Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book V: Grace and Free Choice in Moral Works
Chapter 30: The arguments from the testimonies of St. Augustine are solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Now indeed from blessed Augustine — in whom the adversaries glory that they have a great stronghold. First they bring forward that from the Enchiridion, chapter 30: “Man, using free choice ill, lost both himself and it. For when sin was committed by free choice, sin being victor, free choice too was lost.” I answer: man is said to have lost free choice because he made it worse — in the way he is said to lose a son, or a servant, or a pupil, who by too great leniency lets him become disgraceful. But that free choice did not perish, nor was extinguished, as though it were no longer in the nature of things, is clear from this: that Augustine says, “he lost both himself and it.” For he did not lose himself by extinguishing and destroying himself, but by making himself worse. And how he made it worse he explains when he says that, sin being victor, free choice was lost. For free choice is lost, not when it perishes — which cannot happen — but when it is taken captive by the devil; in the way those things are said to be lost which in time of war have come into the power of the enemy. Whence also Augustine brings forward the testimony of the Lord saying: If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed. And he says openly, “lost, sin being victor” — because, namely, it came into the power of the victor. And this whole place will be conveniently explained from book 1 to Boniface, against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, chapter 2: “Who of us,” says he, “says that by the sin of the first man free choice perished from the human race? Liberty indeed perished through sin — but that liberty which was in paradise, of having full justice with immortality; whence human nature needs divine grace, the Lord saying: If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed.” And so free choice lost and forfeited is nothing else than made worse through captivity, by which perished the liberty of grace, not the liberty of nature.
The second testimony they take from this very place just cited — that is, from book 1 to Boniface, chapters 2 and 3. For when St. Augustine had said that free choice did not perish from the human race, he subjoins that it did not perish precisely because through it all sin who sin with delight; and this he repeats rather often, so that he seems to acknowledge no free choice except from coercion, and toward evil. I answer: St. Augustine, on account of the snares of the Pelagians, who from the liberty of nature gathered a liberty from sin, scarcely ever dares to assert free choice without adjoining something whence it can be understood that it cannot, without the grace of God, be free from sin. And we shall attain this more easily if we briefly expound the sense of that whole place. At the beginning, then, of the second chapter of book 1 to Boniface, St. Augustine proposes the objection — or more truly the calumny — of the Pelagians, who spoke thus of the Catholics: “They say that by the sin of the first man, that is, of Adam, free choice perished, and that no one now has the power of living well, but all are compelled into sin by the necessity of their flesh.” This is the objection of the Pelagians, by which they calumniated the Catholics as though they denied free choice; and thence they cunningly aimed to bring it about that the grace of God should not seem necessary for living well. This fraud Augustine uncovers in these words: “By defending free choice they hurl it headlong, so that trust for the doing of justice is placed in it rather than in the Lord’s aid, and each one glories in himself, not in the Lord.” By which words he does not deny that free choice ought to be defended, but forbids too much to be attributed to it. Then he adds, refuting the above calumny: “But who of us says that by the sin of the first man free choice perished from the human race? Liberty indeed perished through sin — but that liberty which was in paradise, of having full justice with immortality; on which account human nature needs divine grace.” By these words Augustine first denies that part of the Pelagian objection, “they say that by the sin of the first man free choice perished”; then he explains that other part, “and no one now has the power of living well,” saying that man cannot live well without the help of grace, and fell into this misery through sin, from which we are not freed except through him who said, If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed. He then subjoins, proving from the fact that sin is committed that free choice did not perish: “For free choice has so far not perished in the sinner, that through it sin above all all they who sin with delight.” Now St. Augustine does not mean in this place to signify that the liberty of choice is placed in this, that one sin with delight. For even if someone sinned without delight — as one who through fear of death should deny the faith — he would yet be said to sin freely. But he wished to indicate that they sin most freely who sin with delight, since men of that kind enjoy a double liberty: the one, which is opposed to necessity, and which is common to all who sin, and is properly called the liberty of nature, or the liberty of choice; the other, which is opposed to the servitude of justice, and is properly called the liberty of sin — or also the servitude of sin. For the servitude of sin and the liberty of sin are the same, since he who is the servant of sin sins freely — that is, willingly, and with delight; even as the liberty of justice and the servitude of justice are also the same, since they who are the servants of justice do justice willingly and with delight. Last, in chapter 3 he refutes that third part of the same Pelagian objection, “but all are compelled into sin by the necessity of their flesh,” and says: “It is not, then, as they say that we say — and this man dares even to write it — that all are compelled into sin, as though unwilling, by the necessity of their flesh. But if they are now of that age that they use the choice of their own mind, they are both retained in sin by their own will, and hurled from sin to sin by their own will. For even he who persuades and deceives does not act in them except that they commit sin by will. But this will, which is free in evil things because it takes delight in evil things, is therefore not free in good things, because it has not been freed.” By which words Augustine answers directly to that phrase, “are compelled by necessity,” and teaches that men are not compelled — that is, not dragged unwilling — to sin, but rather sin most freely, since men for the most part sin not only with the liberty of nature, but also with the liberty of sin; and, lest the Pelagians should gather, after their manner, that a sinful man can by his own powers do well, he adds that the will of the impious man, which is free in evil things with the liberty of sin, is not free in good things with the liberty of grace, unless it be first freed by Christ the Lord.
