Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Sacrament of the Eucharist · Book III: On the Truth of the Body of the Lord, from Reason
Chapter 24: The Objections of Peter Martyr Are Refuted
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. IV, De Sacramento Eucharistiae, Book III: On the Truth of the Body of the Lord in the Eucharist (from Reason). The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Peter Martyr, in his book against Stephen Gardiner, either proposes or confirms many arguments proposed before by others against transubstantiation: but of these many, which are taken from the word of God or from the Fathers, have been refuted by us above. Now, omitting these, we shall pursue the rest.
The first argument is had in objection 13, to which argument he inscribed in the margin of his book this eulogy: “Note a useful argument.” So, then, he argues: “As the Lord in John 6 said of Himself, I am bread; so in Matthew 26 He said of the bread, This is my body. But when He says, I am bread, He did not change Himself into bread: therefore when He says, This is my body, He did not change the bread into His body.”
I answer: those two sayings are not altogether alike. For when the Lord says, I am bread, He was not speaking of wheaten bread, but of heavenly bread; for He never said absolutely, I am bread, but, I am the living bread, or the bread of life, or something of this kind. Wherefore there was no need of any change for those sayings to be true, since both the pronoun “I” and the noun “bread” stood for the same Christ. But when the same Lord says, This is my body, according to the opinion of the adversaries that “This” points to wheaten bread; but according to the opinion of the Catholics it pointed to that which was contained under the species of wheaten bread. And so according to the opinion of the adversaries the sense was, This wheaten bread is my body; which saying cannot be true unless the bread be changed into the body of the Lord, as we showed above. And according to the opinion of the Catholics too that pronouncement of the Lord cannot be true unless a change of the bread into the body be made; for before the change, that which is contained under those species is not the body of the Lord, but the substance of wheaten bread. Wherefore in that useful argument the major proposition is false, if that “as” expresses a likeness of the propositions: but if that “as” be so taken that it signifies only that both sayings are of the same Christ, then the major proposition is true, but the consequence is bad, because in one sense the Lord said one thing, and in another sense another.
The second argument, in objection 14: “Transubstantiation opens a window to Marcion, Valentinus, Eutyches, and the other heretics who said that the body of Christ was phantasmal; for if the substance of His body flits invisibly through innumerable places, and now begins to be here, now there, who would not suspect it to be a phantasm?”
The third argument is in the same place: “The bread cannot totally cease to be without being annihilated. But what is annihilated cannot be converted, or pass into another substance, and therefore cannot be transubstantiated, unless we wish to abuse words; therefore transubstantiation, such as is posited by the Catholics, is impossible.” He proves the first proposition: for the bread was something, and now is nothing; therefore it is annihilated. And that it is nothing he proves, because it is nowhere, is nothing, no part of it remains. Nor can it be answered that it is not annihilated because a nobler thing succeeds it, for when food in the stomach is turned into human flesh, a nobler thing succeeds it, and yet it is said simply to be corrupted. And he proves the second proposition, because to be converted, or to pass, one into another, signifies, if we are to speak properly, that one and the same remains under both terms; otherwise it does not pass, but recoils or recedes, one from the other, if at the coming of one the other yields. And because this argument seems to Peter Martyr insoluble, he speaks thus with us: “If you were dealing with beasts, you ought not to dare to speak things so condemned and monstrous. Thanks be to God, who so manifestly destroys the wisdom of the wise, and rejects the understanding of the understanding. He knows the thoughts of men, that they are vain. In this time too, for our instruction, He does not disdain to comprehend the wise in their own craftiness.” So he.
Calvin too, Institutes Book IV, chapter 17, § 14, contends that the Catholics do not posit a true conversion, but an annihilation of the bread. Which the same Kemnitz asserts in the place noted: and before them John Wyclif in Thomas Waldensis, tome 2, chapter 68, where he also deduced that Christ is the evil God of the Manichees, if transubstantiation be true, because it will annihilate good things created by God.
I answer: The argument about the phantasm of the Marcionites seems to me a true phantasm: for it has a certain face of an argument, but is not a true argument, since it concludes nothing for the adversary. For a phantasm, or phantasmal bodies, such as the Marcionites, Manichees, Eutychians thought the body of Christ to be, seem to be true bodies if considered with the external eyes, and yet really are not true. But the body of Christ in the Eucharist, according to the opinion of the Catholics, does not seem to the external eyes to be a true body, and yet really is. And so the body of Christ in the Eucharist has conditions contrary to those which belong to a phantasmal body. Wherefore the argument of the adversary concludes the contrary of what he himself wished.
To the other, from what we said above in chapter 18 the solution is clear: but lest Martyr glory too much, I answer to the several parts of his argument. I deny, then, that the bread is annihilated, and assert that it is most truly converted. To that proof: “The bread was something, and now is nothing, is nothing, is nowhere, etc.” I answer that it is not therefore annihilated. For although the bread be nothing, yet that into which it is converted is not nothing, nor nowhere. For that is not said to be annihilated which remains nothing in itself, but that which is terminated at nothing, so that the term of the action by which it ceases to be is nothing: otherwise the water which was turned by the Lord into wine would have been annihilated; for after the conversion it was nothing, was nowhere. Nor does it stand in the way that perhaps the matter remained; for the matter is not water; and moreover at least the substantial form of the water, and many of its accidents, would have been annihilated, because nothing at all of them remained.
To the example of the food, which is said to be corrupted in the stomach even though a nobler thing succeed it, I answer, speaking properly: when a nobler thing succeeds, that whole action is called generation, not corruption; as, on the contrary, when an ignobler thing succeeds, it is called corruption, not generation. Yet because in truth wherever there is a generation of one, there is a corruption of the other, I admit that the food is truly corrupted, that human flesh may be generated; and in the same way I admit that the bread perishes by consecration, that the body of Christ may succeed it: but it is one thing to be corrupted and to perish, another to be annihilated. For whatever ceases to be is corrupted or perishes: but nothing is annihilated except that which so ceases to be that nothing succeeds, so that its ceasing is terminated at nothing. And so the food is indeed corrupted, because it ceases to be, but is not annihilated, because it does not cease into nothing, but into human flesh.
As to the other proposition of the argument of Peter Martyr, I answer that it is one thing to pass from one to another, another to pass one into another. For when we say that something has passed from one to another, then we signify the permanence of the same thing under both terms: and in this way, when one so yields to the other coming that it migrates to another, it is said to recoil or recede, and to pass from that to which it yields, but not to pass into it. But when we say that one passes into another, then we do not signify the permanence of the same thing under both terms, but signify the ceasing of one thing and the beginning of another. So we most usually say that night is converted or passes into day by the rising of the sun, and day into night by the setting of the sun; wood into fire by burning; food into a man by nutrition; and the elements into one another by mutual conflict; and in this way we say that the bread is converted or passes into the body of Christ, but not that some third thing passes from the bread to the body of Christ. Hence, then, it is clear how inept and cold was the boasting of the Pseudo-martyr.
The fourth argument is had in objection 30, where he takes an argument from the confession of Berengarius, which is had in the canon Ego Berengarius, on consecration, distinction 3. For in that confession, which was approved by the Roman Council, it is had that the bread and wine which are placed on the altar are, after consecration, not only a Sacrament, but also the true body and blood of the Lord, and are sensibly and in truth handled by the hands of the priests, and broken, and ground by the teeth of the faithful. From which confession it is openly gathered that true bread is in the Eucharist, and that it is sensibly handled, broken, ground: for these things cannot be said of the flesh of Christ without enormous blasphemy.
The same argument John Wyclif had made before, in Thomas Waldensis, tome 2, chapters 42 and 43. For Wyclif objected that the Church in the time of Innocent III fell away from the Church which was in the time of Nicholas II, because the former denied that the substance of the bread remains in the Eucharist, the contrary of which that confession in the abjuration of Berengarius had posited. Calvin too, Institutes Book IV, chapter 17, § 12, and others, both Lutherans and Calvinists, either object this confession of Berengarius against us, or deride it as monstrous. And finally the first of all, Berengarius (as Lanfranc testifies in his book on the body of the Lord), after that abjuration, being perjured, began to object to the faithful that from that confession it could be gathered that true bread is in the Eucharist: “For just as he who says, Christ is the cornerstone, does not take away Christ, but posits Him; so also (he said) he who says, The bread is the body of Christ, does not take away the bread, but posits it.”
I answer: That confession of the Roman Council, as to the words, is wholly taken from the ancient holy Fathers, and therefore cannot be rejected or derided without at the same time the ancient holy Fathers being rejected and derided. And as to the thing itself, it contains nothing false, or contrary to the faith which both before and after the Catholic Church of Christ held.
There are four parts of that confession. The first is that the bread after consecration is a Sacrament: and this none of the adversaries denies, and it is had expressly in Augustine, Book 20 against Faustus, chapter 13, where he says that the bread and the chalice become mystical by a certain consecration, otherwise they are the nourishment of refreshment, not the Sacrament of religion.
The second part is that the same bread after consecration is the true and natural body of Christ: which is understood of the bread changed substantially by the power of consecration, as above in chapter 21 we proved from Lanfranc, Guitmund, and Anselm. And so the consecrated bread, as to the external species, is a Sacrament; as to the internal substance, is the true and natural body of Christ. And this is not only true as to the sense, but also conformable to the opinions of the Fathers above cited in chapter 20, especially of St. Augustine in his homily to the infants, in Bede in his commentary on 1 Corinthians 10, where he says: “The bread is the body, and the wine is the blood.”
To the argument of Berengarius, Wyclif, Peter Martyr, and others, who say, If after consecration the bread is the body of the Lord, then after consecration the bread remains: Lanfranc answered most excellently, that the bread does altogether remain after consecration, but heavenly bread, not wheaten; for the bread after consecration is bread changed substantially into the flesh of the Lord, as we have often said.
