti homini, qualis est ex se, sive ex corruptione naturae, et probat, quia ad Colossenses secundo, ubi nos legimus : In¬ flati sensu carnis suae. Graece pro sensu est vou<;, id est, mens, et ad Rom. vm, eadem mens carnis dicitur oppov^ua capxo ;, id est, prudentia carnis. Sed haec objectio nihil concludit. Admitti¬ mus enim, mentem cousiderari a Paulo, ut renovatam per gratiam, et nos eodem modo illam consideramus ; negamus autem illam opponi toti homini. Consequens enim est, ut mentem renovatam opponat parti non reno¬ vatae, id est, carni, cujus redemptionem ad¬ huc expectamus. Et confirmatur quarto, quia quod Aposto¬ lus hic dixit, in carne sua esse malum, cla¬ rius dixit ad Roman. vi. in corpore mortali id malum esse, et in hoc ipso cap. vii : Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis hujus (I) ? Per corpus autem mortale certum est, non posse intelligi omnes partes hominis, sed alteram tantuin. Quinto, quia quod dicit : « Mente servio (1) Rom. VII, 24. LIBE II V. legi Dei, paulo ante dixit : Condelector legi Dei, secundum interiorem hominem.» Intel- ligimus autem ex cap. iv. posterioris ad Co- linth. exteriorem hominem esse corpus cor¬ ruptibile, interiorem autem esse animam rationalem : « Licet is, qui foris est, noster homo corrumpitur, is, qui intus est, renova¬ tur de die in diem (1). » Sexto, quia tametsi caro interdum acci¬ piatur pro toto homine, tamen cum caro di¬ citur, in malam partem, non usurpatur h?ec vox in Scripturis, nisi cum agitur de impiis, quorum animus carni obedit, ut Genes, vi : Aon permanebit spiritus meus in homine, quia caro est; Joan. m, Quod natum est ex came, caro est; ad Galat. v, Opera carnis sunt forni¬ catio , etc. I ad. Corinth. xv, Caro et sanguis regnum Dei non possidebit ( I). Et in illis etiam locis agitur de impiis, in quibus mens, vel prudentia tribuitur carni, qua? loca Beza ci¬ taverat. Justificati autem, quia carnis desi¬ deriis fortiter resistunt, non solum non di¬ cuntur caro, sed etiam dicuntur in carne non esse, ut patet ex cap. vm. ad Roman. Quare cum in toto cap. vii. loquatur Apostolus de se, aliisque justificatis, sine dubio per car¬ nem non intelligit totum hominem, sed tan¬ tum partem hominis inferiorem, Accedat auctoritas sancti Augustini, qui passim ita exponit hscc loca, ac praesertim in i. lib. contra duas epistolas Pelagiano- rum, cap. 10. et toto i. lib. de nuptiis et con¬ cupiscentia, in quo libro cap. 6. sic loqui¬ tur : « Ibi homo primitus Dei lege trans¬ gressa, aliam legem repugnantem suae menti habere coepit in membris, et inobedientiae suae malum sensit, quando sibi retributam dignissime inobedientiam suae carnis inve¬ nit. » Adde ultimo quod etiamsi cogeremur no¬ mine carnis intelligere omnes animae poten- tentias etiam in vn ad Rom. tamen omnino discendum esset, nomen carnis in justificatis non pertinere ad voluntatem, sive mentem, nisi quoad primos quosdam motus indelibe- ratos. Nam apertissime opponit Apostolus consensum voluntatis, desideriis carnis. Ita¬ que etiam hoc modo concupiscentia non ha¬ beret sedem nisi in parte animae, quae non est capax peccati proprie dicti. Nam nec pars inferior, nec superior, ut praevenit suo motu judicium rationis, peccati proprie dicti capax est. Ibi enim tantum peccatum proprie dic¬ tum esse potest, ubi justitia proprie dictat esse potest ; non potest autem justitia pro- proprie dicta esse in parte inferiore, vel in superiore, ut praevenit judicium rationis, igitur nec peccatum proprie dictum. Tertium argumentum duci potest a testi¬ monio beati Pauli in epist. ad Rom. cap vm ubi sic loquitur : Nihil ergo damnationis est iis qui sunt in Christo Jesus (3). Quo loco, cum in vi et vii, cap. multa dixisset de concupi¬ scentia, quam modo peccatum per metony- miam, modo legem membrorum appellave¬ rat, tandem concludit, nihil esse timendum justificatis in Christo, etsi