The third testimony they take from book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 15: “He who cannot with good will resist compelling cupidity — this now is sin in such wise that it is also the punishment of sin.” And below: “For when it is such that the same thing is also the punishment of sin, how much is it that the will avails — unless perhaps, if it be pious, to pray for help? For it is free just so far as it has been freed.” From this place they gather that the impious will is not free, but sins altogether from necessity, since it can do nothing in good — not even ask for help — and yet truly sins, since otherwise the sin would not truly be the punishment of sin. I answer: the will which cannot resist compelling cupidity is free absolutely, since that impotence is conditioned, not absolute. For it can implore the help of God; and if it does not, it fails to do so by its own fault. For to no one is the help wanting whereby he can at least ask strength from God; and that to no one is wanting the help necessary for not sinning, we proved in another book.
The fourth testimony they take from epistle 144: “Without the grace of God the will cannot be free, since it is subject to cupidities conquering and binding.” I answer: without the grace of God — taking grace in the broad manner, for the help necessary for not sinning — the will is not free as to exercise, that is, it has not the use of free choice; yet absolutely it is free, since (as we said) the help of grace necessary for not sinning is wanting to no one. It is like if someone should so gather: without light the eye cannot see, therefore absolutely the eye cannot see. And we have already often said that the necessity of grace is not denied by us while we assert the liberty of choice; for what we maintain is this: that, the necessary help being present, man can sin and not sin. Nor will the contrary of this opinion ever be found in the books of Augustine.
The fifth testimony they take from the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 30: “Through the law, the knowledge of sin; through faith, the obtaining of grace against sin; through grace, the healing of the soul from the vice of sin; through the health of the soul, the liberty of choice; through the liberty of choice, the love of justice; through the love of justice, the fulfilling of the law.” And below: “Why do wretched men dare to be proud of free choice before they are freed, and do not attend that in the very name of free choice liberty is sounded?” etc. I answer: St. Augustine speaks in this place most openly of free choice as it is denominated from the liberty of grace, not from the liberty of nature. For if the liberty of nature — that is, free choice properly so called — first began to be in us after faith and justification, how would the same Augustine, in the same book, chapter 33, say that free choice, naturally bestowed on the rational soul, is that middle power which can either be bent toward faith or inclined toward unbelief? For how is it bent toward receiving faith, if it does not begin to exist except after faith? He speaks, then, of the liberty of grace, through which the healed soul runs the way of the Lord’s commandments with delight. Of which he speaks also in the book On Correction and Grace, chapter 8, when he says: “The human will does not attain grace by liberty, but liberty by grace.”
