Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Grace and Free Choice · Book VI: Grace and Free Choice in Works of Piety
Chapter 3: The objections against the doctrine of the preceding chapter are solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Book VI. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The objections against the things we taught a little before are wont chiefly to be these.
First: unbelievers believe many things, by the powers of free choice alone, no less difficult than are the articles of our faith — as that the continuum can be cut into infinite parts; that between any two marked points, however near to each other, there intervene infinite others; that there is one mind of all men who are, will be, and have been; and several other things of that kind, of which the philosophers, either all or some, have persuaded themselves. Why, then, could they not also believe the articles of our faith — especially since these have been proved by many miracles — if they have believed things no less arduous without any miracles?
Second: pagans and heretics often believe many articles of our faith — as that Christ is the Virgin’s son, which the Mahometans believe, and that God is three and one, which the Calvinists believe, and very many others of the heretics of this time. But this faith of theirs is not the gift of God; nor is it credible that they believe these things through the special help of God, since they believe these truths from the same principle from which they believe their errors. For the Mahometans, as they believe Christ to be the Virgin’s son on account of the authority of the Alcoran, so on account of the authority of the same Alcoran they believe that Christ is not the Son of God, nor truly God. And they who are now brought up among the Lutherans, as they believe the preaching minister that God is three and one, so they believe the same preacher that there is no liberty of choice, that man is justified by faith alone, and other errors of that kind.
Third: we all easily believe, without the special grace of God, that the things Livy and Sallust and other profane historians have handed down are true; why then shall we not be able, with the same easiness, to believe what the sacred historians have written — at least in those things which do not surpass nature, such as the deeds of the Patriarchs and Prophets?
Fourth: certain false things, which exceed all reason — such as that paradox of the Lutherans, that the Body of Christ is always everywhere; and that other, that infants, while they are baptized, actually believe — can be most firmly believed without any aid of God, as is known. What cause is there, then, why some true things also could not be believed without the special help of God, though they exceed the same reason?
Fifth: the articles of our faith have now been confirmed by so many miracles and other testimonies of great weight that they ought, in the judgment of all, to be reckoned credible, according to that of the Prophet, Psalm 92: Thy testimonies are become exceedingly credible. But what is credible — why can it not be believed without other help?
Sixth: if someone from earliest boyhood be brought up among Christians, even if by some chance he receive not Baptism, nor ask for it, he will from custom believe what the others believe. What, then, can be done from custom — why can it not much more be done from election, especially by one who compares the dogmas of the faith with the ancient oracles of the Prophets, and with the signs and prodigies by which it is agreed they have been confirmed in every age?
To all these it will be easy to answer, if one observe that we, when we say that without special help man cannot believe the articles of our faith, do not mean that he cannot believe in any way, but that he cannot believe as is fitting — for this, that it be an act of Catholic faith, and the beginning of justification. For not without cause did the Council of Orange, canon 25 [al. 7], and that of Trent, session 6, canon 3, add that particle, “as is fitting,” in their decrees. Now that “as is fitting” includes three conditions. One, that it be believed with certainty on the side of the object — that is, as revealed by God, and as what can in no way be false. Another, that it be believed firmly on the side of the subject — that is, that the man doubt nothing, and prefer rather to die than not believe an article of the faith. The third, that it be believed from a pious affection — that is, from a certain pious inclination toward God, because the man begins to bend his neck to God, and to subject himself to him unto the obedience of faith, even in those things which surpass human reason.
To the first objection, then, about the gentile philosophers, I say that they either have a demonstration — as about the division of the continuum — and then the thing is not difficult to believe, except to the unskilled; or they have not — as about the one intelligence of all men — and then they do not firmly believe. And moreover, whether they have a demonstration or have not, they do not believe from a pious affection of subjecting themselves to God, but either because they are compelled by arguments, or because they yield to the authority of the more learned.