The third part is that the body of the Lord is sensibly handled by the hands, broken, and ground by the teeth; which mode of speaking is found most openly in the Fathers. Chrysostom, homily 83 on Matthew: “Him thou seest, Him thou touchest, Him thou eatest.” And homily 45 on John: “He permits Himself not only to be seen by those who desire, but also to be touched and eaten, and the teeth to be fixed in His flesh.” And homily 24 on the first to the Corinthians: “What He suffered not on the cross, that He suffers in the oblation, and endures to be broken for thee, that He may satisfy all.” So he. Chrysostom asserts that the body of the Lord in the Eucharist is seen, touched, broken, and the teeth fixed in it: such things as are read also in Cyril, Book 12 on John, chapter 58, and other Fathers. And the sense of these words is that the body of Christ is seen, touched, broken, and ground by the mediation of the species of bread, which alone are formally seen, touched, broken, ground. In the way that in Luke 8 the Lord said, Who touched me? And again, Somebody touched me. And yet no one had touched Him, or His body, immediately, but only by the mediation of the hem of His garment: and we usually say, The rain has wetted and moistened me all over, even though perhaps only the cloak was sprinkled with water. Finally, in the Scriptures the Angels were very frequently said to be seen and touched, when they were seen and touched in the bodies they had assumed.
The fourth part is that this sensible contact of the flesh of Christ is not only in the Sacrament, that is, in the symbol, but also in the truth of the thing: which particle was added on account of the frauds of the heretics. For in two ways can the flesh of Christ be sensibly seen and touched by the mediation of the species of bread. In one way by the mediation of certain species or signs; in the way that he who sees and touches an image of Christ painted or sculptured can say that he has sensibly seen and touched Christ by the mediation of that sign: and that Christ is only in this way seen and touched in the Eucharist, that confession of the Roman Council denies. In the other way by the mediation of those species, as really covering the present flesh of Christ; and this that confession wills, and to this the examples brought forward pertain, of the touch of Christ by the mediation of the garment, and of the touch of the Angels by the mediation of the assumed body: and this mode of speaking Chrysostom too has, homily 83 on Matthew, where he says thus: “O how do they say, I would I could see His face and form.” And he subjoins: “Him therefore thou seest, Him thou touchest, etc.” Where he opposes the presence of Christ in the Eucharist to His presence in an image and form expressed to the life; which certainly he would not do, if in the Eucharist we had Christ only in a sign.
The fifth argument is had in objections 63, 64, 121, 122, 123, 129. The senses cannot be deceived about a sensible substance: but they judge that in the Eucharist there is bread. Likewise the Fathers prove that Christ was a true man, against Marcion, Manichaeus, and like heretics, because He ate, drank, slept, was wearied: therefore in the same way we can prove that in the Eucharist there is true bread, because there is there the color, taste, smell, figure of true bread. Or if here the senses are deceived, and it is lawful for us to say, It is not bread, though it seem so to all the senses, why will it not be lawful for the Marcionites to say, Christ was not a man, though to all the senses He seemed to be a man? Therefore this transubstantiation prejudices the faith, and favors the heretics, etc. This is the sum of those objections. The like has also John Wyclif, in Thomas Waldensis, tome 2, chapters 45 and 46, where he argues that in the Eucharist there is true bread, because so the mice judge.
There can be added a somewhat weightier argument from Scotus, who both proposes and resolves it. And it is of this kind: “In the Sacrament of truth nothing ought to be false. But if the substance of the bread be lacking, there will be falsity in the accidents: for the external accidents are natural signs of the internal substance, whence also by them the substance is investigated a posteriori by the philosophers.”
I answer to the first: That opinion of the philosophers, that the sense is not deceived about its object, is true, but needs many limitations, which are to be noted, that we may see how weak a foundation the adversaries have. First, it is true of the object per se, that is, of the accidents, not of the substance, which is the object of the senses by accident. For we see that men are very frequently deceived even about sensible substances, when they judge from the sole apprehension of the senses, as is clear in ice, which seems crystal, in brass, which is not discerned from gold, and so of others: and this would suffice to resolve the argument. For we confess that the senses are not deceived in the accidents of the bread, which are the objects per se, but only in the substance, which is the object by accident. There was brought to us at Rome in the year 1585, by certain men from Syria, a fragment of wood converted into stone, certain accidents of the wood remaining, as figure, color, roughness, etc.; which indeed seemed so truly wood to the judgment of the eyes that one who knew not the thing would have sworn it to be wood, whereas it was not wood, but most truly stone.
Secondly, that opinion is true of the proper object, not of the common object. Whence we see men everywhere deceived in judging the magnitude of the stars, in the figure of a staff existing in water, in motion and rest when we sail: for we think the shores recede and the ship stand still.
Thirdly, it is true of the proper object if the organ and the medium be well disposed: for otherwise even about the proper object we can be deceived; for often through green spectacles we think a white color to be green; and the tongue, being infected, judges sweet things to be bitter.
Fourthly, it is true of the proper object in general; for in particular an error seems able to occur, even the organ and medium being rightly disposed. It is true (I say) of the object in general, because the sense of seeing never errs in this, that it apprehends color or light: for it can in no way come about that it apprehend taste and smell, or anything else, except color and light. In the way too that the understanding does not err in this, that it apprehends being in general: but in particular an error seems able to occur, namely that it apprehend one thing for another. For in the rainbow the eyes judge the colors to be most true, which nevertheless are nothing but reflected light. Since therefore these things are so, the Fathers deservedly reprehend those who from the apprehension of the senses wish to judge of this Sacrament and other matters of faith. See Cyril, catechesis 4 of the Mystagogics, Chrysostom homily 83 on Matthew, and Augustine sermon 33 on the words of the Lord.
To the second I answer that against Marcion, Manichaeus, and the like, it is proved by the Fathers that the body of Christ was true and solid, and not phantasmal, by the experience of the senses: and this most rightly for two causes, each of which is lacking to the argument of the adversaries concerning the bread of the Eucharist. The first cause is that it was disputed with those heretics about the proper object of the senses, that is, about the solidity of the body; for a phantasm cannot be touched. Whence also the Lord in Luke 24 proved that He was not a spirit or phantasm, but a solid body, by touch: Handle and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see me to have. But we do not dispute with the Lutherans about the substance of the bread, which is not an object of the senses, neither proper nor common, except by accident, and about which one is often deceived.
The second cause is that the Scripture nowhere says that Christ has not a true body, nay affirms the contrary, and likewise the Church in the Councils always taught the same. And this foundation of faith being laid, from the word of God explained through the Church, all other arguments are rightly employed which can confirm the same; although otherwise they cannot produce the certitude of Catholic faith. But in the cause of the Lutherans, the word of God declared through the Catholic Church in many Councils affirms that in the Eucharist there is not bread: and therefore arguments from the experience of the senses, which (as I showed) are in themselves fallacious, in this matter are to be judged most fallacious.
To the argument of Scotus, I say that there is nothing false in the sensible sign of the Eucharist; because those accidents naturally signify that under that species lies hidden the substance of bread, and therefore, unless God do something beyond the course and order of nature, by those accidents one comes into the knowledge of the substance. But in the Eucharist it comes about not naturally, but above the order of nature, that under those accidents the substance of bread is lacking. And so in the signs themselves there is no falsity, since they signify only this, that naturally under that species the substance of bread lies hidden. And if the imagination of men is deceived in this matter, that arises from their own fault: for they are either faithful or unfaithful. If faithful, they are not deceived, because they know by the testimony of God and the Church that there are there accidents without substance. If unfaithful, they are deceived, either because they will not believe God and the Church, or, if perhaps they have heard nothing of this mystery, they are deceived simply from ignorance of the mystery, not from a falsity which is in the thing. And this is no absurdity: for in this way even holy men were deceived, Abraham, Lot, Tobias, Manoah, Gideon, and others, who believed the Angels appearing to them in human species to be true men, and treated them as men: and the two disciples were deceived, who thought the Lord to be some stranger: and Magdalen, who thought Him to be the gardener.
The sixth argument is in the same author, objections 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73: “The bread of the Eucharist receives various changes, which can in no way come about without the substance of the bread, which is the subject of those changes; therefore the substance of the bread, and not the accidents alone, are found in the Eucharist. The antecedent is proved, because the bread of the Eucharist can be altered, as heated, nay even infected with poison: for it is established that Pope Victor III and the Emperor Henry VII perished by poison which had been placed in the Eucharist. Likewise the bread of the Eucharist is sometimes corrupted, and thence another thing is generated: for it is established that men are nourished by it, and worms procreated from it, and that it too can be burned, and the wine of the Eucharist sometimes turned into vinegar.”
I answer: All these are treated accurately by the Schoolmen: but as to the arguments of the adversaries, they can easily be resolved. For the change in the bread of the Eucharist is either mere alteration or corruption. If mere alteration, as heating, condensation, etc., then no matter or substance is required; for all the accidents have for subject the quantity, which remains in the Sacrament. Whence the consecrated host is called white, savory, round, small, etc.; for these all denominate the quantity, otherwise this denomination could not be made: for the accidents are not said of themselves in the concrete, but only of the subject, excepting the quantity, which is both called quantity and quantified. And as it can come about that the qualities remain in the quantity separated from the matter, so it can also come about that new qualities be introduced into the same quantity separated from the matter. But if it be a corruption of the species, as in human nutrition, burning, etc., then matter is indeed required, but it is substituted by God in that very instant in which those species cease to be, and in which another thing is generated; and this without a miracle. For just as, when the matter of a human body is sufficiently disposed, God creates and infuses the soul, and this is not called a miracle, because the order of things instituted by God requires this: so also when by the alteration of the species of bread it comes to this, that the dispositions requisite for introducing some form are present, the order of things requiring it, God substitutes the matter, and in that very instant by a natural agent, by the mediation of the premised dispositions, the substantial form is introduced. And this is the simplest and safest explanation of this matter: for so all things cohere. For we neither say that generation and corruption are made without matter, nor multiply miracles, nor say that matter is made by a natural agent, or certainly that nothing is made by it, but the whole by God alone: and at the same time we show that nothing of matter perishes from the world by the consecration of so many loaves.
