Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Indulgences and the Jubilee · Book I: That Indulgences Exist, and What They Are
Chapter 12: Whether a just cause is required for an indulgence to be valid
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VII, De Indulgentiis et Jubilaeo, Book I, a treatise of the Controversies. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
We have discussed authority; now the cause must be discussed. For we said that these two are required for an indulgence to be rightly granted. And in order to separate the certain from the uncertain, first it is agreed among all writers that without a just cause the grant of an indulgence is valid as regards those things which depend on ecclesiastical law alone, such as the privileges of choosing a confessor who can absolve even from reserved sins, and other things of that kind. So teach Navarrus on the Jubilee, notable 15, number 12, and Dominic Soto on the fourth book, distinction 21, question 2, article 2, conclusion 2; and the reason is that when the Supreme Pontiff dispenses in ecclesiastical law, the dispensation is valid even if a just cause is not present. For it is enough if it is agreed that he wished to dispense, since the whole thing depends on his judgment and will.
Second, it is agreed among all that without a just cause an indulgence is not valid as regards the expiation of the guilt of punishment before God, whether in this life or in the other. So teach Saint Thomas, Saint Bonaventure, Durandus, Gabriel and others on the fourth book, distinction 20, and all the more recent writers. And the reason is that this punishment is to be expiated by divine right, and the Supreme Pontiff cannot without a just cause dispense in those things which in any way belong to divine right, since he is the minister of God, not the lord. Which we also see happen in the dispensation of an oath or a vow; for he relaxes the obligation in the name of God when he has a cause of such a kind that it is credible this will please the Lord. But if he dispenses at his pleasure, without any just cause, God does not hold the dispensation valid. Moreover, the Supreme Pontiff not only is not above divine right, so as to be able to take it away at his pleasure, but neither is he the lord, but the dispenser of the spiritual treasury; and a dispenser ought to be faithful and prudent, otherwise he will have to be called not a dispenser but a squanderer. Wherefore Clement VI, in the Extravagant Unigenitus, when he writes that the Supreme Pontiff can dispense the spiritual treasury, adds, for just causes; and after the end of the Council of Constance, in the Constitution of Martin V, those suspected in faith are ordered to be asked whether they believe that the Supreme Pontiff can grant an indulgence for just causes; and always in letters of indulgence the cause is expressed why the indulgences are granted. Finally, why are certain indulgences called in the general Lateran Council under Innocent III not only indiscreet but also superfluous, unless because they are idle, empty and void? Of which that saying of Saint Cyprian in the sermon on the lapsed can rightly be said: a void peace, pernicious to those who give it, and of no profit to those who receive it.
Third, it is agreed among all that for a just cause it is not required that the work enjoined be in itself so satisfactory as fully to compensate the debt of punishment which is remitted through the indulgence; for then the indulgence would not be a remission. The question, therefore, turns on this alone, whether for a just cause some proportion of the work enjoined with the indulgence is required, so that for a greater indulgence a greater cause is required, or whether for a very small work a very great indulgence can be given. On which matter there are two opinions. The first is that of those who teach that no proportion is required, but that it is enough if the cause is pious, that is, provided the indulgence is not granted for an evil work, or for a merely temporal work, or for a vain work having nothing to do with the divine glory; but for any work whatever which tends to the honour of God or the benefit of the Church, the indulgence will be valid. So taught Saint Thomas on the fourth book, distinction 20, question 1, article 3, little question 2; Durandus and Paludanus on the same distinction 20, question 4; Saint Antoninus, part 1, title 10, chapter 3, paragraph 1; John of Torquemada in the commentary on distinction 1, on penance, canon Quis aliquando, paragraph Item in Levitico, question 4; the Gloss on the Extravagant of Boniface VIII, Antiquorum, on penances and remissions; Sylvester in the Summa, under the word Indulgentia, number 19; John of Tabia, under the word Indulgentia, number 10; and our Gregory of Valencia in the tract on indulgences, chapter 7. The reasons for this opinion are drawn almost all from the usage of the Church. For we see indulgences given for the same cause, sometimes greater, sometimes lesser. Likewise we see sometimes for a very slight cause the greatest indulgences given, as when a plenary indulgence is given to all who stand before the doors of the Basilica of Saint Peter while the Supreme Pontiff on Easter day solemnly blesses the people. Besides, if indulgences granted without a sufficiently great cause were not valid, the Christian people would be gravely deceived by their pastors, which does not seem to be asserted in any way. Moreover, it is a common pronouncement of the theologians that indulgences are worth as much as they sound; therefore, if for a very slight cause a very great indulgence is signified in papal letters to be given, that indulgence will have to be valid. Finally, indulgences do not rest on that cause of the work enjoined, although this too ought to be present, but on the infinite treasury of the merits of Christ and the saints, which is a cause sufficient, nay, surpassing and transcending every remission by indulgence.