The sixth testimony they take from the book On Correction and Grace, chapter 12: “If their own will were left to them, so that they should remain in the help of God if they would, amid so many and so great temptations the will itself would succumb through its own infirmity, and therefore they could not persevere, because, failing through infirmity, they would not even will.” For St. Augustine seems in this place to say that just men, even with the help of the grace healing the soul, cannot persevere in good works unless they be perpetually led by the spirit of God; but this is not to have free choice toward either part. I answer: Augustine signifies that for man, after the fall of the first man, the aid of habitual grace does not suffice (for that he calls the aid in which man remains if he will — which also in the same place he compared to nourishment, which, if we will, we use, and if we will not, we use not); but that besides, on account of temptations, the help of God protecting and directing is necessary, without which even the just could not persevere, because, failing through infirmity, they would not even will. But this impotence is not absolute, but conditional; for although the just man cannot, without special help, persevere in good works, yet absolutely he can, since God does not desert unless deserted. Wherefore in the same book, chapter 7 [al. 11], the same Augustine says that they cannot be excused who do not persevere, since they could have persevered had they willed.
The seventh testimony they take from the same book, chapter 13, where, when St. Augustine had said that they who sin, sin through free choice, he straightway corrects himself and says: “choice, I say, free, but not freed.” For he seems (as Calvin notes) to have wished to say that the choice is free in name, not in fact. I answer: we have now often said that Augustine, on account of the Pelagians, calls the choice free, not freed — since without the grace of God it is the servant of sin, though it be free from natural necessity.
The eighth testimony they take from the book On the Perfection of Justice, response 9: “Through the liberty of choice it came to pass that man was with sin; but now the penal viciousness that followed has made, out of liberty, necessity.” And below: “Because the will sinned, there followed upon the sinner the hard necessity of having sin, until the whole infirmity be healed.” I answer: necessity is manifold, but not every necessity is repugnant to the liberty of choice. The first is that of suffering the motions of the flesh fighting against the law of the mind; for even all the most just can say with the Apostle, Romans 7: I see another law in my members. But this is not repugnant to the free choice of the will, since, even though we necessarily feel those motions, yet we do not necessarily consent; and then we say with the Apostle: If I do that which I will not, it is no more I that work it. The second necessity is that of sinning from ignorance — for who can understand sins? But neither is this repugnant to free choice, since, even though we cannot but be ignorant of certain things, yet we can not will to be ignorant. For he is reprehended who would not understand that he might do well — not he who willed and could not. And of these necessities St. Augustine speaks in the former part of the objection; for in the same place he subjoins: “Whence faith cries to God: Bring me out of my necessities — placed under which, we either cannot understand what we will, or, what we have understood and will, we are not able to fulfill.” The third necessity is that of divine grace, both for the remission of sin contracted and for avoiding those which could be contracted. But neither does this take away free choice, since, as we have often said, and proved in the second book, God denies to no one the necessary aid. The fourth necessity is that of having some venial sin; for even just men have need daily to use that prayer to God, Forgive us our debts. But neither does this necessity fight with the liberty of choice, since, if reason keep watch as it ought, we can avoid each single venial sin, though it cannot come to pass that we avoid all, without a special privilege. And of this necessity Augustine speaks in the latter part of the objection, as is clear to one reading that place. Nay, the whole book was for this reason entitled On the Perfection of Justice: because it does this above all, to prove against the Pelagians that we cannot in this life so perfectly fulfill justice that that prayer be not always necessary, Forgive us our debts. The fifth necessity is that of doing evil acts, an evil and efficacious will being posited. For he who efficaciously wills the end cannot not will the means which he judges necessary to that end; so he who vehemently hates someone cannot from his heart do him good. But neither is this necessity repugnant to liberty, because it is conditional, not absolute; for man can, if he will, not will efficaciously that end from love of which he was in a certain manner compelled to the choosing of the means.
