Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book IV: Grace and Free Choice in Natural and Civil Works
Chapter 5: The principal question is proposed, whether man has free choice in natural and civil works; and the errors of Luther and Melanchthon are noted
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book IV. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
There follows the third question, which is one of the principal and gravest questions of this whole matter: whether, namely, man has free choice in those natural or civil actions which we have said can be done with only the general help of God.
Now there are three opinions on this question. The first is that of almost all Catholics: that not only is man of free choice in the actions explained above, but that this is also evident, both in the light of nature and in the doctrine of faith. See, besides others who teach this, St. Thomas in question 6 On Evil, which is on election, and question 24 On Truth (which is on free choice, article 1); likewise Gregory, Gabriel, and others on 2 Sentences, distinction 25.
The second opinion is that of certain Catholics, who affirm that it is certain from the doctrine of faith that man is of free choice, yet that this cannot be established by natural reason. So taught John Buridan in the third book of the Ethics, question 4, and Andreas de Castro on the first of the Sentences, distinction 45, whom Ruard Tapper cites in the explication of article 7 of the Louvain doctors.
The third opinion — or rather manifest heresy — is that of Lorenzo Valla in the book On Free Choice, of Martin Bucer in the book On Concord, in the article on free choice, and of John Calvin, book 1 of the Institutes, chapter 16, § 8, and book 2, chapter 4, § 6, who teach that man, in the state of corrupt nature, does not have free choice in anything — not even in things indifferent and civil. Wherefore the same Calvin, in book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 2, § 4 [al. 7], says he could wish that the very name of free choice were altogether taken out of the way. The same was the opinion of many old heretics, whom we shall name in chapter 7, in a more opportune place. The same also had been the opinion, at the beginning of Lutheranism, of Martin Luther himself and of his Achates, Philip Melanchthon; but each most openly retracted it. And if Bucer and Calvin had been willing to imitate them, no controversy about free choice in civil actions would remain with the heretics of this time.
It will be useful, however, to note this retractation and self-contradiction of Luther and Melanchthon, that their inconstancy may appear in the greatest matter of all. For Luther, in the assertion of article 36, placed the sum of his affairs in the doctrine of the servitude of choice. For thus he says: “In the other articles — on the Papacy, on Councils, on Indulgences, and other unnecessary trifles — the levity and folly of the Pope and his men may be borne; but in this article, on the servitude of choice, which is the best of all and the sum of our affairs, it is to be grieved and wept over that wretched men so rave.” And in the book against the King of the English he wrote that he was so certain of his own doctrine that if anyone should teach otherwise, or should condemn what he himself had written on faith, on works, on free choice, and the like, that man would condemn God, and would have to remain a son of gehenna.
Let us see, then, his constancy in the chief doctrine, of which he boasted himself most certain. In the assertion of article 36 he speaks thus: “Free choice is a figment among things, and a title without a thing, because it is in no one’s hand to think anything of good or evil, but all things (as the article of Wyclif condemned at Constance rightly teaches) come to pass by absolute necessity. Which the Poet also meant when he said, ‘all things stand by a fixed law.’ And Christ, Matthew 6 [al. 10]: ‘A leaf of a tree shall not fall to the ground without your Father.’” And below: “There is no doubt that this name ‘free choice’ came into the Church with Satan for its teacher.” Here Luther openly and simply takes away free choice in all things, according to the heresy of Wyclif; and therefore he condemns even the very name of free choice. Whence it came to pass that he entitled his book against Erasmus “On the Servile Choice.”