To the second, about the Mahometans and heretics who believe some articles of the Catholic faith, I answer that they have not a faith certain on the side of the object. For that faith be certain on the side of the object, two infallible causes are required: a cause revealing the articles, and a cause proposing, or declaring, the articles revealed. For if he who reveals, and on whose authority we lean, can be deceived, the faith too is rendered uncertain; and so the revealing cause must be none but God. And by like reasoning, if he who proposes or declares the revealed articles is liable to error, and can propose something as revealed by God which is not truly revealed by God, the whole faith will totter. Now, then, the Mahometans and heretics think indeed that they believe what they believe because God has revealed it; but in very truth they do not believe because God has revealed it, but because they themselves rashly will to believe what they believe, since they have no infallible cause proposing and declaring the revelation of God. For if anyone ask the heretics whence they have it that God revealed this article or that, they will answer: from the divine writings. But if one press them — whence have they it that the divine writings signify this which they themselves say, since others understand the Scriptures otherwise; nay more, whence have they it that these are the divine writings — they will be able to answer nothing at all, except that they so judge. For the judgment of the Church — which alone God has declared infallible by innumerable signs and prodigies, and very many other testimonies — they themselves have already rejected, and each one has called back to himself the judgment of interpreting the divine revelation. But who could believe, except very rashly, that his own judgment about divine things is infallible, since he can prove this infallibility by no divine promise, nor by human reason? But Catholics have a faith altogether certain and infallible, since they believe what they believe because God has revealed it; and they believe that God has revealed it because they hear the Church so saying, or declaring — which they believe, not rashly, cannot err, since her testimonies have been made exceedingly credible from very many signs and prodigies, and many other arguments, which have been numbered and explained in the book On the Marks of the Church.
To the third, about the things we believe from Livy and Sallust, I answer: human histories we believe with human faith, so that we also think they can be false; but divine things must be believed with a far other faith: namely, so that we judge that heaven and earth can pass away, but the word of the Lord cannot pass.
To the fourth, about those who believe things most difficult, yet false, I answer that the reasoning of the true and of the false is not altogether the same, as neither is the reasoning of good and evil the same. For a sinful man can from his heart, and with his whole heart, blaspheme God; yet he cannot from his heart and with his whole heart praise God without special grace. So he will be able easily to believe his own figments, though incredible to others, on account of his affection toward his own things; and yet he will not be able, without the special grace of God, to believe divine things. I add, moreover, that men of this kind, as they rashly believe things false and diabolic, so also rashly believe things true and divine — but not, as we said, as is fitting; that is, with a pious affection, as things revealed by God, and in which the false can by no means lie hidden.
To the fifth I answer: credible things can be believed without other grace, but with human faith, not divine. For the arguments which make the articles of our faith credible are not such as to render the faith altogether undoubting, unless the mind be divinely helped.
To the sixth the response is easy. For the boy born and brought up among Christians, when he shall have grown up, will either think himself baptized, or will know that he is not baptized. If he believe himself baptized, it will be probable that he has faith divinely infused; for the approbation of a baptism which one judges oneself to have received and to have is equal to the desire of baptism, and can lead to eternal salvation — on which matter stands the Pontifical rescript, chapter Apostolicam, On a Presbyter Not Baptized. But if he know himself not to be baptized, and yet ask not for baptism, he without doubt has no faith — except perhaps a human one, or rather not even a human. For how can it be that someone certainly believe that without baptism he will perish forever, and yet not ask for, nor desire, baptism — a thing most easy to do? Nor is it likely that anyone could be brought up among Christians, and know the faith of Christians, who yet has never heard anything of baptism — since among the rudiments of the faith mention is made of baptism, and daily in the Church newborn infants are baptized.