Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Sacrament of the Eucharist · Book III: On the Truth of the Body of the Lord, from Reason
Chapter 7: The Objections of the Adversaries Are Resolved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. IV, De Sacramento Eucharistiae, Book III: On the Truth of the Body of the Lord in the Eucharist (from Reason). The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
There are two chief arguments of the adversaries. The first is from Augustine, in his Epistle 57 to Dardanus, which is repeated a thousand times by both Calvin and Peter Martyr; for thus Augustine speaks: “The quantity of the body could not obtain what the quality could; for since its parts are so distant that they cannot be together, because each holds its own spaces of place, the lesser parts lesser and the greater greater, it could not be whole, or as great, in each several part, but the quantity is larger in the larger parts, shorter in the shorter, and in no part so great as through the whole.” And below: “Take away from bodies the spaces of place, and they will be nowhere; and because they will be nowhere, they will not be.” And above he had already said that the human nature of Christ is destroyed if there be not granted to it a fixed space by which, after the manner of other corporeal things, it may be contained.
I answer: In that epistle Augustine says certain things about the body of Christ, and certain things about bodies in general, which are not to be confounded. Concerning the body of Christ he teaches that it is not diffused everywhere, so as to lack human form and figure; for that would be to destroy its nature. For thus he speaks at the beginning of the epistle: “Hence perhaps you say it is to be understood that Paradise is composed as it were in some part of heaven; or that, because God is everywhere, that Man also who is in God is diffused everywhere.” And below, refuting this very thing: “If He is to come,” he says, “that Angelic voice bearing witness, in the same manner as He was seen to go into heaven, that is, in the same form and substance of flesh — to which He assuredly gave immortality, but did not take away its nature — according to this form He is not to be thought diffused everywhere: for we must beware lest we so build up the divinity of the Man as to take away the truth of His body. Nor does it follow that what is in God is therefore everywhere as God is.” So he: nor does he say anything else concerning the body of Christ in particular.
But these things fight directly against the opinion of the Ubiquitarian Lutherans, who by the hypostatic union will have the body of Christ so diffused everywhere that nowhere does it keep the figure, form, and situation befitting a human body — which is (as Augustine says) to destroy the human nature of Christ. But we confess that the body of Christ is not diffused everywhere; and wherever it is, it has its own human form and figure, and the situation and disposition of its parts; although this figure, form, and disposition of parts is beheld in heaven, where it fills a place; but in the Sacrament it is indeed present, yet does not fill a place, nor can it be seen by us: just as (as we said above) Christ did not lack figure and form when more than once He made Himself invisible; nor did He lack flesh and bones when He walked upon the waters and entered through closed doors.
Now concerning body in general Augustine says two things. First, that bodies having magnitude are extended and have a fixed order of parts, and therefore it cannot come about that the magnitude of one part be as great as that of the whole; or as great in a small body as in a great one: the contrary of which we see not only in spiritual things but even in corporeal qualities. For the same soul can be whole both in a part of the body and in the whole body; likewise in a small body and in a great one; and it can come about that the whiteness or heat in a part of the body be as great as in the whole, nay even that the whiteness or heat be greater in a small body than in a great one.
All which things are most true, and in no way fight against our opinion concerning the Eucharist; because Augustine requires only that every true body be extended in itself, not that it be necessarily coextended with place. And if in the words of Augustine alleged in the first place by the heretics mention is made of place, this comes about because Augustine proves a posteriori that a body is extended in itself from the fact that it occupies a fixed space of place; but from this it does not follow that it cannot be extended in itself unless it occupy place. And by these things the first words of Augustine cited above remain explained: “The quantity could not obtain, etc.”
Secondly, Augustine says that bodies are in place in such a way that they depend on place, whereas on the contrary God is in place in such a way that He does not depend on place, but rather place depends on God. But this saying is to be understood of bodies which are below heaven, and inasmuch as they exist naturally: for otherwise it would be false. Since, as we have often said, the outermost heaven is not in space, or in any place, but is in itself and in God; and just as the outermost heaven needs no space in which to be, so without doubt God could preserve other bodies without space, even though they naturally need space.
