Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Grace of the First Man
Chapter 7: The arguments against the preceding opinion are refuted
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Gratia Primi Hominis. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
We shall now solve some objections which are wont to be made against the fourth proposition.
The first objection: if original righteousness had been supernatural, it would follow that the concupiscence of the flesh would have been natural, and thereby good, and from God. But John, in his first epistle, chapter 2, says that it is not of the Father, but of the world; and Paul, Romans 7, says that he hates it; and Augustine, book 6 against Julian, chapter 5, and elsewhere in many places, proves that it is evil, and contrary to nature. Answer: the concupiscence of the flesh is now indeed a punishment of sin; yet to man created in pure naturals it would without doubt have been natural — not indeed as some good of nature, but as a defect, and as it were a certain disease of nature, following from the condition of matter. Wherefore it is most rightly said not to be from God, to be worthy of hatred and not of love, evil, and contrary to nature, for two causes: first, because it would have existed in man not from the intention of the author of nature, but beside his intention, if man had been created in pure naturals; next, because God had taken it away, and it has place in us from man's own fault.
The second objection: St. Augustine, in the Enchiridion, chapter 11, writes that whatever vices there are of souls are privations of natural goods. But the wounds left us from the sin of the first parent are certain vices of souls; therefore those wounds are privations of natural goods; therefore original righteousness, and that first integrity of human nature, to which the privative wounds are opposed, was natural. Answer: St. Augustine seems in that place to understand by natural goods not the forms, but the subjects — so that his meaning is that those evils which are called vices are privations of natural goods because they are in good natures, and deprive them of the contrary virtues. For a little before, using the same form of speech, he had said that bodily diseases are privations of goods, because the substance is good which, the disease coming, is deprived of health. And if we take St. Augustine's words in this way, they are most true, and do not fight against our opinion; for we do not deny that human souls, which are deprived of virtues when vices succeed, ought to be called, and are, natural goods. Besides, St. Augustine speaks of the vices which are certain habits acquired by repeated evil acts, not of the concupiscence, ignorance, weakness, and malice with which we are born. Moreover, all vices are privations of natural goods — that is, of the natural rectitude, not such as was in the first man, but such as could have been, had he been created in pure naturals; for a nature created without righteousness and without sin (for that is what we call “in pure naturals”) has a certain rectitude of its own, insofar, namely, as it has no crookedness of vice. Finally, if we were compelled to understand by “natural goods” in Augustine the original righteousness divinely given and superadded to nature, the answer would be at hand: that that gift is called a natural good because it does not destroy nature, but perfects it — just as, contrariwise, vice is said to be against nature because it does not perfect nature, but corrupts it.
The third objection: St. Augustine, book 12 On the City of God, chapter 1, speaks thus of the angels: “When it is called a vice of the angelic creature that it does not cleave to God, hereby it is most openly declared that it belongs to its nature to cleave to God.” And if it is natural to the angel to cleave to God, certainly it will be natural to man also; there was no need, then, of some supernatural gift that the first man might cleave to God, and thereby be just and upright. Answer: St. Augustine teaches in that place that it belongs to the angelic nature to cleave to God through charity, and that in this it is distinguished from the natures lacking reason, to which it does not belong to cleave to God through charity, and to be blessed of him — though neither can they be wretched. But he does not teach that this belongs naturally to the nature of the angels, as though an angel could by his own powers alone inhere in God through charity, or as though the gift of infused charity were necessarily owed to the angels, so that it ought to be called natural, not supernatural; owed, not gratuitous. Nay rather he teaches the contrary in express words in the same book 12, chapter 9, when he speaks thus: “And this (good will) who had made, save he who created them with a good will — that is, with the chaste love with which they cleave to him — at once both founding in them their nature and bestowing grace?” And below: “It must be confessed, then, with due praise of the Creator, that not to holy men only does it pertain, but that of the holy angels also it can be said, that the charity of God is poured out in them by the Holy Spirit who has been given to them.” Thus far he — who most openly distinguishes in the angels nature from charity, which he calls grace, and writes that it was poured out in them not through creation, but through the inbreathing of the Holy Spirit. Finally, he says nothing else of the angels in this place than what he said of men in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 5: that to be able to have faith and charity belongs to the nature of men; to have them, to the grace of the faithful.
The fourth objection: St. Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 11, and in the Enchiridion, chapter 106, writes that that felicity through which man will be able neither to sin nor to die — that is, eternal life — is now a gift of grace, which would have been the reward of merit if the first man had remained in the state of innocence. From which it seems to follow that in the state of innocence no grace was needed for meriting eternal life; and hence that original righteousness, and charity itself, through which we merit, was for the first parents not a gift of grace, but a natural condition. Answer: by the judgment of St. Augustine, as the merits of eternal life are for us, after Adam's fall, from grace, so also for the holy angels, and for Adam himself before the fall, they were from grace; hence in every state eternal life is both reward and grace. That the angels, or the first man in the state of innocence, could not have merit of eternal life without grace, Augustine teaches in the very places whence the objection was taken. For in the Enchiridion, chapter 106, when he had said, “Human nature will receive (the felicity by which it cannot die) through grace, which it would have received, had it not sinned, through merit,” he straightway subjoins: “Although without grace not even then could there have been any merit.” And in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 11, discoursing of the state of the first man before the fall: “Nor did God will even him to be without his grace; because free choice suffices for evil, but is too little for good, unless it be aided by the omnipotent Good.” Thou seest, then, from Augustine, that neither for the angels nor for the first man before the fall could felicity have been a reward and not a grace, since without grace he could have had no good merits. And that for us, after Adam's fall, eternal life is not grace alone, but also reward, the same St. Augustine teaches in epistle 105 to Sixtus: “Are there then no merits of the just? There are, plainly; but that they might become just, there were no merits.” And below: “As to the merit of sin death is rendered as a wage, so to the merit of righteousness eternal life as a wage.”