But hear now the retractation, which stands in his book on the Saxon Visitation, which he wrote afterwards; for thus he speaks in the article on free choice: “Many speak indiscreetly about free choice. Therefore we have appended this brief instruction. Man has, from his own power, free choice for doing or omitting external works, driven by the law and by penalties. Wherefore he can perform both secular probity and good works from his own power, given and obtained from God for these things. For Paul calls it the justice of the flesh — that is, that which the flesh or the man does from his own power. If therefore man works any justice from his own power, surely he has election and liberty both for fleeing evil and for doing good.” Likewise in the same place: “The human will is a free power, so that it can do the justice of the flesh, or civil justice, where matters are carried on by law and by force: as not to steal, not to kill, not to commit adultery, etc.” Thus he — where by the justice of the flesh he understands external good works, yet not good simply. And thereby he teaches that man through free choice can do and not do what the law commands, yet not sin or not sin. And so he admits liberty of choice in civil and external actions, which he had denied in the assertion of article 36; and he receives the name of free choice, which he had before said came into the Church with Satan for its teacher. Thus he himself condemns his own best article and the sum of his affairs; and, if what he wrote in the book against the King of the English be true, he has condemned God, and must remain a son of gehenna.
Let us come to Philip. He, in the Commonplaces which he published in the year 1521, first execrates the name of free choice: “The word ‘free choice,’” says he, “has been usurped, most alien from the divine writings and from the sense and judgment of the spirit. There has been added from the philosophy of Plato the word ‘reason,’ equally pernicious.” Second, he defends Valla against Eck in these words: “Valla, says Eck, because he confuted the opinion of the Schools on free choice, wished to know more than he had learned — forsooth, an excellently witty trifler.” Third, he reprehends natural philosophy and reason: “In this place,” says he, “Christian doctrine utterly dissents from philosophy and from human reason.” Fourth, he takes away all liberty and contingency: “Liberty,” says he, “is to be able to act or not act, to be able to act thus or otherwise. And so it is called into question whether the will is free, and how far it is free. The response: since all things that come to pass come to pass necessarily according to the divine predestination, there is no liberty of choice. What then, you will say — is there no contingency in things? nothing of chance? nothing of fortune? The Scriptures teach that all things come to pass necessarily. And if there seem to you to be contingency in human affairs, here the judgment of reason must be commanded down.” Fifth, to these he adds, in the commentary on chapter 8 of the epistle to the Romans, that not only indifferent works, but even sins, are wrought in us by God: “As we confess,” says he, “that the calling of Paul was the proper work of God, so we confess that those works are proper works of God, whether those called indifferent, as to eat, to speak freely, or those that are evil, as the adultery of David, the severity of Manlius. For it is agreed from chapter 1 to the Romans that God does all things not permissively but potently (to use Augustine’s word), that is, so that the betrayal of Judas is his own proper work, just as the calling of Paul.” And below: “Therefore there is no reason why we should admit the frigid gloss that God permits evils, but does not also do them.” Thus he.
Things contradicting all these are found in the same Commonplaces published at a later time, both in the place on the cause of sin and in the place on free choice. For first, he receives the name of free choice and of reason, which before he execrated: “The ruder sort,” says he, “are to be admonished to take from the natural philosophers the distinctions and appellations of the parts of man. In man there is a knowing and judging part, which is called mind, or intellect, or reason. The other, desiring part is called the will; and the mind and will conjoined are called free choice.” Second, he reprehends Valla, whom before he had defended: “Valla,” says he, “and very many others, do not rightly take liberty from the will of man because all things come to pass by God’s decree.” Likewise in the epitome of moral Philosophy: “Let us flee those Stoic imaginations about fate, or those absurd ones of Valla, which on account of the divine governance take away liberty from the will.” Third, he embraces the opinions of the philosophers, which before he said were contrary to the Scriptures: “This,” says he, “is the liberty of the will which the philosophers rightly attribute to man.” Likewise: “Plato,” says he, “taught more honorably.” And in the Epitome of moral philosophy: “The description of reason,” says he, “has been most prudently added by Aristotle.” Fourth, he admits that there is contingency and liberty in things, which before he had simply denied: “It must be conceded,” says he, “that the Apostolic Scripture attributes to man, even now after the fall, some liberty of choosing those things which are subject to reason.” And below: “This Manichaean imagination is a horrible lie, and minds are to be led away from this error, and taught that free choice does something.” Fifth, he denies that God is the cause of sin, which before he so impudently asserted: “This,” says he, “is also a pious opinion, to be held with both hands, and more truly with the whole breast: that God is not the cause of sin, nor wills sin.” And below: “Nor do those figures of words in the Hebrew speech — ‘I will harden the heart of Pharao,’ and the like — fight against this opinion. For it is certain that in the Hebrew phrase they signify permission, not an efficacious will.” From these things it can easily be understood how inconstant the adversaries are, even in the gravest matters. But leaving these aside, let us proceed to confirm the truth.