But Peter Martyr objects, in objection 67, an argument insoluble in his own judgment, but really altogether inept, and unworthy even of a mediocre philosopher: “For if,” he says, “those species are disposed to receive matter, either this comes about while the body of Christ remains in the Eucharist, or after its departure. While the body of Christ remains, it cannot come about, because the matter of the bread and the body of Christ ought never to be together; but they would be together if the disposition were made while the body of Christ remained: for the last disposition and the introduction of that for which the disposition was made are together. But the body of Christ departing, the species perish, nor are they anywhere, as all the Theologians teach who will have the body of Christ to remain so long as the species remain. But what perishes cannot be disposed; therefore that disposition is fictitious.”
I answer: The dispositions are not made to receive matter, as Martyr unskillfully says, but to receive form: but because the form could not be introduced unless matter were present, therefore (as I said) God substitutes the matter. Moreover those dispositions are begun while the body of Christ remains: but the last disposition, together with which both the matter is substituted by God and the form is introduced by the natural agent, is made in that instant which is the first non-being of the body of the Lord in the Eucharist, and the first being of the generated thing.
But, says Martyr: “Then the species are not.” I answer: they are not in their own nature, but they are nevertheless in the nature of the other qualities introduced: nor is this new or singular, but common and ordinary in every generation and corruption.
To that about poison administered in the Eucharist, I answer that, whatever be the case with the truth of the histories (for there are not lacking those who contend that those histories are false), either the poison consisted in a mere quality sprinkled on the wine of the Eucharist, or in some substance mixed with that wine before or after consecration. If in a mere quality, then no absurdity follows if we say that in the consecrated species itself that quality can remain or be introduced, as others can which are compatible with the accidents of bread and wine. But if there be some poisoned substance, as some liquor, in that the body of the Lord will not be, although in the same chalice that liquor be with the consecrated wine; for nothing can be turned into the body and blood of the Lord except what the Lord Himself instituted, that is, bread and wine.
The seventh argument is in objection 106: “It is of the nature and essence of accidents to inhere in a subject. But in the bread of the Eucharist the accidents of bread are found; therefore also their subject, which is the substance.” He proves the major proposition. First, because the being of an accident is to be in something, as is gathered from Book 5 of the Metaphysics, text 33. Whence an accident is not so much called a being as of a being, that is, something of a being, or something existing in a being.
Secondly, Aristotle reprehends Plato for positing ideas separated from matter. And if substantial forms, such as the ideas are, cannot be separated from matter, how much less can accidental forms be separated?
Thirdly, as it belongs to an accident to inhere in another, so it belongs to a substance not to inhere. But it can in no way come about that a substance inhere in another: therefore neither that accidents do not inhere.
Fourthly, those accidents are either in themselves or in another. If in themselves, then they subsist per se, and therefore are substances, not accidents. If in another, then they inhere; therefore they do not remain without a subject.
Fifthly, Augustine in Epistle 57 to Dardanus: “Take away,” he says, “the very bodies from the qualities of bodies, there will be no place where they may be; and therefore it is necessary that they be not.” Another passage like to this John Wyclif brought forward from Book 2 of the Soliloquies, chapter 12, where Augustine speaks thus: “To whom can it seem possible that that which is in a subject remain, the subject itself perishing?”
I answer that it is false that it pertains to the essence of an accident to inhere in a subject: for this is denied not only by the ancient Fathers and all the Theologians and Christian philosophers, but even by many of the heathen. Of the Fathers, Basil not only believed that an accident can be without a subject, but even that it really was so at the beginning of the creation of things. For in homily 2 on the work of the six days, and more clearly in homily 6, he teaches that the light of the sun was created on the first day and remained without a seat and vehicle for three days, and at length on the fourth day the solar body was created, and in it, as in a subject, was placed that light which had been created on the first day. And lest anyone say that by light Basil understands not a true and mere quality, but some luminous substance, he explains himself most clearly. For he says that whiteness is one thing, and the body which by it is made white is another; and in the same way that light is one thing, and a luminous body another: and although we cannot separate one from the other except by thought alone, yet those things which we separate by mind and thought can really be separated by God. Nor can it also be said that Basil perhaps confounds light with brightness, and only wishes to say that in those first three days there was brightness in the world without the sun, so however that the subject was not lacking (for the brightness was in the air and water as in a subject), but the second efficient cause was lacking, that is, the luminous body from which that illumination would be made. This, I say, cannot be said. For in homily 3 Basil distinguishes the primigenial light, which he says was afterward placed in the solar body, from the brightness which was diffused through water and air: for he says that that light, by the emission of rays, and again by the contraction of the same, effected day and night; for while that light emitted rays, all diaphanous bodies were illuminated, while it contracted its rays, the same bodies were darkened. The like has John Damascene, following Basil, Book 2 on the Orthodox faith, chapter 7.
Moreover Thomas Waldensis, tome 2, chapter 76, brings forward many testimonies of the ancient philosophers, who taught that accidents can exist without a subject. Aristotle indeed does not grant this, because it cannot come about naturally: yet he openly teaches that inherence is not of the essence of an accident: which suffices for us in this place to refute the vanity of Peter Martyr. For Aristotle, Book 3 on the soul, text 9, says: “Magnitude is one thing, the being of magnitude another.” And if the very being, that is, the existence of an accident, is distinguished from its essence, certainly much more will the inherence be distinguished, which is a certain mode of existence. Again, Book 4 of the Physics, text 58, Aristotle asks whether that space is to be deemed empty in which there should be only color or sound: which question indeed would be altogether empty, if inherence were of the essence: for he who should name color would necessarily include also the subject, and therefore a body.
To the first proof, then, I say that that opinion, The being of an accident is to be in something, and, An accident is not a being, but of a being, signifies nothing else than that the nature of an accident is imperfect, and has a certain order to substance, for whose sake it exists.
For it is to be known that accidents have their own essence, as is clear: for accidents have their genera and species plainly distinct from the genera and species of substance; for they are diverse categories. Again it cannot be denied that accidents have their own existence distinct from the existence of the subject or substance, as is clear, because they terminate real actions; for alteration properly produces quality, and augmentation quantity: yet accidents have a threefold order to substance. The first is essential, because, as I said, they are beings essentially imperfect, and therefore essentially regard substance. But this order is not a relation properly so called, but is the very imperfect nature, and by reason of this it is said to be not so much a being as of a being, and its being is said to be to be in something, because it is ordered to inhere in a subject. The second order is a certain potency or aptitude to inhere: and this order is not of the essence, but is a certain property of the accident, which arises from that imperfect nature, as we said. The third order is actual inherence, which is as it were a certain act and office of the accident, and therefore something posterior to the accident itself. For an accident, for example a given whiteness, is not such because it makes the wall white, but on the contrary, it therefore makes the wall white because it is in itself whiteness. No repugnance, therefore, is admitted if by divine power an accident were separated from that which is neither of its essence, and on which it does not depend, since it is prior.
To the second proof I say that those are deservedly reprehended by Aristotle who posited separated substantial forms: for they thought that this was the nature of things, that forms should be separated. But this reprehension does not pertain to us, who confess that naturally separated forms not only do not exist, but even cannot exist.
To the third I answer that a fallacy lurks in the argument; for when Peter Martyr says, As it belongs to an accident to inhere, so to a substance not to inhere: he compares the act of an accident, not with the act of a substance, as he ought if he wished to compare rightly, but with the negation of the act of an accident. But if he had compared rightly in this way: As it belongs to an accident to inhere, so it belongs to a substance to subsist; or negatively: As it belongs to an accident not to subsist, so to a substance not to inhere, he would have seen that his argument is worth nothing, nay is for us. For just as it belongs to a substance naturally to subsist, and yet supernaturally it can be separated from its subsistence, as is clear in the mystery of the Incarnation, where human nature is a substance and yet does not subsist, that is, does not exist per se, but is sustained by the Word: so it belongs to an accident naturally to inhere, and yet it can come about by divine power that it does not inhere. So also, just as a substance can in no way subsist per se: for in the Sacrament, although the accidents are not in a subject, yet they do not subsist per se in the manner of a substance, but are sustained by God in a supernatural mode. And the reason why an accident cannot inhere, or exist per se, is at hand; because a formal effect cannot be separated from its cause, on which it intrinsically depends, although on the contrary the cause can be separated from the effect, because the prior does not depend on the posterior. Now to inhere is the formal effect of an accident, as to subsist is of a substance; hence, then, that thing can in no way inhere which is not an accident, nor that subsist which is not a substance.
To the fourth, which was of this kind: “Those accidents are either in themselves or in another. If in themselves, then they subsist: if in another, then they inhere.” I answer that they are in themselves and do not subsist: because they are in themselves negatively, not positively. For they are therefore said to be in themselves because they are not in any suppositum, and yet in truth they do not subsist by a positive act, such as flows from substantial natures; for so I say that they are in another and do not inhere, because they are in another as in a preserver, not as in a subject.
To the fifth proof, from Augustine, I answer that he speaks of that which can come about naturally.
The eighth argument is had in objections 125 and 126: “Transubstantiation is made either before the words of consecration, or after, or together with them. If before, then it is not made by the power of those words: if after, then those words are false, This is my body: if together, then transubstantiation is made successively, and not in an instant, as all the Theologians teach.”
I answer that it is made together: and to the argument on the contrary I say that it is made not in the whole time during which the pronunciation lasts, but in the last terminative instant of that utterance. For although the last part of that motion by which the words are uttered is not given, nor of the time corresponding to it: yet there is given a last “changed-being” terminative of that motion, and a last instant terminative of that time.
And what Peter Martyr objects, that it follows from this solution that the whole force of consecration consists in that last syllable, which seems ridiculous, is trifling. For that syllable does not operate by its own force alone, since of itself it signifies nothing, but by the force of the whole sentence, which then has its complete being when the whole utterance is finished.
But someone might object: Just as the body of the Lord begins to be in the Sacrament in an instant, so also the bread ceases to be in an instant: for it is not corrupted gradually by previous dispositions, but by a simple divine action ceases to be. But those things which cease in an instant cease by the last of their being, just as those which begin in an instant begin by the first of their being: therefore there must be given an affirmative instant both of the ceasing of the bread and of the succession of the body of the Lord. Again, either the instant of the ceasing and of the succession is the same, or diverse. If the same, then together under those species will be the bread and the body of the Lord: if diverse, then in the intermediate time (for two immediate instants are not given) those species will be without the substance of bread and without the body of the Lord.