Why then (thou wilt say), if for us and for them eternal life is both reward and grace, does St. Augustine say in the places cited that for us eternal life is a gift of grace, which would have been the reward of merit if Adam had not sinned? I answer: for two causes. First, because the angels, and the first man before the fall, had only the grace by which they could merit well and persevere, if they willed; but that they should will was left in their free choice. But the saints after Adam's fall have not only the grace by which they can merit well and persevere if they will, but they have a certain more powerful grace, by which it comes to pass that they will, as St. Augustine teaches, the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapters 11 and 12. And so, in respect of this grace which makes us will and persevere, eternal life is called for us a gift of grace, but for the angels, and for the first man had he not sinned, a reward of merit — although, as we have shown, absolutely it is for both reward and grace. And how that grace which makes us will does not take away free choice, we shall say afterwards in its place. The other cause is that we, after Adam's sin, were made unworthy of beatitude, and worthy of everlasting misery; and we not only have not the willing of good, but not even the being able to will it, unless we attain it from a new kindness of God. Wherefore, in respect of this new kindness — which the holy angels did not need, nor would the first man have needed, had he not sinned — beatitude is called for us a gift of grace, which otherwise would have been a reward of merit. And this is what St. Augustine teaches in the Enchiridion, chapter 106, when he says: “But after that ruin the mercy of God is greater, since free choice itself also must be freed from the servitude in which sin, with death, lords it over it.” An example of this might be: if some king of his kindness admitted many athletes to a contest for the obtaining of a signal prize, and furnished the same with arms and the other necessary things; and then some of them, fighting bravely, attained the palm, while others departed conquered; but the king, out of a new liberality, furnished those conquered ones with better arms, and admitted them again to the fight, and at last brought it about that they too came off victors: although absolutely the prize would be, for all who conquered, both reward and grace, yet if the former were compared with the latter, it could rightly be said that for the former that prize was a reward of merit, for the latter a gift of grace.
The fifth objection: St. Augustine, book 3 On Free Choice, chapter 18, speaks thus: “To approve false things for true, so as to err unwilling, and, the pain of the carnal bond resisting and torturing, not to be able to refrain from lustful works, is not the nature of man as instituted, but the punishment of man condemned.” I answer: he speaks of nature such as it was in the first man, not such as it could have been. For in the same book (as we noted above) the same Augustine writes that if ignorance and difficulty were the natural beginnings of man, the Creator could not be reprehended, but praised; and he disputes at some length, chapter 20 and following, that man could have been created such as he is now born, even if no sin had preceded.
The sixth objection: St. Leo, sermon 13 [al. 16] on the Lord's Passion, calls the innocence of the first man natural, when he says thus: “The liberty, then, of natural innocence, which we lost by the transgression of the first parents, none have received back through the merits of the preceding saints.” Answer: he calls the innocence natural because it had been bestowed from the beginning of creation together with nature itself, and was to be propagated to posterity by way of nature — just as now original sin can be called natural, according to that: we… were by nature children of wrath, Ephesians 2. But as that sin, though it be drawn from birth, yet comes to nature from without, and does not flow from the principles of nature, so also the gift of original innocence, even though it would have been transfused with nature, would nevertheless have flowed not from the principles of nature, but from the gift of supernatural grace.
The seventh objection: the Council of Trent, session 5, teaches that on account of original sin we incurred the power of the devil, and that the whole man, according to body and soul, was changed for the worse. But this is not merely to be deprived of the gift of original righteousness and grace; for man in pure naturals, without grace, would by no means have been in the power of the devil. Answer: none of us denies that on account of original sin we have not only been wretchedly stripped of original righteousness and grace, but have also run into the power of the devil, and that the whole man, according to body and soul, has been changed for the worse. Nor do we say that man created in pure naturals would have been in the power of the devil; but that he would have been such as we are, as to the mortality of the body, the rebellion of the members, ignorance, difficulty, and the like; and hence that the change of the whole man, according to body and soul, for the worse was born from the loss of original righteousness — so that there is no need to say that God or the devil implanted in us the rebellion of the flesh, or deliberately blinded us, since ignorance and cupidity and other evils of that kind could flow from the loss of original righteousness, as from the removal of the hindrance.
The eighth objection: that the natural impulse of our flesh is now more rebellious than it would have been before sin without grace, most clear arguments can be sought from the doctrine of Augustine. For these are the words of Augustine, the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 11: “He — Adam, namely — was in the goods of his nature; we are in the evils of nature. He did not need the death of Christ” (supply: that he might preserve health); “we need it” (supply: that we may recover health), “Paul crying, Who shall deliver me, etc. He had no need of help against the strife of the flesh; we have need of it. He, finally, received grace by which he could if he would; we have received it that we may will, and may will so much, and love with so great an ardor, that by the will of the Spirit we conquer the will of the flesh lusting contrary things.” Thus far he. Without doubt, then, his pure naturals, grace and the gift of righteousness set aside, were much sounder and purer — as being preserved, or perfected, by a lesser remedy — than ours are, grace now taken away. Answer: from the words of St. Augustine it can by no reasoning be gathered that the natural impulse of our flesh is now more rebellious than it would have been before sin without grace; nor this, that the pure naturals were sounder and purer before sin than they now are after sin. For first, Augustine does not say that Adam was in the goods of nature, and we in the evils of nature; but these are his words: “He was in the goods which he had received from the goodness of his Creator.” And a little after: “But the saints in this life, to whom pertains this grace of deliverance, are in evils,” etc. — where no mention is made of nature; and from the preceding words we understand that he speaks of the goods of grace, not of nature. For thus he says: “What then? Did Adam not have the grace of God? Nay indeed he had a great grace, but a different one. He was in the goods which he had received from the goodness of his Creator,” etc. And so the sense of those words seems to be that Adam was in the goods of grace and of original righteousness, and that we are in the evils which overflowed from the loss of grace. But suppose Augustine had said, “He was in the goods of nature; we are in the evils of nature” — what wouldst thou gather thence, except that Adam had a nature healed by a supernatural gift from that disease which could have been born from the condition of matter, and that we have a nature deprived of that gift, and thereby liable and subject to the natural sickness? Next, what Augustine adds — that Adam did not need the death of Christ, and we do — has that cause which the same Augustine indicates in the same place, when he says that we are freed by the blood of Christ from hereditary and personal guilt; for hence it follows that Adam in that state did not need the blood of Christ, because he had no hereditary or personal guilt from which to be freed; but we need the blood of Christ, because we all have personal or hereditary guilt. And what does this pertain to proving that the pure naturals in the first man, grace set aside, were sounder than ours? And what Augustine adds in the same place, that Adam had no need of help against the strife of the flesh, is no wonder, since in him original righteousness had taken away the strife of the flesh; for Augustine does not write that Adam in pure naturals, original righteousness set aside, had no need of help against the strife of the flesh, but that Adam, in those goods — that is, in that state of felicity in which, adorned and furnished with the divine gift of original righteousness, he suffered no vexations of the flesh — had no need of that help which we assiduously implore when we say, “I see another law in my members, etc. Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?” Hence Adam was endowed with a choicer grace, we with a more powerful one: because grace in him not only subjected the mind to God, but also the flesh to the spirit; while in us, the battle of flesh with spirit being left, the grace of God has set the mind on God with so great an ardor that we conquer the lower appetite, lusting contrary things, by the higher appetite. Hence, finally, it came to pass that it pleased God to give the first man, endowed with original righteousness, only the grace by which he could work righteousness if he willed; but to us, stripped of that righteousness, to give a more powerful grace, by which we in very deed will.
