Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book IV: Grace and Free Choice in Natural and Civil Works
Chapter 1: The order of the coming disputation is set forth
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book IV. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
We have discoursed thus far on the nature of free choice; now we set about disputing on the powers of the same choice, and at the same time on the necessity of grace.
Now there are three kinds of human cognitions, and likewise of actions. For one cognition is natural, whether it be theoretical or mechanical; another is moral cognition — that is, the knowledge of that which, according to virtue, is either to be done or to be omitted; another, finally, is supernatural cognition — that is, of those things which cannot be known unless they be divinely revealed. So also of actions: some can be called natural, such as to walk, to sit, to till fields, to wage wars, and other things of that kind; others moral, in which are contained all the actions of the virtues and the vices, as to give alms, to fast, and the like — and contrariwise, to steal, to fornicate, and others of the same kind; others divine and supernatural, which properly pertain to attaining eternal salvation, as to believe, to hope, to love, to pray, to sacrifice, and the rest.
And although the actions of the first kind, which we have called natural — and which by some are also named civil — in the particular, or (as the Theologians speak) in the individual, are necessarily good or evil morally (according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, which we follow as the more probable), yet of their own kind they are indifferent; and it can even come to pass that someone is free in actions of this kind insofar as they are natural, and is not free insofar as they are moral. So, if anyone should think that all the works of unbelievers are sins, he will perhaps say that the unbelieving man has free choice for tilling a field or not tilling it, insofar as to till a field is a natural work; but has it not, insofar as it is a moral work — because he will be able to till the field or not till it, but will not be able in that work by any means to avoid sin.
We, then, concerning each of these kinds of cognitions and actions, shall treat three questions: one, whether man needs the help of special grace for knowing things; a second, whether he needs help for performing the same things; a third, whether, the aid of grace being admitted, that work is in the free power of man. Wherefore there will be nine principal questions, besides others which will have to be discussed on occasion of these.
The first question will be whether we need grace for knowing natural truth. The second, whether for natural actions, as such, we also need grace. The third, whether for the same actions, even as such, we have free choice of the will. The fourth, whether without the help of grace we can know moral truth. The fifth, whether for moral works — that is, for keeping the precepts and avoiding sins — we have need of the help of grace. The sixth, whether it is in our power to act well and ill morally. The seventh, whether the help of grace is necessary for knowing supernatural truth. The eighth, whether the same help of grace is necessary for the divine actions of believing, hoping, loving, etc. The ninth, whether man has free choice in such supernatural and divine actions.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
Disseruimus hactenus de natura liberi ar¬ bitrii ; nunc de viribus ejusdem arbitrii, et simul de gratifc necessitate disputare ag¬ gredimur. Sunt autem tria genera humanarum, tum cognitionum, tum actionum. Est enim alia cognitio naturalis, sive theoricasit, sive me¬ chanica: alia est cognitio moralis, id est, notitia ejus, quod secundum virtutem est vel agendum, vel omittendum ; alia denique est cognitio supernaturalis, idest, eorum, qua? sciri non possunt, nisi divinitus revelentur. Sic etiam actionum aliae naturales dici pos¬ sunt, quales sunt ambulare, sedere, colere agros, gerere bella, et alia id genus ; aliae morales, quibus actiones omnes virtutum, et vitiorum continentur, ut eleemosynas dare, jejunare et similia ; ut contra, furari, forni¬ cari ; et alia ejusdem generis; aliae divinae, ac supernaturales, quae proprie ad salutem aeternam consequendam pertinent, ut cre¬ dere, sperare, diligere, orare, sacrificare, et caetera. Et quamvis actiones primi generis, quas naturales diximus, et a quibusdam civiles etiam nominantur, in particulari, sive (ut Theologi loquuntur) in individuo necessario sint bonae, aut malae moraliter (juxta doc¬ trinam S. Thomse, quam nos ut probabilio¬ rem sequimur) tamen ex genere suo indiffe¬ rentes : unt, et potest etiam fieri, ut aliquis sit liber in ejusmodi actionibus, qua parte naturales sunt, et non sit liber qua parte sunt morales, ut si quis existimet omnia ope¬ ra infidelium esse peccata, is fortasse dicet, habere hominem, infidelem liberum arbi- trium ad colendum agrum, et non colendum, quatenus colere agrum est opus naturale ; non autem habere, quatenus est opus morale quia poterit colere agrum, vel non colere, sed non poterit in eo opere ulla ratione vi¬ tare peccatum. Nos igitur de singulis his cognitionum, actionumque generibus tres tractabimus qiia?stiones : unam, egeatne homo auxilio gratise specialis ad res cognoscendas; alte¬ ram, egeatne auxilio ad res easdem per¬ agendas ; tertiam, admisso gratiee adjumen¬ to, sit ne opus illud in libera hominis pote¬ state. Quare novem erunt praecipuae quae¬ stiones, praeter alias, quae harum occasione discutiendae erunt. Prima quaestio erit, an ad cognoscendum verum naturale, indigeamus gratia. Secun¬ da, an ad actiones naturales, ut tales sunt, egeamus etiam gratia. Teitia, an ad easdem actiones, etiam ut tales sunt, habeamus li¬ berum voluntatis arbitrium. Quarta, utrum sine auxilio gratia? cognoscere possimus ve¬ rum morale. Quinta, utrum ad moralia ope¬ ra, id est, ad preeeepta servanda, et peccata cavenda opus habeamus auxilio gratise. Sex.- ta, utrum sit in nostra potestate bene et male agere moraliter. Septima, sit ne auxi¬ lium gratise necessarium ad cognoscendum verum supernaturale. Octava, sit ne idem auxilium gratia? necessarium adactiones di¬ vinas, credendi, sperandi, diligendi etc. No¬ na, sit ne homo liberi arbitrii in ejusmodi actionibus supernaturaiibus, atque divjpis. -8 LIBER IV.