I answer: Although the bread cease in an instant, yet that instant cannot be assigned or noted except negatively, so that it is the first non-being of the bread, and not the last being of the bread. The reason of which is that the bread ceases at the ceasing of the words, by whose force that conversion is made: but the words do not have a last being, but a first non-being. And so that instant terminative of the utterance of the words is the first non-being of the words, and consequently of the substance of the bread: and at the same time is the first being of the body of the Lord under those species. Which same we discern in natural transmutation. For the substance which is corrupted ceases to be in an instant, for there are not degrees in substance, as in qualities; and yet, because it ceases at the ceasing of the dispositions, it has not a last being, but a first non-being: for the dispositions cease by successive motion.
The ninth argument is had in objection 108 and the following up to 116: “Transubstantiation being posited, it follows that the body of Christ is made from bread: but this is absurd in many respects; therefore transubstantiation is not to be admitted. The assumption is proved.” First, “If the body of Christ is made from bread, then the body of Christ is generated: for there is no change to substance except generation. But it is absurd that Christ be daily generated.” Secondly, “in the Eucharist is Christ, God and man; therefore, if what is in the Eucharist is made by the priest through consecration, then God and man is made by the priest.” Thirdly, “the body of Christ which was on the cross and in the womb of the mother was not made from bread, but from the flesh of the Virgin. But what is in the Eucharist is made from bread; therefore the body of the Lord which is in the Eucharist is not that which was on the cross and in the womb of the mother.” This argument he repeats again and again, and reduces into various forms of syllogisms, that no place may be left for cavils.
I answer: There is no absurdity that the body of Christ be made from bread: for so speaks Ambrose, Book 4 on the Sacraments, chapter 4, Gaudentius, treatise 2 on Exodus, and other Fathers.
To the first proof I wonder at the unskillfulness or audacity of Peter Martyr, who so often inculcates that the body of Christ must necessarily be said to be generated, if that conversion is terminated at substance. For although generation be rightly distinguished by the philosophers from alteration, augmentation, and lation; because generation is terminated at substance, alteration at quality, augmentation at quantity, and lation at “where” or place: yet what Christian is ignorant that generation is distinguished from creation, although each be to substance? And again, that the conversions made by miracle of water into wine, and of Lot's wife into a statue of salt, were terminated at substance, and yet are not properly generations? I say, then, that transubstantiation is terminated at substance, and yet is not generation, but a supernatural conversion, by which (as I showed above) the body of Christ is not produced, but succeeds the substance of the bread.
To the second I deny that the body of Christ, or Christ Himself, God and man, is absolutely made by the priests. For it is one thing to confect the body of Christ from bread, which the priests do, another to make the body of Christ absolutely: for to make the body of Christ from bread is not to produce it, but to change into it the pre-existing substance of the bread. Although, if it be a matter of the mode of speaking, Jerome did not hesitate, in his letter to Heliodorus, and in the other to Evagrius, to say that the priests confect the body of Christ with their sacred mouth.
To the third I say that the body of Christ is made from bread, not as from matter, in the way it was made from the flesh of the holy Virgin, and in the way from wood a chair is made, from gold and silver precious vessels; but as from a term from which, in the way from nothing the heaven was made, from day comes night, and also from water was made wine. For neither did the water remain as the matter of the wine, although the first matter remained, which cannot be called water. Moreover this various effecting does not change the nature of the thing. For if anyone were produced by God from nothing, he would not be of a different nature from those men who are made from pre-existing matter, nor was the wine made from water in Cana of Galilee of a different nature from the wine which is made from grapes. And although the species is never changed, yet a new individual is produced distinct from all others, when the conversion is productive: but in the present business the conversion is not productive, as we showed above. For the bread is converted into the very pre-existing body of Christ; and therefore the body made from the flesh of the Virgin, and the body made from bread, are not diverse, but altogether one and the same.
To the argument of Peter Martyr comprised in an expository syllogism, in which he so greatly confides, I answer in form. The argument is this: “This body (pointing to the crucified body) was not made from bread. This body (pointing to the body of the Lord in the Eucharist) was made from bread; therefore this is not that.” I answer: If by “made from bread” be understood “produced,” the proposition being granted, the assumption is denied: for the body of the Lord in the Eucharist is not produced, but only succeeds the bread. But if by “made from bread” be understood “to have succeeded the bread converted and changed into it,” then the assumption being granted, the proposition is denied. For truly that body which was crucified was made from bread: for it is that into which the bread was converted by consecration by Christ Himself saying, This is my body, which shall be delivered for you. And thus far concerning transubstantiation.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXIV. Refelluntur objectiones Petri Martyris. Petrus Martyr in lib. contra Stephanum Gardinerum multa argumenta, vel proponit, vel ab aliis antea proposita confirmat contra transubstantiationem : sed ex iis multa, qua} ex verbo Dei, vel ex Patribus sumuntur, supra a nobis refutata sunt. Nunc iis omissis, reliqua prosequemur. Primum argumentum habetur objectione 13. cui argumento ad marginem libri hoc elogium adscripsit : « Nota utile argumen¬ tum. » Sic igitur argumentatur : « Sicut Do¬ minus Joan. vi. de se dixit, Ego sum panis; ita Matth. xxvi. de pane dixit, Hoc est cor¬ pus meum. Sed cum ait, Ego sum panis ; non se mutavit in panem : ergo cum ait, Hoc est corpus meum ; non mutavit panem in corpus suum. » Respondeo : non sunt omnino similes illae duce sententice. Nam cum Dominus ait : Ego sum panis , non loquebatur de pane triticeo, sed de pane coelesti ; nunquam enim dixit absolute : Ego sum panis, sed, Ego sum panis vivus , aut panis vitee, aut aliud hujusmodi. Quare non fuit opus ulla mutatione, ut ilice sententia; verse essent, cum pro eodem Christo supponerent , tam pronomen, ego, quam nomen panis. At cum idem Dominus ait : Hoc est corpus meum ; ex adversariorum sententia, illud, Hoc , demonstrat panem tri¬ ticeum ; ex sententia autem Catholicorum demonstrabat id , quod continebatur sub triticei panis speciebus. Itaque ex sententia adversariorum, sensus erat, Hic panis tri¬ ticeus est corpus meum ; quse sententia non potest esse vera, nisi panis mutetur in corpus Domini, ut supra ostendimus. Ex sententia etiam Catholicorum non potest esse verum illud Domini pronunciatum , nisi fiat mu¬ tatio panis in corpus ; non enim ante muta¬ tionem , id quod sub speciebus illis conti¬ netur, est corpus Domini, sed panis triticei substantia. Quare in illo utili argumento major propositio est falsa, si illud, sicut, dicat similitudinem propositionum : si autem ita accipiatur illud, sicut, ut solum significet ejusdem Christi esse utramque sententiam ; tunc major propositio est vera, sed conse¬ quentia est mala, quia in alio sensu Dominus unum dixit, et in alio sensu aliud. Secundum argumentum in objecto 14 : <( Transubstantiatio aperit fenestram Marci o- ni, Valentino, Eutycheti, aliisque hsereticis, qui Christi corpus phantasticum esse dice¬ bant ;nam si substantia corporis ejus invisibi¬ liter volitat per innumera loca, et modo hic incipit esse, modo illic, quis non suspicetur esse phantasma ? » Tertium argumentum est ibidem : « Non potest panis totaliter desinere esse, quin an¬ nihiletur. At quod annihilatur, non potest converti, vel transire in aliam substantiam, et proinde nec transubstantiari, nisi vocabu¬ lis abuti velimus ; ergo est impossibilis tran¬ substantiatio, qualis a Catholicis ponitur ». Probat primam propositionem : nam panis erat aliquid, et jam est nihil ; ergo est an- nihilatus. Quod autem sit nihil probat, quia nusquam est, nullus est, nulla pars ejus re¬ manet. Nec potest responderi non annihilari quia succedit ei res nobilior, nam quando cibus in stomacho vertitur in carnem hu¬ manam, succedit ei res nobilior, et tamen dicitur simpliciter corrumpi. Probat autem secundam propositionem, quia converti, vel transire unum in aliud significat, si proprie loquendum sit, unum et idem manere sub utroque termino, alioqui non transit, sed resilit vel recedit unum ab alio, si uno ve¬ niente alterum cedit. Et quia hoc argumen- CAPUT XXIV. tum videtur Petro Martyri insolubile, ita loquitur nobiscum: <c Si ageretis cumbclluis non deberetis audere tam da ua-rata, et mon- strosa loqui. Gratia sit Deo, qui tam mani¬ feste perdit sapientiam sapientium, et intel- ligentiam intelligentium rejicit. Ipse novit cogitationes hominum quoniam vanre sunt. Hoc quoque tempore ad nostram institutio¬ nem non dedignatur comprehendere sa¬ pientes in astutia ipsorum. » Heec ille. Calvinus quoque lib. iv. Institut. cap. xvii. §. 