Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Indulgences and the Jubilee · Book I: That Indulgences Exist, and What They Are
Chapter 6: Objections against the doctrine of the preceding chapter are solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VII, De Indulgentiis et Jubilaeo, Book I, a treatise of the Controversies. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
But against the things contained in these propositions a few objections can be raised, which must be briefly dissolved.
First objection. If the Pontiff could absolve judicially through indulgences from temporal punishment, he could consequently absolve from the punishment which someone would pay in Purgatory if he died with the guilt of that punishment; but over the punishments of Purgatory the Pontiff has no authority; therefore he cannot take it away by his absolution, but only by the application of the treasury, as he does when he grants indulgences for the dead. Answer. Whether the Supreme Pontiff has power over the souls who dwell in Purgatory we shall see afterwards. But over the punishment of Purgatory, nay, even over the eternal punishment of hell, he has power without doubt, at least consequently and indirectly, because when he absolves through the sacrament of Penance from mortal fault, he consequently frees the man from the debt of everlasting punishment; and in the same way, when through indulgences he absolves a man from the penance enjoined or to be enjoined, he consequently absolves the same man from the punishment of Purgatory which he would have paid if he had not fulfilled that penance or been absolved from it. But this is not to have power over Purgatory or over hell, but over the faithful men who are guilty of fault or punishment. Wherefore the opinion of Peter of Osma was deservedly condemned by Pope Sixtus IV and by the Council of Alcalá, who taught that the Supreme Pontiff cannot remit to anyone living in the flesh the punishment of Purgatory, and that sins are blotted out as to the fault and the punishment of the other life by contrition alone, without reference to the keys. See, if you like, the condemnation of this error in Alphonsus de Castro, in the book against heresies, under the word Confessio, or in the Summa of the Councils, in the decrees of Pope Sixtus IV.
Second objection. By the application of the treasury a full compensation is made for the debt of temporal punishment; therefore the judicial absolution is superfluous. Answer. The argument does not conclude rightly, since a judge is not bound to dismiss one guilty of some punishment even if a just compensation is offered by another, especially if the compensation is not of the same nature; and therefore if the judge admits the compensation and absolves the guilty man, he is truly said to do him a favour. As for example, if someone is condemned to the galleys, or to be publicly beaten with rods, and someone offers a great sum of money for the release of that guilty man, certainly the judge will not be bound to accept the money and release the guilty man; but if he chooses to do it, he will do him a favour, and will absolve him. And so, if we wish to speak properly, it is not he who offers the compensation who is said to take away the obligation to punishment, but he who, the compensation having been admitted, absolves the guilty man from that obligation. The Pontiff, therefore, truly gives an indulgence to his subjects, because in the name of God, whose place he holds on earth, he admits a compensation drawn from the treasury, and, that being admitted, absolves penitents from the guilt of temporal punishment. But on the contrary, to the dead he is not said to give an indulgence simply, but by way of suffrage, because not he but God accepts the compensation for the dead and absolves those same dead; the Pontiff only offers from the treasury a just compensation.
Third objection. A judicial absolution can be given even to one unwilling, as is plain of absolution from excommunication; but an indulgence cannot be given to one unwilling; therefore an indulgence is not an absolution, but a mere payment. Answer. Not every absolution can be given to one unwilling, but only that which does not necessarily require some action or disposition in him to whom it is given. And so sacramental absolution, because it requires contrition, confession and satisfaction, cannot be conferred on one unwilling; absolution from excommunication and other censures, because it depends necessarily only on the will of the prelate, can be conferred on one unwilling. Now an indulgence requires in the recipient, first, that he be in the state of grace; then that he do the things prescribed in the letters of indulgence, visit the basilicas, pray, fast, give alms; all of which so depend on free will that they cannot be extorted from one unwilling. Wherefore, although an indulgence is an absolution, it is no wonder if it cannot be conferred on one unwilling.
Fourth objection. Absolution requires knowledge of the cause; but indulgences are often given in general to all who have done this or that, without the causes of those to whom the indulgences are granted being known; therefore an indulgence is not to be called a judicial absolution. Answer. A particular and absolute absolution, as also a condemnation, because they are pronounced according to what is alleged and proved, without doubt require a particular and accurate knowledge of the cause. But a certain general and conditional absolution does not require knowledge of the cause except in general. The former absolution is called a sentence from a man, the latter a sentence from the law. And indulgences indeed which are given to individual penitents, which were most usual among the ancients, are like the former absolution, and therefore in that case knowledge of the cause in particular is required; but those which are given to all in general, and with the condition of a certain work to be done, such as fighting against the Mohammedans for the recovery of Jerusalem, are like the latter absolution, and therefore it is enough to know in general that a just cause is present for granting such an indulgence.