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CAPUT V. Proponitur qusestio principalis , An homo li- . bertum arbitrium habeat in operibus natura¬ libus et civilibus; et notantur Lutheri et Me- lancthouis contradictiones. Sequitur tertia qusestio, quae una est ex principalibus , et gravissimis totius hujus materiae quaestionibus ; utrum videlicet homo liberum arbitrium habeat in actionibus illis naturalibus, sive civilibus, quas diximus fieri posse cum solo generali auxilio Dei. Sunt autem tres de hac quaestione senten¬ tiae. Prima est Catholicorum fere omnium, non solum esse hominem liberi arbitrii in ac¬ tionibus supra explicatis, sed etiam id esse evidens, tum in lumine naturae, tum in doc¬ trina fidei. Vide praeter alios, qui hoc docent, (f) Ileb. 1,3. 14 LIBER IV. S. Tliomam ia qua}st. G. de malo, qua} est de electione, et qusest. 24. de veritate (qua} est de libero arbitrio art. 1.) Item Gregorium, Gabrielem, et alios in 2. sententiar. distinet. 25. Altera sententia est quorumdam Catholi¬ corum, qui affirmant certum esse ex doctrina fidei, hominem esse liberi arbitrii, tamen id non posse naturali ratione convinci. Ita do¬ cuit Joannes Buridanus in tertio libro Ethi¬ corum, qua2st. 4. et Andreas de Castro in primo sententiarum, distinet. 45. quem citat Iluardus Tapperus in explicatione articuli 7. Lovaniensium. Tertia sententia, sive potius haeresis, ma¬ nifesta est Laurentii Valla} in lib. de libero arbitrio, Martini Bucceri in lib. de Concor¬ dia, articulo de libero arbitrio, et Joannis Calvini lib. 4. Institutionum cap. 46. § 8. et lib. ii. cap. 4. §. 6. qui docent, non habere hominem, in statu naturae corrupta}, liberum arbitrium ulla in re, ac ne in indifferentibus quidem et civilibus. Quocirca idem Calvinus in lib, II. Institutionem cap. 2. §. 4. dicit, optare se, ut,tollatur omnino de medio no¬ men ipsum liberi arbitrii. Eadem fuit sen¬ tentia multorum veterum haereticorum, quos cap. 7. opportuniore loco nominabimus. Eadem etiam sententia fuerat initio Luthe- ranismi, ipsiusMartini Lutheri, et ejus Achatis Philippi Melanchthonis, sed uterque aper¬ tissime retractavit. Quos si Bucerus et Cal¬ vinus imitari voluissent, nulla cum haereticis hujus temporis de libero arbitrio in actio¬ nibus civilibus controversia remaneret. Utile autem erit annotare hanc retracta¬ tionem, et contradictionem Lutheri etMelan- chtonis, ut appareat eorum inconstantia in re omnium maxima. Nam Lutherus in asser¬ tione articuli 36. summam rerum suarum in doctrina de arbitrii servitute constituit. Sic enim ait : « In caeteris articulis de Papatu, de Conciliis, de Indulgentiis, aliisque non necessariis nugis, ferenda est levitas et stul¬ titia Papa} et suorum, sed in hoc articulo, de servitute arbitrii, qui omnium optimus, et rerum nostrarum summa est, dolendum ac .flendum est, miseros sic insanire. » Et in libro adversus Regem Anglorum scripsit , adeo se certum esse de sua doctrina, ut si quis aliter doceret, aut damnaret, qua} ipse scripsit de fide, de operibus, de libero arbi¬ trio, et similibus ; is damnaret Deum, et oporteret eum manere filium gehenna}. Videamus igitur constantiam ejus, in sum¬ ma doctrina}, de qua certissimum se esse