14. contendit, Catholicos non ponere veram conversionem, sed annihilationem panis. Quod idem asserit Kemnitius loco no¬ tato : et ante eos Joannes Wiclefus apud Thomam Waldensem, tomo ir. cap. lxviii. ubi etiam deducebat Christum esse Deum malum Manicheeorum, si vera sit tran sub¬ stant i atio, quia annihilabit res bonas a Deo creatas. Respondeo: Argumentum de phantasmate Marcionistarum, verum phantasma mihi esse videtur : habet enim faciem quamdam argu¬ menti , sed verum argumentum non est, cum nihil concludat pro adversario. Nam phantasma, seu phantastica corpora, quale esse putabant Christi corpus Marcionistse, Manicheci, Eutychiani, videntur esse vera corpora, si externis oculis considerentur, et tamen reipsa non sunt vera. At corpus Chri¬ sti in Eucharistia ex Catholicorum sententia non videtur oculis externis esse verum cor¬ pus et tamen reipsa est. Itaque habet corpus Christi in Eucharistia contrarias conditiones iis qua) conveniunt corpori phantastico. Quare argumentum adversarii concludit con¬ trarium ejus, quod ipse volebat. Ad alterum cx iis , quse supra diximus cap. xviii. patet solutio : sed ne Martyr ni¬ mium glorietur, respondeo ad singulas partes argumenti ipsius. Nego igitur panem anni¬ hilari, atque assero verissime converti. Ad illam probationem : « Panis aliquid erat, et nunc nihil est, nullus est, nusquam est, etc. » respondeo, non propterea esse anni- hilatum. Nam etiamsi panis nihil sit, tamen id in quod ipse conversus est, non est nihil, nec nullum, nec nusquam. Non enim dicitur annihilari quod manet nihil in se, sed quod terminatur in nihil, ita ut terminus actionis, qua ipsum desinit esse, nihil sit : alioqui aqua, quee a Domino versa est in vinum, an- nihilata fuisset; nara post conversionem nihil fuit, nulla fuit, et nusquam fuit. Neque ob¬ stat quod forte materia manserit ; nam mate- Tom. IV. 193 ira non est aqua ; et pnetorea saltem forma substantialis aqua'., et multa ejus accidentia annihilata fuissent, quia nihil omnino eorum mansit. Ad exemplum de cibo, qui in stomacho corrumpi dicitur etiamsi succedat ei res alia nobilior, respondeo proprie loquendo : cum succedit res nobilior, tota illa actio generatio dicitur, non corruptio, sicut c contrario, cum succedit res ignobilior corruptio dicitur, non generatio. Quia tamen revera ubicumque est generatio unius, ibi est corruptio alterius, ad¬ mitto cibum vere corrumpi, ut caro humana generetur, et eodem 'modo admitto panem per consecrationem interire, ut ei succedat corpus Christi : sed aliud est corrumpi, et in¬ terire, aliud annihilari. Corrumpitur enim sive interit, quidquid desinit esse : at non annihilatur nisi quod ita desinit esse, ut nihil succedat, ita ut ejus desitio terminetur ad nihil. Itaque cibus corrumpitur quidem, quia desinit esse, sed non annihilatur quia non desinit in nihil, sed in carnem humanam. Quantum autem ad alteram propositionem argumenti Petri Martyris, respondeo, aliud esse transire de uno ad aliud, aliud transire unum in aliud. Cum enim dicimus transivisse aliquid de uno ad aliud, tunc significamus permanentiam ejusdem rei in utroque termi¬ no : et hoc modo quando unum sic cedit al¬ teri venienti, ut migret ad aliud, dicitur resi¬ lire, seu recedere, et transire ab illo, cui cedit, non autem in illud transire. At vero, cum dicimus, unum transire in aliud, tunc non significamus permanentiam ejusdem rei in utroque termino, sed significamus desitio- nem unius rei, et inchoationem alterius. Sic dicimus usitatissime noctem converti, seu transire in diem per ortum solis, et diem in noctem per solis occasum ; ligna in ignem per combustionem ; cibum in hominem per nutri- tionem ; et elementa in invicem per mutuum conflictum ; atque hoc modo dicimus panem converti, seu transire in corpus Christi ; non autem aliquid tertium de pane transire ad corpus Christi. Hinc igitur patet quaminepta, et frigida fuerit Pscudomarlyris gloriatio. Quartum argumentum habetur objectione 30. ubi ex confessione Berengarii, qiue habe¬ tur can. Ego Bercngarius, de consecrat, dis¬ tinet. 3. argumentum sumit. Nam in ea Confessione, qme a Concilio Romano appro¬ bata fuit, habetur panem, et vinum, quie in altari ponuntur, post consecrationem esse non solum Sacramentum, sed etiam verum 13 194 LIBER i II. corpus, ct sanguinem Domini, et sensualitcr, et in veritate Sacerdotum manibus tractari, et frangi, ct fidelium dentibus atteri. Ex qua confessione aperte colligitur, panem verum esse in Eucharistia, et eum sensualiter tractari, frangi, atteri : neque enim ista de Christi carne dici possunt sine ingenti bla- sphemia. Idem argumentum antea fecerat Joan. Wiclefus apud Tliomam Waldensem tom. 11. cap. 42. et 43. Objiciebat enim Wiclefus, Ec¬ clesiam tempore Innocentii III. defecisse ali Ecclesia, quse fuit tempore Nicolai II. quod illa negaverit substantiam panis manere in Eucharistia, cujus contrarium posuerat ista in abjuratione Berengarii. Calvinus etiam lib. iv. Instit. cap. 77. §. 12. et alii tum Lu- therani, tum Calvinistse istam confessionem Berengarii, aut contra nos objiciunt, aut eam ut monstrosam irrident. Et denique primus omnium Bcrengarius (teste Lantfranco in libro de corpore Domini) post illam abjura- tionem perjurus coepit objicere tidelibus, ex illa confessione colligi posse verum panem esse in Eucharistia : « Sicut enim qui dicit, Christus est lapis angularis, Christum non tollit, sed ponit ; ita etiam (dicebat ipse) qui ait, Panis est corpus Christi, panem non tollit, sed ponit. » Respondeo, Confessio ilia Romani Conci¬ lii, quod ad verba attinet, tota desumpta est ex antiquis sanctis Patribus, et ideo non potest rejici, vel irrideri, quin simul veteres SS. Patres rejiciantur, et irrideantur. Quod autem attinet ad rem ipsam, nihil continet falsum ; aut contrarium fidei, quam et antea, et postea Catholica Christi Ecclesia tenuit. Quatuor sunt partes ejus confessionis. Prima est, panem post consecrationem esse Sacra¬ mentum : ct hoc nullus negat adversariorum, et habetur expresse apud Augustinum lib. xx. contra Faustum cap. 13. ubi dicit, panem et calicem certa consecratione fieri mysti¬ cum, alioqui esse alimentum refectionis, non Sacramentum religionis. Secunda pars est, eumdem panem post consecrationem esse verum, et naturale Christi corpus : quod intelligitur de pane mutato substantialiter virtute consecrationis, ut supra cap. 21. probavinnls ex Lantfranco, Guitmundo, et Anselmo. Itaque panis conse¬ cratus, quoad species externas, est Sacra¬ mentum; quoad internam substantiam, est verum, et naturale Christi corpus. Et hoc non solum est verum quoad sensum, sed etiam conforme sententiis Patrum supra ci¬ tatis cap. 20. praesertim S. Augustini in homil. ad infantes apud Bedarn in com- ment. i. Corinth. x. ubi dicit : « Panis est corpus, ct vinum est sanguis. » Ad argumentum autem Berengarii, Wi- clefi, Petri Martyris, et aliorum, qui dicunt, Si post consecrationem panis est corpus Do¬ mini ; ergo post consecrationem manet panis : respondit optime Lantfrancus, omnino ma¬ nere panem post consecrationem, sed panem coelestem non triticeum ; panis enim post consecrationem est panis mutatus substantia¬ liter in carnem Domini, ut sajpe diximus. Tertia pars est, corpus Domini sensualiter manibus tractari, frangi, et atteri dentibus ; qui modus loquendi invenitur apertissime in Patribus. Chrysostomus homil. 83. in Matth. : « Ipsum, inquit, vides, ipsum tangis, ipsum comedis. »'Et homil. 45. in Joan. : a Non se tantum videri permittit desiderantibus, sed et tangi, ct manducari, et dentes carni sme infigi. » Et homil. 