Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book VI: The Punishments of Original Sin
Chapter 14: It is shown against the Pelagians that concupiscence is evil
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book VI. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Concerning the misery of human life, which we have set forth in these five chapters, the controversy with the Pelagians is twofold. The one, whether all those things which we have numbered among the miseries are truly evils. The other, whether they are in man from the desert of sin, or from the condition of nature. For the Pelagians, who denied original sin, numbered some of those things which we have counted among the calamities and vices — and chiefly the concupiscence of the flesh — among the goods of nature; others they said were evils indeed, but natural.
Against this error St. Augustine fights most keenly in the book On Original Sin, from chapter 34 to 39; in the two books On Marriage and Concupiscence; in book 1 against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, chapter 15 and the three following; in book 3 against Julian, chapter 6 and following; and in the whole of books 4 and 5 against the same Julian. We, following Augustine, shall demonstrate first that concupiscence, such as it is in us, is truly evil, and is to be named a vice of nature, not a good of nature; then, that both concupiscence itself and the other evils explained above were born from sin, not from the condition of nature.
That concupiscence, then, is evil. First, the Apostle teaches it in Romans 7, when he says: Evil is present with me; but to accomplish that which is good, I find not. Where by the evil present with him nothing else can be understood but the concupiscence of the flesh; for that same evil, in the same chapter, the same Apostle calls the law of the members, and the law of sin fighting against the law of the mind. But if concupiscence were a good of nature, how would it be named an evil by the Apostle?
Second, the same Apostle in the first to the Corinthians, chapter 7: They who contain not themselves, let them marry; for it is better to marry than to be burnt. And again, admonishing the married that they abstain for a time by consent, for prayer, and again return together on account of the danger of temptation: This, says he, I speak by indulgence, not by commandment. Where the holy Apostle declares openly enough that marriage was given by God as a remedy of concupiscence, and that there is need of indulgence when the work of marriage is exercised not for love of offspring but to satisfy concupiscence — or, as Ambrose speaks, not for love of posterity but from the ardor of lust. But certainly good things do not need a remedy and indulgence, but evil.
Third, the same Apostle, 1 Corinthians 9, chastises his body and brings it into servitude; and 2 Corinthians 12, he thrice asks the Lord that the sting of the flesh be taken from him. But what so great an Apostle so vehemently assails, both by prayers before God and by asperity of life in himself, is without doubt an evil, and to lack it a good.
Fourth, the same Apostle, in Galatians 5, says that the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh. But that the concupiscence of the spirit is good, its works bear witness, which are enumerated in the same place: charity, joy, peace, etc. Therefore the concupiscence of the flesh, which is contrary to the concupiscence of the spirit, must be evil. To omit meanwhile that, since its fruits, which are noted in the same place, are evil, it cannot itself not be evil, according to the doctrine of the Lord, Matthew 7: A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit.
Fifth, the Apostle John, in the first epistle, chapter 2, says that concupiscence is not of the Father, but of the world. And how is that good which is not from God, from whom is every good?
Sixth, the concupiscence of the flesh needs a bridle; otherwise it is carried immoderately into all disgraces. But it does not apply the bridle to itself; it is imposed on it by reason. Therefore it is of itself immoderate, and thereby evil and vicious.
Seventh, on account of that concupiscence every carnal union, even the lawful one with a wife, shuns being seen, and is never performed except in hiding-places or in darkness. But for good things no one blushes, no one seeks the darkness. Therefore concupiscence is without doubt evil. See Augustine, book 14 On the City of God, chapter 17 and following.
Eighth, it is an evil that the lower things struggle against the higher; for that is against equity and right reason. But on account of concupiscence the lower part of the soul resists the higher — that is, reason — does not obey the law of the mind, and is contrary to the spirit. Who then would doubt whether it is to be called evil?
Ninth, let there come the testimonies of the Fathers, whom Augustine cites in book 2 against Julian — of Cyprian, Ambrose, Hilary, Jerome, Chrysostom — who with one mouth confirm that concupiscence is evil.