The ninth objection: in little children, as soon as they grow up, a very great abundance of vain cupidity appears, and of their own accord they are borne headlong, with monstrous impulse, into all vices, or most; on which read Augustine, book 22 On the City of God, chapter 22. Not so would man have come into the light in pure naturals: for in him there would have been the bare possibility of sinning, not some headlong inclination. Answer: the assumption of the argument needed proof. For it is gratuitously assumed that man created in pure naturals would not have been such that in him, besides the possibility of sinning, there would also be a headlong inclination to vices, such as is seen in us after Adam's fall. Nay rather, most open reason teaches that man in pure naturals would have been altogether such that there would be in him that headlong inclination to vices: both because the objects of the senses are near and present, while the objects of the spirit are in a manner absent and far removed; and because in the whole time of infancy and boyhood we have scarcely any use of reason, on account of the natural indisposition of the organs, while sense and the lower appetite are vigorous at every time; and finally because, unless that inclination to vices arise from the condition of matter, no cause of it can be shown, as we demonstrated above.
The tenth objection: if such an impulse of sensuality, at least in a certain respect and by reason of matter, against the nature of man, had been in the first man, then surely man would have had even a corrupt nature, enticing to sin; but if this be posited, it will be most difficult to excuse God from being the author of sin, who implanted in nature itself, before any demerit of man, an impulse so rebellious and iniquitous, and therefore evil — and indeed sin, since it is a certain disobedience against the dominion of the mind (as Augustine says, book 5, chapter 3, against Julian). But against this Scripture cries, that God made man right — assuredly without such crookedness — and that he entangled himself in infinite questions, namely in strifes and carnal battles. Answer: in this argument the state in which Adam was in fact created is wrongly confounded with that in which he could have been created. For what Scripture cries, that man was made right by God, and that he entangled himself in infinite questions, is most true, because God created man (as we have now often said) clothed with original righteousness, which made the highest and most joyful peace between flesh and spirit; but he by sinning lost that righteousness, and so begot for himself the battle of flesh and spirit. But if God had created man in pure naturals, he would indeed have made him right in this sense, that he would have implanted in him no vicious habit — yet liable to the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. Nor is it therefore difficult to demonstrate how God would not be the author of sin. For first, God would not have made that rebellion, even if he had created man in pure naturals; but it would have followed, beside the intention of the agent, from the condition of matter. For neither can the blacksmith rightly be called the author of the rust which an iron sword contracts, although he himself made the iron sword. Next, that rebellion neither is properly sin (as we shall demonstrate in the books on original sin, where we shall also expound the place of Augustine adduced in the argument), nor does it necessarily lead to sin, as St. Augustine disputes in book 3 On Free Choice. For either God would furnish to man created in pure naturals a help by which he could restrain concupiscence, or at least not consent to its desires, or he would not furnish it. If he furnished it, man would not necessarily yield to concupiscence. If he did not furnish it, he would yield indeed, but would not yield by his own fault, and hence would not sin. And this very thing St. Augustine writes in these words, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 11: “But if this help had been wanting either to angel or to man when first they were made — since their nature had not been made such that it could remain if it would without the divine help — they would assuredly not have fallen by their own fault; for the help would have been wanting without which they could not remain.”
The eleventh objection: against the accusers of nature the Fathers are wont to oppose the corruption of original sin, brought in by our fault, and not, as the heathen do, to call nature itself a stepmother; see Augustine, book 4 against Julian; book 2, chapter 22, On the Merits and Remission of Sins; and book 14, chapter 17, On the City of God. Answer: rightly do the Fathers teach that nature is not to be accused, but that the cause of all our afflictions is to be referred to original sin. For (as we have said more than once above) God had made man most happy in his very creation, but the same man by his own disobedience rendered himself most wretched. But, thou wilt say, the fact that the heathen philosophers accuse nature, and say that she has been to us not a parent but a stepmother, is a proof that human nature, as it now is, is not such as it naturally ought to be. I answer that the heathen philosophers thought contrary things about our nature, as Theodoret shows, book 5 to the Greeks: for some discoursed that man was made by nature most wretched, others most happy. Tully, in book 3 of the Republic, cited by Augustine in book 4 against Julian, chapter 12, complains that nature has been a stepmother to us; contrariwise Plato, likewise in the third book of the Republic, writes that man can through the body become blessed, and is of all living things the happiest; and no less does Galen, in the books On the Parts, everywhere celebrate the author of nature as having dealt most excellently with the race of men. Now why the heathen philosophers dissented among themselves about human nature, the cause could be this: that some looked, in man constituted in pure naturals, at the many excellent goods which no one can deny to be in him and wonderfully to shine forth; others turned the eyes of the mind to those defects which from the condition of matter, beside the intention of the agent, exist in the nature of man; and since they judged it equitable that the author of nature should remove these defects also by his benefaction, but were ignorant of what we have learned from the divine Scriptures — that those defects, taken away by God in the creation of the first man, were again permitted, in punishment of sin, to arise from the condition of matter — therefore St. Augustine, in book 4 against Julian, chapter 12, rightly wrote that the philosophers who called nature a stepmother saw the thing, but were ignorant of the cause.
The twelfth objection: the inordinate motions of carnal concupiscence appear most of all in the genitals; but of these there would have been before sin no inordinate motion, but they would have served generation without any act of lust, as Augustine demonstrates in long disputation against the Pelagians; therefore neither could any other impulse of concupiscence against reason have had place in pure naturals. Answer: the assumption of the argument needed proof. For St. Augustine, in long disputation against the Pelagians, demonstrates indeed that there was in the first man, endowed with original righteousness, no heat of lust — on which matter there is no doubt among us; but he does not demonstrate that in pure naturals there would have been no heat of lust; rather he demonstrates the contrary, in the many places cited by us above. Wherefore that conclusion (“therefore neither could any other impulse of concupiscence against reason have had place in pure naturals”) is agreeable neither to Augustine nor to the truth.