That necessity alone, then, is properly repugnant to the liberty of choice which absolutely brings it about that man is not the lord of his own will; which necessity our adversaries, however much they boast Augustine to be theirs, will never be able to point out in the books of Augustine.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXX. Solvuntur argumenta ex testimoniis S. Augustini. Jam vero ex B. Augustino, in quo magnum praesidium habere se gloriantur adversarii. Primo proferunt illud ex Enchiridio cap. xxx. «Libero arbitrio male utens homo, et se per¬ didit, et ipsum. Nam cum libero peccaretur arbitrio, victore peccato amissum est et libe¬ rum arbitrium i) . Respondeo : dicitur homo perdidisse libe¬ rum arbitrium, quia deterius illud fecit ; quo¬ modo dicitur perdere filium, aut servum, aut discipulum, qui nimia lenitate flagitiosum fieri sinit. Alioqui non periisse liberum arbi¬ trium, neque esse extinctum, quasi non fit amplius in rerum natura, perspicuum est ex eo, quod Augustinus dicit, « et se perdidit, et ipsum. «Non enim se perdidit extinguendo, ac perimendo, sed deteriorem efficiendo. Quemadmodum autem deteriorem fecerit, explicat cum dicit, victore peccato amissum esse liberum arbitrium. Amittitur enim libe¬ rum arbitrium, non cum perit, quod fieri non potest, sed cum a diabolo captivatur ; quo¬ modo dicuntur amissa, quse tempore belli in potestatem hostium devenerunt. Unde etiam adfert Augustinus testimonium Domini dicen¬ tis : « Si vos filius liberavit, vere liberi eri¬ tis». Et aperte dicit, victore peccato arnis^ sum, quia videlicet in potestatem victoris ve¬ nit. Explicabitur autem commode totus hic lo¬ cus ex lib. i ad Bonifacium contra duas epi¬ stolas Pelagianorum cap. ii « Quis nostrum, inquit, dicat, quod primi hominis peccato perierit liberum arbitrium de humano genere ? libertas quidem periit per peccatum, sedilia, qua? in paradiso fuit habendi plenam cum immortalitate justitiam. Unde natura humana divina indiget gratia, dicente Domino, si vos filius liberaverit, vere liberi eritis ». Itaque liberum arbitrium perditum et amissum nihil est aliud, nisi deterius factum per captivita¬ tem, qua periit libertas gratia;, non libertas naturae. Secundum testimonium sumunt ex hoc ipso loco proxime citato, id est, ex lib. i. ad Boni¬ facium cap. 2. et 3. nam cum S. Augustinus dixisset, non periisse liberum arbitrium de humano genere ; subjungit, ideo non periisse, quia per illud peccant, quicumque cum de¬ lectatione peccant. Idque saepius repetit, ut videatur non agnoscere liberum arbitrium nisi a coactione, et acTmalum. Respondeo : S. Augustinus propter insidias Pelagianorum, qui ex libertate naturae colli¬ gebant libertatem a peccato : vix unquam audet liberum arbitrium asserere, quin ali¬ quid adjungat, unde intelligi possit, illud sine gratia Dei non posse liberum esse a peccato. Id autem facilius assequemur, si breviter ex¬ ponamus sententiam totius illius loci. Initio igitur secundi capitis libri primi ad Bonifadium, proponit S. Augustinus objecti¬ onem, seu verius calumniam Pelagianorum, qui de Catholicis ita loquebantur : « Dicunt illi, quia peccato primi hominis, id est, Adse, liberum arbitrium perierit, et nemo jam po¬ testatem habeat bene vivendi, sed omnes in peccatum carnis suae necessitate cogantur». Haec est Pelagianorum objectio, qua calum¬ niabantur Catholicos, quasi negarent liberum arbitrium, et inde callide intendebant effice¬ re, ut gratia Dei ad bene vivendum non vi¬ deretur esse necessaria. Hanc fraudem his verbis Augustinus dete¬ git : « Liberum, inquit, arbitrium defendendo praecipitant, ut de illo potius ad faciendum justitiam, quam de Domini adjutorio confida- tur, atque in se quisque, non in Domino glo- rietur ». Quibus verbis non negat, defendi debere liberum arbitrium, sed