concupiscentiam illam adhuc sentiant in membris, repugnan¬ tem legi mentis. Nec tam significat, nullam esse condemnationem justificatis in Christo ob concupiscentiam, quam nihil esse in eis condemnatione dignum, sive nullam esse causam condemnationis. Quod enim non¬ dum essent actu, ac re ipsa condemnati, perspicuum erat, quia sententia damnationis non fertur, nisi post hanc vitam. Habemus igitur ex hoc loco, concupiscentiam, qualis remanet in renatis, non esse peccatum ex natura sua. Respondent communiter adversarii, Lu- therus, Calvinus, Kemnitius et caiteri, Apo¬ stolum dixisse, nihil damnationis esse rena¬ tis ob concupiscentiam, non quod ea non sit damnatione digna, sed quod ejus reatum Deus dimiserit in Baptismo. At hgee responsio multis de causis non est solida. Primum enim si vere crederent adversarii, reatum dimitti in Baptismo, fa¬ teri deberent consequenter, nihil esse in re¬ natis, quod habeat veram peccati rationem. Siquidem reatus et sancti Augustini testi¬ monio, et ipsorum confessione est id, quod proprie dicitur peccatum. Sic enim loquitur sanctus Augustinus lib. i, de nuptiis, et con¬ cupiscentia, cap. xxvi : «Hoc est non habere peccatum, reum non esse peccati. » Et Phi¬ lippus in locis communibus ut sapra citavi¬ mus tit. de peccato, docuit, formale peccati esse reatum. Quod idem indicat Calvinus lib. in. Instit. cap. m, § xi, cum dicit, re¬ misso reatu, manere in homine peccati ma¬ teriam. At certe sublata rei forma, non ma¬ net ejus rei ratio, sive natura, cum forma sit prajeipua pars natura;, immo sit ipsa ra¬ tio et quidditas rei. Deinde, reatus est omniuo inseparabilis ab (1) II Corin. IV, 16. - (2) Gen. VI, 3; Joan. III, 6: Sal. V, 19; I Coria. XV, 50. — (3) Rom. VIII, I . CAPUT IX. 't((0 oo, quod natura sua est dignum aeterna dam¬ natione qualem osse volunt concupiscentiam adversarii. Nam reatus, qui ab Augustino di¬ citur peccatum, et a Philippo formale pecca¬ ti, non est sola ordinatio ad poenam; ha?c enim est bona et a Deo; sed est dignitas sive meritum poenae, ut eam S. Augustinus ap¬ pellat : « Nemo nascitur (inquit in Psalm. i.) nisi trahens poenam, trahens meritum poenae.» Porro iste reatus, ut recte docet Philippus loco notato, est relatio, cujus proximum fun¬ damentum est actus malus, sive iniquitas. Non potest autem relatio a fundamento pro¬ ximo separari, quia ex ipso fundamento na¬ turaliter et necessario sequitur. Neque eniin fieri potest, ut qui genuit filium, nou sit ejus pater, et qui genitus est ab alio, non sit ejus filius, quia posita generatione, quae est fun¬ damentum, necessario consequitur in gene¬ rante paternitas, in genito filiatio. Eodem modo quia scelus, exempli causa, homicidii fundamentum est reatus, fieri non potest, ut qui homicidium fecit, non sit reus, id est, dig¬ nus poena, etiamsi forte judex nolit illum punire, ac tunc praesertim separari non po¬ test reatus a scelere, cum adhuc manet ac¬ tus, vel desiderium homicidii. Jam igitur si concupiscentia, etiam in re¬ natis, esset natura sua res digna morte sem¬ piterna, ut adversarii communiter docent, et (ut Philippus fatetur) fundamentum proxi¬ mum ejus relationis, quae dicitur reatus, certe ab ca reatus sejungi nullo modo pos¬ set. Quomodo enim separari potest reatus, id est, dignitas, et meritum poenae ab ea re, quae natura sua est digna poena et meretur poenam? Ergo si B. Paulus per damnatio¬ nem intelligit reatum, evidenter sequitur ut vel falsum sit Apostoli testimonium, vel sit verum quod nos dicimus, concupiscentiam in renatis natura sua non esse rem dignam poena, nec habere veram, ac propriam pec¬ cati rationem. \ Tertio, etiamsi concederemus, fieri posse, ut concupiscentia escet res digna morte Sem¬ piterna, et tamen ab ea tolleretur l-eatus, ta¬ men certum est ex Scripturis divinis, Deum nunquam remittere reatum dum manet ejus fundamentum. Nam judicium Dei secundum veritatem