Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 6: The arguments against the things said in the preceding chapter are solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
But against the things that have been said, the adversaries object, first, those words of Moses, Deuteronomy 30: “This commandment, that I command thee this day, is not above thee, nor far off from thee,” etc. Where by the commandment he understands, through the figure of universal statement, the whole natural law — that is, the decalogue, which he had repeated in that book.
I answer: this place can be expounded in two ways. First, with Augustine, in the book On the Perfection of Justice, near the end — so that the sense is that the law of the Lord is not above the powers of men; not of any men whatsoever, but of those who through grace have been healed of self-love, and love God with the whole heart. For the same Moses had said a little before, promising the grace of the new testament: The Lord thy God will circumcise thy heart, and the heart of thy seed, that thou mayst love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul. Second, it can be said, with the Bishop of Avila and some others in the commentary on that place, that Moses speaks not of the easiness of observing the law, but of the easiness of knowing it. Which exposition seems most literal and proper. For since, before the law was given, the Jews could have pretended ignorance if they had not done the things God willed to be done by them, therefore Moses, after he had expounded the whole law to them, admonishes them to fulfill the law, and in no way to plead ignorance. He says, then: This commandment is not above thee, nor far off — that is, it is not in a high or distant place, so that thou canst not know it. Then he explains each: of the lofty place he says, “It is not situated in heaven, that thou mayst say: which of us can ascend to heaven, to bring it down to us, that we may hear and fulfill it in work?” Of the distant, he says: “Nor is it set beyond the sea, that thou mayst make excuse and say: which of us can cross the sea, and bring it back even to us, that we may be able to hear and do what is commanded?” Then at last he concludes: “But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart, that thou mayst do it” — that is, the law which I propose to thee to be kept is not above heaven, nor beyond the sea, but altogether near to thee: for it is in thy heart, since thou hast already heard and learned it; and in thy mouth, because thou hast testified that thou hast received and learned it, when thou saidst, “All that the Lord hath commanded us, we will do.” And this exposition is confirmed from the Apostle, Romans 10; for blessed Paul, alluding to this place of Deuteronomy, speaks thus: “But the justice which is of faith speaketh thus: Say not in thy heart, Who shall ascend into heaven? — that is, to bring Christ down; or, Who shall descend into the deep? — that is, to bring up Christ again from the dead. But what saith it? The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart. This is the word of faith, which we preach. For if thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thy heart that God hath raised him up from the dead, thou shalt be saved.” Where the Apostle wishes to show that, as for the Jews in the time of Moses there was no need to climb into heaven or journey beyond the sea to have and understand the law, since they had Moses himself before them, preaching and expounding the sense of the law — so also for the same Jews, in the time of the Apostles, there was no need to ascend into heaven or descend into the lower world to have and understand the incarnation and resurrection of Christ, since these things were openly preached by the Apostles; but it was enough if they had been willing to believe with the heart and confess with the mouth.
Second, they object that of Ecclesiasticus 15: If thou wilt keep the commandments, they shall preserve thee. I answer: to this place, and others like it, St. Augustine answers in the book On the Perfection of Justice, near the end, and in the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapters 15 and 16, that in these places free choice is demonstrated, through which the precepts are to be fulfilled, but the grace of God is not excluded, without which they cannot be fulfilled — even as in many other places, which seem contrary to these, grace is demonstrated, but free choice is not excluded.
Third, they object that of Romans 2: When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law. For St. John Chrysostom, in the commentary on this place, writes that the Gentiles fulfilled all the things that are of the law. I answer: we have already said above that from the place of the Apostle it is only gathered that some commandment of the natural law can be naturally fulfilled, yet not all. To the commentary of Chrysostom I answer: the Gentiles fulfilled all the things that are of the law — that is, all the things that pertain to some one law, so that in keeping that law they sinned in nothing; yet they did not keep all the laws, especially for a long time.
