Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Councils · On the Authority of Councils, Book I
Chapter 22: The Conditions the Lutherans Require for a Council Are Refuted
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. II, De Conciliis (De Conciliorum Auctoritate), On Councils, Book I (of the controversy On Councils and the Church). The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The Lutherans, who call themselves Protestants, propose eight conditions for celebrating a Council; of which, since Gaspar Villalpandus has discoursed fully enough, we will refute them most briefly.
First, then, they require that before the Synod is held, all the acts of the Council of Trent be annulled. Secondly, that the Council be held in Germany; for the Ecclesiastical canon, in Cyprian Book 1 letter 3, is that disputes be judged there where they arose. Thirdly, that the Roman Pontiff neither proclaim the Council nor preside over it, but be one of the litigant parties, since he himself is the one accused, and no one ought to be at once judge and party. Fourthly, that sentences be passed from the divine Scripture alone, not from traditions or canons. Fifthly, that the decision be not made by the plurality of votes, but pronounced according to the norm of the divine word. Sixthly, that the Roman Pontiff absolve all the Prelates from the oath of fidelity by which they are bound to him. Seventhly, that the Theologians of the princes and estates of the Augsburg Confession be permitted to pronounce opinions and decisive votes in the Council no less than the Bishops. Eighthly, that a safe-conduct be given by the Emperor, not only to the persons but also to the principal cause itself — that is, that neither may the persons be punished if they refuse to assent to the Council, nor may the faith and Confession of the Lutherans be condemned, even though the Lutheran Theologians could not defend it. With these conditions they say that they desire a Council with their whole heart, and this they call a truly pious and free Council.
The first condition is iniquitous; because nothing ought to be held void unless condemned by a legitimate judgment. But the Council of Trent is indeed accused by the heretics, but not condemned in that legitimate judgment. As, therefore, the second Council of Ephesus was condemned in the Council of Chalcedon, and that of Constantinople against images was condemned in the seventh Synod, so the Council of Trent, if it were condemned, ought to be examined and judged in another Synod, but not annulled before the judgment of the Synod.
The second condition is also iniquitous; for as the Lutherans think they by right ask that the Council be not held in Italy, where the Catholics prevail, so the Catholics can by right demand that it be not held in Germany, where the Lutherans prevail; and truly no place could be chosen better and fitter than Trent, which is on the borders of Germany and Italy, even if this question were left to the judgment of a Heathen man. But to the canon which is in Cyprian I say that that canon is understood of particular causes — that is, of the crimes of particular men, which ought to be judged where they were committed, because there witnesses can more easily be found. But of causes of faith, which pertain to the whole Church, the reason is different. Whence the question that arose at Antioch concerning the cessation of the legal observances was ended at Jerusalem in the Council of the Apostles, Acts 15; and the Arian heresy, arisen at Alexandria in Egypt, was judged at Nicaea in Bithynia; the heresy of Nestorius, arisen at Constantinople, was condemned at Ephesus; the heresy of Eutyches, born at Constantinople, condemned at Chalcedon; the heresies of the Origenists, Didymus and Evagrius, in the fifth Synod were judged at Constantinople, where they had by no means been born; the heresy of the Monothelites, which had been born at Alexandria, Cyrus being its author, was condemned first at Rome in the Council of Saint Martin the Pope, then at Constantinople in the sixth Synod. Finally the heresy of the Iconoclasts, which had either arisen or been wonderfully increased and confirmed at Constantinople, was judged and condemned at Nicaea in Bithynia, and before too at Rome in a Council. Add that the Lutherans too had, in the midst of Germany, not a few provincial Councils, as of Cologne, Mainz, and others, in which they were condemned. Nor ought the adversaries to object that these were Councils of the Papists; for the same all heretics could have objected. For always in the Church this was observed, that the Bishops who then were should judge controversies, and that new Bishops should not be created because of new questions.
