Faith & the Word

Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book I: On Justifying Faith

Chapter 12: The second question is proposed, whether faith alone justifies

Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book I. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).

There follows now the second question: whether faith alone justifies. In which place this is at the beginning to be observed: that this question can be disputed about the dispositions toward justice — whether, namely, faith by way of disposition alone justifies; likewise about formal justification itself — whether, that man be formally just, the obedience of the law be required, at least in habit, or whether the faith apprehending the justice of Christ suffice; finally, about the things that follow justice — namely, whether for retaining and conserving justice good works be required, or faith alone suffice. But in this place we have undertaken to explain only the first question; for of the other two we shall have to discourse in the following books. Wherefore no one ought to wonder if in this place we pass over many things which other writers dispute about faith alone justifying — or rather about faith not alone justifying.

Further, the heretics of this time agree among themselves in one thing, and dissent from the Catholics; in three others they dissent even among themselves. They agree that faith alone justifies — that is, that justification is acquired, or, as they speak, apprehended, by no other thing than faith. But they dissent, first, about the manner in which faith justifies. For Luther seems to have held that faith is the true cause of justification. For thus he writes on chapter 2 to the Galatians: “Faith is the formal justice on account of which man is justified — not on account of charity.” Where not only that word “formal” signifies a true cause, but also the antithesis by which he opposes faith to charity. For when he denies that we are justified on account of charity, he certainly denies that charity is the cause of justification; therefore when he asserts that we are justified on account of faith, he asserts that faith is the cause of justification. The same opinion, in the Colloquy of Altenburg, the Illyricians attribute to the Wittenbergers, affirming that it was said by George Major that faith is the cause why justification is given. Yet very many others — and at this time almost all — teach that faith does not justify by way of formal cause, or of efficient, physical or meritorious — as though either it were itself the justice, or the beginning of justice, or as though in view or respect of it God justified us — but only relatively, because it regards and receives the offered pardon. And so they will have the sense of this proposition, “man is justified by faith,” to be this: man is justified through the grace of God not imputing sins, which grace faith by believing receives. They explain their opinion by the example of the hand by which a poor man receives an alms from a rich one. For that hand receiving the alms is not itself the alms, nor is it the efficient cause of the alms, nor is the alms given on account of it, as though by its beauty it merited this; but it concurs only relatively toward the obtaining of the alms, since to give and to receive are relatives, nor can an alms be given unless it be received by someone. So Philip explains the manner in which faith justifies, in the Commonplaces, under the title of good works, in the dissolution of the arguments; and Chemnitz, in the Examination of the Council of Trent, session 6; and John Calvin, in the Antidote of the Council, on canon 11 of session 6. Likewise in the Colloquy of Altenburg not only the Illyricians, or Saxons, but also the Electoral Wittenbergers agreed in this: that faith is not to be called a cause, but a mere organ, of justification; and the words of George Major objected to them they did not so much defend as excuse. From which we understand that the Lutherans, who boast that they attribute all things to faith alone, in very truth attribute nothing at all to it, but plainly contemn it and count it as nothing.

Second, they dissent about the acts of the other virtues, or works — as of hope, love, penance, and the like — whether, namely, they be required in any way for justification. For although they agree in this, that those acts are not the cause of justification, nor are said to justify, yet some judge that their presence is required, whether as signs of true faith or for other causes. So teach the Wittenbergers in the Colloquy of Altenburg; the same also Philip teaches, in the Commonplaces cited a little before: “We teach clearly,” says Philip, “that there must exist in man the knowledge of the articles, likewise contrition, a good purpose, love begun. About these the adversaries fight — which yet we ourselves confess must exist in man. But we add that faith must come besides; that is, the confidence of mercy: that on account of the Son of God we have the remission of sins, not on account of these our virtues.” Calvin likewise, in the Antidote of the Council, on article 11 of session 6, teaches that faith alone justifies, but that that faith is not alone — in the way that the sun’s heat alone kindles, though it is not alone, but conjoined with brightness. Chemnitz has like things in the place noted. Contrariwise, the Illyricians, or Saxons — that is, the rigid Lutherans — in the same Colloquy of Altenburg contend that faith alone so justifies that that “alone” excludes not only the merit, but even the presence, of the other virtues; and they will have this to have been Luther’s opinion. And truly Luther, on chapter 2 to the Galatians, speaks thus: “Faith justifies without and before charity.” And in the disputation “Whether works make toward justification or not,” tome 1 of his works, he speaks thus in the third proposition: “Faith, unless it be without even the least works, does not justify — nay, is not faith.”