Nor ought it to seem strange or hard that Augustine's saying is not true absolutely, but only with those two limitations: for that abundantly suffices for his purpose; for he wished only to teach that God is in place in such a way that He does not depend on place. And in order to show what it is to be in place and not to depend on place, he explained it by the contrary, which is better known to us, that is, by the examples of bodies which are in place in such a way that they depend on place: and for the truth of this example it is enough if certain bodies cannot exist naturally unless they be in a place. And hence those other words remain explained: “Take away from bodies the spaces of place, etc.”
The other objection is philosophical: for they strive to show that the essence of quantity is destroyed if it be placed somewhere and yet not occupy place. For thus Calvin argues in Book IV of the Institutes, chapter 17, § 29: “This is the proper truth of a body, that it be contained by space, that it consist of its own dimensions, that it have its own face: let there depart, therefore, that foolish figment which fastens both the minds of men and Christ to the bread.” Secondly, Peter Martyr, in his book against Gardiner, objection 74, proves that certain things are so intrinsic to a thing that, although they be posterior, yet they can in no way be separated: “For the faculty of understanding is posterior to the very essence of man, since the one is a quality, the other a substance, and yet the faculty of understanding cannot be separated from man, for he will not be a man if he lack reason. Likewise quantity is posterior to corporeal substance, and yet they cannot be separated without the destruction of the substance. But to occupy place is a certain intrinsic property of quantity; therefore it cannot be separated from quantity, although it be posterior.” Thirdly, the same author argues in the same place: “A quaternary cannot be separated from the mode of a quaternary, so that it exist after the mode of a unity; therefore neither can a line, or any other continuous quantity, be separated from its mode, so that it exist not extendedly but indivisibly.” To this belongs also the argument of others, which is the fourth: “A substance cannot exist except substantially; therefore neither can quantity except quantitatively.” And another, which is the fifth: “An indivisible spirit cannot in any way exist after the manner of a body divisibly and extendedly; therefore neither can a divisible body exist in any way after the manner of a spirit, indivisibly.” The sixth: “It seems to imply a contradiction that a body of three cubits be contained under the dimensions of a morsel of bread of one finger's breadth: for if this be done, the same body will be greater and lesser; and consequently greater and not greater in respect of the same thing.” The seventh: “If the body of the Lord has in the Eucharist its own figure, and the distinction and order of parts, then the feet are more distant from the head than the breast is. But greater and lesser distance cannot be understood without relation to place: for those things are more distant among which a greater interval is interposed.” The eighth: “It is of the essence of quantity to have part outside part; therefore where one part is, another is not; therefore the whole quantity of the Lord's body cannot be in the same particle of the host.”
But all these can be resolved from the foundations laid in chapter 5. To Calvin's first argument, therefore, I answer that he has mixed the true with the false, so as to seem to be saying something. For what he says, that for the truth of a body it is required that it have its own dimensions and its own face, is true: nor do we say that the body of Christ in the Eucharist lacks dimensions or face. But what he adds, that it is also required that it be contained by space, is false, as we showed above. And indeed, if from this whole hall in which we now are God should take away all the air, and suffer no other to enter, we should all retain our dimensions and our faces, and yet none would be contained by space, nor would any see the face of another.
To the second, of Peter Martyr, it might be said first that those things which he brings forward as alike are not alike. For to fill a place is a certain act, not a potency, but the faculty of understanding is a potency, not an act: and it is more absurd for a thing to lack a potency than an act. Whence we, who say that quantity sometimes by a divine miracle does not fill a place, yet at the same time say that it is of itself apt to fill a place, and would fill it, if it were left to its own nature.