Fifth objection. An archbishop can extend his indulgence to the whole province, as is found in the chapter Nostro, on penances and remissions. But not all those of the province are properly subjects of the archbishop, but only those who belong to his diocese; therefore an indulgence is not an absolution properly so called, which requires jurisdiction. I answer. All those of the province are not indeed absolutely subjects of the archbishop, but they are all subjects nevertheless in certain cases, of which one is the granting of an indulgence.
Last objection. If an indulgence were a judicial absolution, the Supreme Pontiff could not be a partaker of any indulgence, since he cannot judicially absolve himself, nor has he himself or any other as a superior. But that seems absurd, that the Supreme Pontiff cannot enjoy those indulgences which are common to all the faithful. And the same argument can be made concerning bishops, as regards the indulgences which are granted by them to the whole people. Answer. There were not lacking those who denied that the Supreme Pontiff or the bishops can be partakers of the indulgences which they themselves bestow on the rest in common. Certainly the Archdeacon, on the chapter Indulgentiae, on penances and remissions, in the Sext, so teaches. And to the same opinion Sylvester cites a few others in the Summa, under the word Indulgentia, number 21. But all others think the contrary, both theologians, as Saint Thomas, Durandus, Richard and others on the fourth book, distinction 20, and Soto, distinction 21, and the interpreters of canon law, on the chapter Nostro, on penances and remissions, and on the chapter Indulgentiae, under the same title in the Sext. To whom is added Navarrus in the tract on the Jubilee, notable 20, number 19. But although this common opinion is most true and altogether agreeable to reason, yet the contrary argument is not easily solved. For those principles are most certain, that no one can be bound or loosed except by a superior, and that no one is his own superior; whence also it comes that no one has ever dared to absolve himself in the sacrament of Penance. It could perhaps be said, then, that the Supreme Pontiff and the bishops use absolution toward others, but toward themselves payment only. It could also be said that the Pontiff cannot indeed immediately absolve himself through an indulgence, but can do it through another, to whom he himself gives the power. For why can he give his confessor the faculty to absolve him from sins, which all admit, and not be able to give the same man power to confer an indulgence on him? Certainly this answer seemed probable to Cardinal Cajetan, tract 15, chapter 5, and before him to Richard, on the fourth book, distinction 20, article 4, question 3, in the solution of the argument. For although an indulgence does not belong to the sacrament of Penance, it belongs nevertheless to the interior and penitential court, in which the Supreme Pontiff can subject himself to another who uses the ministry of the keys upon him. It can also finally and best be said that the Pontiff can indirectly become a partaker of an indulgence proposed in general by himself or by a predecessor, even if he does not wish to use the work of a confessor but only to perform the things which are required of others for obtaining the indulgence, since, as Saint Thomas rightly says on the fourth book, distinction 20, question 1, article 5, little question 4, reply to the last, the Pontiff cannot indeed directly absolve himself, but he can use those things which he himself has granted to others out of his jurisdiction. And such are indulgences, to the receiving of which he comes not as pastor but as one of the flock, subject to the keys of the Church, and thereby indirectly and accidentally subject to himself. Dominic Soto adds, in the place cited, that this very indirect subjection is not even coercive, since the absolution which is given in an indulgence is not as it were a personal sentence pronounced by a man, nor even as it were pronounced by the law and coercive, but as it were pronounced by the common law, and not containing coercion, but remission with the condition of such a work to be done.