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT III, Solvuntur objectiones contra doctrinam capitis superioris. Objectiones adversus ea, quae paulo ante docuimus, hae potissimum fieri solent. Primum, infideles multa ci’edunt solis viri¬ bus liberi arbitrii non minus difficilia, quam sunt articuli nostrae fidei, ut continuum se¬ cari posse in infinitas partes, inter quaelibet duo puncta notata, quamvis inter se proxi¬ ma, intercedere alia infinita : unam esse mentem omnium hominum, qui sunt, erunt, fuerunt, et alia id genus plura, quae phil j- sophi vel omnes, vel aliqui sibi persua¬ serunt: cur igitur non possint etiam cre¬ ti) Rom. XI, 35: l Cor. IV, 7. CAPUT III. 111 dere articulos nostrae fidei, praesertim cum hi multis miraculis comprobati sint, si res non minus arduas sine ullis miraculis credi¬ derunt? Secundo pagani atque haeretici saepe mul¬ tos articulos nostrae fidei credunt, ut Chri¬ stum esse Virginis filium, quod credunt Ma- hometani, et Deum esse trinum et unum quod credunt Calvinistae, aliique plurimi ex haereticis hujus temporis : at haec eorum fi¬ des non est donum Dei, neque credibile est eos per speciale Dei auxilium ista credere, cum ex eodem principio ista vera credant, quo suos errores credunt. Mahomctani siqui¬ dem, quemadmodum ob Alcorani auctorita¬ tem credunt, Christum esse Virginis filium, sic ob ejusdem Alcorani auctoritatem cre¬ dunt, Christum non esse Dei filium, nec ve¬ re Deum. Et qui nunc inter Lutheranos edu¬ cantur, ut credunt ministro praedicanti, Deum esse trinum et unum, ita credunt ei¬ dem praedicanti, nullam esse arbitrii liberta¬ tem, hominem sola fide justificari, et alios id genus errores. Tertio, non omnes facile credimus sine speciali gratia Dei vera esse, quae Livius et Salustius, aliique profani historici tradide¬ runt : cur non igitur poterimus eadem faci¬ litate credere quae scripserunt historici sacri, saltem in his rebus, quae naturam non supe¬ rant, quales sunt res gestae Patriarcharum ac Prophetarum? Quarto, res quaedam falsae, quae omnem rationem excedunt, quale est paradoxum il_ ludLutheranorum, Corpus Christi semper es¬ se ubique ; et illud. Infantes dum baptizan¬ tur, actu credere, firmissime credi possunt absque ullo adjutorio Dei, ut notum est : quae igitur causa est, cur non possint credi etiam aliqua vera, sine speciali auxilio Dei, quamvis eamdem rationem excedant? Quinto, articuli nostrae fidei tot jam mira¬ culis, aliisque testimoniis magni ponderis confirmati sunt, ut omnium judicio credi¬ biles censeri debeant, juxta illud Prophetae Psalm. xcii : Testimonia tua credibilia facto sunt nimis (I). At quod credibile est, cur si¬ ne alio auxilio credi non poterit? Sexto, si quis ab ineunte pueritia inter Christianos educetur, etiamsi casu aliquo Baptismum non suscipiat, neque illum petat, ex consuetudine credet, quod alii credunt : quod igitur fieri potest ex consuetudine, cur non magis fieri poterit ex electione, ab eo praesertim, qui conferat dogmata fidei cum antiquis Prophetarum oraculis et signis ac prodigiis, quibus ea singulis aetatibus confir¬ mata fuisse constait? Ad haec omnia facile responderi poterit, si quis observet, nos cum dicimus, sine auxilio speciali, non posse hominem credere articu¬ los nostrae fidei, non intelligere, non posse credere ullo modo, sed non posse, ut opor¬ tet, ad hoc, ut sit actus fidei Catholicae, et initium justificationis. Non enim hanc parti¬ culam (ut oportet) sine causa in decretis suis addiderunt Concilium Arausicanum can. 25. et Tridentinum sess. 6. can. 3. Includit au¬ tem illud (ut oportet) tres conditiones. Unam, ut certo credatur, ex parte objecti, id est, tamquam a Deo revelatum, et quod nullo modo falsum esse possit. Alteram, ut firmi¬ ter credatur ex parte subjecti, id est, ut ho¬ mo nihil dubitet, et malit potius mori, quam articulum fidei non credere. Tertiam, ut ex pio affectu credatur, id est, ex quadam incli¬ natione pia erga Deum, quia incipit homo cervicem Deo flectere, eique se subjicere ad obedientiam fidei, etiam in iis rebus, quae rationem humanam superant. Ad primam igitur objectionem de philoso¬ phis gentilibus, Dico eos vel habere demon¬ strationem, ut de divisione continui, et tunc non esse rem difficilem ad credendum, nisi imperitis : vel non habere, ut de una intelli- gentia omnium hominum, et tunc non firma- ter credere : et praeterea sive demonstratio¬ nem habeant, sive