Then I answer further that the faculty of understanding can be taken away by the divine power, and yet it does not thence follow that a man ceases to be a man, but only that he ceases to exercise what belongs to a man, because he lacks the instruments of human actions: just as infants and idiots are men, because they possess a rational soul, although they lack the use of understanding no less than if they did not have that faculty at all. The same I say of substance and quantity; for although they cannot naturally be sundered, yet it involves no contradiction that the one be without the other.
To the third of the same, I answer that a quaternary cannot be separated from the essential mode of a quaternary, but it can from the accidental mode; that is, it cannot come about that a quaternary be reduced to the mode of a unity, so that four men be one man: but it can come about that it be reduced to the place of a unity, so that four men occupy the place of one man. And in the same way a line or a body cannot be separated from its essential mode, so as to become in itself indivisible, but it can nevertheless be separated from its accidental mode, so as not to occupy a divisible place.
To the fourth, concerning substance, which seems unable to exist except substantially, I answer in the same way, that a substance cannot be separated from its essential mode — which would happen if it inhered in a subject after the manner of accidents — yet it can be separated from its intrinsic and proper, but not essential, mode, which is to exist through itself. For the substance of Christ's humanity is separated from that mode, since it exists in the Word and has not its own subsistence: so therefore quantity too cannot exist except quantitatively as regards its essential mode, because it cannot exist without extension and distinction of parts in itself; yet it can well exist non-quantitatively in relation to place, as we have often said.
To the fifth, concerning spirit and body, I answer that from the same principle it can be gathered why a spirit cannot be extended in place, and a body can be not extended. For to be extended in place is the formal effect of extension in itself: for a thing can be extended in place precisely because it is extended in itself, not conversely. But a formal cause can be separated from its effect, not conversely the effect from its cause; because the cause is prior, the effect posterior. Hence, then, a body extended in itself can be not extended in place, because by this only the cause is separated from the effect: but a spirit indivisible in itself cannot be extended in place, because by this the formal effect would be posited without its cause, and the posterior without the prior: which cannot be.
To the sixth I answer that, if we consider the dimensions of the body of Christ separately, and the dimensions of the consecrated host, the former are much greater than the latter; yet if we consider the same dimensions of the Lord's body as they are ineffably contained under the species of bread, they are neither greater nor lesser, because they are not commensurated with these, but exist without order to place, almost in the manner in which the soul is in the body, which can be called neither lesser nor greater than the body.
To the seventh I answer that the distance which is between the members of the body, inasmuch as it is extended in itself, is not a local distance, but of some other kind: for those things are said to be distant among themselves which are not immediately joined; and those to be more distant among which more things are interposed — and not intervals, but members. Which is plainly discerned in the human body, which we could conceive to be placed above heaven: in it indeed the feet would be distant from the head, not by local space, which is there none, but by the interposition of the breast and the other members.
To the eighth, which of all seems the most difficult by reason of the weakness of the human understanding, I answer that a quantified body has part outside part, if that word (outside) express a relation to the subject, but not if it express a relation to place. And likewise when in the argument they conclude, “Therefore where one part is, another is not,” I say it is rightly concluded, if that word (where) express the internal situation of the parts in the subject, but not if it express situation in place; and in this way is understood what the Philosopher says in the category of quantity, that a certain species of quantity consists of parts having position: for he speaks of position in the whole, or subject, not of position in place.
But against this solution certain men press acutely: A quantified body has part outside part in relation to the whole or subject; therefore also in relation to place. The consequence is proved. For a part of the body coexists with a fixed part of place: either therefore another part of the body coexists with the same part of place, or not; if not, then that body has part outside part in place too, and consequently is not whole in every part; if it coexists, then the parts of the body also coexist among themselves. But this cannot be, since they are distant among themselves, and one is outside the other, as has been said.