Tenth, let there come the testimonies of the heathen. For Augustine, book 14 On the City of God, chapter 19, and book 4 against Julian, chapter 12, adduces Tully, saying in book 3 On the Republic that anger and lust are vicious parts of the soul. Clement of Alexandria also, in the third book of the Stromata, cites Plato, saying in the first book On the Republic that the pleasure of the body is repugnant to wisdom, and is a most savage mistress, from whom it is a most happy thing to be able to be freed. Like things from Archytas of Tarentum and Sophocles Marcus Tullius recites in the dialogue On Old Age, and among other things writes that no more deadly plague than the pleasure of the body has been given to men by nature.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XIV. Ostenditur contra Pelagianos concupiscentiam esse malam. De miseria humanae vitee, quam his quin¬ que capitibus exposuimus, controversia cum Pelagianis duplex est. Altera an sint vere mala illa omnia, qua; nos inter miserias nu¬ meravimus. Altera an sint in homine ex me¬ rito peccati, an ex conditione naturae. Pela- giani enim qui peccatum originale negabant, aliqua ex iis, quae nos inter calamitates et vitia numeravimus, pracipue vero concupi¬ scentiam carnis, inter naturae bona nume¬ rabant. Alia, mala quidem, sed naturalia esse dicebant. Adversus hunc errorem pugnat acerrime S. Augustinus in lib. de peccato originali a c. 34. usque ad 39. in libris duobus de nu¬ ptiis et concupiscentia, in i. lib. contra duas epistolas Pclagianorum cap. 15. et tribus seq. lib. hi. contra Julian. cap. 6. et seq. et totis libris iv. et v. contra cuftidem Julian. Nos Augustinum sequentes demonstrabimus pri¬ mum concupiscentiam, qualis in nobis est, vere esse malam, et vitium natura;, non bo¬ num natura; nominandam. Deinde tum ipsam concupiscentiam, tum cmtera mala supra ex¬ plicata, ex peccato nata esse, non ex condi¬ tione natura;. Igitur concupiscentiam esse malam. Primo docet Apostolus ad Rom. n. cum ait : Malum adjacet mihi , perficere autem bonum non in¬ venio (2). Ubi per malum adjacens nihil aliud intelligi potest, nisi concupiscentia carnis ; nam illud idem malum in eodem capite, idem Apostolus vocat legem membrorum, et le¬ gem peccati repugnantem legi mentis. At si concupiscentia esset bonum natura; , quo¬ modo ab Apostolo malum nominaretur? Secundo, idem Apostolus in priore ad Cor. cap. 7. : Qui non se continent , nubant ; melius est enim nubere quam uri (3). Et rursus ad¬ monens conjugatos ut propter orationem ad tempus et ex consensu contineant, et rursus propter tentationis periculum revertantur in (t) Gen.IX, 2. (2) Rom; 11,31. -(3) I Corinlb. VIU 0. CAPUT \Y. id ipsum : Hoc, inquit, dico secundum indul¬ gentiam, non secundum imperium. Ubi S. Apo* stolus satis aperte declarat conjugium datum esse a Deo in remedium concupiscentia;, et indulgentia opus esse ; cum opus conjugii exercetur non amore prolis, sed ad satisfa¬ ciendum concupiscentia;, sive, ut Ambrosius loquitur, non amore posteritatis, sed ardore libidinis : at certe remedio et indulgentia non egent res bonae, sed malse. Tertio, idem Apostolus I Corinth. ix. ca¬ stigat corpus suum, et in servitutem redigit, et ii. Corinth. xn. ter Dominum rogat ut au¬ feratur a se stimulus carnis. At quod tan¬ tus Apostolus ita vehementer oppugnat, et precibus apud Deum , et asperitate vita; in se, sine dubio malum est, et eo carrere bonum. Quarto, idem Apostolus ad Galat. v. dicit carnem concupiscere adversus spiritum, spi¬ ritum autem adversus carnem. At concupi¬ scentiam spiritus bonam esse, testantur opera ejus, qua; ibidem enumerantur, charitas, gaudium, pax, etc.; igitur malam esse necesse est concupiscentiam carnis, qua; concupi¬ scentia; spiritus adversatur. Ut interira omit¬ tam, quod cum ejus fructus, qui in eodem loco notantur, mali sint, non potest ipsa non esse mala, juxta doctrinam Domini, Matth. vn. : Non potest arbor bona malos fructus fa¬ cere (1). Quinto, Apostolus Joannes in epist. T. cap. 2. concupiscentiam dicit non esse ex Patre, sed ex mundo. Quomodo autem bonum est, quod non est a Deo, a quo est omne bonum? Sexto, concupiscentia carnis eget frarno, alioqui fertur immoderate in omnia flagitia : at fraenum non ipsa sibi adhibet, sed a ra¬ tione illi imponitur, igitur ipsa ex se immo¬ derata, ac per hoc mala et vitiosa est. Septimo, propter istam concupiscentiam omnis concubitus , etiam leg'itimus cum uxore, vitat aspectum, et nisi in latebris, vel in tenebris nunquam peragitur. At propter bona nemo erubescit, nemo tenebras quaerit. Igitur concupiscentia sine dubitatione est mala, vide Augustinum lib. 14. de Civitate Dei, cap. 17. et sequent. Octavo, malum est, ut inferiora superio¬ ribus reluctentur. Id enim contra aequitatem et rectam rationem est. At propter concu¬ piscentiam pars animae inferior superiori, id est , rationi repugnat , legi mentis non m paret, spiritui adversatur. Quis igitur am¬ bigat, an ea mala sit appellanda ? Nono, accedant testimonia Patrum, quo* Augustinus citat lib. ii. in Julian. Cypriani, Ambrosii, Hilarii, Hieronymi, Chrysostomi, qui malam esse concupiscentiam uno ore confirmant. Decimo, accedant testimonia ethnicorum. Nam Augustinus lib. xiv. de Civit. Dei cap. 19. et lib. iv. in Julian. cap. 12. Tullium adducit in iii. lib. de Republica dicentem, iracundiam et libidinem vitiosas esse animi partes. Clemens quoque Alexandrinus in tertio Stromatum Platonem citat, in primo de Republica dicentem, corporis voluptatem sapientia; repugnare, et esse dominam sae¬ vissimam, a qua felicissimum sit posse li¬ berari; similia ex Archita Tarentino, et So¬ phocle recitat M. Tullius in dialog. de se¬ nectute, et inter alia scribit, nullam capita¬ liorem pestem quam voluptatem corporis hominibus a natura datam.