A thirteenth objection can be added, in this manner: eternal beatitude is the natural end of man, as St. Thomas teaches, part 1, question 12, article 1; man therefore ought to have natural means for attaining that end; otherwise he would be more wretched and abject than all things, since the other things attain their ends by their own natural powers. Righteousness, therefore, and the other virtues which are necessary for winning beatitude, were natural to the first man. Answer: it is no small question whether everlasting beatitude, which is seated in the vision of God, is the natural or the supernatural end of man. But since the explanation of that question does not make much to our matter, the affirmative side being admitted, I answer that beatitude is the natural end of man as to the appetite, not as to the attainment. Nor is it either new, or unworthy of man's nature, that he naturally desire what he can attain only by supernatural help. It is not new, I say, since the souls of men loosed from their bodies have a natural order and propensity toward the bodies whose forms they were, and yet will not be able to be joined again to their bodies without supernatural help. Nor is it unworthy of human nature; on the contrary, it pertains to its greatest dignity that it was founded for an end more sublime than that it can reach it by the powers of its own nature alone. Someone will perhaps say: Granted, man needs supernatural means; yet it will follow that he could not be created without those means, and thereby could not be created such as he is now born; for he could not be founded for a lower end without his nature being changed, nor could the means for obtaining his natural end be denied him. I answer: it was altogether equitable that God should not deny to man, ordained to so sublime an end, the necessary means; yet nothing absurd would have followed, had he denied them. For although that highest beatitude is the natural end of man, yet it is an unproportioned end; and besides it man has another natural end, altogether proportioned to himself, which is to seek out truth by reasoning. Wherefore God could have led man through natural means to the end proportioned to his nature, and not raised him higher. Of which thing we have an example in the bat, which has a natural capacity and appetite for seeing the sun, and yet it is credible that it will never come to pass that it see the sun, but only a weak and somewhat obscure light, which is the object of its eyes not only natural, but also proportioned.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
sententiam. Solvemus nunc aliquot objectiones, qua) adversus quartam propositionem fieri so¬ lent. Prima objectio : Si justitia originalis super- 13 180 LIBER I. naturalis fuisset, sequeretur concupiscen¬ tiam carnis futuram fuisse naturalem, ac per hoc bonam, et a Deo. At Joannesin I. epist. cap. ir. dicit eam non es3e ex patre, sed ex mundo. Et Paulus ad Roman. vn, dicit se eam odisse : et Augustinus lib. vi. contra Ju- lian. cap. 5. et alibi multis in locis probat eam esse malam, ac natura? contrariam. Responsio : Concupiscentia carnis nunc quidem poena peccati est, tamen homini con¬ ditio in puris naturalibus fuisset sine dubio naturalis, non quidem ut bonum aliquod na¬ turae, sed ut defectus, et quasi morbus qui¬ dam naturae, ex conditione materiae conse¬ quens. Quare rectissime dicitur non esse ex Deo, odio, non amore dignam, malam, natu¬ raeque contrariam, propter duas causas : pri¬ mum quia non ex intentione aucteris naturae sed praeter ejus intentionem in homine exti- tisset, si in puris naturalibus homo creatus fuisset; deinde quia Deus illam sustulerat, et ex ipsius hominis culpa locum in nobis habet. Secunda objectio : S. Augustinus in En- chir. cap. H. scribit : animorum quaecumque sunt vitia, naturalium esse privationes bono¬ rum. Sunt autem vulnera nobis ex peccato primi parentis relicta, vitia quaedam animo¬ rum : igitur ea vulnera naturalium sunt pri¬ vationes bonorum ; justitia igitur originalis, et prima illa naturae humanae integritas, cui privativa vulnera opponuntur, naturalis erat. Responsio. Videtur S. Augustinus eo loco per naturalia bona, non formas sed subjecta intelligere, ut sententia ejus sit, mala illa quae dicuntur vitia, privationes esse naturalium bonorum, quia in bonis naturis insunt, eas- que contrariis virtutibus privant. Nam paulo ante dixerat, eadem forma loquendi utens, corporales morbos esse privationes bonorum, quia substantia bona est, quae accedente mor¬ bo sanitate privatur. Quod si hoc modo ac¬ cipiamus verba S. Augustini, verissima sunt neque pugnant contra sententiam nostram : neque enim negamus animos humanos qui virtutibus privantur succedentibus vitiis, na¬ turalia bona dici debere, et esse. Praeterea loquitur S. Augustinus de vitiis, quae sunt habitus quidam per iteratos malos actus ac¬ quisiti, non de concupiscentia, ignorantia, infirmitate et malitia, cum quibus nascimur. Porro vitia omnia privationes sunt natu¬ ralium bonorum, id est, naturalis rectitudinis non qualis in primo homine fuit, sed qualis esse potuit, si in puris naturalibus conditus fuisset. Natura enim creata sine justitia, et stne peccato (id enim vocamus in puris na¬ turalibus) suam quamdam habet rectitudinem, quatenus videlicet nullam habet vitii curvi¬ tatem. Denique si cogeremur per naturalia bona apud Augustinum, intelligere justitiam originalem divinitus datam, etsuperadditam naturae, pro mptum esset respondere donum illud naturale bonum vocari, quia naturam, non destruat, sed perficiat. Quemadmodum e contrario vitium dicitur contra naturam, quia naturam non perficit, sed corrumpit. Tertia objectio : S. Augustinus