I answer: I deny that first consequence, “Therefore it has part outside part in relation to place too.” To the proof I say that two parts of the body coexist with the same part of place. When it is inferred, “Therefore they coexist also among themselves,” I say they do coexist also among themselves in place, but not in the subject: the reason of which has been often given, namely because the extension and distinction of parts in the subject is not, and cannot be, impeded, since it is essential; but the extension and distinction as regards place can be impeded, and is in fact impeded by God, when the Lord's body abides in the Sacrament. But enough of these things.
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CAPUT VII, Solvuntur objectiones adversariorum. Duo sunt adversariorum argumenta prae¬ cipua. Unum ex Augustino in epistol. 57 ad Dardanum, quod et a Calvino, et a Petro Martyre millies repetitur ; sic enim Augusti¬ nus loquitur : «Non potuit obtinere quanti¬ tas corporis, quod potuit qualitas ; nam ita distantibus partibus, quse simul esse non possunt, quoniam sua quseque spatia loco¬ rum tenent, minores minora, et majora ma¬ jores, non potuit esse in singulis quibusque partibus tota, vel tanta, sed amplior est quantitas in amplioribus partibus, brevior in brevioribus, et in nulla parte tanta, quanta per totum. » Et infra : « Spatia locorum tolle corporibus, et nusquam erunt ; et quia nus¬ quam erunt, nec erunt. » Et supra jam dixerat, destrui naturam humanam Christi, si non detur ei certum spatium, quo more aliarum rerum corporatarum contineatur. Respondeo : Augustinus in ea epistola qusedam dicit de corpore Christi, qusedam de corporibus generatim, quse non sunt confun¬ denda. De corpore Christi docet, illud non esse ubique diffusum, ita ut forma, et figura humana careat ; id enim esset naturam ejus destruere. Sic enim loquitur initio epistola : « Hinc fortasse intelligendum dicis. Paradi¬ sum quasi in aliqua coeli parte compositum ; aut quia ubique Deus sit, hominem quoque illum qu i in Deo sit, ubique esse diffusum. » Et infra hoc ipsum refellens : « Si venturus est, inquit, illa Angelica voco testante, quemadr- moduin ire visus est in coelum, id est in eadem carnis forma, atque substantia; cui profecto immortalitatem dedit, naturam non abstulit. Secundum hanc formam non est putandus ubique diffusus: cavendum est enim, ne ita divinitatem astruamus hominis, ut veritatem corporis auferamus. Non est autem conse¬ quens, ut quod est in Deo, ita sit ubique ut Deus. » Hsec ille : nec alia dicit de corpore Christi in particulari. Hac autem directe pugnant cum sententia CAPUT VIT. 1.51 Ubiquistarum Lutlieranorum, qui per unio¬ nem hypostaticam, ita Christi corpus ubique diffusum esse volunt, ut nusquam servet fi¬ guram, formam et situm humano corpori convenientem : quod est (ut Augustinus dicit) destruere naturam humanam Christi. At nos fatemur Christi corpus non esse ubique diffu¬ sum ; et ubicumque est, habere suam formam et figuram humanam, et partium situm, ac dispositionem ; quamvis lieec figura, forma, dispositio partium in coelo conspiciatur, ubi locum replet ; in Sacramento autem sit qui¬ dem, sed non repleat locum, nec videri a nobis possit : quemadmodum etiam ut supra diximus, non caruit figura, et forma Christus, cum se non semel inv:sibilem fecit ; neque carne, et ossibus caruit, quando super aquas ambulavit, et per clausas portas intravit. Jam vero de corpore gencratim duo dicit Augustinus. Primo corpora magnitudinem habentia extensa esse, et habere certum ordi¬ nem partium, et proinde non posse fieri ut tanta sit magnitudo unius partis , quanta totius ; vel tanta in parvo corpore, quanta