The second opinion is that of others, who contend that for a just cause something is required not only pious and useful, but also having a proportion with the indulgence; so that it is not valid if for a very slight cause a very great indulgence is given. So teach among the old scholastics Saint Bonaventure on the fourth book, distinction 20, part 2, last question; Richard on the same distinction 20, last question; Augustine of Ancona in the Summa on the power of the Church, question 30, articles 4 and 5; John Gerson in the tract on sacramental absolution; Gabriel in the Supplement on the fourth book, distinction 45, question 3, article 1, and on the Canon of the Mass, lecture 57. Among the authors of our age the same was taught by Pope Adrian on the fourth book, in the tract on indulgences; Cardinal Cajetan in the tract on the cause of indulgence, and in the other tract to Julius de' Medici, chapter 8; John Major on the fourth book, distinction 20, question 2; Martin Ledesma, part 2 on the fourth book of the Sentences, question 27, article 2; Dominic Soto on the fourth book, distinction 21, question 2, article 2; Peter Soto, lecture 2 on indulgences; Navarrus on the Jubilee, notable 5, numbers 3 and 4; Cordoba, question 20 on indulgences. To these can be added Innocent on the chapter Quod autem, on penances and remissions, and Felinus in the sermon on indulgences. The reasons of this second opinion are these. First, because they seem to abuse words who say that a just cause is required for the grant of indulgences, and yet hold that for any work whatever, even the slightest, the greatest indulgence can be granted; for how can that be called a just cause which has no proportion with the effect? Second, because not only is he called an unfaithful dispenser who gives away his master's goods for no cause, but also he who for the smallest thing has poured out and squandered the precious treasures of the same master. Third, because if indulgences granted for any pious cause whatever were valid, none could be called superfluous or indiscreet, since there is always some pious cause ready to hand which can be alleged. Fourth, because the bestowal of an indulgence is not unlike the dispensation of vows. But in vows all agree that no dispensation can be given except for a very great cause, which pleases God more than the fulfilment of the vow itself. Fifth, because if that opinion were true, the Supreme Pontiff could in a moment free all the souls of Purgatory, since it could be said that a pious cause is not lacking, as it belongs to the glory of God that so many souls fly most speedily to heaven, where they will praise God for ever. These opinions can perhaps be reconciled in some way; but absolutely the second, as it is the more common, so also seems to me the truer.
But that the matter may be better explained, it must be observed, first, that for a just cause two things are for the most part required: first, some pious end, pleasing to God, the attainment of which pleases God more than the penitential satisfaction which is relaxed by the indulgence. For he is a faithful and prudent dispenser of the heavenly treasury who faithfully pleads the cause of his master and works according to his will. Second, some work by which that end can really and probably be obtained. For if the end indeed greatly pleases God, but by the work enjoined can in no way be obtained, there does not seem to be a just cause for giving the indulgence. As for example, if a plenary indulgence is given to those who once recite the Lord's Prayer for the conversion of heretics, the cause will not seem just; since, although the conversion of heretics is a very great thing, and more pleasing to God than the penitential satisfaction of many of the faithful, yet it is not probable that heretics will be converted by that one very brief prayer alone. In the same way, if an indulgence is given to those who contribute one coin for the recovery of Jerusalem, there will not seem to be a just cause for so great an indulgence, because that work is not of such a kind that Jerusalem can be recovered by it. It must be observed, second, that for the proportion of the cause with the indulgence it is not required that the work enjoined be in itself very meritorious, or satisfactory, or difficult and laborious, although these too ought to be regarded; but it is required that it be a means apt and useful for attaining the end for whose sake the indulgence is granted. And so it can happen that by a work in itself quite light and easy a great indulgence can be acquired, since that light and easy work is a means to attaining an end most pleasing to God. Such, for example, is that attendance before the doors of the Basilica of Saint Peter at Rome while the Supreme Pontiff blesses the people with solemn ceremony. For