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CAPUT VI. Solvuntur objectiones contra doctrinam capitis superioris. Sed adversus ea, quae in his p#opositioni- nibus continentur, pauca quadam objici possunt, qua breviter dissolvenda sunt. Prima objectio. Si posset Pontifex absol¬ vere judicialiter per indulgentias a pcena temporali, posset consequenter absolvere a poena, quam aliquis in purgatorio daturus esset, si cum reatu illius pana moreretur; at in poenas purgatorii non habet pontifex au¬ ctoritatem, igitur non potest eam tollere per suam absolutionem, sedsolum per applicatio¬ nem thesauri, ut facit cum indulgentias pro defunctis concedit. Responsio. An Summus Pontifex postestatem habeat in animas, qua in purgatorio degunt, postea videbimus. Sed in poenam purgatorii, immo etiam in poenam aternam gehenna sine dubio potestatem habet, saltem consequenter et indirecte, 'quia dum absolvit per sacramentum Poeni¬ tentia a culpa lethali, liberat consequenter hominem a debito poena sempiterna , et eodem modo dum per indulgentias absolvit hominem a poenitentia injuncta, vel injun¬ genda, absolvit eumdem consequenter a pce¬ na purgatorii, quam is luiturus esset, si eam 3i poenitentiam non explevisset, vel ab ea ab¬ solutus non fuisset. Sed hoc non est habere potestatem in p irgatorium, vel in gehen¬ nam, sed in homines fideles, qui rei sunt cul¬ pa, vel poena. Quare merito damnata fuit sententia Petri Oxomensis a Sixto IV Pon¬ tifice, ct Concilio Complutensi, qui docebat, non posse Summum Pontificem indulgere alicui viventi in carne poenam purgatorii, et sola contritione deleri peccata quoad culpam et poenam alterius vita, sine ordine ad cla¬ ves. Vide si libet, condemnationem hujus erroris apud Alphonsum de Castro in lib. adversus hareses, verbo, Confessio, vel in Sumina Concilior, in decretis Sixti IV Pontif. Secunda objectio. Per applicationem the¬ sauri fit integra compensatio pro debito p or¬ na temporalis, igitur supervacanea est abso¬ lutio judicialis. Responsio. Argumentum non recte oonc udit, quoniam judex non tenetur dimittere reum alicujus poena, etiamsi justa compensatio offeratur ab alio, prasertim si compensatio non sit ejusdem rationis ; ct ideo si judex admittat compensationem, et absol¬ vat reum, vere dicitur gratiam illi prastare, ut exempli causa, si quis damnatus sit ad triremes, vel ut publice virgis cadatur, et ali¬ quis offerat pro illius rei liberationem agnam pecunia summam, certe non tenebitur ju¬ dex acceptare pecunias, et reum liberare : sed si voluerit id faCere, gratiam illi p rasta - bit, atque eum absolvet. Itaque si proprie loqui velimus, non dicetur tollere obligatio¬ nem ad poenam is, qui compensationem of¬ fert, sed is, qui admissa compensatione reum ab illa obligatione absolvit. Dat igitur vere indulgentiam subditis suis Pontifex, quia nomine Dei, cujus vices in terris gerit, ad¬ mittit compensationem ex thesauro deprom¬ ptam, et ea admissa pcenitentes a reatu poe¬ na temporalis absolvit. Contra autem, de¬ functis non dicitur clare simpliciter indul¬ gentiam, sed per modum suffragii, quia non ipse, sed Deus acceptat compensationem pro defunctis, et eosdem defunctos absolvit : Pontifex autem solum offert ex thesauro justam compensationem. Tertia objectio. Absolutio judicialis dari potest etiam invito, ut patet de absolutione ab excommunicatione : sed indulgentia in- vi o dari non potest; igitur indulgentia non est absolutio, sed mera solutio. Responsio. Non omnis absolutio dari potest invito, sed ca sola, qua non requirit necessario aliquam 32 LIBER I. actionem, vel dispositionem in eo, cui datur, Itaque absolutio sacramentalis, quia requirit contritionem, confessionem, et satisfactio¬ nem, non potest in invitum conferri ; abso¬ lutio ab excommunicatione, aliisque censu¬ ris, quia non pendet necessario nisi a volun¬ tate Praelati, potest in invitum conferri. Porro indulgentia exigit in suscipiente primum, ut sit in statu gratiae, deinde ut faciat quae prae¬ scribuntur in litteris indulgentiae, visitet ba¬ silicas, oret, jejunet, eleemosynas faciat; quae omnia sic a libero arbitrio pendent, ut ab invito extorqueri non possint. Quare indul¬ gentia, quamvis sit absolutio, non est mirum si in invitum conferri nequeat. Quarta objectio. Absolutio requirit cogni¬ tionem causae ; sed indulgentiae saepe dantur in communi omnibus, quiboc aut illud ege¬ rint, non cognitis causis eorum, quibus in¬ dulgentiae tribuuntur : non igitur indulgen¬ tia judicialis absolutio dicenda est. Respon¬ sio. Absolutio particularis, et absoluta, ut etiam