Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book VI: The Punishments of Original Sin
Chapter 9: The diseases, or wounds, of the human mind are enumerated
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book VI. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
To begin, then, from the first part of our soul: in the intelligence, or human mind, there are very many wounds. The first is an ignorance of necessary things, as great in infants as is seen even in the beasts. St. Augustine, book 1 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 38 [al. 35]: “The young,” says he, “of many of the cattle, even the tiniest, know their mothers, nor are they moved to the udders to be sucked by another’s care and help, but they themselves, with wonderful ease, know those things placed in a hidden spot in the maternal bodies. Contrariwise, for the newborn man, unless the nipple of the breast be put into his lips brought near by the work of the nurse, he does not even perceive where it is; and with the breasts lying beside them, the hungry can rather weep than suck.”
The second is the fatuity with which some are born; for there is no animal which is born so wholly destitute of every operation proper to its own nature as some men are born. St. Augustine, deploring this misery in epistle 28 to Jerome: “Some,” says he, “are so slow and forgetful that they could not learn even the first elements of letters. And some are of such fatuity that they do not differ much from the cattle — whom the common people name simpletons.”
The third is the difficulty of learning; for without labor we are ignorant, with labor we learn. And ignorance has so cast its roots in the minds of some that they prefer to live always in the darkness of ignorance rather than undergo so much labor as they see to be necessary for learning. St. Augustine, book 22 On the City of God, chapter 22: “What else,” says he, “does that horrendous depth of ignorance indicate, from which all error arises, which receives all the sons of Adam in a certain darksome bosom, so that man cannot be freed from it without labor, sorrow, fear?”
The fourth is the ignorance of the last end, in the attainment of which the whole beatitude of man consists. For not only are all men ignorant of the supernatural end, unless they be divinely aided, but even the greatest part of men wanders astray from understanding the natural end itself. Of which thing the so diverse opinions of the philosophers concerning the highest good can be witnesses. On which see St. Augustine, book 19 On the City of God, chapter 1 and following. And what more miserable can be imagined than ignorance of one’s own end — that is, of the true and highest good?
The fifth is the ignorance of the means to the end — that is, of those things through which one can arrive at a good and blessed life. For no one is so prudent as not oftentimes to doubt, hesitate, and grope blindly in the deliberation of things to be done, and especially concerning place, time, manner, and the other circumstances of things: For the thoughts of mortals are fearful, and our counsels uncertain, says the Wise Man, chapter 9.
The sixth is the difficulty of understanding the natures of things. For though the proper office of man seems to be to contemplate all things, and from the knowledge of them to ascend to the knowledge of the Maker, and there is implanted in man by nature an incredible desire of knowing — whence is that saying of the Philosopher in book 1 of the Metaphysics, “All men by nature desire to know,” and that of Marcus Tullius in book 1 of the Tusculans, “There is by nature in our minds a certain insatiable desire of seeing the truth” — yet so great is the weakness of the human mind that it has not perfectly known the nature even of the ant, as St. Basil writes in epistle 168 to Eunomius. And so Ecclesiastes, chapter 1, truly said: All things are difficult; man cannot explain them by word. And chapter 3: He hath delivered the world to their disputation, so that man cannot find out the work which God hath wrought from the beginning unto the end. And how obscure and thin a notion of God human study can acquire, so many monstrous opinions of the heathen concerning the nature of God bear witness — who went so far that they did not hesitate to give divinity even to onions and garlics.
The seventh is the ignorance of one’s own mind. For the other minds — the angelic, namely — know themselves perfectly; but the human mind knows nothing less than itself, and is ignorant not only of its own nature but even of its own works. Hence that holy prophet, groaning, cries out in Psalm 18: Who can understand sins? From my secret ones cleanse me, O Lord. Plainly incredible is the unhappiness, that the very man who sins by his own will often cannot discern whether he has truly sinned, whether he consented with deliberate will, how often and how much he has offended. And yet can he rightly order his life, and make medicine for his sicknesses, who does not know himself, nor knows with what disease he labors, nor understands even this, whether he labors at all?
The eighth is that the human mind is hindered by the very body which was given to it as an instrument for acquiring knowledge, from understanding easily and perfectly: For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul, says the book of Wisdom, chapter 9, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon many things. And certainly there is no other body which hinders the most excellent action of its own form.
The ninth is a certain curiosity, almost natural. For rare are they who do not observe more willingly and more diligently the deeds of others — and especially their errors — than their own. St. John Chrysostom, in book 1 On Compunction of Heart, affirms that scarcely is there found, even among those who profess a life of perfection, one who does not labor under this vice: to see the mote in his brother’s eye, but not to see the beam in his own. Whence occasion was given to the fable of the two wallets, of which the front one contains the vices of others, the hind one our own: “But we do not see,” says the one, “what is in the wallet on our back.” And another: “But the wallet is seen on the back of him who goes before.” Great is this misery; for to know one’s own vices is always useful, often necessary; to scrutinize those of others has scarcely ever been useful, and oftentimes has been hurtful and pernicious.