that attendance the first opinion called a very slight thing and a very small cause, and such it is if it is considered in itself absolutely. But the same attendance the second opinion would say is a great and just cause, since that concourse of people at that time is a means apt and useful for the profession of faith concerning the head of the Church, and for the honour of the Apostolic See, which is the end of that indulgence. It must be observed, third, that the cause of an indulgence is not to be judged in the same way when it is given to some one individual and when it is given in common to many. For when it is given to one individual, the work enjoined on him alone must be proportioned to the end for whose sake the indulgence is given; but when it is given in common to many, it is not necessary that the work of each, but only that the work of all together, be proportioned to the end. And hence it can happen that a very great indulgence is most just, even if the work enjoined on each seems light. For example, if it is necessary that a basilica or a hospital be built, and an indulgence of seven or ten years, or even a plenary one, is given to those who contribute a certain sum of gold: if the work of each is regarded, the cause will not seem just; but if the whole sum contributed by all is considered, then it will be a just cause, because with that expense a basilica or hospital can be built, which building will be more pleasing to God and more useful to the Church than the penitential satisfaction which is relaxed by the indulgence. It must be observed, fourth, that it was said above that generally in a just cause two things are contained, the end and the means to the end; since sometimes the end alone seems to be enough, without any means, that is, without any work enjoined, namely when the end does not depend on some work, and of itself suffices to make the indulgence just. So formerly at the petition of the martyrs (as we proved above from Tertullian and Cyprian) indulgences were given without any work enjoined, because the Church judged the petition of the martyrs to be a sufficiently great cause, namely that men might be kindled to martyrdom when they saw the prayers of the martyrs so highly valued. And in these places those are called martyrs who, shut up in prisons and having already suffered something for the confession of the faith, were awaiting the completion of martyrdom. So also at the point of death indulgences are sometimes given to men who have deserved well of the Church, and no work is enjoined, because the extreme necessity itself joined with preceding merits seems to be a sufficiently just cause. So we read that Gregory VII gave indulgences without any work enjoined, book 1, letter 34; book 2, letter 61; and book 6, letter 13. And so an indulgence can sometimes be granted without a work enjoined; but without a cause, and that a just and reasonable one, never. It must be observed, lastly, that a just cause is indeed always required, but that it is not for subjects to judge whether the cause is just or unjust; for they ought simply to think that it is just. Nevertheless, just as it is not to be approved that some, out of a zeal perhaps excessive, speak against certain indulgences granted for slight causes, as John Gerson does in the tract on sacramental absolution, Dominic Soto on the fourth book, distinction 21, question 2, article 2, conclusion 5, and Andrew Vega on the Council of Trent, book 13, last chapter; so Clement VIII, Supreme Pontiff, who now sits, is deservedly to be praised, in that he strives to put into execution the decree of the Lateran Council under Innocent III on moderating indiscreet indulgences, and the decree of the Council of Trent, session 25, on recalling indulgences to the ancient and approved custom of the Church. For it is very well known that the ancients were most sparing in conferring indulgences. Since Sergius II (as we cited in chapter 3) gave an indulgence of three years only, and Paschal II of forty days only. Innocent III also attests, in the chapter Cum ex eo, on penances and remissions, that the Apostolic See was accustomed ordinarily not to extend indulgences beyond the remission of a penance of one year or forty days; and according to this saying of Innocent, Nicholas IV, in the various indulgences which he granted to the church of Saint Praxedes, which are read at the entrance of the chapel of Saint Zeno, never exceeds one year or forty days. Finally Saint Thomas, on the fourth book, distinction 20, question 1, article 3, little question 2, reply to the fourth, writes that to those coming to the thresholds of the Apostles from regions beyond the sea an indulgence of five years is given; from regions beyond the mountains, of three years; from other nearer places, of one year only.