The third condition is iniquitous; because the Roman Pontiff cannot be deprived of his right of proclaiming Councils and presiding over them — a right in whose possession he has now been for 1500 years — unless he be first convicted in a legitimate judgment of not being the supreme Pontiff. But what they say, that the same ought not to be judge and party, I say has place in private men, not in a supreme Prince. For a supreme Prince, until he is declared or judged legitimately to have fallen from the principality, is always the supreme Judge, even though there be litigation with him. And so private men who litigate with their Prince are wont sometimes to appeal from the Prince ill-informed to the same to be better informed. And this is confirmed from the ancient histories; for when Marcellinus had sinned, and a Council had been gathered on his account, all the Bishops said that he could be condemned by none, but that he himself ought to be judge and accused, as Nicholas I relates in his letter to Michael. Likewise Sixtus III, when he was accused of adultery, the Emperor gathered a Council, the Pontiff consenting; but in that Council no one dared to discuss the cause of the Pontiff, unless he himself had first said that he wished the cause to be discussed, since it was in his own choice to be judged or not judged. This is plain both from the acts of the Council and from the letter of the same Sixtus to the Bishops of the East. Finally, in the fourth Roman Council under Symmachus we read that all the Bishops said that the Council could not by right be proclaimed except by the Pontiff, even though he himself were the one accused. Besides, did not Arius litigate with Alexander concerning the faith? and yet in the Council of Nicaea Alexander sat, because he was a Bishop, as Judge. Likewise in the third Synod Cyril presided over the Episcopal judgment, who yet was said by the Nestorians to be one of the litigant parties. So also in the fourth Synod the Legates of Leo presided, though the whole cause was between Leo and Dioscorus. There is added that the Pontiff in a Council is not the sole judge, but has many colleagues — that is, all the Bishops — who, if they could convict him of heresy, could also judge and depose him, though unwilling. The heretics, then, have nothing to complain of, if the Roman Pontiff presided over a Council before he was condemned.
The fourth condition is iniquitous, because things once defined ought not to be called again into doubt, according to the law of the Emperor Marcian, the law Nemo, in the Code, on the supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith. But it is established that in the seventh general Synod it was defined that unwritten traditions are to be received. But although this condition is iniquitous, yet it could be admitted, until it were again legitimately defined in a Synod that they are to be received for the word of God. For hence it is that the Council of Trent, before it proceeded to other things, defined that the Scriptures and the Apostolic traditions are to be received for the word of God.
The fifth condition utterly takes away the form of Councils, as we showed above, and therefore it cannot come to pass that any end of controversies be reached, unless place be given to the greater part of the votes; for since each part brings forward testimonies of Scriptures, how can it be known which is the opinion of the Council, unless the votes be gathered, and the opinion of the greater number prevail?
The sixth condition is iniquitous and impertinent. Iniquitous, because inferiors ought not to be freed from the obedience of superiors, unless the superior be first legitimately deposed or declared not to be superior — just as it would be iniquitous that as often as an Imperial diet is held, the Emperor should have to free from the oath of fidelity all the Princes subject to him. And that it is not new for Bishops to render an oath of obedience to the Pontiff is plain from blessed Gregory Book 10 letter 31, and from the chapter Significasti, in the Decretals on election; likewise from the eleventh Council of Toledo chapter 10. But impertinent, because that oath does not take away the liberty of the Bishops, which is necessary in Councils; for they swear that they will be obedient to the supreme Pontiff — which is understood while he is Pontiff, and while he commands the things which according to God and the sacred canons he can command; but they do not swear that they will not say what they think in a Council, or that they will not depose him if they convict him of being a heretic.
The seventh condition, if it be understood of a properly decisive vote in the form of a judgment, is repugnant to the fifth condition, and is against the form of all Councils, as we showed above; if it be understood improperly, and the divine Scripture brought forward in testimony of some opinion be called a decisive vote, the condition is most just, and never denied to the Protestants — nay, offered to them thrice in the Council of Trent, namely sessions 13, 15, and 18.