The tenth is that we turn over in the mind many empty, light, foolish things, even unwilling, even at the most unfitting time. The holy Fathers everywhere deplore this misery, and among the rest St. Jerome, in the dialogue against the Luciferians, speaking perhaps in the person of others: “Now,” says he, “very often in my prayer I either walk about the porticoes, or reckon up usury, or, carried off by a base thought, I do even things shameful to tell.” And St. Augustine, in book 10 of the Confessions, chapter 35: “Since,” says he, “our heart is a receptacle of things of this kind, and carries crowds of copious vanity, hence our prayers also are often interrupted and disturbed, and before thy sight, while we direct the voice of the heart to thy ears, so great a matter is cut short by trifling thoughts rushing in from I know not whence.” And so what the Apostle says in Romans 8 — The creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly — fits most excellently even the human mind itself.
To these is added that, though the mind is eternal, and perpetual operation is owed to it, yet while it is in the body it cannot claim for itself even the half part of its time. For if you subtract infancy and boyhood — in which ages the mind works either nothing or very little — if you take away the time which the body takes to itself both for sleep and for the other necessities of life, how little is left to the intelligence for its own work?
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT IX. Enumerantur morbi sive vulnera mentis humanae. Ut igitur a prima animi nostri parte inci¬ piamus, in intelligentia, seu mente humana, plurima sunt vulnera. Primum est ignoran¬ tia rerum necessariarum in infantihus tanta, quanta et in bestiis quidem cernitur. S. Au¬ gustinus lib. i. de peccat, merit. et remiss. cap. 38 : « Multorum, inquit, pecorum, pulli etiam minutissimi matres agnoscunt, nec su¬ gendis uberibus cura et ope admoventur aliena, sed ea ipsi in maternis corporibus loco abdito posita mirabili facilitate nove¬ runt. Contra, homini nato, nisi opere nutri¬ entis admotis labris papillae uberis ingeran¬ tur, nec ubi sint sentiunt, et juxta se jacen¬ tibus mammis magis possunt esurientes flere, quam sugere. Secundum est fatuitas, cum qua nonnulli nascuntur ; nullum enim est animal, quod ita nascatur destitutum omnino ab omni ope¬ ratione naturae suae propria, ut hominum ali¬ qui nascuntur. S. Augustinus deplorans hanc miseriam in epist. 28. ad Hieronymum : « Tam tardi, inquit, nonnulli sunt et obliviosi, ut ne prima quidem discere litterarum elmenta po- ' tuerint. Quidam vero tantae sunt fatuitatis, ut non multum a pecoribus differant, quos moriones vulgo nominant. » Tertium est difficultas discendi, nam sine labore ignoramur , cum labore discimus. Tamque altera dices suas in quorumdam mentibus ignorantia jecit, ut malint illi sem- per in tenebris ignorantiae vivere, quam tan¬ tum laboris, quantum ad discendum neces¬ sarium esse vident, omnino subire. Sanctus Augustinus lib. xxii. de civit. Dei, cap. 22 : « Quid, inquit, aliud indicat horrenda quae¬ dam profunditas ignorantiae, ex qua omnis error existit, qui omnes filios Adam tenebro¬ so quodam sinu suscipit, ut homo ab illo liberari sine labore , dolore , timore non possit. » Quartum est ignoratio ultimi finis, ut cu¬ jus adeptione tota hominis beatitudo consi¬ stit ; non enim solum ignorant omnes homi¬ nes, nisi divinitus adjuventur, finem super- naturalem, sed etiam maxima pars hominum ab ipso naturali fine intelligendo aiberrat. Cujus rei testes esse possunt tam diversae philosophorum sententiae de summo bono. De quibus vide S. August, lib. xix. de civit. Dei, cap. i. et seq. Quid autem miserius fin¬ gi potest, quam ignoratio proprii finis, id est, veri ac summi boni ? Quintum est ignoratio mediorum ad finem, id est, earum rerum, per quas ad bonam beatamque vitam perveniri potest. Nemo est enim tam prudens, qui non saepenumero dubitet, haesitet, caecutiat in deliberatione rerum agendarum, ac praesertim circa locum, tempus, modum, aliasque i’erum circum¬ stantias : « Cogitationes enim mortalium ti¬ midae et incertae providentiae nostrae, » inquit Sapiens cap. ix. Sextum est difficultas intelligendi naturas rerum. Nam cum hominis proprium munus esse videatur contemplari