From these things the arguments for the first opinion can easily be answered. To that about indulgences being given for the same cause now greater, now lesser, it can be answered that this can happen for a twofold cause: for sometimes a lesser indulgence is given than could be given for the greatness of the cause, and in this way for the same cause now a greater, now a lesser indulgence is given, and the greatness of the indulgence never surpasses the greatness of the cause. It can also happen that the same good work is at one time more proportioned to the end for whose sake the indulgence is given, and more useful or necessary, than at another time; as when a great need prevails the same alms will contribute more to the relief of the poor than if that dearness of provisions did not prevail; and when a most grave danger threatens, the same prayer with the same fasting and alms will be more necessary for appeasing God than if that danger did not threaten. From which it follows that the good work is the same in itself but different by accident, and the cause is in truth not the same, and therefore it is no wonder if various indulgences are given for that work which at one time offers a greater cause, at another a lesser. To the other, that for a very slight cause the greatest indulgences are given, it has already been answered above that this happens because a cause which is in itself very slight, if the labour or the expense or something of that kind is attended to, is often very great if the proportion to the end is considered for the obtaining of which the indulgences are proposed. To the third, about the deception of the people, we answer that for the most part there is no danger of deception, since we do not think that indulgences are given by the Apostolic See without a just cause; yet just as it can happen that sometimes an indulgence does not obtain its effect through the defect of him who receives it, or through the defect of authority in him who grants it, so it ought not to seem absurd if sometimes the same happens through the defect of the cause; and the Christian people are not ignorant that it belongs to faith that there is in the Church a power of granting indulgences, but not that in particular it cannot happen that an indulgence is either not valid or does not profit; and therefore prudent Christians so receive papal indulgences that at the same time they also strive to bear worthy fruits of penance and to make satisfaction to the Lord for their sins. To the fourth, about that common pronouncement, that indulgences are worth as much as they sound, we answer that that pronouncement is most true, but is understood of an indulgence which does not lack the necessary conditions, authority in the one granting, charity in the one receiving, and justice and piety in the cause. And that question was celebrated among the old scholastics, whether indulgences are worth as much as they sound, or as much as they are preached by the Church, on account of some errors which then prevailed, since some said that indulgences are worth only according to the measure of devotion, others that they are worth only as much as the work enjoined of itself profits for satisfaction, others that they are worth only before the Church, not before God. Which errors, refuted by Saint Thomas and other ancients, are now extinct. But to the last, about the treasury of the merits of Christ and the saints, which is said to be the true cause of indulgences, we answer that the treasury of the merits of Christ and the saints is the true cause why indulgences can be granted; but that besides this cause another is required which moves to dispensing the treasury at this time rather than another, and now more, now less liberally; for the Pontiffs ought not to relax penitential satisfaction, nor have recourse to the treasury, except when they judge it to be necessary or useful for the glory of God and the salvation of souls.