lib. xii. de Civ. Dei cap. 1. sic loquitur de Angelis : « Cum vitium creaturae Angelicae dicitur, quod non adhaeret Deo, hinc apertissime de¬ claratur, ejus naturae ut Deo adhaereat con¬ venire. i) Quod si naturale est Angelo ad¬ haerere Deo, certe naturale erit etiam ho¬ mini ; non igitur opus fuit dono aliquo su- pernaturali ut primus homo Deo adhaereret, ac per hoc justus et rectus esset. Responsio. Docet eo loco S. Augustinus, naturae Angelicae convenire ut per charita- tem adhaereat Deo, et in hoc distingui a na¬ turis ratione carentibus, quibus non convenit, ut per charitatem adhaereant Deo, ac de ipso beatae sint, quamquam nec miserae esse pos¬ sint. Sed non docet, id Angelorum naturae naturaliter convenire, quasi possit Angelus suis solis viribus Deo per charitatem inhae¬ rere, aut certe quasi donum charitatis in¬ fusae necessario Angelis debeatur, ita ut na¬ turale, non supernaturale, debitum, non gra¬ tuitum dici debeat. Quin potius contrarium disertis verbis docet in eodem lib. xii. cap. 9. cum sic loquitur : « Et istam (bonam vo¬ luntatem) quis fecerat nisi ille, qui eos cum bona voluntate, id est, cum amore casto, qui illi adhaerent, creavit, simul in eis et condens naturam, et largiens gratiam ? » Et infra : « Confitendum est igitur cum debita laude creatoris, non ad solos sanctos homines per¬ tinere, verum etiam de sanctis Angelis posse dici, quod charitas Dei diffusa sit in eis per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est eis. » Haec ille, qui apertissime distinguit in Angelis na¬ turam a charitate, quam gratiam vocat, et non per creationem, sed per Spiritus sancti inspirationem diffusam in eis fuisse scribit. Denique nihil aliud hoc loco de Angelis dicit nisi quod de hominibus dixit lib. de praede¬ stinatione Sanctorum cap. 8. posse habere fi¬ dem, et charitatem, naturae esse hominum, habere autem, gratiae fidelium. CAPUT VII. 187 Quarta objectio. S. Augustinus in lib. de correptione et gratiacap. 11. et in Enchiridio cap. 106. scribit, felicitatem illam, per quam homo neque peccare, neque mori poterit, id est vitam aeternam, nunc esse munus gratia;, qua; merces meriti futura erat, si primus homo in statu innocentia; permansisset. Ex quo- sequi videtur, ut in statu innocentiae nulla gratia opus esset ad vitam aeternam promerendam, ac per hoc justitia originalis, et ipsa charitas, per quam meremur, non do¬ num gratiae, sed conditio naturalis primis pa¬ rentibus fuerit. Responsio. Ex sententia S. Augustini, me¬ rita vitae aeternae ut nobis post lapsum Adae sunt ex gratia, ita quoque Angelis sanctis, et ipsi Adae ante lapsum fuerunt ex gratia : proinde in omni statu vita aeterna et merces est, et gratia. Non potuisse Angelos, aut pri¬ mum hominem in statu innocentiae, meritum vitae aeternae habere sine gratia, docet Au¬ gustinus in iisdem locis, unde sumpta est ob¬ jectio. Nam in Enchiridio cap. 106. cum di¬ xisset: « Natura humana (felicitatem, qua mori non poterit) est acceptura per gratiam, quam fuerat, si non peccasset, acceptura per meritum, continuo subjungit ; Quamvis sine gratia nec tunc ullum meritum esse potuis¬ set. » Et lib. de correptione et gratia cap. 11. de statu primi hominis ante lapsum dis¬ serens : « Nec ipsum, inquit, Deus esse vo¬ luit sine gratia sua, quia liberum arbitrium ad malum sufficit, ad bonum autem parum est, nisi adjuvetur ab omnipotenti bono. » Vides igitur ex Augustino neque Angelis, ne¬ que primo homini ante lapsum fcelicitatem esse potuisse mercedem, et non gratiam, cum sine gratia nulla bona merita habere potuerit. Nobis autem post lapsum Ada; vi¬ tam mternam non esse solam gratiam, sed etiam mercedem, docet idem S. Augustinus in epistola 105. ad Sixtum : « Nullane, in¬ quit, sunt merita justorum ? Sunt plane, sed ut justi fierent, merita non fuerunt. » Et infra : « Sicut merito peccati tamquam stipendium redditur mors, ita merito justitia; tamquam stipendium vita a;terna. » Cur ergo (inquies) si et nobis et illis vita ffiterna est merces, et gratia, S. Augustinus dicit in locis citatis, nobis vitam asternam esse donum gratiee, quas merces meriti futura erat si Adam non peccasset? Respondeo, propter duas causas. Primum, quia Angeli, et primus homo ante lapsum habuerunt solum gratiam qua possent bene mereri, et perseverare si vel¬ lent, ut autem vellent, relictum est in eorum libero arbitrio. Sancti vero post lapsum Ada; non habent solum gratiam, qua possint bene mereri, et perseverare, si velint, sed habent gratiam quamdam potentiorem, qua fit, ut velint, ut S. Augustinus docet lib.de cor¬ reptione, et gratia cap. Ii. et 12. Itaque re¬ spectu hujus graticE, qua; facit nos velle, et perseverare, dicitur vita a;terna nobis donum gratice, Angelis autem, et primo homini, si non peccasset, merces meriti : quamvis, ut ostendimus, absolute utriusque sit merces, et gratia. Quemadmodum autem gratia illa, qua; facit nos velle, non tollat liberum arbi¬ trium, dicemus postea suo loco. Altera causa est, quia nos post Ada; pecca¬ tum indiggi facti sumus beatitudine, et digni miseria sempiterna. Neque solum non ha¬ bemus velle bonum, sed neque posse id velle nisi ex nova Dei benignitate id assequamur. Quare respectu hujus novae benignitatis, qua non eguerunt Angeli sancti, neque pri¬ mus homo, si non peccasset, eguisset, di¬ citur nobis beatitudo donum gratiae , quae alioqui merces meriti futura erat. Atque hoc est quod docet S. Augustinus in Enchirid. cap. 106. cum ait : « Sed post illam ruinam major est misericordia Dei, quando et ipsum liberum arbitrium liberandum est a servitute cui dominatur cum morte peccatum. » Ex¬ emplum hujus rei esse posset, si rex quis¬ piam athletas multos ad certamen pro insigni obtinendo bravio sua