jactabat. In assert. articuli 36. ita loquitur : (i Liberum arbitrium est figmentum in rebus, et titulus sine re, quia nulli est in manu quippiam cogitare boni vel mali, sed omnia (ut Wiclefi articulus Constantiae damnatus recte docet) de necessitate absoluta eveniunt. Quod et Poeta voluit, quando dixit, certa stant omnia lege. EtChristus Matthaei vi : Fo¬ lium arboris non cadet in terram sine patre vestro. Et infra : Non est dubium Satana magistro in Ecclesiam venisse hoc nomen li¬ berum arbitrium. » Hic aperte Lutherus sim¬ pliciter tollit liberum arbitrium omnibus in rebus, juxta hacresim Wiclefi, et ideo ipsum etiam nomen liberi arbitrii damnat. Ex quo factum est, ut liberum adversus Erasmum inscripserit de servo arbitrio. Sed audi nunc retractationem, quae extat in libro ejus de Visitatione Saxonica, quem postea scripsit, sic enim loquitur in articulo de libero arbitrio : « Multi de libero arbitrio indiscrete loquuntur. Idcirco hanc brevem informationem adseripsimus. Horno habet ex propria virtute liberum arbitrium ad facien¬ dum vel omittendum opera externa per le¬ gem, et poenas adactus. Quapropter potest et saecularem probitatem, et bona opera facere, ex propria virtute, a Deo ad haec data et ob¬ tenta. Paulus enim vocat eam justitiam car¬ nis, hoc est, quam caro aut homo ex propria virtute facit. Si ergo operatur homo ex pro¬ pria virtute ullam justitiam, utique habet e- lectioncm et libertatem, et fugiendi malum, et faciendi bonum. » Item ibidem : « Voluntas humana est vis libera, ut facere possit justitiam carnis, seu justitiam civilem, ubi lege et vi agitur, ut non furari, non occidere; non moechari etc. » Ha}c ille, ubi per justitiam carnis intelligit opera bona externa, non tamen bona simpli¬ citer. Ac per hoc docet, posse hominem per liberum arbitrium facere et non facere qua; lex jubet, non tamen peccare, aut non pec¬ care. Itaque admittit arbitrii libertatem in actionibus civilibus et externis, quam nega¬ verat in assert. art. 36. et nomen liberi arbi¬ trii recipit, quod a Satana magistro in Eccle¬ siam venisse antea dixerat. Ita damnat ipse articulum suum optimum, et summam rerum suarum, et, si verum sit quod scripsit in libro adversus llcgem Vnglorum, Deum dam¬ navit, et oportet eum manere filium gehen- me. Veniamus ad Philippum. Is in locis com- CAPUT VI. munibus, quos edidit anno 1521. Primo, de¬ testatur nomen liberi arbitrii : « Usurpata est, inquit, vox liberi arbitrii a divinis litteris, a sensu et judicio spiritus alienissima. Ad¬ ditum est e Platonis philosophia vocabulum rationis seque perniciosum. » Secundo, defendit Vallam contra Eckium his verbis : « Vallam, ait Eckius, quod Scho¬ larum sententiam de libero arbitrio confu¬ tavit, plura voluisse scire, quam didicisset, scilicet egregie festivus nugator. » Tertio, reprehendit philosophiam natu¬ ralem et rationem. « Hoc loco, inquit, prorsus Christiana doctrina a philosophia, et humana ratione dissentit, » Quarto, tollit omnem libertatem, eteontin- gentiam: a Est, inquit, libertas posse agere, aut non agere, posse sic, aut aliter agere. Itaque in quaestionem vocatur, sitne libera voluntas, et quatenus libera sit. Responsio, quandoquidem omnia quae