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CAPUT XII. An requiratur causa justa , ut indulgentia sit rata. Disseruimus de auctoritate, nunc de causa disserendum est. Nam haec duo requiri di¬ ximus, ut indulgentia rite, concedatur. Ac ut sejungamus certa ab incertis, convenit primo inter omnes scriptores, sine justa cau¬ sa ratam esse indulgentiae concessionem, quo ad ea, quae pendent ex solo jure eccle¬ siastico, qualia sunt privilegia eligendi con- fessarium, qui possit etiam a reservatis pec¬ catis absolvere , et alia id genus. Docet Navarrus de Jubilaeo, Notab. 15. num 12. et Dominicus a Soto in 4. dist. 21. quaest. 2. art. 2. conci. 2. et ratio est, quoniam cum Summus Pontifex dispensat in jure eccle¬ siastico, dispensatio est rata, etiamsi non adsit causa justa. Satis enim est, si constet, eum voluisse dispensare, cum id totum ab ejus arbitrio et voluntate dependeat. Secundo convenit inter omnes, sine justa causa, indulgentiam non esse ratam, quod attinet ad expiandum reatum poenae co¬ ram Deo, vel in hac vita, vel in alia. Docent S. Thomas, S. Bonaventura, Durandus, Ga- briel, et alii, in 4. dist. 20. et recentiores omnes. Ratio vero est, quoniam haec poena expianda est jure divino, non potest autem Summus Pontifex sine justa causa dispensare in iis, quae aliquo modo pertinent ad jus di¬ vinum, quoniam minister Dei est, non do¬ minus. Id quod etiam videmus accidere in dispensatione juramenti, et voti ; relaxat enim obligationem nomine Dei, quando cau¬ sam habet ejusmodi, ut credibile sit id pla¬ citurum Domino. Quod si pro arbitrio, sine ulla justa causa dispenset, Deus non habet ratam dispensationem. Praeterea Summus Pontifex non solum non est supra jus divi¬ num, ut possit illud pro arbitrio tollere, sed neque est Dominus, sed dispensator thesauri spiritualis, dispensator autem fidelis, et pru¬ dens esse debet, alioqui non dispensator, sed dissipator dicendus erit. Quare Clemens VI, in extravaganti, Unigenitus, cum scribit, Summum Pontificem posse thesaurum spi¬ ritualem dispensare, addit, justis ex causis, et post finem Concilii Constantiensis in Con¬ stitutione Martini V, interrogari jubentur suspecti de fide, an credant, Summum Pon¬ tificem indulgentiam justis de causis posse concedere ; et semper in litteris indulgen¬ tiarum exprimitur causa, cur indulgentiae concedantur. Denique cur dicuntur in Con¬ cilio Lateranensi generali sub Innocentio III indulgentiae quaedam non solum indiscretae, sed etiam superfluae, nisi quia otiosae, ina¬ nes, et irritae sunt? de quibus, recte dici po¬ test illud S. Cypriani serm. de lapsis, Irrita pax, perniciosa dantibus, et nihil accipienti¬ bus profutura. Tertio convenit inter omnes, ad justam causam non requiri, ut opus injunctum sit in se ita satisfactiorum, ut plene compenset debitum poenae, quod remittitur per indul¬ gentiam; tunc enim indulgentia non esset remissio. Quaestio igitur in eo solum versa- CAPUT XII. 45 tur, an ad justam causam requiratur pro¬ portio aliqua operis injuncti cum indulgentia, ita ut pro majori indulgentia major causa requiratur, an vero possit pro opere minimo dari indulgentia maxima. De qua re duae sunt opiniones; prior est eorum, qui docent, non requiri proportionem ullam, sed satis esse, si causa sit pia, id est, modo non con¬ cedatur indulgentia pro opere malo, vel pro opere mere temporali, aut pro opere vano, et nihil ad divinam gloriam pertinente, sed pro quocumque opere, quod ad honorem Dei, vel Ecclesiae utilitatem cedat, indulgen¬ tia rata erit. Ita docuit S. Thomas in 4. dist. 20. quaest. 1. art. 3. quaestiuncula 2. Duran¬ dus, et Paludanus in eadem distinet. 20. quaest. 4. S. Antoninus l.par. tit. 10. cap. 3. §. 1. Joannes de Turecremata in comment. dist. 1. de poenit. can. Quis aliquando, §. Item in Levitico, quaest. 4. Glossa in extra- vagantem Bonifacii VIII. Antiquorum, de poenit. et remiss. Silvester in summa, verbo, Indulgentia, num. 19. JoanTabiensis, verbo, Indulg. num. 10. et noster Gregorius de Va¬ lentia in tract. de Indulg. cap. 7. Rationes hujus sententiae ducuntur fere omnes ab usu Ecclesiae. Nam videmus pro eadem causa dari indulgentias, aliquando majores, ali¬ quando minores. Item videmus interdum pro causa levissima dari indulgentias maxi¬ mas, ut cum datur indulgentia plenaria om¬ nibus, qui ante fores Basilicae S. Petri ad- stant, dum Summus Pontifex in die Paschae populo solemniter benedicit. Ad haec si in¬ dulgentiae, sine causa satis magna concessae, non essent ratae, Christianus populus a Pa¬ storibus suis graviter deciperetur, quod non videtur ullo modo asserendum . Praeterea