in magno : cujus contrarium videmus non solum in rebus spiritualibus, sed etiam in qualitatibus corporalibus. Nam eadem ani¬ ma, et tota potest esse in parte corporis, et in toto corpore ; similiter in parvo corpore, et in magno ; et potest fieri, ut tantus sit candor, vel calor in parte corporis quantus in toto, imo etiam ut major sit candor, vel calor in parvo corpore, quam in magno. Quse omnia verissima sunt, et nihil pug¬ nant cum sententia nostra de Eucharistia ; quia solum requirit Augustinus, ut omne verum corpus sit extensum in se, non autem ut necessario coextendatur loco. Quod si in verbis Augustini primo loco allegatis ab haereticis, fit mentio loci, id fit, quia a pos¬ teriori probat Augustinus corpus in se exten¬ sum esse ex eo quod occupat certum spa¬ tium loci, sed non inde sequitur non posse extensum esse in se, nisi occupet locum. Ac per ha3C explicata manent prima verba Au¬ gustini supra citata : « Non potuit obtinere quantitas, etc. » Secundo Augustinus dicit, corpora ita esse in loco, ut pendeant a loco, cum o contrario Deus ita sit in loco, ut non pendeat a loco, sed potius locus pendeat a Deo. Sed hoc dictum intclligendum est de corporibus, qua} sunt infra coelum, et quatenus naturaliter existunt : nam alioqui falsum esset. Siqui¬ dem, ut scepe diximus, ultimum coelum non est in spatio, vel loco aliquo, sed est in seipso, et in Deo ; et sicut ultimum coelum non eget ullo spatio in quo sit, ita posset sine dubio Deus conservare alia corpora sine spa¬ tio, tametsi naturaliter egeant spatio. Neque mirum, aut durum videri debet dictum Augustini non esse verum absolute, sed solum cura duabus illis limitationibus : id enim abundo sufficit proposito ipsius ; solum enim docere volebat, Deum ita esse in loco, ut non pendeat a loco. Ut autem ostenderet, quid sit esse in loco, et non pen¬ dere a loco, explicuit per contrarium, quod est nobis notius, id. est, per exempla corpo¬ rum, qua} ita sunt in loco, ut pendeant a loco : ad hujus autem exempli veritatem satis est, si qusedam corpora non possint naturaliter existere, nisi in loco sint. Atque hinc expli¬ cata manent illa alia verba : « Spatialocorum tolle corporibus etc. » Altera objectio philosophica est : nituntur enim ostendere destrui essentiam quantita¬ tis, si alicubi ponatur, et tamen non occupet locum. Sic enim Calvinus argumentatur lib. iv Instit. cap. 17. § 29. « Hsec est propria corporis veritas, ut spatio contineatur, ut suis dimensionibus constet, ut suam faciem habeat : facessat igitur stultum illud com¬ mentum, quod tam mentes hominum, quam Christum pani affigit. » Secundo Petrus Mar¬ tyr in lib. contra Gardinerum objecto 74. probat, qusedam esse ita intrinseca rei, ut licet sint posteriora, tamen separari nequeant ullo modo : « Nam facultas intelligendi est posterior ipsa hominis essentia, cum illa qualitas, ista substantia sit, et tamen non potest separari ab homine facultas intelli¬ gendi, neque enim homo erit, si ratione careat. Similiter quantitas est posterior cor¬ porata substantia, et tamen separari nequeunt sine interitu substantia}. Sed occupare locum, est qua}dam intrinseca proprietas quantita¬ tis ; ergo separari non poterit a quantitate, licet posterior sit. » Tertio idem ibidem ar¬ gumentatur : « Non potest separari quater¬ narius a modo quaternarii, ita ut existat per modum unitatis ; ergo nec poterit linea, aut alia quantitas continua separari a modo suo, ita ut existat non extense sed indivisibiliter.» Huc pertinet aliorum etiam argumentum, quod sit quartum : « Non potest substantia existere nisi substantialiter; ergo nec quan¬ titas, nisi quantitative. » Et aliud quod sit quintum : « Non potest ullo modo spiritus