condemnatio, quia feruntur secundum allegaita, et probata, sine dubio requirunt particularem et accuratam cognitionem cau¬ sae. At absolutio quaedam generalis, et con- ditionata, non requirit cognitionem caiusae, nisi generatim. Prior absolutio dicitur sen¬ tentia ab homine, posterior a jure. Atque indulgentiae quidem, quae dantur singulis pcenitentibus, quae apud veteres usitatissi¬ mae erant, similes sunt priori absolutioni, et ideo tunc exigitur cognitio causae in parti¬ culari : eae vero, quae dantur omnibus gene¬ ratim, et cum conditione certi operis facien¬ di, ut militandi adversus Mahumetanos pro recuperanda Hierosolyma, similes sunt po¬ steriori absolutioni, et propterea satis est generatim cognoscere justam causam adesse talis indulgentiae concedendae. Quinta objectio. Archiepiscopus ad totam provinciam indulgentiam suam extendere potest, ut habetur cap. Nostro, de pcenit. et remiss. At non sunt proprie subditi Archie- piscopo omnes provinciales, sed ii soli, qui ad ejus dioecesim pertinent : igitur indul¬ gentia non est absolutio proprie dicta, quae jurisdictionem exigit. Respondeo. Non sunt quidem omnes provinciales absolute subditi Archiepiscopo, sed sunt tamen omnes sub¬ diti in certis casibus, quorum unus est in¬ dulgentiae condonatio. Postrema objectio. Si indulgentia esset judicialis absolutio, non posset Summus Pontifex ullius indulgentiae particeps esse, cum se ipse judicialiter absolvere nequeat, nec se, vel alium superiorem habeat. Atqui id videtur absurdum, ut Summus Pontifex illis indulgentiis frui non possit, quae sunt communes omnibus fidelibus. Quod idem argumentum fieri potest de Episcopis, quod attinet ad indulgentias, quae ab illis toti po¬ pulo conceduntur. Responsio. Non defuerunt qui negaverint, Summum Pontificem, aut Episcopos participes esse posse indulgentia¬ rum, quas ipsi caceris in commune largiun¬ tur. Certe Archidiaconus in cap. indulgen¬ tiae, de poenitent. et remiss. in 6. ita docet. Atque in eamdem sententiam paucos alios citat Sylvester in Summa, verbo Indulgentia nuir.. 21 . Contra tamen sentiunt omnes alii, tum Theologi, ut S. Thomas, Durandus, Richardus et alii, in 4. dist. 20. et Sotus dist. 21. tum Juris Canonici interpretes, in cap. Nostro, de pcenit. et remiss. et in cap. Indulgentiae, eodem in 6. Quibus accedit Navarrus in tract. de Jubilaeo, notab. 20. num. 19. Quamvis autem haec sententia communis verissima sit, et omnino consen¬ tanea rationi, tamen argumentum contra¬ rium non facile solvitur. Illa enim principia certissima sunt, neminem posse ligari, vel solvi, nisi a superiore ; et neminem sui ipsius superiorem esse : unde etiam fit, ut nemo se in sacramento Poenitentiae ab¬ solvere unquam sit ausus. Posset igitur fortasse dici Summum Pontificem et Episco¬ pos erga alios viri absolutione, erga se vero solutione dumtaxat. Posset item dici, non posse quidem Pontificem immediate seipsum absolvere per indulgentiam, sed posse per alium id facere, cui ipse potestatem tribuat. Cur enim possit Confessario suo facultatem dare, ut seTi peccatis absolvat, quod omnes admittunt, et non possit eidem potestatem faCere, ut sibi indulgentiam, conferat? Certe haec responsio probabilis visa est Car¬ dinali Cajetano tract. 15. cap. 5. et ante eum Richardo in 4. dist. 20. art. 4. qusest. 3. in solutione argumenti. Quamvis enim indul¬ gentia non pertineat ad sacramentum Poeni¬ tentiae, pertinet tamen ad forum interius, et poenitentiale, in quo Summus Pontifex potest se alteri subjicere, qui in se ministerio cla¬ vium utatur. Potest etiam postremo et opti¬ me dici, posse Pontificem indirecte partici¬ pem fieri indulgentiae a se vel a praedeces¬ sore generatim propositae, etiamsi nolit uti opere Confessarii, sed solum ea praestare, quae ab aliis exiguntur ad indulgentiam con- CAPUT VII. 33 sequendam, quoniam ut recte ait S. Thomas in 4. dist. 20. qu. 1. art. 5. qu. 4. ad ult. non potest quidem Pontifex se ipse directe absol¬ vere, sed potest uti iis rebus, quas ipse aliis ex jurisdictione concessit. Tales au¬ tem sunt indulgentiae, ad quas ipse perci¬ piendas accedit, non ut Pastor, sed ut unus de grege, subjectus clavibus Ecclesise, ac per hoc indirecte, et per accidens subjectus sibi. Addit Dominicus a Soto loco citato, hanc ipsam subjectionem indirectam non esse etiam coactivam, quoniam absolutio quae datur in indulgentia, non est quasi sen¬ tentia personalis ab homine lata, neque etiam quasi lata a jure, et coactiva, sed quasi lata a jure communi, et non continens co¬ actionem, sed remissionem cum conditione talis operis faciendi.