The last condition, for the first part — that is, as regards the safe-conduct of the persons — was offered to the Protestants, as is plain from the same places of the Council of Trent, that is, sessions 13, 15, and 18. For the second part it is utterly inept and ridiculous; for it is as if they had openly said: We wish the Bishops of the whole Christian world to be troubled, and to make expenses and suffer the greatest labors, to come to the Council, and yet, when they have come, we wish nothing to be determined, nor disputes ever to be ended.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
Tridentinum non accedant. Refutantur conditiones , quas Lutherani requi¬ runt in Concilio celebrando. Lutherani, qui se Protesfcantes vocant, octo conditiones proponunt Concilii celebrandi; de quibus quoniam satis plene disseruit Gas- par Yvdllalpandffius, nos eas brevissime re¬ fellemus. Primo ergo requirunt , ut antequam fiat Synodus, irritentur omnia acta Concilii Tri- dentini. Secundo, ut Goneilium fiat in Ger¬ mania ; et enim canon Ecclesiasticus apud Cyprianum lib. I, epist. 3. ut illic lites judi¬ centur, ubi exortae sunt. Tertio , ut Pontifex Romanus non indicat Concilium, nec ei prae¬ sit, sed sit altera pars litigantium , quando¬ quidem ipse est qui accusatur, et nemo de¬ bet simul esse judex, et pars. Quarto , ut ex sola Scriptura divina sententiae ferantur, non ex traditionibus, vel canonibus. Quinio , ut decisio non fiat penes suffragiorum plurali¬ tatem, sed ut juxta normam verbi divini pro¬ nuntietur. Sexto , ut Romanus Pontifex ab¬ solvat omnes Praelatos a juramento fidelita¬ tis, quo ei obstricti sunt. Septimo, ut Theo¬ logi principum, ac statuum Confessionis Au¬ gustanae, non minus, quam Episcopi in Con¬ cilio sententias, ac voces decisiva^ proferre permittantur. Octavo , ut detur salvus con¬ ductus ab Imperatore, non solum personis, sed etiam ipsi causae principali, id est, ut nec personae possint puniri, si nolint Concilio as- sentiri, nec fides, et Confessio Lutheranorum possint damnari, etiamsi Theologi Lutherani eam defendere non potuerint. Cum his con¬ ditionibus dicunt, se Concilium toto pectore optare, et hoc vere pium, et liberum Conci¬ lium se vocare. Prima conditio et iniqua ; quia nihil debet irritum haberi, nisi legitimo judicio damna¬ tum. Concilium autem Tridentinum est qui¬ dem accusatum ab hasreticis , sed non dam¬ natum in illo legitimo judicio. Sicut ergo Concilium Ephesinum II damnatum est in Concilio Chalcedonensi , et Constantinopo- litanum contra imagines damnatum est in septima Synodo : ita Concilium Tridenti¬ num si damnatum esset, deberet in alia Synodo examinari, et judicari, non autem ante Synodi judicium irritari. Secunda conditio est etiam iniqua ; ut etiam Lutherani jure sibi videntur petere, ut Concilium non fiat in Italia, ubi praevalent Catholici, ita Catholici jure postulare pos¬ sunt, ut non fiat in Germania, ubi praevalent Lutherani, et sane non poterat locus eligi melior atque aptior, quam Tridentum, quod est in finibus Germanice, et Italiae , etiamsi Ethnici hominis judicio quaestio ista relin¬ queretur. Ad canonem autem qui est apud Cypria¬ num dico, intelligi eum canonem de parti¬ cularibus causis, id est, de criminibus par¬ ticularium hominum , quae debent judicari ubi sunt commissa, quia ibi facilius testes inveniri possunt. At de causis fidei , quae ad totam Ecclesiam pertinent, alia ratio est. Unde quaestio exorta Antiochiae de legalium cessatione, Hierosolymae in Concilio Apos¬ tolorum terminata est, Actor. XV; et haeresis Ariana exorta Alexandriae in /Egypto, judi¬ cata est Nicaeae in Bithynia : haeresis Nestorii exorta Constantinopoli, damnata est Ephesi : haeresis Eutychetis nata Constantinopoli, damnata Chalcedone : haereses Origenista- rum, Didymi et Evagrii, in V Synodo judi¬ catae sunt apud Constantinopolim, ubi mini¬ me natae fuerant ; haeresis Monothelitairum, quae nata erat Alexandriae, Cyro auctore, damnata est primum llomae in Concilio S . Martini Papae : deinde Constantinopoli in VI Synodo. Denique haeresis Iconoelastarum, quae Constantinopoli vel exorta, vel mirifice aucta et confirmata fuerat, apud Nicaeam Bi¬ thyniae, et antea etiam Romae in Concilio ju¬ dicata et damnata est. Adde, quod habue¬ runt etiam Lutherani in media Germania Concilia provincialia non pauca, ut Colo- niense, Moguntinum, et alia, in quibus dam¬ nati sunt. Neque objicere debent adversarii, ista Concilia Papistarum fuisse ; idem enim omnes hseretici objicere potuissent. Semper enim in Ecclesia id servatum est, ut contro¬ versias judicarent Episcopi, qui tunc erant, et non propter novas quaistiones novi crea¬ rentur Episcopi. Tertia conditio iniqua est; quia Romanus Pontifex non potest privari jure suo