commune pronunciatum theologorum est, indulgentias valere, quantum sonant : igitur si pro levissima causa indulgentia maxime in litteris pontificiis dari significetur, indul¬ gentia illa rata esse debebit. Denique indul¬ gentiae non nituntur ista causa operis injun¬ cti, quamvis haec etiam adesse debeat, sed thesauro infinito meritorum Christi, et San¬ ctorum, quae est causa sufficiens, immo su¬ perans, et trascendens omnem indulgentiae condonationem. Posterior sententia est aliorum, qui con¬ tendunt ad justam causam requiri aliquid non solum pium et utile, sed etiam quod proportionem habeat cum indulgentia; ita ut non sit ratum, si detur, pro causa levis¬ sima indulgentia maxima. Ita docent ex ve¬ teribus Scholasticis S. Bonaventura in 4. distint. 20. par. 2. quaest. ult. Richardus in eadem 'dist. 20 quaest. ult. Augustinus de Ancona in Summa de potestate Ecclesiae quaest. 30 art. 4. et 5. Joan. Gerson in tract. de Absolutione sacramentali. Gabriel in sup¬ plemento 4. dist. 45. quaest. 3. art. 1. et in Canonem Missae lect. 57. Ex auctoribus no¬ stri saeculi idem docuit Adrianus Papa in 4. in tract. de Indulg. Gardin. Gajetanus in tract. de causa Indulgentiae, et in alio tra¬ ctatu ad Julium Medicem cap. 8. Joan. Ma¬ jor in 4. dist. 20. quaest. 2. Martinus Lede- smius par. 2. 4. sent. quaest. 27. art. 2. Dominicus a Soto in 4. dist. 21 q. 2. art. 2. Petrus a Soto lect. 2. de Indulg. Navarrus de Jubilaeo Notab. 5. num. 3. et 4. Cordu¬ bensis quaest. 20. de Indulg. His addi pos¬ sunt Innocentius in cap. Quod autem, de poenit. et remiss. et Felinus in serm. de In¬ dulgentiis. Hujus posterioris sententiae ra¬ tiones hae sunt. Prima, quoniam videntur abuti vocabulis, qui dicunt, requiri justam causam ad concessionem indulgentiarum, et tamen volunt pro opere quocumque etiam levissimo concedi posse indulgentiam maxi¬ mam quomodo enim justa causa dici potest, quae nullam habet proportionem cum effe¬ ctu ? Secunda, quoniam non solum infidelis dispensator dicitur, qui nulla de causa do¬ nat bona domini sui, sed etiam qui pro re minima profudit, ac prodegit thesauros pre¬ tiosos ejusdem domini sui. Tertia, quoniam si pro quacumque pia causa concessae in¬ dulgentiae, ratae essent, nullae dici possent superfluae, vel indiscretae, cum semper sit in promptu aliqua pia causa, quae allegari possit. Quarta, quoniam non est dissimilis indulgentiae, largitio dispensationi votorum. In votis autem conveniunt omnes, non pos¬ se dispensari nisi pro maxima causa, quae magis placeat Deo, quam ipsa impletio voti. Quinta, quoniam si esset vera ea sententia, posset Summus Pontifex in momento liberare omnes animas purgatorii : quia posset dici non deesse causam piam, cum ad gloriam Dei pertineat, ut tot animae citissime volent ad ccelum, ubi perpetuo Deum laudabunt. Possunt fortasse conciliari hae sententiae ali¬ quo modo : sed absolute posterior, ut est communior, ita etiam verior mihi esse vide¬ tur. Sed ut magis res explicetur, observan¬ dum est primum, ad causam justam ut plu¬ rimum duo requiri, primo finem aliquem pium, ac Deo gratum, cujus assecutio magis 46 LIBER I. placeat Deo, quam pcenitentialis satisfactio, quse per indulgentiam relaxatur. Is enim fi¬ delis, et prudens est dispensator coelestis thesauri, qui fideliter agit causam domini sui, et juxta ejus voluntatem operatur. Se¬ cundo opus aliquod, per quod revera finis ille probabiliter obtineri possit. Nam si finis quidem valde placeat Deo, sed per opus in¬ junctum nullo modo valeat obtineri, non vi¬ detur justa causa dandee indulgentiee. Ut exempli gratia, si detur indulgentia plenaria iis, qui semel recitant orationem Dominicam pro conversione haereticorum causa non vi¬ debitur justa ; quoniam tametsi conversio hsereticorum res est maxima, et Deo gratior, quam pcenitentialis satisfactio multorum fi¬ delium, tamen non est probabile converten¬ dos haereticos per eam solam, brevissimam- que orationem . Quomodo etiam si detur indulgentia iis, qui nummum unum, expo¬ nent pro recuperanda Hierosolyma, non vi¬ debitur justa causa tantae indulgentia;, quia opus illud non est ejusmodi, ut per ipsum Hierosolyma recuperari possit. Observandum est secundum, non requiri ad proportionem causee cum indulgentia, ut opus injunctum sit in se valde meritorium, velsatisfactorium, vel