prohibet ni¬ mis multum illi tribui. «Deinde addit, calum¬ niam superiorem refellens : « Quis autem nostrum dicat, quod primi hominis peccato perieritliberum arbitrium de humano genere ? libertas quiclera periit per peccatum, sedilia, qua? in paradiso fuit habendi plenam cum immortalitate justitiam, propter quod natura humana divina indiget gratia » . His verbis Augustinus primum negat illam partem objectionis Pelagianse : « Dicunt, quod peccato qmrni hominis, perierit liberum ar¬ bitrium. » Deinde, explicat illam alteram par¬ tem « et nemo jam potestatem habeat bene vivendi » , dicens, hominem non posse bene vivere sine auxilio gratia3, et in hanc mise¬ riam incidisse per peccatum, a quo non libe¬ ramur, nisi per illum, qui dixit : « Si vos fi¬ lius liberaverit, vere liberi eritis». Subjun¬ git deinde probans, ex eo quod peccatur, li¬ berum arbitrium non periisse : «Nam inquit, liberum arbitrium usque adeo in peccatore non periit, ut per illud peccent, maxime om¬ nes, qui cum delectatione peccant ». 104 LIBER V. Non vult autem hoc loco S. Augustinus si¬ gnificare, libertatem arbitrii in eo sitam esse, ut quis cum delectatione peccet. Nam etiamsi aliquis sine delectatione peccaret, ut qui metu mortis fidem negaret, libere tamen peccare diceretur : sed indicare voluit, ma¬ xime libere eos peccare, qui cum delectati¬ one peccant, quoniam qui ejusmodi sunt du¬ plici libertate gaudent. Una, qua} opponitur necessitati, qua}que communis est omnibus qui peccant, et dicitur proprie libertas natu¬ ra}, sive libertas arbitrii ; altera, quae oppo¬ nitur servituti justitia}, et dicitur proprie li¬ bertas peccati, sive etiam servitus peccati. Eadem enim est servitus peccati, et libertas peccati, quoniam qui servus est peccati, li¬ bere, id est, libenter, et cum delectatione peccat, sicut etiam eadem est libertas justi¬ tia}, et servitus justitia}, quoniam qui servi sunt justitiae, libenter et cum delectatione justitiam faciunt. r Refellit postremo in cap. 3. illam tertiam partem ejusdem objectionis Pelagianae : «Sed omnes in pdccatum carnis suae necessitate cogantur » . Et ait : «Non itaque sicut dicunt, nos quidem dicere, et iste audet etiam scri¬ bere, omnes in peccatum velut inviti caimis sua} necessitate coguntur. Sed si jam in ea aetate sunt, ut propriae mentis utantur arbi¬ trio, et in peccato sua voluntate retinentur, et a peccato in peccatum voluntate sua prae¬ cipitantur. Neque enim agit in eis etiam qui suadet et decipit, nisi ut peccatum voluntate committant. Sed haec voluntas, quae libera est in malis, quia delectatur malis, ideo libera in bonis non est, quia liberata non est. » Quibus verbis respondet Augustinus dire¬ cte', ad illud a necessitate cogantur», et docet non cogi, id est non invitos trahi homines ad peccatum, sed liberrime potius peccare, quo¬ niam non solum libertate naturae, sed etiam libertate peccati, ut plurimum homines pec¬ cant, et ne Pelagiani more suo colligerent, posse hominem peccatorem suis viribus bene facere, addit voluntatem hominis impii, quae est libera in malis libertate peccati, non esse in bonis liberam libertate gratiae, nisi prius a Christo Domino liberetur. Tertium testimonium sumunt ex lib. I re¬ tractationum cap. 45. «Qui cogenti cupiditati bona voluntate resistere non potest, jam hoc ita peccatum est, ut sit etiam poena peccati. » Et infra : « Nam quando tale est ut idem sit et poena peccati, quantum est quod valet vo¬ luntas, nisi forte, si pia est, ut oret auxilium? in tantum enim libera est, quia in tantum li¬ berata est» . Ex hoc loco colligunt, impiam voluntatem non esse liberam, sed omnino ex necessitate peccare ; quoniam nihil potest in bono, ac ne auxilium quidem petere, et ta¬ men vere peccat, quoniam alioqui non vere peccatum esset poena peccati. Respondeo : voluntas, qua} cogenti cupi¬ ditati resistere nequit, libera est absolute, quoniam illa impotentia conditionata est, non absoluta. Potest enim Dei auxilium implora¬ re ; quod si non facit, culpa sua non facit. Nemini enim deest auxilium, quod saltem possit vires a Deo petere. Nemini autem de- esse auxilium necessarium ad non peccan¬ dum, in alio libro probavimus. Quartum testimonium sumunt ex epist. 