Fourth, they object thus: The precepts of the law of nature are called natural for this reason, that they have a proportion to the powers of nature; therefore they can be kept by the powers of nature. Nor will it satisfy if someone say that nature is not sound but infirm; for infirm nature seems able to do all that sound nature can, but not equally easily — otherwise it should be called not so much infirm as extinguished. Moreover, human nature is called infirm if it be compared to the soundness of original justice, in which it was founded; for absolutely it is not less sound than it would be if it were created in its pure natural endowments. But man, founded in pure natural endowments, would have powers for keeping the natural precepts; therefore he has them now also. I answer: human nature is infirm not only because it lacks the soundness of original justice, but also because, from the condition of matter, as we have demonstrated elsewhere, it has the internal and natural disease of carnal concupiscence — which it would not have had if it had remained in original justice, but would have had if it had been founded in pure natural endowments. Now infirm nature can indeed do all the things that sound nature could, but not alone; for it needs help, which it would not need if it were sound — in the way a man bodily sick can make a journey, but on horseback, or at least with a staff, whereas the same man in health would have finished the journey on foot and without a staff. And so, if man be considered in his pure natural endowments: since even then he would be infirm, on account of the disease flowing from the condition of matter, he would not have powers by which, without the aid of God, he could keep all the commandments; but yet either the help would not have been wanting, or man would at some time have fallen, not by his own fault — as Augustine teaches, book On Correction and Grace, chapter 11.
Fifth, they object the testimonies of the Fathers, who say that God does not command impossible things; from which testimonies this follows: that the things commanded to a man destitute of any help are possible to him; but the natural precepts are commanded to every man; therefore they are possible to every man. I answer: God never commands impossible things, because he is always prompt to help: “Justly does he press with the precept,” says St. Leo, sermon 16 on the passion of the Lord, “who runs before with help.” But of this matter we have disputed at large in the second book, where we treated that question, whether sufficient help is given to all.
Sixth, they object this reason: Man can by his own powers keep some one moral precept, according to that of Romans 2: When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do those things that are of the law, etc. Therefore he can keep all; for many precepts to be kept do not occur together, but one after another. Again, someone can keep all the commandments for a short time, as we ourselves said above; therefore he will also be able for a long time, since by keeping the precepts the habit of obeying is acquired, and a work is more easily continued than begun. I answer: this argument avails nothing, for many causes. First, because all the precepts are not equal, but some heavier than others; and therefore it does not follow that he can keep all who can keep some one. Then, several sometimes occur together — as if someone, while he gives himself to prayer or the divine praises, is driven, at the devil’s suggestion, toward consent to a harmful thought, or has an occasion of secretly pilfering something; and it is easier to avoid one sin than many, and to keep one precept than many. Moreover, though on the one side it is easier to continue a work than to begin it, yet on the other, when one labors in a work, the powers little by little fail; and it is easier to endure in a work for a short time than a long. And so, as you would not rightly conclude if you said, “a sick man can walk a mile by his own powers, therefore he will also be able two miles,” so also they do not reason rightly who say: man, in the state of corrupt nature — in which perpetual vigilance and premeditation are required for acting well — can for a little time observe all the commandments; therefore he will be able also for a long time. Finally, for a little time one can observe all the commandments by his own powers, because it can come to pass, as we said, that in that brief space no affirmative precept occur, and no temptation against the negative; which yet in a long space cannot fail to occur.