Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book IV: Grace and Free Choice in Natural and Civil Works
Chapter 7: That according to the Catholic faith man has free choice in civil matters is proved from the divine writings
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book IV. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Now indeed, that man is of free choice in civil matters (which had been proposed in the second place) is proved, according to the doctrine of faith, from the divine writings.
And first, let those testimonies come which attribute to man, after the fall, the election of diverse things. For the power of true election cannot be understood without true liberty of choice; for, as we demonstrated in book 1, election is the act most proper to free choice. These, then, are the testimonies. Numbers 30: It shall be in the choice of the man, whether he do it or do it not. Josue 24: The option is given you; choose this day that which pleaseth you. 2 Kings 24: The option of three things is given thee; choose one of them which thou wilt. 3 Kings 3: Ask what thou wilt, that I should give it thee. Daniel 13: Straits are upon me on every side, and I know not what to choose.
Second, hither pertain those testimonies which teach that man can do some things which he does not do; and contrariwise, does some things which he could have not done. For hence it is most openly clear that it is free in such a man to do or not do at his choice. 3 Kings 3: Because thou hast asked this word, and hast not asked riches, nor the lives of thy enemies, but hast asked wisdom, etc. Solomon, therefore, could have asked riches and not asked wisdom; and yet he asked not riches, but wisdom. Ecclesiasticus 31: Who could have transgressed, and hath not transgressed, etc. 1 Corinthians 9: Am not I free? Am not I an Apostle? etc. In which place the Apostle teaches that he could have led about a sister, and received expenses from the Churches, but willed to do neither. Acts 5: Whilst it remained, did it not remain to thee? and after it was sold, was it not in thy power? That is: Couldst thou not, Ananias, have not sold thy field? And after thou hadst sold it, couldst thou not have retained the price for thyself? Who compelled thee to sell the field, or to offer the price to God? He could, therefore, sell and not sell, and offer and not offer. Nor would he satisfy who should answer that in this place and the preceding one it is a question of liberty from precept, not of liberty from natural necessity. For liberty from precept includes liberty from natural necessity; otherwise precepts would be inept and ridiculous, if he to whom the precept is given were not free from natural necessity. For if Ananias could not have not sold the field, or not offered that price to the Apostles, but had necessarily both sold the field and offered the price to the Apostles, blessed Peter would have spoken ineptly: Whilst it remained, did it not remain to thee? and after it was sold, was it not in thy power?
Third, let those testimonies come which contain a condition; for these include the power of a free option of opposites. Isaias 1: If you be willing, and will hearken to me, you shall eat the good things of the land. Matthew 19: If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments. In the same place: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all that thou hast. Luke 9: If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, etc.
Fourth, to the foresaid places can be adjoined those which contain a reprehension with an interrogation. For it follows thence that man could have not done that for which he is reprehended. In Genesis 3 it is said to the woman: Why hast thou done this? But to the serpent, which is devoid of reason and liberty, it is not said, “Why hast thou done this,” but, Because thou hast done this. Genesis 4: Why art thou angry? and why is thy countenance fallen? Eve, therefore, could have not done what she did; and Cain could have not been angry, nor cast down his countenance for grief. For it is not said to the sheep, “Why fleest thou the wolf?” — for it cannot not flee the wolf. Nor is it said to the wolf, “Why devourest thou the lamb?” — because it cannot do otherwise.
Fifth, there can be added all the testimonies which contain the praises of the holy Fathers — Noe, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Moses, Job, David, Tobias, and finally all the Prophets. Likewise those which contain precepts, counsels, exhortations — such as are the Proverbs of Solomon, the book of Ecclesiasticus, a great part of the Psalms, the Prophets, the Gospels, the Epistles of Peter, Paul, John, James, Jude. For all these signify that man is of free choice, as St. Augustine gathers in the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 2.
Last, let those testimonies be added which prove that the first man before the fall was endowed with free choice — such as that of Ecclesiasticus 15: God created man, and left him in the hand of his own counsel, etc. For even Calvin himself, on account of this place, confesses that the first man before the fall was endowed with free choice, book 1 of the Institutes, chapter 15, § 8, and book 2, chapter 5, § 18. For although the adversaries will have the case of man before the fall and after the fall to be different, as regards liberty of choice, yet we can easily prove that even after the fall man is of free choice, if he was before the fall. For the whole reason of Calvin (as we shall see afterwards) why man lacks free choice is placed in this: that the liberty of man fights with the providence of God. But the providence of God did not begin from the fall of man, but existed also before; why, then, will man after the fall be hindered from free choice, if before the fall he was not hindered?