difficile, et laboriosum, quamvis haec etiam spectari debeant, sed requiri, ut sit medium aptum, atque utile ad consequen¬ dum finem, cujus gratia conceditur indul¬ gentia. Itaque fieri potest, ut per opus in se satis leve et facile magna indulgentia acquiri possit ; quoniam opus illud leve, ac facile est medium ad finem Deo gratissimum asse¬ quendum. Talis est exempli gratia, assisten¬ tia illa prae foribus Basilicae S. Petri Romae, dum Suihmus Pontifex solemni caeremonia populo benedicit. Illam enim assistentiam prior opinio rem levissimam et causam minimam appellabat, talis enim est si per se absolute consideretur. At eamdem assisten¬ tiam t posterior opinio magnam causam et justam esse diceret, quoniam frequentia illa populi eo tempore medium est aptum, et utile ad protestationem fidei de capite Ec- clesia3, atque ad honorem sedis Apostolicae, qui est finis illius indulgentiae. Observandam est tertio, non eodem modo judicandum esse de causa indulgentiae, cum datur uni alicui particulari, et cum datur in commune multis. Nam cum datur uni particulari, oportet ut opus injunctum illi soli, sit proportionatum fini, cujus gratia datur indulgentia : ac cum datur in commune multis, non est necesse, ut opus singulorum, sed tantum ut opus omnium simul sit proportionatum fini. Atque hinc accidere potest, ut indulgentia maxima sit justissima, etiamsi opus injunctum singulis videatur leve. Exempli causa, si necesse sit aedificari basilicam, vel xenodochium, et de¬ tur indulgentia septem, vel decem annorum, vel etiam plenaria conferentibus certam auri summam : si respiciatur opus singulorum, non videbitur causa justa, sed tamen si tota summa ab omnibus collata consideretur, jam erit justa causa, quia poterit iis sumpti¬ bus aedificari basilica vel xenodochium, quae aedificatio erit gratior Deo, et utilior Eccle¬ siae, quam pcenitentialis satisfactio, quae per indulgentiam relaxatur . Observandum est quarto, supra dictum esse, plerumque in causa justa duo contineri, finem, et media ad finem : quoniam aliquando solus finis sa¬ tis esse videtur, sine ullis mediis, id est, sine aliquo opere injuncto, quando videlicet finis non pendet ab aliquo opere, et perse suflicit ad indulgentiam justam efficiendam. Sic olim ad petitionem Martyrum (ut supra ex Tertulliano , et Cypriano prabavimus) da¬ bantur indulgentiee sine aliquo opere injun¬ cto, cjuia judicabat Ecclesia satis magnam causam esse, petitionum Martyrum, ut vide¬ licet homines ad martyrium accenderentur, cum viderent tanti fieri martyrum preces. Vocantur autem in his locis martyres, qui in carceribus inclusi, et jam aliquid passim fuerant ob confessionem fidei, et consumma¬ tionem martyrii expectabant. Quomodo et¬ iam in articulo mortis hominibus bene me¬ ritis de Ecclesia dantur aliquando indulgen¬ tiee, neque opus ullum injungitur, quia videtur causa esse satis justa ipsa necessitas extrema conjuncta cum praecedentibus me¬ ritis. Ita legitur Gregorius VII indulgentias sine ullo injuncto opere dedisse, lib. i. epist. 34. lib. ii. epist. 61. et lib. vi. epist. 13. Ita¬ que sine opere injuncto concedi potest ali¬ quando indulgentia, sine causa vero, eaque justa et rationabili numquam potest. Obser¬ vandum est ultimo, justam quidem semper causam requiri, sed non esse . subditorum judicare, utrum causa sit justa, vel injusta : debent enim simpliciter existimare justam esse. Nihilominus tamen sicut probandum non est, quod, aliqui pro zelo, sed nimio fortasse de indulgentiis quibusdam, levibus de causis concessis obloquuntur, quod fa¬ ciunt Joan. Gerson in tract. de Absolutione sacramentali, Dominicus a Soto in 4. dist. CAPUT XII. 47 21. qusest. 2. art. 2, conclus. 