benignitate admitteret, eosdemque armis, et caeteris necessariis re¬ bus instrueret. Deinde aliqui ex iis fortiter pugnando ad palmam pertingerent, alii victi discedei’ent : sed Rex victos illos iterum ex nova liberalitate melioribus armis instrueret, atque ad pugnam rursus admitteret, ac de¬ mum efficeret, ut ipsi quoque victores eva¬ derent. Tametsi enim absolute bravium om¬ nibus, qui vicissent, et merces esset, et gra¬ tia ; tamen si priores cum posterioribus con¬ ferrentur, recte dici posset, prioribus mer¬ cedem meriti, posterioribus donum gratia’ bravium illud fuisse. Quinta objectio. S. Augustinus lib. m. de libero arbitrio cap. 18. sic loquitur : « Ap¬ probare falsa pro veris ut erret invitus, et resistente atque torquente dolore carnalis vinculi non posse a libidinosis operibus tem¬ perare, non est natura instituti hominis, sed poena damnati. » Respondeo loquitur de na¬ tura, qualis fuit in primo homine, non qualis esse potuit. Nam in eodem libro (ut supra 188 LlliElt I. notavimus) idem Augustinus scribit : Si ignorantia, et difficultas essent hominis pri¬ mordia naturalia, non potuisse reprehendi, sed laudari Creatorem. Et satis copiose dis putat cap. 20. eQsequent. potuisse hominem creari, qualis nunc nascitur, etiamsi nullum peccatum ante prtecessisset. Sexta objectio. S. Leo serm. 13. de Pas¬ sione Domini vocat innocentiam primi ho¬ minis naturalem, cum sic ait : « Libertatem itaque innocentia; naturalis, quam primorum parentum praevaricatione perdidimus, nulla per Sanctorum praecedentium merita rece¬ perunt. » Responsio. Innocentiam naturalem vocat, quia ab initio conditionis cum ipsa natura tributa, et per modum naturae in po¬ steros propaganda fuerat. Quemadmodum nunc peccatum originis dici potcstfnaturale, juxta illud : Eramus et nos natura filii irae (1). Ephes. ii. Sed sicut peccatum illud, quamvis a nativitate trahatur, tamen extrinsecus ac¬ cedit natura:, non autem ex naturae principiis fluit : ita quoque donum innocentiae origi¬ nalis, etiamsi cum natura transfusum fuisset non tamen ex naturae principiis, sed, ex mu¬ nere supernaturalis gratiae profluxisset. Septima objectio, Concilium Tridentinum sess. 3. docet, propter peccatum originis in¬ currisse nos potestatem diaboli, totumquo hominem secundum corpus, et animam in deterius esse mutatum. IIoc autem non est solum privari dono originalis justitia; ac gra¬ tiae ; nam homo in puris naturalibus sine gratia in potestate diaboli minime fuisset : non solum ratione mortalitatis nostrae, sed etiam ratione peccati. Responsio. Nemo no¬ strum negat, propter peccatum originis non solum justitia originali, et gratia nos esse misere spoliatos, sed etiam incurrissse in diaboli potestatem, et totum hominem se¬ cundum corpus et animam in deterius esse mutatum. Neque illud dicimus, hominem in puris naturalibus conditum, futurum fuisse in diaboli potestate, sed futurum fuisse qua¬ les nos sumus, quoad mortalitatem corporis, rebellionem membrorum, ignorantiam, dif¬ ficultatem, et similia ; ac proinde mutatio¬ nem totius hominis secundum corpus et ani¬ mam in deterius ex amissione justitia; origi¬ nalis natam esse, ita ut non sit opus dicere, Deum vel Diabolum rebellionem carnis nobis inseruisse, aut nobis dedita opera excaicas- se, cum ignorantia, et cupiditas, et alia id genus mala ex amissione justitia; originalis, ut ex removente prohibens, dimanare potue¬ rint. Octava objectio. Naturalem carnis nostra; impetum magis nunc esse rebellem, quam ante peccatum sine gratia futurus erat , ex doctrina Augustini clarissima argumenta peti possunt. II®c enim sunt verba Augusti¬ ni, lib. de correptione et gratia, cap. 11: « Ille Adam videlicet in bonis sua; natura; erat, nos in malis natura; sumus. Ille non eguit morte Christi, supple, ut samitatem conservaret. Nos egemus, supple, ut sani¬ tatem recuperemus, clamante Paulo : Quis raelibcrabit etc. Ille non opus habuit adjutorio contra rixam carnis, nos ille opus habemus. Ille denique accepit gratiam, qua potuit si vellet, nos acccepimus, ut velimus, idque tantum velimus, tantoque ardore diligamus, ut voluntatem contraria concupiscentem vo¬ luntate Spiritus vincamus. » H®c ille. Ilaud dubie igitur pura illius naturalia, seclusa gratia, et dono justitia; multo erant saniora, et puriora, ut qua; minori remedio conserva¬ bantur, seu perficiebantur, quam nostra sunt, sublata jam gratia. Responsio, ex verbis S. Augustini non po¬ test ulla ratione colligi naturalem carnis nostra; impetum magis nunc esse rebellem, quam ante peccatum sine gratia futurus erat ; neque illud, pura naturalia fuisse saniora, et puriora ante peccatum, quam modo sint post peccatum. Nam, primum non dicit Augusti¬ nus, Adamum fuisse in bonis naturae, nos esse in malis naturae. Sed haec sunt verba ejus : (( Ille in bonis erat, quae bonitate sui conditoris acceperat. » Et paulo post : « San¬ cti vero in hoc vita, ad quos pertinet libera¬ tionis haec gratia, in malis sunt etc. » Ubi nulla fit mentio naturae. Et ex superioribus verbis intelligimus, eum loqui de bonis gra¬ tiae, non naturae. Sic enim ait : « Quid ergo ? Adam non habuit Dei gratiam ? Imo vero habuit magnam, sed disparem. Ille in bonis erat, qu® bonitate sui conditoris acceperat etc. » Itaque sensus eorum verborum esse videtur, Adamum fuisse in bonis grati® ori- ginadisque justitiae, nos esse in malis, qu® cx amissione grati® redundarunt. Sed fac, Augustinum dixisse : Ille erat in bonis natur®, nos sumus in malis natur® ; quid inde colliges, nisi Adamum habuisse naturam per supcrnaturale donum sanatam (I) Eph. II, 3. CAPUT VII. 189 ab eo morbo, qui ex conditione materiae na¬ sci potuerat : nos habere naturam dono illo privatam, ac per hoc naturali aegritudini obnoxiam