indivisibilis existere per modum corporis LIBER Ili. 1 «'i 2 divisibiliter, et extense; ergo nec potest cor¬ pus divisibile existere ullo modo per modum spiritus indivisibiliter. » Sextum : « Videtur implicare contradictionem ut corpus trium cubitorum contineatur sub dimensionibus frustuli panis unius digiti : nam si ita fiat, erit idem corpus majus, et minus ; et proin¬ de majus et non majus respectu ejusdem. » Septimum : « Si corpus Domini suam habet in Eucharistia figuram, et partium distin¬ ctionem, et ordinem ; ergo distant pedes magis quam pectus a capite. At distantia major, et minor sine relatione ad locum in- telligi nequit : illa enim magis distant inter se. inter qua? majus intervallum interjectum est. » Octavum : « De essentia quantitatis est habere partem extra partem ; ergo ubi est est una pars, non est alia; non igitur tota quantitas corporis Domini in eadem hostia} particula esse potest. » Sed hsec omnia solvi possunt ex funda¬ mentis jactis cap. 5. Ad primum igitur Cal¬ vini argumentum, respondeo illum admi¬ scuisse vera falsis, ut aliquid dicere videretur. Nam quod ait ad corporis veritatem requiri, ut suas dimensiones, et suam faciem habeat, verum est : neque nos dicimus, Christi cor¬ pus in Eucharistia dimensionibus, aut facie carere. Quod vero addit, requiri etiam, ut spatio contineatur, falsum est, ut supra ostendimus. Et sane si ex tota hac aula, in qua nunc sumus, Deus totum aerem auferret nec alium ingredi pateretur, nos omnes reti¬ neremus dimensiones nostras, et facies, et tamen nec spatio contineretur, nec ullus alterius faciem videret. Ad secundum Petri Martyris dici posset in primis illa non esse similia, quse ipse ut si¬ milia adducit. Nam replere locum est actus quidam, non potentia, at facultas intelligendi est potentia, non actus : et magis absurdum est, rem carere potentia, quam actione. Unde nos qui dicimus quantitatem aliquan¬ do divino miraculo non replere locum : ta¬ men simul dicimus, illam ex se aptam esse replere locum, et repleturam, si sute na¬ tura} relinquatur. Deinde etiam respondeo facultatem intcl- ligendi per divinam potentiam tolli posse nec tamen inde sequi, ut homo desinat esse homo, sed tantum, ut desinat exercere, qua} hominis sunt, quia instrumentis actionum humanarum careat : quemadmodum infantes ac moriones homines sunt, quia rationabilem animum possident, licet non minus careant usu intelligendi, quam si facultatem illam penitus non haberent. Quod idem dico de substantia, et quantitate ; licet enim natura¬ liter sejungi nequeant, tamen nullam invol¬ vit contradictionem, ut unum sine altero sit. Ad tertium ejusdem respondeo quaterna¬ rium non posse separari a modo quaterna¬ rii essentiali, sed posse ab accidentario, id est, non potest fieri, ut quaternarius rediga¬ tur ad modum unitatis, ita ut quatuor homi¬ nes sint unus homo : sed potest fieri, ut re¬ digatur ad locum unitatis, ita ut quatuor liomines occupent locum unius hominis. Et eodem modo non potest linea, vel corpus separari a modo suo essentiali, ita ut fiat in se indivisibile, sed potest tamen separari a modo accidentario, ita ut non occupet lo¬ cum divisibilem. Ad quartum de substantia, qua} nou vide¬ tur posse existere, nisi substantialiter, re¬ spondeo eodem modo, substantiam non posse separari a modo suo essentiali, quod fieret, si inhaereret in subjecto more accidentium : tamen posse separari a modo suo intrinseco et proprio, sed non essentiali, qui est per se existere. Nam substantia humanitatis Chri¬ sti, ab isto modo separata est, cum existat in verbo, et non habeat propriam subsisten¬ tiam : sic igitur, et quantitas non potest existere nisi quantitative, quantum ad essen¬ tialem