Nay, what of this — that from this very fact, that God has providence over all things, it follows that man enjoys liberty of choice? For it is proper to the divine providence not to destroy, but to conserve natures. For it disposes all things sweetly, as we read in Wisdom 8; and, as St. Augustine gathers thence, book 7 On the City of God, chapter 30, it so administers all things which it created that it also lets them exercise and carry on their own proper motions. And so, since the rational nature demands liberty of choice, and received it from the creator from the beginning, the divine providence so governs and rules man that it in no way hinders his free election.
And this is what Origen meant, book 3 On First Principles, chapter 3; Gregory of Nyssa, book 7 of the Philosophy, chapter 1, and book 8, last chapter; Theodoret, in the epitome of the divine decrees, chapter on Providence; and John Damascene, book 2 On the Faith, chapter 29, when they wrote that the free actions of men are not done by providence, but by the reason and counsel of men. For they did not mean to signify that the providence of God does not extend itself to all singular things — since they confess this in the same place, and prove it — but that the actions of men are not determined to one, nor is necessity brought upon them by providence, in the way those things are determined which are not free, and a certain necessity laid on them, so that they cannot be done in another way. But of these things more will be said in the response to the arguments.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT YII. Secundum fidem Catholicam hominem esse liberi arbitrii in rebus civilibus, probatur c.v divinis litteris. Jam vero liberi arbitrii hominem esse in rebus civilibus (quod secundo loco propositum luerat) secundum doctrinam fidei, probatur ex divinis litteris. Ac primum, accedant ea testimonia, qiue tribuunt homini post lapsum, electionem di¬ versarum rerum. Noqhe enim intelligi potest verte electionis potestas, sine vera arbitrii li¬ bertate. Nam ut in i. libro demonstravimus, electio est actus maxime proprius Uberi ar¬ bitrii. Sunt igitur haec testimonia. Numeri xxx. In arbitrio viri erit, sive faciat, sive non faciat (1). Josue xxiv. Optio vobis datur, eligite hodie quod vobis placet. II Reg. xxiv. Trium tibs datur optio, elige unum quod voluerit ex his. III Reg. iix. Postula quod vis, nt dem tibi. Dan. xm. Augustae mihi sunt undique , et quid eligam ignoro (!)■. Secundo, huc pertinent ea testimonia, qua? docent, hominem aliqua posse facere, quae non facit : et contra, facere aliqua, quae po¬ tuisset non facere. Hinc enim apertissime patet, liberum esse in ejusmodi homine, ut pro arbitrio faciat vel non faciat, m. Regum, ni. Quia postulasti verbum hoc, et nonpostula- sti divitias, aut animas inimicorum tuorum , sed postulatti sapientiam, etc. (2). Potuit igitur Salomon postulare divitias, et non postulare sapientiam, et tamen non divitias, sed sa¬ pientiam postulavit, Ecclesiast. xxxi. Qui po¬ tuit jtransg redi, et non est transgressus etc. i. Cor. ix. Non sum liber ? non sum Apostolus ? (3) etc. Quo loco docet Apostolus, potuisse se circumducere sororem, et ab Ecclesiis sum¬ ptus accipere, sed neutrum facere voluisse. Act. v. Nonne manens tibi manebat, et venun¬ datum intuaerat potestate (4)?hoc est, Nonne poteras (Anania) agrum tuum non vendere ? et posteaquam vendideras, nonne poteras pretium tibi retinere? quis te agrum vendere aut Deo pretium offerre coegit ? poterat igi¬ tur vendere et non vendere, et offerre et non offerre. Neque satisfaceret, qui responderet, in hoc loco, et superiore agi de libertate a pra- cepto, non de libertate a naturali necessitate. Nam libertas a praecepto includit libertatem a naturali necessitate ; alioqui inepta et ri¬ dicula essent praecepta, si is, cui praecipitur, non esset liber a naturali necessitate. Nam si Ananias non potuisset non vendere agrum, aut pretium illud Apostolis non offerre, sed necessario cl agrum vendidisset, et pretium Apostolis obtulisset, inepte dixisset, B. Bo¬ trus, Nonne manens tibi manebat, et venun¬ datum in tua erat potestate ? Tertio, accedant illa testimonia quae con¬ ditionem continent. Ea siquidem virtutem includunt liberam oppositorum optionem Isaice i. Si volueritis et audieritis me, bona terrae comedetis. Matth. xix. Si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata. Ibidem : Si vis per¬ fectus esse, vade, vende omnia quae habes. Luc. ix. Si quis vult post me venire, abneget se ip¬ sum etc. (5). t)uarto, praedictis locis aidjuugi posgunlea, quae continent reprehensionem cum interro¬ gatione. Sequitur enim inde potuisse homi¬ nem non facere id, propter quod reprehen¬ ditur. Genes, m. mulieri dicitur : Quare hoc fecisti ? serpenti vero, qui expers est rationis et libertatis, non dicitur : Quare hoc fecisti, sed, Quia hoc fecisti. Genes, iv. Quare iratus es ? et quare concidit vultus tuus ? Potuit igi¬ tur et Eva illud non facere, quod fecit. Et Cain non irasci, neque vultum prae moerore dejicere. Neque enim ovi dicitur, Quare fugis lupum ? non enim potest non fugere lupum. Neque lupo dicitur : Quare agnum devoras ? quia non potest aliud facere. Quinto, adjici possunt omnia testimonia, quae continent laudes sanctorum Patrum, Noe, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Mosis, Job, David, Tobiae, Prophetarum denique omnium. Item illa, quae continent praecepta, consilia, cohortationes, qualia sunt P^verbia Salomonis, liber Ecclesiastici, magna pars Psalmorum : Prophetarum, Evangeliorum, Epistolarum Petri, Pauli, Joannis, JacObi, Judae. Ilaec enim omnia significant, hominem esse liberi arbitrii, ut S. Augustinus, colligit in libro de gratia et libero arbitrio cap. 2. Postremo, addantur ea testimonia, quae probant, primum hominem ante lapsum praeditum fuisse libero arbitrio ; quale est il- (1) Jos. XXIV, 15; II Reg. XXIV, 12; III Reg. III, 5; Dan. XIII, 22.-(2) III Rfeg. III, \ 1 .-(3) Eccl . XXXI, 10; I Corin. IV, 1. — (4) Act. V, 4. - (5) Isai. I, 19; Matth. XIX, 17 ; ibid. XIX, 21 ; Luc- IX, 23. LIBER IV. IS lud Eccles. xv. Deus creavit hominem , et reli¬ quit illum in manu eonsilii sui etc. (1). Nam ipse etiam Calvinus propter hunc locum fatetur, primum hominem ante lapsum libero arbi¬ trio praeditum fuisse lib. i. Instit. cap. 15. §. 8. et lib. ii. cap. 5. §. 18. Quamvis enim adversarii aliam esse velint rationem homi¬ nis ante lapsum et post lapsum, quod attinet ad arbitrii libertatem : nos tamen facile pro¬ bare possumus etiam post lapsum hominem esse liberi arbitrii, si fuit ante lapsum. Nam tota ratio Calvini (ut postea videbimus) cur homo careat libero arbitrio, est in eo posita, quod libertas hominis pugnet cum provi¬ dentia Dei. At providentia Dei non incepit a lapsu hominis, sed fuit etiam antea, cur igitur impedietur post lapsum hominis a li¬ bero arbitrio, si ante lapsum non impedieba¬ tur ? Quid, quod ex hoc ipso, quod Deus provi¬ dentiam rerum omnium habet, sequitur, ut homo Ubertate fruatur arbitrii ? Nam provi¬ dentiae divinae illud est proprium, non de¬ struere , sed conservare naturas. Disponit enim suaviter omnia, ut legimus Sapient. 8. et, ut inde colligit S. August. lib, vn, de Ci¬ vitate Dei cap. 30. sic administrat omnia, quae creavit, ut etiam ipsa proprios exercere et agere motus sinat. Itaque cum natura ratio¬ nalis libertatem arbitrii postulet, eamque ab initio a conditore perceperit : sic hominem divina providentia gubernat et regit, ut liberam ejus electionem nullo modo impe¬ diat. Atque hoc est quod voluerunt Origenes lib. m. de principiis cap. 3. Gregorius Nys- senus lib. vii de Philosophia cap. I. lib. vm. cap. ult. Theodoretus in epitome divinorum decretorum cap. de Providentia, et Joan. Damascenus lib. n de fide cap. 29, cum scri¬ pserunt, liberas hominum actiones non fieri a prodentia, sed ab hominum, ratione et consilio. Non enim significare voluerunt, providentiam Dei non se extendere ad om¬ nia singularia, cum hoc ibidem fateantur, et probent, sed non determinari ad unum ac¬ tiones hominum, neque necessitatem eis a providentia adferri ; quemadmodum deter¬ minantur ea, quse libera non sunt, eisque necessitas quaedam, ut non possint alio modo fieri. Sed de his plura dicentur in responsio¬ ne ad argumenta. (l)Eccl. XV. 14.