444. « Sine gratia Dei non potest esse libera vo¬ luntas, cum cupiditatibus vincentibus, et vincientibus subdita sit». Respondeo : Sine gratia Dei accipiendo gratiam largo modo pro auxilio necessario ad non peccandum non est libera voluntas, quo¬ ad exercitium, id est non habet usurii liberi arbitrii ; tamen absolute libera est, quoniam (ut diximus) auxilium gratia} necessarium ad non peccandum nulli deest. Simile est, si quis ita colligeret, sine lumine non potest oculus cernere, igitur absolute non potest oculus cernere, et nos sa}pe jam diximus, non negari a nobis gratiae necessitatem, dum as¬ serimus arbitrii libertatem. Id enim quod vo¬ lumus, hoc est, praesente auxilio necessario, posse hominem peccare, et non peccare. Neque contrarium hujus sententiae in Augu¬ stini libris unquam reperietur. Quintum testimonium sumunt ex libro de spiritu et littera cap. 30. « Per legem cogni¬ tio peccati, per fidem impetratio gratiae con¬ tra peccatum, per gratiam sanatio animae a vitio peccati, per animae sanitatem libertas arbitrii, per arbitrii libertatem dilectio justi¬ tiae, per dilectionemjustitiae impletio legis. » Et infra : « Ut quid miseri homines audent superbire de libero arbitrio antequam libe¬ rentur, nec attendunt in nomine liberi arbi¬ trii sonare libertatem etc. » Respondeo : loquitur hoc loco S. Augusti¬ nus apertissime de libero arbitrio, ut deno¬ minatur a libertate gratiae, non a libertate naturae. Nam si libertas naturae, id est, libe¬ rum arbitrium proprie dictum , inciperet primum in nobis esse post fidem et justifica¬ tionem, quo modo idem Augustinus in eo- CAPUT XXX. dem libro eap. 33. diceret, liberum arbi¬ trium naturaliter attributum anima; ratio¬ nali, esse vim illam mediam, qua vel intendi ad fidem, vel inclinari ad infidelitatem po¬ test? quo modo enim intenditur ad susci¬ piendam fidem, si non incipit existere nisi post fidem? loquitur igitur de libertate gra- tise, per quam anima sanata viam mandato¬ rum Domini cum delectatione currit. De qua loquitur etiam in libro de correptione et gra¬ tia cap. 8. cum ait : « Yoluntas humana non libertate consequitur gratiam, sed gratia libertatem. Sextum testimonium sumunt ex libro de correptione et gratia cap. 12. « Si relinque¬ retur ipsis sua voluntas, ut in adjutorio Dei manerent, si vellent, inter tot, et tantas ten- tationes infirmitate sua voluntas ipsa suc¬ cumberet, et ideo perseverare non possent, quia deficientes infirmitate nec vellent». Videtur enim hoc loco S. Augustinus dicere, justos homines etiam cum adjutorio gratise sanantis animaiy, non posse perseverare in bonis operibus nisi a spiritu Dei perpetuo agantur; atqui hoc est non habere liberum arbitrium ad utramque partem. Respondeo : Significat Augustinus, non sufficere homini post lapsum primi hominis, adjutorium gratise habitualis (id enim vocat adjutorium, in quo permanet homo, si vult, quod etiam in eodem loco cum alimentis comparavit, quibus si volumus, utimur, si nolumus, non utimur) sed necessarium esse prseterea, propter tentationes, auxilium Dei protegens, et dirigens, sine quo etiam justi perseverare non possent, quia deficientes in¬ firmitate, nec vellent. Csetcrum hsec impotentia non est abso¬ luta, sed conditionalis ; quamvis enim non possit homo justus, sine auxilio speciali per¬ severare in operibus bonis, absolute tamen potest, quoniam Deus non deserit nisi deser¬ tus. Quocirca in eodem libro cap. 