modum, quia non potest existere sine extensione, et partium distinctione in se ; tamen bene potest existere non quantitative in ordine ad locum, ut saepe diximus. Ad quintum de spiritu et corpore, re¬ spondeo, ex eodem principio colligi posse, cur non possit spiritus extendi in loco, et possit corpus non extendi. Nam extendi in loco est effectus formalis extensionis in se : ideo enim potest aliquid extendi in loco, quia in se est extensum, non e contrario. Potest autem causa formalis ab effectu separari, non contra, effectus a causa; quia causa prior est, effectus posterior. Hinc igitur potest corpus in se extensum non extendi in loco, quia per hoc separatur tantum causa ab effectu : non au¬ tem potest spiritus in se indivisibilis extendi in loco, quia per hoc poneretur effectus for¬ malis sine causa, et posterius sine priore : quod fieri nequit. Ad sextum respondeo, si consideremus di¬ mensiones corporis Christi seorsim, et di¬ mensiones hostiae consecratae, majores multo esse illas, quam istas ; tamen si consideremus easdem corporis Domini dimensiones, ut sub CAPUT VIII. 153 specie panis incffabiliter continentur, non esse majores, nec minores, quia non com- mensurantur illae istis, sed existunt sine or¬ dine ad locum, eo modo fere, quo anima est in corpore, quae nec minor, nec major cor¬ pore dici potest. Ad septimum respondeo, distantiam, quae est inter membra corporis, quatenus in se extensum est, non esse distantiam localem, sed alterius cujusdam generis : dicuntur enim ea distare inter se, quae non sunt im¬ mediate conjuncta ; et ea magis distare, in¬ ter quae plura sunt interjecta, et non inter¬ valla, sed membra. Quod perspicue cernitur in corpore humano, quod supra coelum col¬ locatum esse cogitare possemus : in eo siqui¬ dem distarent pedes a capite, nonper spatium locale, quod ibi nullum est, sed per interje¬ ctionem pectoris, aliorumque membrorum. Ad octavum, quod omnium videtur esse difficillimum ob ingenii humani imbecilli¬ tatem, respondeo, corpus quantum habere partem extra partem, si illud (extra) dicat habitudinem ad subjectum, non autem si dicat habitudinem ad locum. Et similiter cum in argumento colligunt : Ergo ubi est una pars, non est alia ; dico recte colligi, si illud (ubi) dicat situm internum partium in subjecto, non autem si dicat situm in loco ; et hoc modo intelligitur quod ait Philosophus in praedicamento quantitatis quamdam spe¬ ciem quantitatis constare ex partibus haben¬ tibus positionem : loquitur enim de positione in toto, sive subjecto, non de positione in loco. Sed contra solutionem quidam acuto in¬ stant : Corpus quantum habet partem extra partem in ordine ad totum seu subjectum, ergo et in ordine ad locum. Probatur conse¬ quentia. Nam pars corporis coexistit certa; parti loci : vel ergo eidem parti loci coexi¬ stit alia pars corporis ; vel non ; si non, ergo etiam in loco habet corpus illud partem extra partem, et proinde non est totum in qualibet parte : si coexistit, ergo etiam inter se partes corporis coexistunt. At hoc fieri nequit, cum inter se distent, et una sit extra aliam, ut dictum est. • Respondeo : Nego primam illam conse¬ quentiam : Ergo et -in ordinea d locum habet partem extra partem. Ad probationem dico duas partes corporis, coexistere eidem parti loci. Cum infertur : Ergo coexistunt etiam inter se ; dico coexistere etiam inter se in loco, non tamen in subjecto : cujus ratio est scepc reddita, quia videlicet extensio, et dis¬ tinctio partium in subjecto non impeditur, nec impediri potest, cum sit essentialis, ; extensio, et distinctio quoad locum impediri possit, et reipsa impediatur a Deo, cum cor¬ pus Domini in Sacramento manet. Sed do¬ liis satis.