indicendi Concilia, et eis praesidendi, in cujus posses¬ sione jam fuit per 1500 annos , nisi prius in legitimo judicio convincatur, non esse sum¬ mus Pontifex. Quod vero dicunt, non debere eumdem esse judicem, et partem ; dico ha¬ bere locum in privatis hominibus, non in Principe supremo. Princeps enim supremus donec non declaratur, vel judicatur legitime excidisse a principatu , semper est summus Judex, etiamsi cum ipso litigetur. Itaque solent privati, qui cum Principe suo litigant, interdum appellare ab ipso Prin¬ cipe male informato, ad eumdem melius in¬ formandum. Et confirmatur hoc ex antiquis historiis ; nam cum Marcellinus peccasset, et propter ipsum , Concilium congregatum fuisset, Episcopi omnes dixerunt , eum non posse ab ullo damnari , sed ipsum debere esse judicem, et reum, ut refert Nicolaus I in epistola ad Michaelem. Item Sixtus III, cum accusaretur de adulterio, Concilium congregavit Imperator, Pontifice consen¬ tiente, sed in eo Concilio nemo ausus est Pontificis causam discutere, nisi prius ipse dixisset, velle se ut causa discuteretur, etsi in suo arbitrio esset judicari, vel non judi¬ cari. Id patet tum ex actis Concilii, tum ex epistola ejusdem Sixti ad Episcopos Orientis. Denique in Concilio IY Romano sub Sum- macho legimus , Episcopos omnes dixisse, Concilium non potuisse jure indici, nisi a Pontifice, etiamsi ipse esset, qui accusaba¬ tur. Ad haec, nonne Arius cum Alexandro de fide litigabat? et tamen in Concilio Nicaeno sedit Alexander, quia Episcopus erat, ut Ju¬ dex. Item in tertia Synodo praesedit judicio Episcopali Cyrillus, qui tamen altera pars li¬ tigantium a Nestorianis dicebatur. Ita quo¬ que in IY Synodo, praesederunt Legati Leo¬ nis, cum tamen tota causa inter Leonem, et Dioscorum versaretur. Accedit, quod Ponti¬ fex in Concilio non est solus judex, sed ha¬ bet multos collegas, id est, omnes Episco¬ pos, qui si eum convincere possent de hae- resi, possent etiam eum judicare, et depo¬ nere, licet invitum. Nihil ergo habent hae¬ retici, cur conquerantur, si Romanus Pon¬ tifex Concilio praesedit antequam damnatus esset. Quarta conditio iniqua est, quia non de¬ bent semel definita in dubium iterum revo¬ cari, juxta legem Marciani Imperatoris, lib. nemo, C. de summa Trinitate, et fide Catho¬ lica. Constat autem in YII Synodo generali definitum esse, traditiones non scriptas esse recipiendas. Quamvis autem ista conditio sit iniqua ; posset tamen admitti, donec iterum in Synodo legitime non esset definitum , eas esse recipiendas pro verbo Dei : Hinc enim est, quod Tridentinum Concilium, antequam ad alia progrederetur, definivit Scripturas, et traditiones Apostolicas pro verbo Dei re¬ cipiendas. Quinta conditio tollit penitus formam Con¬ ciliorum, ut supra ostendimus, et propterea non potest fieri, ut aliquando ad finem con¬ troversiarum deveniatur , nisi detur locus majori parti suffragiorum ; cum enim utra¬ que pars proferat Scripturarum testimonia, quomodo potest cognosci , quse sit Concilii sententia, nisi colligantur suffragia, et plu¬ rium sententia valeat? Sexta conditio est iniqua, et impertinens : Iniqua, quia non debent inferiores liberari ab obedientia superiorum, nisi prius ille le¬ gitime deponatur, vel declaretur non esse superior. Quemadmodum iniquum esset , ut quotiescumque fiunt Comitia Imperialia, Im¬ perator deberet liberare a juramento fideli¬ tatis omnes Principes sibi subjectos : Quod autem non sit novum , Episcopos juramen¬ tum obedientiee praestare Pontifici , patet ex B. Gregorio lib. X, epist. 31, et ex c. Signi¬ ficasti, extra de electione. Item ex Concilio Toletano XI, cap. 10. Impertinens autem, quia istud juramentum non tollit Episcopo¬ rum libertatem, quse in Conciliis necessaria est, jurant enim se fore obedientes summo Pontifici, quod intelligitur , donec Pontifex est, et dum jubet ea, quse secundum Deum, et sacros canones jubere potest : sed non ju¬ rant, se non dicturos, quod sentiunt in Con¬ cilio, vel se non deposituros eum, si haereti¬ cum esse convincant. Septima conditio, si intelligatur de voce proprie decisiva in forma judicii , repugnat quintae conditioni, et est contra formam om¬ nium Conciliorum, ut supra ostendimus ; si intelligatur improprie, et vocetur vox deci¬ siva, Scriptura divina in testimonium alicu- jus sententiae in medium allata, conditio est aequissima , et nunquam negata Protestanti- bus, imo eis ter oblata in Concilio Tridenti- no, nimirum sess. XIII, XY et XVIII. Ultima conditio pro prima parte, id est, quod attinet ad salvum conductum persona¬ rum, oblata est Protestantibus , ut patet ex iisdem locis Concilii Tridentini , id est, sess. XIII, XV et XVIII, pro secunda parte est prorsus inepta, et ridicula : Est enim, ac si aperte dixissent, volumus vexari Episcopos totius Christiani orbis, et sumptus facere, ac labores maximos pati , ut ad Concilium veniant, et tamen cum venerint, nolumus quidquam statui, neque lites unquam finiri.