non habeant, eos non cre¬ dere ex pio affectu subjiciendi se Deo, sed vel quia coguntur argumentis, vel quia ce¬ dunt auctoritati doctiorum. Ad secundam de Mahometanis et haereticis, qui aliquos Catholicae fidei articulos credunt, respondeo, eos non habere fidetn certam ex parte objecti. Nam ut fides sit certa ex parte objecti, duae causae infallibiles requiruntur, causa revelans articulos , et causa propo¬ nens, aut declarans articulos revelatos. Nam si is, qui revelat, et cujus auctoritate- niti¬ mur, falli possit, fides etiam incerta redditur- Itaque causa revelans non debet esse, nisi Deus. Et pari ratione si is, qui articulos re¬ velatos proponit, aut declarat, errori sit ob¬ noxius, et possit aliquid proponere tamquam a Deo revelatum, quod nere non sit a Deo revelatum, tota fides nutabit. (I) Psal. XCII, 5. 112 JJBER VI. Jam igitur Mahometani et haeretici, exi¬ stimant quidem se credere id, quod credunt, quia Deus revelaverit, sed re vera non cre¬ dunt, quia Deus revelavit, sed quoniam ipsi temere volunt id credere, quod credunt, cum non habeant causam proponentem ac decla¬ rantem revelationem Dei infallibilem. Nam si quis ab haereticis petat, unde habeant Deum revelasse hunc articulum, aut illum : respondebuntex divinis litteris. At si quis ur¬ geat, unde habeant divinas litteras hoc signi¬ ficare, quod ipsi dicunt, cum alii aliter Scripturas intelligant : immo etiam, unde habeant, has esse divinas litteras : nihil om¬ nino respondere poterunt, nisi ita se judi¬ care : judicium enim Ecclesiae, quod unum Deus innumeris signis et prodigiis, aliisque testimoniis plurimis infallibile esse declara¬ vit, jam ipsi rejecerunt, et unusquisque ad se judicium divinae revelationi^ interpre¬ tandae revocavit. Quis autem possit, nisi valde temere credere, suum ipsius judicium de rebus divinis infallibile esse, cum hanc infpllibilitatem nulla neque divina promis¬ sione, neque humana ratione probare pos¬ sit? At Catholici fidem habent omnino certam et infallibilem, quoniam credunt id, quod credunt, quia Deus id revelavit : Deum au¬ tem revelasse credunt, quoniam Ecclesiam ita dicentem, vel declarantem audiunt, quam errare non posse non temere credunt, cum testimonia ejus ex plurimis signis et prodi¬ giis, aliisque multis argumentis, quae in libro de notis Ecclesise numerata et explicata sunt, credibilia facta sint nimis. Ad tertiam, de his, quae credimus Livio et Salustio, respondeo, humanas historias nos humana fide credere, ut etiam existimimus falsas esse posse; at res divinas longe alia fide credi oportere, ut videlicet existimemus coelum et terram transire posse. Verbum autem Domini transire non posse. Ad quartam, de iis, qui res difficillimas, sed tamen falsas credunt, respondeo, non esse omnino eamdem rationem veri et falsi, sicut nec est eadem ratio boni et mali. Po¬ test enim homo peccator ex animo, ac toto corde blasphemare Deum, non tamen potest ex animo ac toto corde laudare Deum sine speciali gratia : ita poterit figmenta sua, quamvis aliis incredibilia, ipse facile credere propter affectum erga res suas, nec tamen poterit sine speciali gratia Dei res divinas credere. Addo praeterea, ejusmodi homines, sicut temere credunt falsa et diabolica, ita etiam temere credere vera et divina, non autem sicut diximus, ut oportet , id est, pio affectu, ut res a Deo revelatas, et quibus falsum subesse nulla ratione possit. Ad quintam respondeo, res credibiles sine alia gratia, credi posse, sed humana fide, non divina, argumenta enim, quae articulos fidei nostrae credibiles faciunt, non talia sunt, ut fidejn omnino indubitatam reddant, nisi mens divinitus adjuvetur. Ad sextam facilis est responsio. Nam aut puer inter Christianos natus atque educatus, ubi adoleverit, existimabit Se esse baptiza- tum, vel sciet non esse baptizatum. Si ba- ptizatum se esse credat, probabile erit, eum fidem divinitus infusam habere. Siquidem approbatio baptismi, quem quis se accepis¬ se, atque habere censet, par est voto bapti¬ smi, et ad salutem aeternam perducere po¬ test. De qua re extat rescriptum Pontificium capite: Apostolicam, de presbyter, non bap- tiz. Si vero sciat, se non esse baptizatum, et tamen baptismum non postulet, is sine du¬ bio non habet fidem, nisi forte humanam, vel potius nec humanam. Quomodo enim fieri potest, ut aliquis certo credat, sine baptismo se in aeternum periturum, et ta¬ men baptismum, rem videlicet factu facilli¬ mam, non postulet, neque cupiat? Neque verisimile est, posse aliquem esse inter Chri¬ stianos institutum , et qui noverit fidem Christianorum, qui tamen de baptismo nihil unquam audierit, cum inter rudimenta fidei fiat mentio baptismi, et quotidie in Ecclesia recens nati baptizentur infantes.