est, ad Rom. ii. Et : Odio habet Deus omnes, qui operantur iniquitatem, et per¬ dit omnes qui loquuntur mendacium, Psal. v. Et : Odio est Deo impius et impietas ejus , Sa¬ pient xiv (1). Denique Ezecli. xvnr, demon¬ strat Deus aequas esse vias suas, quia ma¬ nente iniquitate, punit; remota illa, ignoscit. Quare si re vera concupiscentia in renatis (ut adversarii volunt) esset iniquitas digna morte sempiterna, nunquam Apostolus di¬ xisset : Nihil ergo damnationis est iis, qui sunt in Christo ./esu. Neque enim tam cito oblitus fuisset ejus, quod antea dixex*at, ju¬ dicium Dei secundum veritatem esse. Quarto, illa particula, ergo, cum Aposto¬ lus dicit : Nihil ergo damnationis est, etc., significat, eam sententiam deduci ex supe¬ rioribus verbis : in superioribus autem ver¬ bis, non dixerat B. Paulus, Deum non im- putare concupiscentiam, aut condonare ejus reatum, sed ostenderat motus concupiscen¬ tia) involuntarios non esse peccata, nec posse homini imputari. Id enim significat (ut su- pra diximus) illud ad Ilom. vn : Non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago ; sed quod odi malum, illud facio. Si autem quod odi ma¬ lum, illud facio, jam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum. » Nam si vei'e dici potest (ut sine dubio potest) de motu concupiscentia) involuntario, non ego operor illum, pi-ofecto nobis imputari non potest ejusmodi motus, quippe cujus non auctores non sumus, qui fit in nobis, sed non a no¬ bis. Quod si motus ille nobis imputari ne¬ quit, multo minus (ut supia diximus) proni- tas ad eum molurn nobis imputari poterit. Quoniam igitur per Baptismum non so¬ lum habemus remissionem omnium pecca¬ torum, sed etiam gratiam, qua legi carnis fortiter ac strenue resistamus, et ideo con¬ cupiscentia in renatis non habet culpae, sed pcense tantum et aegritudinis rationem, ideo beatus Paulus ait : Nihil ergo damnationis est iis, qui sunt in Christo Jesu. Et subjungit ra¬ tionem similem superiori : Qui, inquit, non secundum carnem ambulant. Ex iis rejicitur etiam responsio Illyrici, qui cum videret, quod Lutherus, Philippus, Cal¬ vinus dixerant de reatu remisso, non satis esse fumum, addidit aliam responsionem in Apologia pro Confessione Antuerpiensi , cap. 3, quod videlicet, nihil damnationis sit iis, qui sunt in Christo, non simpliciter, et per se, sed per accidens, accedente vide¬ licet assidua petitione remissionis pecca¬ torum, tum actualium, tum etiam ipsius concupiscentiae. Quae responsio Illyrici ab- (l) Rom. II, 2; Psal. V, 7: Sap. XIV, 9. — (2) Rom. VII, 15. Tom. V. m i.lBEH V. surdissima est. Nam nec pro remissione concupiscentiae oraro debent renati, ut S. Augustinus disertis verbis docet lib. i, cap. 13 contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, in epist. 200 ad Asellicum, et in libro de perfectione justitiae : nec admitti sine im¬ pietate potest, quod Apostoli sententia non sit vera simpliciter et per se, sed tantum per accidens. Inde enim sequeretui’, ut sim¬ pliciter, et per se falsa esset. Sed accedit praeterea ratio illa quarta, quam attulimus contra Lutheri, Philippi, et Calvini explicationem. Nam quemadmodum Apostolus illam conclusionem, Nihil ergo damnationis , etc. non deduxit ex eo, quod concupiscentia non imputetur, ita etiam non deduxit ex eo quod petentibus remittatur, sed exeo, quod resistente voluntate per gratiam Dei justificata motibus concupiscentiae, motus illi nostri non sint, nec nobis imputari possint. Quartum argumentum principale, sumitur ab his testimoniis Scripturarum, quae do¬ cent per Baptismum fieri veram peccatorum remissionem, ita ut non solum condonetur debitum poenae, sed etiam maculae abluantur, purgentur, deleantur, tollantur, etc. Sed quo¬ niam totum hoc argumentum fuse tractavi¬ mus in 2. tom. de Sacramentis, lib. I. de Baptismo, cap. 13. ideo supervacaneum du¬ ximus hoc loco illud repetere.