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT YI. Solvuntur argumenta contra ea, qux capite superiore dicta sunt . Sed adversus ea, qum dicta sunt, objiciunt adversarii primo, verba illa Mosis Deute- ronom. xxx. « Mandatum hoc, quod ego - prtecipio tibi, non supra te est, neque procul positum etc. » Ubi per mandatum intclligit, per figuram intellectionis, totam legem natu¬ ralem, hoc est, decalogum, quem in eo lib. repetiverat. Respondeo : hic locus duobus modis exponi potest primo, cum August. in lib. de perfe¬ ctione justitiae, prope extremo, ut sensus sit, legem Domini non esse supra vires hominum, non quorumlibet, sed eorum, qui per gratiam sanati sunt ab amore proprio, Deumque toto corde diligunt. Dixerat enim paulo ante idem Moses, promittens gratiam testamenti novi : Circumcidet Dominus cor tuum , et cor seminis tui , ut diligas Dominum Deum tuum in toto corde tuo , et in tota anima tua (1). Secundo, dici potest cum Abulen. Epi¬ scopo, et aliis nonnullis in comment. ejus loci. Mosemnonloqui defacilitate observanda) legis, sed de facilitate cognoscenda). Qua) expositio videtur maxime litteralis et propria. Quoniam enim ante datam legem potuissent (1 ) Dent. XXX, 14. CAPUT VI. 47 Judsei praetexere ignorantiam, si non fecis¬ sent, quae Deus ab illis fleri volebat : idcirco Moses posteaquam totam legem illis exposuit, admonet eosdem, ut legem impleant, neque ullo modo ignorantiam obtendant, ait igitur : Mandatum hoc non supra te est , neque procul positum, id est, non est in loco alto vel lon¬ ginquo, ut illud cognoscere non valeas. Deinde explicat utrumque, et de loco su¬ blimi ait : « Non estin coelo situm, ut possis dicere, quis nostrum valet ad coelum ascen¬ dere, ut deferat illud ad nos, ut audiamus, atque opere * compleamus ? » De longinquo ait : « neque transmare positum est, ut cau- seris et dicas, quis e nobis poterit transfre¬ tare mare, et illud ad nos usque deferre, ut possumus audire et facere quod praeceptum est ? » tum demum concludit, « sed juxta te est sermo valde in ore tuo, et in corde tuo, ut facias illum, » id est, lex quam tibi ser¬ vandam propono, non est supra coelum, ne¬ que ultra mare, sed proxima tibi omnino. Nam est in corde tuo, quoniam illam jam au¬ divisti, et didicisti, et in ore tuo, quia tu illam accepisse et didicisse testatus es, cum dixeris, omnia, quae praecepit nobisDominus, faciemus. Et confirmatur haec expositio ex Apostolo ad Roman. x. alludens enim B. Paulus ad hunc locum Deuteronomii sic loquitur : « Quae, inquit, ex fide est justitia, sic dicit, ne dixeris in corde tuo, quis ascendet in coe¬ lum, id est, Christum deducere? aut quis de¬ scendet in abyssum, id est, Christum a mor¬ tuis revocare? sed quid dicit? prope est ver¬ bum in ore tuo, et in corde tuo, hoc est, verbum fidei, quod praedicamus; quia si con¬ fitearis in ore tuo Dominum Jesum, et in corde tuo credideris quod Deus illum susci¬ tavit a mortuis, salvus eris. » Ubi vult Apo¬ stolus ostendere , quemadmodum Judaeis tempore Mosis, non erat opus in coelum con¬ scendere, vel trans mare proficisci, ut legem haberent et intelligerent, cum Mosem ipsum coram praedicantem et exponentem senten¬ tiam legis haberent : sic etiam iisdem Ju¬ daeis, tempore Apostolorum, opus non fuisse in coelum ascendere, aut in infernum descen¬ dere, ut Christi incarnationem et resurre¬ ctionem haberent et intelligerent, cum ista palam ab Apostolis praedicarentur, sed satis fuisse, si corde credere et ore confiteri vo¬ luissent. Secundo, objiciunt illud Ecclesiastici xv. Si volucris mandata servare, conservabunt te (1). Respondeo: Ad hunc locum, et alios similes respondet S. August. in lib. de perfectione Justitiae, prope extremo, et lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio cap. 15. et 16. in his locis de¬ monstrari liberum arbitrium, per quod prae¬ cepta implenda sunt, sed non excludi gratiam Dei, sine qua impleri non possunt. Quemad¬ modum in aliis multis locis, quae istis con¬ traria esse videntur, gratia demonstratur, sed liberum arbitrium non excluditur. Tertio, objiciunt illud ad Rom. ii. Cum gentes, quse legem non habent , naturaliter ea, quse legis sunt faciunt (2). Sanctus enim Joan. Chrysost. in comment. hujus loci scribit, omnia quae legis sunt, implesse Gentiles. s Respondeo, jam supra diximus, ex loco Apostoli solum colligi, naturaliter impleri posse aliquod mandatum legis