eveniunt, neces¬ sario juxta divinam praedestinationem eve¬ niunt, nulla est arbitrii libertas. Quid igitur inquies, nulla ne est in rebus contingentia? nihil casus ? nihil fortuna? Omnia necessario evenire Scripturae docent. Et si videatur tibi in rebus humanis esse contingentia, judicio rationis hic imperandum est. » Quinto, his addit in comment. ad cap. 8. epist. ad Romanos. Non solum opera indiffe¬ rentia, sed etiam peccata in nobis a Deo fi¬ eri. (i Sicut, inquit, fatemur proprium Dei opus fuisse Pauli vocationem, ita fatemur opera Dei propria esse, sive quae media vo¬ cantur, ut comedere, libere; sive quae mala sunt, ut Davidis adulterium, Manlii severi¬ tatem.- Constat enim ex cap. i. ad Romanos, Deum omnia facere non permissive , sed potenter (ut Augustini verbo utamur (id est, ut sit ejus propria Judae proditio, sicut Pauli vocatio. » Et infra : « Ergo non est cur frigidum glossema admittamus, Deum mala permittere, non etiam facere. » Haec ille. Contradicentia his omnibus habentur in iisdem locis communibus posteriori tempore editis, tum in loco de causa peccati, tum in loco de libero arbitrio. Primo siquidem, re¬ cipit nomen liberi arbitrii et rationis, quod ante detestabatur. « Monendi sunt, inquit, rudiores, ut a physicis sumant distinctiones et appellationes partium hominis. In homine est pars cognoscens et judicans, quae vocatur mens, vel intellectus, vel ratio. Altera pars appetens vocatur voluntas ; vocatur autem 15 liberum arbitrium mens et voluntas con¬ juncta. » Secundo, reprehendit Vallam, quem ante defenderat : « Valla, inquit, et plerique alii, non recte detrahunt voluntati hominis liber-, tatem, quia fiant omnia decernente Deo. n Item in epitome moralis Philosophia? : « Stoicas, inquit, illas de fato,- seU Valla? ab¬ surdas imaginationes, quae propter divinam gubernationem adimunt libertatem volun¬ tati, fugiamus. » Tertio, amplectitur philosophorum senten¬ tias, quas antea Scripturis contrarias esse dicebat : « Haec, inqurt, est libertas volun¬ tatis, quam philosophi recte tribuunt ho¬ mini. » Item : « Honestius », inquit, « Plato docuit, » Et in Epitome moralis philosophiae, « Est, inquit, prudentissime ab Aristotele addita rationis descriptio. » Quarto, admittit, esse in rebus contin-r gentiam et libertatem, quam simpliciter ante negaverat: « Concedendum est, inquit, quod Scriptura Apostolica tribuat homini, etiam nunc post lapsum, libertatem aliquam dili¬ gendi ea, quae sunt subjecta rationi. Et in¬ fra : Haec Manichaea imaginatio horribile mendacium est, et ab hoc errore mentes ab¬ ducendae sunt et docendae, agere aliquid li¬ berum arbitrium. » Quinto negat, Deum esse causam peccati quod tam impudenter antea asserebat: «Est, inquit, haec et pia sententia, utraque manu, et verius toto pectore tenenda, Deum non esse causam peccati, nec velle peccatum. Et infra : Nec figurae illae verborum in sermone hcbraico pugnant cum hac sententia, Indu¬ rabo cor Pharaonis, et similes. Certum est enim hebraica phrasi significare permissio¬ nem, non efficacem voluntatem. » Ex hi$ enim facile potest intelligi quam sint adver¬ sarii inconstantes in rebus etiam gravissimis; Sed his omissis ad confirmandam veritatem accedamus.