5. et Andreas Yega in Concilium Tridentinum lib. xm. cap. ultimo. Sic laudandas merito est Cle¬ mens VIII Pontifex Maximus, qui nunc se¬ det, quod decretum Concilii Lateranensis sub Innocentio III de moderandis indiscretis indulgentiis, et decretum Concilii Tridentini sess. 25. de revocandis indulgentiis ad vete¬ rem, et probatam Ecclesiae consuetudinem, exeeutioni mandare studet. Veteres enim parcissimos fuisse in indulgentiis conferendis notissimum est. Siquidem Sergius II (ut ci¬ tavimus cap. 3.) trium tantum annorum in¬ dulgentiam dedit ; et Paschalis II quadra¬ ginta solum dierum. Testatur quoque Inno¬ centius III capite, Cum ex eo, de pcenitent. et remiss. Apostolicam Sedem solitam esse ordinarie non extendere indulgentias ultra condonationem poenitentia} unius anni, vel quadraginta dierum ; et juxta hoc Innocentii dictum, Nicolaus IV in indulgentiis variis, quas concessit Ecclesia} sanctae Praxedis, quae leguntur in introitu cappfillee S. Zeno¬ nis, numquam excedit annum unum, vel dies quadraginta. Denique S. Thomas in 4. dist. 20. qua}st. 1. art. 3. quaestiuncula 2. ad 4. scribit, venientibus ad limina Apostolorum ex regionibus ultramarinis dari indulgentiam quinque annorum; ex regionibus ultramon- tanis, trium annorum, ex aliis locis vicinio¬ ribus, unius anni dumtaxat. Ex bis ad argumenta pro priore opinione facile responderi potest. Ad illud, quod pro¬ pter eamdem causam dentur indulgentiae modo majores, modo minores, responderi potest, id posse accidere duplici de causa : aliquando enim datur indulgentia minor, quam pro magnitudine causae dari posset, et hoc modo datur pro eadem causa modo major, modo minor indulgentia, et num¬ quam superat indulgentiae magnitudo ma¬ gnitudinem causa}. Potest etiam fieri, ut idem opus bonum sit uno tempore magis proportionatum fini, cujus gratia datur in¬ dulgentia, et magis utile, vel necessarium, quam alio tempore, ut vigente magna ne¬ cessitate eadem eleemosyna plus conferet ad subsidium pauperum, quam si ea charitas annona} non vigeret : et imminente gravis¬ simo periculo eadem oratio cum eodem je¬ junio, et eleemosyna magis necessaria erit ad placandum Deum, quam si illud pericu¬ lum non immineret. Ex quo sequitur, ut idem sit opus bonum secundum se, sed ex accidente diversum, et causa revera non sit eadem, et ideo non sit mirum, si dentur va¬ rice indulgentiae pro illo opere, quod uno tempore majorem causam, alio tempore mi¬ norem offert. Ad aliud, quod pro causa levissima dentur indulgentice maximse, jam supra responsum est, id fieri, quoniam causa, quse est in se levissima, si attendatur labor, aut sumptus, aut aliquid ejusmodi, sa}pe maxima est, si consideretur proportio ad finem, ad quem obtinendum indulgentice proponuntur. Ad tertium illud de populi deceptione re¬ spondemus, ut plurimum nullum esse dece¬ ptionis periculum^ quoniam non existimamus, indulgentias a Sede Apostolica sine justa causa dari ; tamen sicut potest fieri, ut ali¬ quando indulgentia non sortiatur effectum ob defectum ejus, qui illam suscipit, vel ob defectum auctoritatis in eo, qui illam con¬ cedit, ita non debet videri absurdum, si ali¬ quando idem accidat ob defectum causce, et Christianus populus non ignorat ad fidem pertinere, ' quod sit in Ecclesia potestas in¬ dulgentias concedendi, non autem quod in particulari non possit fieri, ut indulgentia vel non sit rata, vel non prosit, et ideo sic accipiunt prudentes Christiani Pontificias indulgentias, ut simul etiam studeant dignos poenitentiae fructus ferre, ac pro suis pecca¬ tis Domino satisfacere. Ad quartum de illo communi pronuntiato, indulgentiae tantum valent, quantum sonant, respondemus, pronuntiatum illud verissi¬ mum esse, sed intelligi de indulgentia, cui non desunt necessariae conditiones, auctori¬ tas in concedente, charitas in suscipiente, et justitia, ac pietas in causa. Fuit autem celebris apud veteres scholasticos quaestio illa, an indulgentiae tantum valeant, quan¬ tum sonant, vel quantum ab Ecclesia prae¬ dicantur, propter nonnullos errores, qui tunc vigebant, cum alii dicerent, indulgentias non valere nisi pro mensura devotionis, alii tan¬ tum valere quantum opus injunctum ex sc ad satisfaciendum prodest, alii tantum va¬ lere coram Ecclesia, non coram Deo. Qui errores a S. Thoma, aliisque veteribus con¬ futati, extincti jam sunt. At postremum de thesauro meritorum Christi, et sanctorum, qui dicitur esse veru causa indulgentiarum, respondemus : the¬ saurum meritorum Christi, et sanctorum esse veram causam, cur indulgentiae concedi possint : sed praeter istam causam requiri aliam, quae moveat ad dispensandum the- 48 LIBER I. saurum hoc tempore potius quam alio, et nunc magis nunc minus liberaliter ; non enim debent Pontifices relaxare poenitentia- lem satisfactionem, neque recurrere ad the¬ saurum, nisi quando judicant id esse neces¬ sarium;, vel utile ad gloriam Dei, et anima¬ rum salutem.