24. in priorem ad Corinth. : « Quod in cruce passum non est, id in obla¬ tione patitur, et propter te frangi sustinet, ut omnes satiet. » Ha:c ille. Chrysostomus asserit, corpus Domini in Eucharistia, videri, tangi, frangi, et dentes in illud infigi: qualia etiam leguntur apud Cyrillum lib. xn. in Joan. cap. 58. et alios Patres. Sensus autem horum verborum est, Christi corpus videri, tangi, frangi, et teri mediantibus speciebus panis, qua: sola: formaliter videntur, tangun¬ tur, franguntur, teruntur. Quomodo Lue. vm. dicebat Dominus : Quis me tetigit ? Et rursus : Tetigit me aliquis (1). Et tamen nemo ipsum, sive ejus corpus immediate tetigerat, sed solum mediante fimbria vestis : et nos usitate dicimus : Pluvia me totum madefecit, et hu- mectavit, etiamsi forte solum pallium asper¬ sum fuerit aqua. Denique in Scripturis fre¬ quentissime dicebantur Angeli videri , et tangi, cum in corporibus assumptis vide¬ rentur, ct tangerentur. Quarta pars est, contactum istum sensua¬ lem carnis Christi non esse tantum in Sacra¬ mento, id est, in symbolo, sed etiam in rei veritate : qua: particula addita est ob fraudes hairelicorum. Nam duobus modis potest Christi caro sensualiter videri, et tangi, me¬ diantibus speciebus panis. Uno modo mc- (1) Lue. VII f, 43 ct 46. CAPUT XXIV. (liantibus speciebus, aut signis quibusdam ; quomodo qui imaginem Christi depictam, vel sculptam videt, et tangit , dicere potest sc sensualiter vidisse, et tetigisse Christum, mediante illo signo : et hoc nodo tantum Christum videri et tangi in Eucharistia, negat confessio illa Romani Concilii. Altero modo mediantibus illis speciebus, ut reipsa tegentibus praesentem Christi carnem; et hoc vult illa confessio, et ad hoc faciunt exempla allata de tactu Christi mediante veste ; et de tactu Angelorum mediante cor¬ pore assumpto : atque hunc modum loquendi liabct etiam Chrysostomus hom. 83. in Matth. ubi sic ait: « 0 quomodo dicunt, Vellem speciem ejus, et formam videre. » Et subdit : « Ipsum igitur vides, ipsum tangis etc. » Ubi opponit praesentiam Christi in Eu¬ charistia, praesentiae ejus in imagine, et for¬ ma ad vivum expressa ; quod certe non fa¬ ceret, si in Eucharistia non haberemus Christum nisi in signo. Quintum argumentum habetur objectione 03, 64, 12 1, 122, 123, 129. Sensus falli non possunt circa sensibilem substantiam : at illi judicant in Eucharistia esse panem. Item Patres probant, Christum Inisse verum ho¬ minem, contra Marcioncm, Manichaeurn, et similes haereticos, quia manducabat, bibe¬ bat, dormiebat, fatigabatur ergo eodem modo probare possumus in Eucharistia esse verum panem , quia ibi est color, sapor, odor, figura veri panis. Vel si hic sensus falluntur, et licet nobis dicere : Non est panis, licet vi¬ deatur omnibus sensibus, cur non licebit Marcionistis dicere, Christus non fuit homo, licet omnibus sensibus videretur esse homo ? Ergo ista transubstantiatio praejudicat fidei, et favet haereticis etc. Haec est summa illa¬ rum objectionum. Similia habet etiam Joan- nes AViclefus apud Thomam Waldensem tom. ii. cap. 45. et 46. ubi argumeqtatur, in Eucharistia esse verum panem, quia ita judi¬ cant mures. Potest addi argumentum paulo gravius ex Scoto, qui et proponit, et solvit. Est autem hujusmodi : « In Sacramento veritatis nihil decet esse falsum. At si substantia panis desit, erit falsitas in accidentibus : accidentia enim externa, sunt naturalia signa internae sub¬ stantiae, unde etiam per ea a posteriori inda¬ gatur a philosophis substantia. » Respondeo ad primum : Illa sententia phi¬ losophorum, sensum non falli circa suum ob¬ jectum; verh est, sed eget multis limitationi¬ 195 bus, quae notandae sunt, ut videamus quam debile fundamentum habeant adversarii. Primo, vera est de objecto per se, id est, de accidentibus, non de substantia, quai est ob¬ jectum sensuum per accidens. Videmus enim circa substantias etiam sensibiles, homines falli frequentissime, cum ex sola apprehen¬ sione sensuum judicant, ut patet in glacie, qme videtur crystallum, in aurichalco, quod non discernitur ab auro, et sic de aliis : et hoc sufficeret ad argumentum solvendum. Fatemur enim sensus non falli in accidentibus panis, qiue sunt objecta per sc, sed in sub- staqtia tantum, qute est objectum per acci- - dens. Allatum est ad nos Romam anno 1585. a quibusdam ex Syria, fragmen ligni conver¬ sum in lapidem, manentibus accidentibus quibusdam ligni, ut figura, colore, asperitate etc. quod quidem ita verum lignum videba¬ tur judicio oculorum, ut sane qui rem non nosset, juraturus fuisset illud esse lignum, cum tamen non lignum, sed verissimus lapis esset. Secundo, vera est ea sententia de objecto proprio, non de objecto communi. Unde vi¬ demus homines passim decipi in judicanda magnitudine stellarum, in figura baculi in aqua existentis, in motu et quiete cum navi¬ gamus : putamus enim littora recedere, et navim quiescere. Tertio , vera est de objecto proprio si sint organum, et medium bene disposita : nam alioqui etiam circa proprium objectum falli possumus ; saipe enim per viridia per- spicilla colorem album putamus esse viridem ; et gustus infectus dulcia judicat esse amara. Quarto , vera est de objecto proprio in generali ; nam in particulari videtur posse contingere error, etiam organo, et medio recte dispositis. Vera est (inquam) de objecto in genere , quia sensus videndi non errat unquam in eo, quod apprehendit colorem, vel lumen : nullo enim modo fieri potest, ut apprehendat saporem, et odorem, aut aliquid aliud, excepto colore, et lumine. Quomodo etiam intellectus non errat in eo, quod ap¬ prehendit ens in genere: at in • particulari videtur posse contingere error , nimirum, ut apprehendat unum pro alio. Nam in iride judicant oculi verissimos esse colores, qui tamen non sunt, nisi lumen reflexum. Cum igitur haec ita sint, merito Patres reprehen¬ dunt eos, qui ex apprehensione sensuum de hoc Sacramento, et aliis rebus fidei judicare volunt. Vide Gyrillum catechesi quarta my LIBER III. 190 stagogica, Gljrysosfcomnmho.mil. 83. inMatth. ct Augustinum serm. 33. dc verbis Domini. Ad secundum respondeo contra Marcio- ncm, Manichamm, et similes, probari a Pa¬ tribus,. Christi corpus verum , ct solidum non autem phantasticum fuisse experimento sensuum : idquc rectissime propter duas causas, quarum utra que deest argumento adversariorum circa panem Eucharistia). Prima causa est, quia disputabatur cum illis haereticis dc objecto proprio sensuum, id est, de soliditate corporis; phantasma enim tangi nequit. Unde etiam Dominus Luc. iv. pro¬ bavit se non esse spiritum scu phantasma, sed corpus solidum ex tactu : Palpate , et vi¬ dete, quia spiritus carnem , et ossa non habet , sicut me videtis habere (1). Non autem cum Lutheranis disputamus dc substantia panis, qua) non est objectum sensuum , nec pro¬ prium, nec commune, nisi per accidens, ct in quo smpe erratur. Secunda causa est, quia Scriptura nus¬ quam dicit Christum non habere verum corpus, imo contrarium affirmat, et similiter Ecclesia in Conciliis idem semper docuit. Posito autem hoc fundamento fidei ex verbo Dei per Ecclesiam explicato, recte adhi¬ bentur omnia argumenta alia, qua) idem confirmare possunt; licet alioqui non possint certitudinem fidei Catholica) efficere. At in causa Lutheranorum, verbum Dei per Eccle¬ siam Catholicam in multis Conciliis decla¬ ratum affirmat, in Eucharistia non esse pa¬ nem: proinde argumenta ex experimento sensuum, qiue (ut ostendi) in se fallacia sunf, in hac re fallacissima judicanda sunt. Ad argumentum Scoti, dico nihil esse falsi in signo sensibili Eucharistia) ; quia acciden¬ tia illa significant naturaliter sub illa spe¬ cie latere substantiam panis, et ideo, nisi praeter cursum , ordinemque natura) Deus aliquid faciat, per illa accidentia venitur in cognitionem substantia). In Eucharistia au¬ tem non naturaliter, sed supra ordinem na¬ tura) fit, ut sub illis accidentibus desit sub¬ stantia panis. Itaque in ipsis signis nulla est falsitas, cum id solum significent, naturaliter sub illa specie latere substantiam panis. Quod si imaginatio hominum fallitur in hac re , id nascitur ex ipsorum vitio: nam vel sunt fide¬ les, vel infideles. Si fideles non falluntur, quia sciunt testimonio Dei, ct Ecclesia) ibi esse accidentia sine substantia. Si infideles falluntur, vel quia credere nolunt Deo, bt Ecclesia) , vel si forte non audierunt quid¬ quam de hoc mysterio, falluntur simpliciter ex ignorantia mysterii , non ex falsitatc, qua) sit in re. Et hoc nullum est absurdum : nam hoc modo fallebantur etiam sancti viri, Abraham, Loth , Tobias, Manuc , Gedeon, et alii, qui Angelos in specie humana sibi apparentes, veros homines esse credebant, et ut homines tractabant : et duo discipuli fallebantur, qui Dominum peregrinum ali¬ quem esse existimabant : et Magdalena , qua) eumdern hortulanum esse putabat. Argumentum sextum est apud eumdern objectione GG, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72,73; « Panis Eucharistia) mutationes varias re¬ cipit , qua) nullo modo fieri possunt sine substantia panis, qua) sit subjectum illarum mutationum; ergo substantia panis, et non sola accidentia in Eucharistia reperiuntur. Antecedens probatur , quia panis Eucha¬ ristia) potest alterari, ut calefieri, imo etiam veneno infici : constat enim Victorem III. Papam, et llonvicum VII. imperatorem ve¬ neno periisse, quod in Eucharistia positum fuerat. Item panis Eucharistia) aliquando corrumpitur, ct inde aliud generatur : nam ex eo homines nutriri constat, et vermes inde procreari, et illum etiam posse combu¬ ri, et v inum Eucharistia) verti aliquando in acetum, » Respondeo : Tractantur luec omnia accu¬ rate a scholasticis : sed quod attinet ad ar¬ gumenta adversariorum, facile solvi possunt. Nam vel mutatio in pane Eucharistia) est solii alterat io, vel est corruptio. Si sola alte- ratio, ut calefactio, condensatio, ctc. t um non requiritur materia, seu substantia; nam ac¬ cidentia omnia pro subjecto habent quanti¬ tatem, qua) in Sacramento manet. Unde hostia consecrata dicitur alba, sapida, ro¬ tunda, parva, ctc.; luee enim omnia deno¬ minant quantitatem, alioqui non posset fieri ista denominatio : non enim accidentia de seipsis dicuntur in concreto , sed solum de subjecto, excepta quantitate, qua) et dicitur quantitas, et quanta. Et sicut fieri potest , ut maneant qualitates in quantitate separata a materia, sic etiam potest fieri, ut introdu¬ cantur nova) qualitates in eamdem quanti¬ tatem a materia separatam. Si vero sit cor¬ ruptio specierum, ut in nutrifcione humana, combustione etc. tum requiritur quidem ma- (1) Luc. XXIV. 39. CAPUT XX IV. 19" tcria, sed ea substituitur a Deo in illo ipso instanti, quo desinunt esse illa; species, et in quo aliud generatur; et lioc sine mira¬ culo. Sicut enim cum disposita est materia corporis humani sufficienter, Deus