7. idem Augustinus dicit, non posse excusari eos, qui non perseverant, quoniam poterant per¬ severare si vellent. Septimum testimonium sumunt ex eodem libro cap. 13. ubi cum dixisset S. Augustinus eos, qui peccant, peccare per liberum arbi¬ trium, corrigit se continuo, ac dicit: « arbi¬ trium, inquam, liberum, sed non liberatum » . Videtur enim (ut notat Calvinus) voluisse di¬ cere, arbitrium liberum esse nomine, non re. 103 Respondeo : Jam saepe diximus Augusti¬ num propter Pelagianos arbitrium vocare liberum, non liberatum, quoniam sine gra¬ tia Dei servum est peccati, licet sit liberum a naturali necessitate. Octavum testimonium sumunt ex libro de perfectione justitiae, responsione 9 : « Per arbitrii libertatem factum est, ut esset homo cum peccato, sed jam poenalis vitiositas sub¬ secuta, ex libertate, fecit necessitatem ». Et infra : « Quia peccavit voluntas, secuta est peccantem peccatum habendi dura necessi¬ tas, donec tota sanetur infirmitas ». ' Respondeo : Multiplex est necessitas, sed non omnis repugnat arbitrii libertati. Prima est, patiendi motus carnis repugnantes legi mentis. Nam etiam justissimi quique dicere possunt cum Apostolo ad Romanos cap. vn. Sentio aliam legem in membris meis (1). Sed hsec non repugnat libero voluntatis ar¬ bitrio, quoniam etiamsi necessario motus illos sentimus, tamen non necessario consen¬ timus, et tunc cum Apostolo dicimus : Si quod nolo facio, jam non ego operor illud. Secunda necessitas est peccandi ex igno¬ rantia, nam delicta quis intelligit? Sed neque hsec repugnat libero arbitrio, quoniam eti¬ amsi non possimus qusedam non ignorare, tamen possumus non velle ignorare. Ille enim reprehenditur, qui noluit intelligere, ut bene ageret, non qui voluit, sed non po¬ tuit. Ac de his necessitatibus loquitur S. Au¬ gustinus in priore parte objectionis. Nam ibidem subjungit : « Unde ad Deum fides clamat : De necessitatibus meis educ me. Sub quibus positi, vel non possumus, quod volumus intelligere, vel quod intelleximus, volumus, nec valemus implere o . Tertia necessitas est divina} gratias, tam ad remissionem peccati contracti, quam ad vitanda ea, quse contrahi possent. Sed neque hsec tollit liberum arbitrium, quoniam ut ssope diximus, et in secundo libro probavi¬ mus, Deus nemini denegat adjutorium ne¬ cessarium. Quarta necessitas est, habendi peccatum aliquod veniale. Nam etiam homines justi quotidie necesse habent illa oratione uti ad Deum, Dimitte 7iobis debita nostra. At neque hsec necessitas pugnat cum arbitrii libertate, quoniam si ratio vigilet, ut debet, possumus vitare singula venialia ; quamvis fieri ne¬ queat, ut omnia evitemus, sine privilegio (!) Rom. VII, 23. Tom. VI. 8 speciali. Et de hac necessitate loquitur Au¬ gustinus in posteriore parte objectionis, ut perspicuum est legenti eum locum. Immo totus liber ideo de perfectione justitia? in¬ scriptus est, quoniam hoc potissimum agit, ut probet adversus Pelagianos, non posse in hac vita nos ita perfecte adimplere justitiam, ut non semper oratio illa necessaria sit, Di¬ mitte nobis debita nostra. Quinta necessitas est faciendi actus ma- ios, posita mala, et efficaci voluntate. Nam qui efficaciter vult finem, non potest non velle media, qua? ad eum finem judicat esse necessaria. Ita qui vehementer aliquem odit, non potest illi ex animo benefacere. Sed neque haec necessitas repugnat libcx-tati, quia conditionalis est. Non absoluta. Potest enim homo si velit, non velle finem illum efficaciter, ex cujus amore ad media eligenda quodammodo cogebatur. Sola igitur illa necessitas libertati ai-biti-ii proprie repugnat, quae absolute facit, ut homo non sit dominus propriae voluntatis; quam necessitatem in Augustini libris ad¬ versarii nostri , quamtumvis Augustinum suum esse jactent, numquam demonstrare poterunt. CONT RO VERSI AH U M