res omnes, et ex earum cognitione ad conditoris cognitionem ascendere, et insitum sit homini a natura incredibile sciendi desiderium ; unde est illud Philosophi in i libro Metaphisic : «Om¬ nes homines natura scire desiderant», et illud M. Tulli, in i. Tusculan. : «Natura inest men¬ tibus nostris insatiabilis quaedam cupiditas veri videndi » : tamen tanta est imbecillitas mentis humanae, ut ne fornicae quidem na¬ turam perfecte noverit, ut S. Basilius scribit in epistola 168. ad Eunomium. Itaque vere dixit Ecclesiastes cap. i : Cunctae res diffici¬ les , non potest eas homo explicare sermone. Et cap. iii : Mundum tradidit disputatoini eorum, ut non inveniat homo opus *, quod operatus est Deus ab initio usque ad finem. Quam autem obscuram ac tenuem de Deo notionem ac¬ quirere possit humanum studium, testantur tot monstrosae opiniones Ethnicorum, de natura Dei, qui eo usque progressi sunt, ut etiam coepis et alliis divinitatem dare non dubitaverint. (11 Eccl> I. 8; Eccl. 111, 41. CAPUT X. 475 Septimum est ignoratio propriae mentis. Nam caeterae mentes, angelicae videlicet, se ipsae perfecte norunt : mens vero humana nihil minus quam seipsa cognoscit ; nec so¬ lum naturam suam, sed etiam opera sua ignorat. Hinc sanctus ille propheta ingemi¬ scens clamat in Psal. xviii : Delicta quis in- telliyit ? ab occultis meis munda me Domine (1)> incredibilis plane est infelicitas, ut ipse, qui propria voluntate peocnt, non possit saepe discernere, an vere peccaverit, an deliberata voluntate consenserit, quoties, quantumque deliquerit? Atqui fieri potest, ut vitam recte instituat , et aegritudinibus suis medicinam faciat, qui se ipse non novit, nec scit quo morbo laboret, ac ne id quidem intelligit, an laboret. Octavum est, quod mens humana ab ipso corpore, quod ei datum est pro instrumen¬ to ad scientias comparandas, impeditur, ne facile perfecteque intelligat : Corpus enim quod corrumpitur , aggravat animam , inquit liber Sap. cap. ix. et terrena inhabitatio de¬ primit sensum multa cogitantem (1). Certe au¬ tem nullum est aliud corpus quod impediat actionem praestantissimam propriae formae. Nonum est curiositas quaedam propemo- dum naturalis. Itari enim sunt, qui non li- . bentius, ac diligentius, aliena facta, ac prae¬ sertim errata observent, quam sua. Sanctus Joannes Chrysostomus in i. lib. de compun¬ ctione cordis affirmat, vix inveniri etiam in¬ ter eos qui perfectionem vitam profitentur, qui non laborent eo vitio, ut videant festu¬ cam in oculo fratris, trabem autem in suo non videant. Unde data est occasio fabulae de duabus manticis, quarum anterior aliena vitia, posterior propria continet : « Sed non videmus, inquit ille, mantica; quod in tergo est. » Et alius ; « Sed praecedenti spectatur mantica tergo; » magna est haec miseria, nam propria vitia cognoscere semper est u- tile, saepe autem necessarium ; aliena scru¬ tari vix unquam utile, saepenumero noxium ac perniciosum fuit. Decimum est, quod multa inania, levia, inepta volvimus animo, vel inviti, etiam a- lienissimo tempore. Deplorant hanc mise¬ riam sancti Patres passim, atque inter caete- ros S. Hieronymus in dialogo adversus Lu- ciferianos, in aliorum fortasse persona lo- quens : « Nunc, inquit, creberrime in ora¬ tione mea, aut per porticus deambulo, aut de fcenore computo, aut abductus turpi cogi¬ tatione, etiam quae dictu erubescenda sunt, gero. » Et S. Augustino in lib. x. Confess. cap. 35 : « Cum, inquit, in hujuscemodi re¬ bus conceptaculum sit cor nostrum, et portet copiosae vanitatis catervas, hinc et orationes nostrae saepe interrumpuntur atque turban¬ tur, et ante conspectum tuum, dum ad au¬ res tuas voce cordis intendimus, nescio unde irruentibus nugatoriis cogitationibus res tan¬ ta praeciditur. » Itaque quod ait Apostolus ad Rom. vm : « Vanitati creatura subjecta est non volens, » in ipsam etiam humanam mentem optime quadrat. His accedit, quod cum mens aeterna sit, et ei perpetua debeatur operatio , tamen dum est in corpore, ne mediam quidem temporis partem sibi vindicare potest ; nam si detra¬ has infantiam, ac pueritiam, in quibus aetati¬ bus mens, aut nihil, aut parum admodum operatur ; si demas tempus, quod sibi cor¬ pus sumit tum ad somnum, tum ad alias vi¬ tae necessitates, quantulum est quod intelli gentiae ad opus suum relinquitur?