atque subjectam ? Deinde quod addit Augustinus , Adamum non eguisse morte Christi, nos egere, illam habet cau¬ sam, quam ibidem idem Augustinus indicat, cum ait, nos a reatu haereditario et proprio, Christi sanguine liberari : hinc enim sequi¬ tur, ut Adam in illo statu Christi sanguine non eguerit, quia nullum habebat reatum haeredilarium, vel proprium, a quo liberan¬ dus esset : nos vero Christi sanguine egea¬ mus, quia reatum proprium, vel haeredi- tarium omnes habemus. Quid autem hoc pertinet ad probandum, pura naturalia fuis¬ se in primo homine, seclusa gratia, saniora quam nostra sint ? Quod ibidem addit Augustinus, Adamum nou eguisse adjutorio contra rixam carnis, nihil est mirum, cum in eo justitia originalis sustulerit rixam carnis ; neque enim scribit Augustinus Adamum in puris naturalibus, seclusa originali justitia, non opus habuisse adjutorio contra rixam carnis, sed Adamum in illis bonis, id est, in statu illo felicitatis, in quo divino munere originalis justitiae or¬ natus atque instructus nullas carnis molestias patiebatur, non habuisse opus, illo adjutorio, quod nos assidue imploramus, cum dicimus, « Video aliam legem in membris meis ete. Infelix ego homo, quis me liberabit de cor¬ pore mortis hujus ? » Proinde lectiore gratia donatus fuit Adam, nos potentiorc, quia gra¬ tia in illo non solum mentem subjiciebat Deo, sed etiam carnem spiritui ; in nobis ve¬ ro relicta pugna carnis cum spiritu, gratia Dei tanto, ardore mentem objecit Deo, ut appetitum inferiorem contraria concupis¬ centem eippetitu superiore vincamus. Ilinc denique factum est ut placuerit Deo, pri¬ mo homini justitia originali praedito dare solum gratiam, qua posset justitiam operari, si vellet, nobis autem justitia illa spoliatis dare gratiam potentiorem, qua re ipsa velle¬ mus. Nona objectio. In parvulis quam primum adolescunt, maxima vanae cupiditatis abun¬ dantia apparet, suaque sponte immani impe¬ tu in vitia vel omnia, vel plurima praecipites feruntur. De qua re lege Augustinum lib. xxn. de civit. Dei, cap. 22. Non sic homo in puris naturalibus in lucem editus fuisset, nuda enim in illo fuisset possibilitas peccan¬ di, non praeceps aliqua inclinatio. Respondeo : Probanda erat assumptio ar¬ gumenti. Gratis enim assumitur, non talem fuisse futurum hominem in puris naturalibus conditum, ut in eo praeter peccandi possibili¬ tatem esset etiam praeceps in vitia inclinatio, qualis in nobis cernitur post lapsum Adae. Quin potius apertissima ratio docet, talem omnino fuisse futurum hominem in puris naturalibus ut in eo esset praeceps illa in vi¬ tia inclinatio ; tum quia objecta sensuum propinqua, et praesentia sunt, objecta autem spiritus quodammodo absentia, ac longe re¬ mota ; tum quia toto infantiae et pueritiae tempore vix ullum habemus rationis usum, ob naturalem organorum indispositionem, sensus- autem et appetitus inferior quovis tempore vigent ; tum denique, quia nisi ex materiae conditione illa inclinatio ad vitia oriatur, nulla ejus causa demonstrari potest, ut supra ostendimus. Decima objectio : Si talis sensualitatis im¬ petus, saltem secundum quid, et ratione ma¬ teria! contra hominis naturam, in primo ho¬ mine fuisset , tunc sane etiam peccatum corruptam naturam, et ad peccatum allicien¬ tem homo habuisset. Sed si hoc ponatur, difficillimum erit Deum excusare, ne sit au¬ ctor peccati, qui impetum tam rebellem, et iniquum, ideoque malum, et quidem pecca¬ tum, quia ioobedientia quaedam est contra dominatum mentis (ut ait Augustinus lib. v. cap. 3. contra Julianum) ipsi naturae ante ullum hominis demeritum indidit. Sed con¬ tra clamat Scriptura, quod Deus fecerit ho¬ minem rectum, utique sine tali curvitate, ip¬ se autem se immiscuerit infinitis quaestioni¬ bus, rixis videlicet, et pugnis carnalibus. Responsio. In hoc argumenta non recte confunditur status, in quo Adam reipsa con¬ ditus fuit, cum eo in quo condi potuisset. Quod enim Scriptura clamat a Deo rectum hominem esse factum, ipsum autem se immi- scuissse infinitis quaestionibus, verissimum est, quia Deus hominem (ut saepe jam dixi¬ mus) condidit vestitum originali justitia, quae pacem summam, ac laetissimam inter carnem et spiritum faciebat : ipse vero pec¬ cando justitiam illam amisit, atque ita pug¬ nam carnis, ac spiritus sibi ipse peperit. Sed si Deus hominem in puris naturalibus condidisset, fecisset quidem rectum in eo sensu, quia nullum ei vitiosum habitum in¬ sevisset, sed obnoxium tamen rebellioni car¬ nis ad spiritum. Neque propterea difficile est demonstrare 100 UBER I. quemadmodum Deus non sit auctor peccati. Primum enim rebellionem illam Deus non fecissset, etiamsi hominem in puris naturali¬ bus condidisset, sed ea praeter intentionem agentis ex conditione materire consecuta fuisset. Nam neque faber ferrarius recte dici potest auctor robiginis, quam gladius fer¬ reus contrahit, tametsi gladium ferreum ip¬ se fecerit. Deinde rebellio illa nec proprie peccatum est (ut in libris de peccato originis demonstrabimus, ubi etiam locum Augustini in argumento adductum, exponemus) nec necessario ad peccatum inducit, utS. Augu¬ stinus disputat in lib. m. de libero arbitrio. Nam vel homini creato in puris naturalibus Deus pra)berct auxilium, quo posset concu¬ piscentiam coercere, aut certe cupiditatibus ejus non consentire, vel non praeberet. Si praeberet, non necessario homo concupi¬ scentiae cederet. Si non praeberet, cederet quidem, sed non sua culpa cederet, proinde nec peccaret. Atque hoc ipsum his verbis S. Augustinus scribit in lib. de correptione etgratiacap.il : « Si autem hoc adjutorium vel Angelo, vel homini quam primum facti sunt, defuisset, quoniam non talis natura facta erat, ut sine divino adjutorio posset manere si