animam creat, et infundit, et hoc non dicitur mira¬ culum, quia hoc exigit ordo rerum a Deo institutus : ita etiam quando per altcra- tionem specierum panis eo venitur, ut adsint dispositiones requisita; ad aliquam formam introducendam, exigente ordine rerum, Deus materiam substituit, et in illo ipso instanti ab agente naturali, mediantibus dispositio¬ nibus praemissis, introducitur forma substan¬ tialis. Atque haec est simplicissima , et tutis¬ sima explicatio hujus rei : sic enim omnia cohaerent. Nam nec dicimus, fieri genera¬ tionem, et corruptionem sine materia, nec multiplicamus miracula , nec dicimus ab agente naturali fieri materiam, aut certe ni¬ hil ab eo fieri, sed totum a solo Deo : et simul ostendimus nihil materiae mundo deperire ex tot panum consecratione. Sed objicit Petrus Martyr objectione 67. argumentum suo judicio insolubile, re autem vera prorsus ineptum, et indignum vel me¬ diocri philosopho : « Nam si. disponuntur, inquit ipse, illa; species ad materiam reci¬ piendam, vel id fit, manente Christi corpore in Eucharistia, vel post ejus abscessum. Manente Christi corpore id fieri nequit, quia nunquam simul esse debent materia panis, et corpus Christi ; essent autem simul si dis¬ positio, fieret manente Christi corpore : nam simul est ultima dispositio, et introductio ejus, ad quod fiebat dispositio. Abscedente autem corpore Christi, species pereunt, nec usquam sunt, ut omnes Theologi docent, qui volunt corpus Christi manere, donec species manent. At quod perit, non potest disponi ; igitur fictitia est illa dispositio. » Respondeo : Dispositiones non fiunt ad materiam recipiendam, ut imperite Martyr dicit, sed ad formam : sed quia forma intro¬ duci non posset, nisi adesset materia, ideo (ut dixi) materiam Deus substituit. Porro dis¬ positiones ilice inchoantur, manente Christi corpore : ultima autem dispositio, cum qua simul, et materia substituitur a Deo, et forma ab agente naturali introducitur, fit in illo instanti, quod est primum non esse corporis Domini in Eucharistia, et primum e%c rei genita». Sed, inquit Martyr : «Tunc species non sunt. )) Respondeo : non sunt in sua natura, sed sunt tamen in natura aliarum qualitatum introductarum : neque est hoc novum, aut singulare, sed commune, et ordinarium in omni generatione, et corruptione. Ad illud autem dc veneno in Eucharistia propinato, respondeo, quidquid sit de ve¬ litate historiarum (neque enim desunt, qui eas historias falsas esse contendant) vel ve¬ nenum consistebat in sola qualitate aspersa vino Eucharistia;, vel in substantia aliqua admixta illi vino ante, vel post consecratio¬ nem. Si in sola qualitate, tum nullum se¬ quitur absurdum, si dicamus in ipsa specie consecrata posse manere, vel introduci istam qualitatem, ut possunt alice, quee se compa¬ tiuntur cum accidentibus panis, et vini. Si vero sit aliqua substantia venenata, ut ali- * quis liquor, in illo corpus Domini non erit, licet in eodem calice sit ille liquor cum vino consecrato; nihil enim verti potest in corpus, et sanguinem Domini, nisi quod ipse Do¬ minus instituit, id est, panis et vinum. Argumentum septimum est in objectione 106 : « De accidentium ratione, et essentia est, ut inhaereant in subjecto.. Sed in pane Eucharistia; accidentia panis inveniuntur ; ergo et subjectum eorum, quod est substan¬ tia. » Probat majorem propositionem. Primo, quia accidentis esse est inesse, ut colligitur ex lib. v. Metaph. tex. 33. Unde accidens non tam dicitur ens, quam entis, id est, ali¬ quid entis, sive aliquid in ente existens. Secundo, Aristoteles Platonem reprehen¬ dit, quod posuit ideas a materia separatas. Quod si forma; substantiales, quales idere sunt, a materia separari nequeunt, quanto minus poterunt separari forma; acciden¬ tales ? Tertio, sicut accidenti convenit inhaerere in alio, ita substantia; non inhaerere. Sed nullo modo fieri potest, ut substantia inlne- reat in alio : ergo neque ut accidentia non inhaereant. Quarto, ista accidentia vel sunt in se, vel in alio. Si in se ; ergo subsistunt per se, et proinde substantia; sunt, non accidentia. Si in alio; ergo minerent; ergo non manent sine subjecto. Quinto, Augustinus in epist. 57. ad Dar¬ danum : « Tolle, inquit, ipsa corpora qua¬ litatibus corporum, non erit ubi sint ; et ideo necesse est, ut non sint. » Alium locum huic similem afferebat Joannes Wiclefus ex lib. n. Soliloquiorum cap. 12. ubi sic loquitur Au¬ gustinus : « Cui fieri posse videatur, ut id, 108 LIBER III. quod in subjecto est, maneat, ipso inter- eunte subjecto ? » Respondeo, falsum esse ad accidentis es¬ sentiam pertinere inhaerentium in subjecto : id enim negant non solum veteres Patres, et omnes Theologi, ac philosophi Christiani, sed etiam multi ex Ethnicis. Ex Patribus Rasilius, non solum credidit, accidens sine subjecto esse posse, sed etiam reipsa fuisse initio creationis rerum. Nam homil. 2. de opere sex dierum, et clarius homil. 6. docet lucem solis creatam fuisse primo die, et mansisse absque sede , et vehiculo tribus diebus, et tandem dio quarta creatum fuisse corpus solare, et in eo, ut in subjecto posi¬ tam fuisse lucem illam, quae fuerat prima die creata. Et ne quis dicat, per lucem non in- tclligi a Rasilio veram, et solam qualitatem, sed substantiam aliquam lucidam : ipse se clarissime explicat. Dicit enim aliud esse al- bedinem, aliud esse corpus, quod per eam fit album ; et eodem modo aliud esse lucem, aliud corpus lucidum : et quamvis nos sepa¬ rare non possimus unum ab alio, nisi sola cogitatione, tamen posse a Deo reipsa sepa¬ rari, quae nos mente, et cogitatione separa¬ mus. Nec potest etiam dici Rasilium forte confundere lucem cum lumine, et solum velle dicere primis illis tribus diebus fuisse lumen in mundo sine sole, ita tamen, ut non de¬ fuerit subjectum (lumen enim in aere, et aqua, ut in subjecto erat) sed defuerit causa secunda efficiens, id est, corpus lucidum, a quo illuminatio illa fieret. IIoc, inquam, dici non potest. Nam homil. 3. distinguit Rasilius lucem primigeniam, quam postea in corpore solari collocatam dicit, a lumine quod per aquam, et aerem diffundebatur : ait enim lucem illam per emissionem radiorum, et rursus per eorumdem contractionem effecisse diem, et noctem; dum enim lux illa emitteret radios ; omnia corpora diaphana illustra¬ bantur, dum radios contraheret, eadem cor¬ pora obscurabantur. Similia habet Joannes Damascenus Rasilium secutus lib. it. de fide Orthodoxa cap. 7. Porro Thomas Waldensis tomo n. cap. 7G. profert multa testimonia veterum philo¬ sophorum, qui docebant posse accidentia existere sine subjecto. Aristoteles autem id quidem non concedit, quia non potest naturaliter fieri : tamen aperte docet non esse inhserentiam de essentia accidentis : quod nobis hoc loco sufficit ad refutandam Petri Martyris vanitatem. Nam Aristoteles lib. ni. de anima tex. 9. dicit : « Aliud est magnitudo, aliud magnitudinis esse. » Quod si ipsum esse, id est, existentia acci¬ dentis, distinguitur ab ejus essentia, certe multo magis inhamentia distinguetur, quse est modus quidam existentia;. Rursus lib. 4. Phys. tex.'58. quaerit Aristoteles, an spatium censendum esset vacuum , ubi solus esset color, aut sonus :• qua) sane queestio inanis esset omnino, si inhaerentia esset de essentia: qui enim diceret colorem , necessario inclu¬ deret etiam subjectum, et proinde corpus. Ad primam igitur probationem dico illam sententiam, Accideritis esse est inesse ; et, Accidens non ens, sed entis : nihil significare aliud, nisi accidentis naturam esse imper¬ fectam , et habere ordinem quemdam ad substantiam, ob cujus gratiam existit. Sciendum enim est, accidentia habere pro¬ priam essentiam, ut patet : nam accidentia habent sua genera , et species distinctas plane a substantia) generibus, et speciebus ; sunt enim diversa praedicamenta. Rursum negari non potest, quin habeant accidentia propriam existentiam distinctam ab existen¬ tia subjecti, seu substantia), ut patet, quia terminant actiones reales; nam alteratio pro¬ prie qualitatem producit, et augmentatio quantitatem : tamen habent accidentia tri¬ plicem ordinem ad substantiam. Primus est essentialis quia, ut dixi, sunt entia essentia¬ liter [imperfecta, et ideo essentialiter re¬ spiciunt substantiam. Hic autem ordo non est relatio proprie dicta, sed est ipsa natura imperfecta , et ratione hujus dicitur esse non tam ens, quam entis , et ejus esse dicitur ine^sc, quia ordinatur ad inhaeren¬ dum in subjecto. Secundus ordo est qute- dam potentia , seu aptitudo ad inhseren- dum : et hic ordo non est de essentia, sed est proprietas quEedam accidentis, quse oritur ex natura illa imperfecta, ut diximus. Ter¬ tius ordo est actualis inhaerentia, qui est quasi actus quidam, et officium accidentis, et proinde quid posterius ipso accidente. Non enim accidens, verbi gratia, candor talis est, quia facit parietem candidum, sed contra, ideo facit parietem candidum, quia ipse in se est candor. Nulla igitur repu¬ gnantia admittitur, si divina potentia se¬ pararetur accidens ab eo, quod nec est de essentia ejus, et a quo ipsum non pendet, cum sit prius. Ad secundam probationem dico , merito reprehendi ab Aristotele eos, qui ponebant CAPUT XXIV. 199 formas substantiales separatas : illi enim existimabant, hanc esse naturam rerum, ut formae separatae sint. Sed haec reprehensio ad nos non pertinet, qui fatemur naturaliter non solum non existere, sed etiam non posse existere formas separatas. Ad