naturalis, non tamen omnia. Ad comment. Chrysostomi re¬ spondeo, Gentiles implesse omnia quae legis sunt, id est, omnia, quae ad unam aliquam legem pertinent, ita ut in ea lege servanda nihil peccaverint, non tamen servasse omnes leges, praesertim longo tempore. Quarto, ita objiciunt : Praecepta legis na¬ turae ideo naturalia dicuntur, quia propor¬ tionem habent ad vires naturae, igitur na¬ turae viribus servari possunt. Neque satisfa¬ ciet, si quis dixerit, naturam non esse sanam, sed infirmam : nam infirma natura videtur posse omnia, quae potest sana, sed non aeque facile, alioqui non tam infirma, quam extin- cta dicenda esset. Praeterea natura humana dicitur infirma, si comparetur ad sanitatem justitiae originalis, in qua condita fuit : nam absolute non est minus sana, quam esset, si in puris naturalibus crearetur. Haberet autem homo, in puris naturalibus conditus, vires ad^ servanda praecepta naturalia; igitur et nunc habet. Respondeo, Natura humana non solum in¬ firma est, quia caret sanitate justitiae origi¬ nalis, sed etiam quia ex conditione mate¬ riae, ut alibi demonstravimus, internum et naturalem morbum habet concupiscentiae carnalis, quem non habuisset, si in originali justitia permansisset ; habuisset tamen, si in puris naturalibus condita fuisset. Natura au¬ tem infirma potest quidem omnia, quae pos¬ set sana, sed non sola ; eget enim auxilio, (I)Eccl. XV, 16. — (2) Rom. II, 14. 48 LIBER V. quo non egeret, si sana esset. Quo modo cor¬ poraliter ajgrotus, potest iter facere, sed in equo, vel certe cum baculo, cum alioqui sa¬ nus idem iter pedibus et sine baculo confe- cisset.*ltaque si homo in puris naturalibus consideretur, quoniam etiam tunc infirmus esset propter morbum, ex conditione mate- riaj promanantem, non haberet vires, qui¬ bus sine adjutorio Dei posset omnia man¬ data servare ; sed tamen vel auxilium non defuisset, vel homo non sua culpa aliquando cecidisset, ut Augustinus docet libro de cor¬ reptione et gratia cap. 11. Quinto, objiciunt testimonia Patrum, qui dicunt, Deum non praecipere impossibilia; ex quibus testimoniis illud sequitur, ut quae praecipiuntur homini, quovis auxilio desti¬ tuto, ea sint illi possibilia; praecipiuntur au¬ tem omni homini praecepta naturalia, igitur illa sunt omni homini possibilia. Respondeo, Deus numquam praecipit im¬ possibilia, quia semper promptus est ad ju¬ vandum : (( Juste (inquit S. Leo serm. 16. de passione Domini) instat praecepto, qui praecurrit auxilio, » sed de hac re fuse dispu¬ tavimus in secundo libro, ubi tractavimus quaestionem illam; utrum detur omnibus auxilium sufficiens. Sexto , objiciunt hanc rationem. Potest homo suis viribus servare aliquod unum praeceptum morale, juxta illud ad Rom. n. Cum gestes , qux legem non habent , ea qux legis sunt faciunt, etc. (1). Igitur potest servare omnia. Non enim occurrunt multa praecepta simul servanda, sed unum post aliud. Rursus potest aliquis servare omnia mandata ad breve tempus, ut supra nos diximus, igitur poterit etiam ad longum tempus, quoniam servando praecepta acquiritur habitus obe- diendi, et facilius continuatur, quam incho- (atur opus. Respondeo, nihil hoc argumentum valet, multis de causis. Primum , quoniam non sunt omnia praecepta paria. Sed alia aliis graviora, et ideo non sequitur, ut possit omnia servare, qui unum aliquod servare potest. Deinde, occurrunt aliquando plura simul, ut si quis dum orationi, aut divinis laudibus operam dat, illidatur, diabolo sug¬ gerente, ad consensum noxiae cogitationis, vel ocasionem habeat clam aliquid subri¬ piendi ; facilius autem est unum peccatum vitare, quam multa, et unum praeceptum, quam multa servare. Praeterea, tametsi ab una parte facilius sit opus continuare, quam inchoare ; tamen ab altera, cum in opere la¬ boratur, vires paulatim deficiunt, et facilius est brevi tempore, quam longo in opere per¬ durare. Itaque sicut non recte colliges, si dicas, potest homo aegrotus ambulare suis viribus mille passibus, igitur poterit etiam duo millia; sic etiam non recte ratiocinantur, qui dicunt, potest homo in statu naturae cor¬ ruptae, in quo requiritur perpetua vigilantia et praemeditatio ad bene agendum, parvo tempore observare omnia mafukita, poterit igitur et longo tempore. Denique , parvo tempore ideo potest quis omnia mandata suis viribus observare, quia fieri potest, ut dixi¬ mus, ut brevi illo spatio nullum occurrat praeceptum affirmativum, et nulla tentatio contra negavita : quae tamen in longo spatio non possunt non occurrere.