vellet, non utique sua culpa ceci¬ disset : adjutorium quippe defuisset, sine quo manere non possent. » Undecima objectio. Contra accusatores natura) solent Patres peccati originis corru¬ ptelam nostre vitio invectam opponere, non ipsam naturam, ut faciunt Ethnici, nover¬ cam vocare. Yide Augustinum lib. iv. in Ju¬ lianum : lib ii. cap. 22. de peccatorum ine¬ rit, s, et remissione. Et lib. xiv. cap. 17. de Civ. Dei. Responsio : Recte Patres docent non esse naturam accusandam, sed in originale peccatum nostrarum omnium erumnarum causam referendam. Nam (ut supra non semel diximus) Deus hominem in ipsa conditione felicissimum fecerat, sed eumdem hominem sua inobedientia miserrimum reddidit. At, inquies, quod philosophi ethnici natu¬ ram accusent, eamque nobis non parentem, sed novercam fuisse dicant, argumento est naturam humanam, qualis nunc est, non ta¬ lem esse, qualis naturaliter esse deberet. Respondeo, philosophos ethnicos contraria de natura nostra sensisse, ut ostendit Theo- doretus lib. v. ad Graecos. Alii enim ho¬ minem miserrimum, alii felicissimum a na¬ tura conditum disserebant. Tullius in m. lib. de Republica, apud Augustinum lib. iv. in Julianum cap. 12. naluram nobis novercam fuisse queritur. Contra Plato in tertio item de Republica scribit, hominem per corpus fieri posse beatum, esseque animantium om¬ nium felicissimum. Nec nimus Galenus in libris de partibus, passim celebrat auctorem natura), ut qui cum hominum genere pr®- clarissime egerit. Porro cur philosophi ethnici inter se de natura humana dissenserint, causa esse po¬ tuit, quia nonnulli spectarunt in homine in puris naturalibus constituto multa egregia bona, qua) in eo inesse, ac mirifice elucere nemo inficiari potest. Alii mentis oculos convertunt ad eos defectus, qui ex conditio¬ ne materise prajter intentionem agentis in hominis natura existunt, et quoniam ®quum esse censebant, ut natur® auctor hos etiam defectus suo beneficio summoveret, ignora¬ bant autem quod nos ex divinis scripturis di¬ dicimus, defectus illos a Deo in primi homi¬ nis conditione sublatos, rursus in poenam peccati ex conditione materi® oriri permis¬ sos, ideo S. Augustinus in iv. lib. adversus Julianum cap. 12. recte scripsit, philosophos, qui naturam novercam appellabant, rem vi¬ disse, causam ignorasse. Duodecima objectio. Concupiscenti® car¬ nalis inordinati motus maxime in genitalibus apparent. Sed illorum ante peccatum nullus fuisset inordinatus motus, sed generationi servissent sine ullo libidinis actu, ut longa disputatione contra Pelagianos demonstrat Augustinus. Ergo nec alius ullus concu¬ piscenti® contra rationem impetus in puris naturalibus locum habere potuit. Respondeo : Assumptio argumenti probanda fuerat. Nam S. Augustinus longa disputatione contra Pelagianos, demonstrat quidem non fuisse in primo homine, justitia originali pr®dito ullum libidinis ®stum, do qua re nulla apud nos dubitatio est ; non tamen demonstrat, in puris naturalibus nullum futurum fuisse ®stum libinis, sed contrarium potius demon¬ strat in tot locis a nobis supra citatis. Qua¬ re conclusio illa (ergo nec alius ullus concu¬ piscenti® contra rationem impetus in puris naturalibus locum habere potuit) nec Augu¬ stino, nec veritati consentanea est. Addi potest objectio decima tertia in hunc modum, ®terna beatitudo finis est hominis naturalis, ut S. Thomas docet in 1. par. qu®st. 12. art. 1. debuit igitur homo media naturalia habere ad eum finem consequen¬ dum ; alioqui rebus omnibus esset miserior CAPUT VIII. 191 et abjectior, cum res caeterac fines suos pro¬ priis, ac naturalibus viribus assequantur. Justitia ergo, et caeterae virtutes, quae ad beatitudinem adipiscendam necessaria sunt, primo homini naturalia fuerunt. Respondeo : Non parva quaestio est, sitne sempiterna beatitudo, quae in visione Dei sita est, finis hominis naturalis, an superna- turalis. Sed quia non multum facit ad rem nostram illius quaestionis explicatio, admis¬ sa parte affirmante, respondeo beatudi- nem finem hominis naturalem esse quoad appetitum, non quoad consecutionem. Neque est aut novum, aut hominis natura indig¬ num, ut naturaliter appetat, quod nonnisi supernaturali auxilio consequi valeat. Non est, inquam, novum, siquidem animae homi¬ num solutae corporibus naturalem habent or¬ dinem, et propensionem ad corpora, quo¬ rum formae fuerunt, nec tamen iterum con¬ jungi corporibus sine supernaturali auxilio poterunt. Non est autem natura humana in¬ dignum, sed contra potius ad maximam ejus pertinet dignitatem, quod ad sublimiorem finem condita sit, quam ut eum solis naturae suae viribus attingere possit. Dicet fortasse quispiam. Esto, egeat homo supernaturalibus mediis, tamen id sequetur, ut non potuerit sine mediis illis creari, ac per hoc non potuerit talis creari, qualis nunc nascitur, neque enim ad finem inferio¬ rem condi potuit, nisi natura ejus mutaretur neque negari media potuerunt ad finem na¬ turalem obtinendum. Respondeo : ^Equum omnino fuisse, ut Deus homini, ad finem tam sublimem ordi¬ nato, media necessaria non negaret : ta¬ men nihil absurdi secuturum, si negasset. Nam tametsi summa illa beatitudo sit finis hominis naturalis, tamen est finis impropor- tionatus, et praeter eum, habet homo alium finem naturalem sibi omnino proportionatum qui est rationando inquirere veritatem. Quare potuit Deus hominem per naturalia media ad finem naturae suae proportionatum perdu¬ cere: nec altius evehere. Cujus rei exemplum habemus in vespertilione, qui naturalem ha¬ bet capacitatem, et appetitum videndi solem, et tamen credibile est nunquam futurum, ut is videat solem, sed lumen tantum debile ac subobscurum , quod est objectum oculorum ejus non solum naturale, sed etiam propor¬ tionatum.