tertiam respondeo, fallaciam latere in argumento ; nam cum dicit Petrus Martyr : Sicut accidenti convenit inhaerere, ita sub¬ stantiae non inhaerere : comparat actum acci¬ dentis, non cum actu substantiae, ut debuit, si recte comparare voluit; sed. cum nega¬ tione actus accidentis. At si recte cornpa- rasset hoc modo : Sicut accidenti convenit inhaerere, ita substantiae convenit subsistere ; vel negative : Sicut accidenti convenit non subsistere, ita substantiae non inhaerere, vi¬ disset argumentum suum nihil valere, imo pro nobis esse. Nam sicut substantiae conve¬ nit naturaliter subsistere, et tamen superna- turaliter potest separari a sua subsistentia, ut patet in mysterio Incarnationis, ubi na¬ tura humana est substantia, et tamen non subsistit, id est, non per se existit, sed a Verbo sustentatur : ita accidenti convenit naturaliter inhaerere, et tamen fieri potest di¬ vinitus, ut non inhaereat. Sic etiam, sicut sub¬ stantia nullo modo potest subsistere per se : nam in Sacramento licet non sint accidentia in subjecto, tamen non per se subsistunt more substantiae, sed a Deo sustentatur mo¬ do supernaturali. Ratio autem cur non pos¬ sit inhajrere, vel accidens per se existere, in promptu est ; quia non potest effectus for¬ malis separari a causa sua, a qua intrinsece pendet, licet e contrario possit causa sepa¬ rari ab effectu, quia prius non pendet a po¬ steriori. Porro inhaerere est effectus formalis accidentis, sicut subsistere, substantiae ; inde ergo non potest ullo modo illa res inhaerere, quae non est accidens, neque illa subsistere, quae non est substantia. Ad quartam, quod erat ejusmodi : « Acci¬ dentia ista, vel sunt in se, vel in alio. Si in se, ergo subsistunt : si in alio, ergo inhae¬ rent. » Respondeo, esse in se, et non subsi¬ stere : quia sunt in se negative, non posi¬ tive. Nam ideo dicuntur esse in se, quia non sunt in aliquo supposito, et tamen revera non subsistunt per actum positivum, qualis manat ex naturis substantialibus ; sic enim dico esse in alio, et non inhairere, quia sunt in alio, ut in conservante, non ut in sub¬ jecto. Ad quintam probationem ex Augustino, respondeo, eum loqui de eo, quod potest fieri naturaliter. Argumentum octavum habetur in obje¬ ctione 125. et 126 : « Transubstantiatio , vel fit ante verba consecrationis, vel post, vel simul. Si ante ; ergo non fit virtute verbo¬ rum illorum : si post ; ergo verba illa sunt falsa : Hoc est corpus meum : si simul ; ergo transubstantiatio fit successive, non autem in instanti, ut omnes Theologi docent. » Respondeo, fit simul : et ad argumentum in contrarium, dico fieri non toto tempore quo durat pronuntiatio, sed in ultimo instanti terminativo illius prolationis. Etsi enim non detur ultima pars illius motus, quo profe¬ runtur verba, neque etiam temporis ei re¬ spondentis : datur tamen ultimum mutatum esse terminativum illius motus, et ultimum instans terminativum illius temporis. Quod autem Petrus Martyr objicit, sequi ex hac solutione totam vim consecrationis consistere in illo ultimo (uni) quod videtur esse ridiculum, leve est. Nam illud (um) non operatur virtute sua sola, quippe quod per se nihil significat, sed virtute totius senten- tisc, quse tunc habet esse completum, cum finitur tota prolatio. Sed posset aliquis obj icere : Sicut corpus Domini incipit esse in Sacramento in instanti, sic eliam panis desinit esse in instanti : non enim corrumpitur paulatim per dispositio¬ nes praevias, sed per simplicem actionem divinam desinit esso. At ea, quse desinunt in instanti, desinunt per ultimum sui esse, sicut ea quse incipiunt in instanti, incipiunt per primum sui esse : ergo dandum est instans affirmativum tam desitionis panis, quam suc¬ cessionis corporis Domini. Rursus , aut est idem instans desitionis, et successionis ; aut diversum. Si idem ergo simul erunt sub illis speciebus, panis, et corpus Domini : si diver¬ sum ; ergo in tempore intermedio (nec enim dantur duo instantia immediata) erunt spe¬ cies illae sine substantia panis, et sine cor¬ pore Domini. Respondeo : Licet panis desinat in instan¬ ti, tamen illud instans non potest assignari, vel notari, nisi negative, ita ut sit primum non esse panis, non autem ultimum esse panis. Cujus ratio est, quia panis desinit ad desitionem verborum, in quorum virtute fit illa conversio : verba autem non habent ul¬ timum esse, sed primum non esse. Itaque illud instans terminativum prolationis ver¬ borum, est primum non esse verborum, et 200 LIBER IU. consequenter substanti® panis : et simul est primum esse corporis Domini sub illis spe- ciebus. Quod idem cernimus in naturali trans¬ mutatione. Nam substantia qu® corrumpi¬ tur, in instanti desinit esse, non enim sunt gradus in substantia, sicut in qualitatibus ; et tamen, quia desinit ad desitioncm dispo¬ sitionum, non habet ultimum esse, sed pri¬ mum non esse : dispositiones enim per mo¬ tum successivum desinunt. Argumentum nonum habetur objectione 108. et sequentibus usque ad 116 : « Posita transubstantiatione , sequitur ex pane fieri corpus Christi : at hoc multis nominibus est absurdum; igitur transubstantiatio admit¬ tenda non est. Probatur assumptio. » Primo, e Si ex pane fit corpus Christi ; ergo gene¬ ratur corpus Christi : mutatio enim ad sub¬ stantiam nulla est, nisi generatio. At absur¬ dum et quotidie Christum generari. » Se¬ cundo, « in Eucharistia est Christus Deus et homo ; ergo, si quod est in Eucharistia, fit a sacerdote per consecrationem ; ergo Deus et homo fit a sacerdote. » Tertio, « corpus Christi, quod fuit in cruce, et in utero ma¬ tris, non fuit factum ex pane, sed ex carne Virginis. At quod est in Eucharistia, fit ex pane ; ergo corpus Domini quod est in Eu¬ charistia, non est illud, quod fuit in cruce, et in utero matris. » lloc argumentum s®- pius, ac s®pius repetit, et in varias formas syllogismorum redigit, ut nullus cavillis re¬ linqui possit locus. Respondeo : Non est ullum absurdum ex pane fieri corpus Christi : ita enim loquitur Ambrosius lib. iv. de Sacram, cap. 4. Gau¬ dentius tract. ii. in Exod. et alii Patres. Ad primam probationem miror imperi¬ tiam, vel audaciam Petri Martyris, qui toties inculcat, corpus Christi necessario dicendum esse generari, si conversio ista terminatur ad substantiam. Nam etiamsi generatio recte distinguatur a philosophis ab alterationc , augmentatione, et latione ; quia generatio terminatur ad substantiam, alteratio ad qua¬ litatem, augmentatio ad quantitatem, et latio ad ubi, sive ad locum : tamen quis Chri¬ stianorum ignorat generationem distingui a creatione, licet utraque sit ad substantiam? Et rursus, conversiones miraculo factas aqu® in vinum, et uxoris Loth in statuam salis, terminatas fuisse ad substantiam, et tamen non esse proprie generationes? Dico igitur transubstantiationcm terminari ad substan¬ tiam, et tamen non esse generationem, sed conversionem supernaturalem, per quam (ut supra ostendi) corpus Christi non produci¬ tur, sed succedit substanti® panis. Ad secundum nego, Christi corpus, vel ipsum Christum Deum, et hominem abso¬ lute a sacerdotibus fieri. Aliud enim est Christi corpus ex pane conficere, quod sa¬ cerdotes faciunt, aliud absolute Christi cor¬ pus efficere : ex pane enim Christi corpus efficere , non est ipsum p roducere , sed in ipsum pr®existens panis substantiam com¬ mutare. Quanquam si de modo loquendi agatur, non dubitavit Hieronymus in epist. ad Heliodorum, et in altera ad Evagrium dicere sacerdotes Christi corpus sacro ore conficere. Ad tertiam dico, corpus Christi ex pane fieri, non tanquam ex materia, quomodo factum est ex carne sanet® Virginis, et quo¬ modo ex ligno fit sedes, ex auro et argento vasa pretiosa ; sed tanquam ex termino a quo, quomodo ex nihilo factum est coelum, ex die fit nox, et etiam ex aqua factum est vinum. Neque enim aqua mansit, ut materia vini, licet manserit materia prima, qu® aqua dici non potest. Porro ista varia effectio, non mutat rei naturam. Nam si quis a Deo ex nihilo produceretur, non esset divers® natu- r® ab illis hominibus, qui ex materia pr®- existente fiunt, neque vinum factum ex aqua in Cana Galil®® fuit divers® natur® a vino, quod fit ex uvis. Quamvis autem nunquam mutetur species, tamen novum individuu m producitur distinctum ab omnibus aliis, quando conversio est productiva : in pr®- senti autem negotio conversio non est pro¬ ductiva, ut supra ostendimus. Panis enim convertitur in ipsum corpus Christi pr®exi- stens; et ideo corpus ex carne Virginis fa¬ ctum, et ex pane factum, non sunt diversa, sed unum et idem omnino. Ad argumentum autem Petri Martyris comprehensum syllogismo expositorio , in quo ille tantopere confidit, respondeo in forma. Argumentum hoc est : « Hoc corpus (demonstrando corpus crucifixum) non est factum ex pane. Hoc corpus (demonstrando corpus Domini in Eucharistia) est factum ex pane; ergo hoc non est illud. » Respondeo : Si per factum ex pane intelligatur produ¬ ctum; concessa propositione, negatur as¬ sumptio : non enim corpus Domini in Eucha¬ ristia producitur, sed solum succedit pani. Si vero per facium ex pane, intelligatur suc¬ cessisse pani in ipsum converso, et mutato; CAPUT XXIV. 201 tunc assumptione concessa, negatur propo- fuit a Christo ipso dicente : IIoc est corpus sitio. Nam vere corpus illud quod fuit cruci- meum , quod, pro vobis tradetur . Atque bacte- fixum, factum fuit ex pane : Illud enim est, nus de transubstantiatione. in quod panis per consecrationem conversus