Third, they dissent about the word “Alone” — whether it be altogether necessary, or could for some just cause be left unsaid. For there are not wanting among the Lutherans those who say that that little word “alone,” in the proposition “Faith alone justifies,” even if it be not expressed, is understood; and therefore that there must be no over-obstinate wrangling about it — especially since it is not found in the sacred writings; nay, that it can usefully be left unsaid for concord’s sake. Others, however, contrariwise, judge that for the little word “alone” one must fight most keenly, and contend that all things are to be endured sooner than that that word be snatched from them. See, on this their sword-play, John Cochlaeus in the Acts of Luther, at the year 1530; and Laurence Surius, in the commentary of the deeds of the same year; or, from the heretics, John Sleidan, at the same year, and David Chytraeus, in the history of the Augsburg confession; and the Colloquy of Altenburg itself, where many things on this matter are reported by the Illyricians. But we, laboring little over their contentions, set about explaining only that controversy which they have with us — that is, with the Catholics.

The adversaries, then, as we said a little before, teach that by faith Alone justification is acquired, or apprehended. The Catholics, contrariwise — and above all the Synod of Trent itself (which all Catholics follow as their teacher), session 6, chapter 6 — enumerate seven acts by which the impious are disposed toward justice: namely, of faith, of fear, of hope, of love, of penance, of the purpose of receiving the sacrament, and of the purpose of a new life and of the observance of the commandments of God. Which opinion we shall prove to be true in the following chapters, God graciously helping.

Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT  XII. 

Proponitur  secunda  quaestio ,  an  fides  sola 
justificet. 

Sequitur  nunc  altera  qusestio,  an  fides  sola 
justificet.  Quo  loco  illud  est  initio  obser¬ 


vandum,  quaestionem  istam  disputari  posse 
dispositionibus  ad  justitiam,  an  fides  vide¬ 
licet  per  modum  dispositionis  sola  justificet. 
Item  de  ipsa  formali  justificatione,  an,  ut 
homo  sit  formaliter  justus,  requiratur  obe- 
dientia  legis  saltem  in  habitu,  an  vero  suf¬ 
ficiat  fides  apprehendens  Christi  justitisun. 
Denique  de  consequentibus  justitiam,  nimi¬ 
rum  utrum  ad  justitiam  retinendam  et  con¬ 
servandam  requirantur  opera  bona,  an  fides 
sola  sufficiat.  Cseterum  hoc  loco  primam 
tantum  quaestionem  suscepimus  explican¬ 
dam.  Nam  de  aliis  duabus  in  sequentibus 
libris  disserendum  erit.  Quare  nemo  mirari 
debet,  si  multa  hoc  loco  praetermittimus, 
quae  alii  scriptores  de  sola  fide  justificante, 
vel  potius  de  fide  non  sola  justificante  dis¬ 
putant. 

Porro  haeretici  hujus  temporis  una  in  re 
conveniunt  inter  se,  et  dissentiunt  a  Catho¬ 
licis  ;  in  aliis  tribus  dissentiunt  etiam  inter 
se.  Conveniunt,  fidem  solam  justificare, 
hoc  est  nulla  re  alia  justificationem  acquiri, 
vel  ut  ipsi  loquuntur,  apprehendi,  nisi  fide. 

Dissentiunt  autem  primo  de  modo,  quo 
fides  justificat.  Nam  Lutherus  sensisse  vide¬ 
tur,  fidem  esse  veram  causam  justificationis. 
Sic  enim  scribit  in  n.  cap.  ad  Galat.  Fides 
est  formalis  justitia,  propter  quam  homo  justi¬ 
ficatur,  non  propter  charitatem.  Ubi  non  so¬ 
lum  vox  illa,  «  formalis  » ,  significat  veram 
causam;  sed  etiam  antithesis,  qua  fidem  op¬ 
ponit  charitati.  Nam  cum  negat,  nos  justifi¬ 
cari  propter  charitatem,  certe  negat,  chari¬ 
tatem  esse  causam  justificationis  :  igitur 
cum  asserit  propter  fidem  nos  justificari,  as¬ 
serit  fidem  esse  causam  justificationis. 

Eamdem  sententiam  in  Colloquio  Altem- 
burgensi,  tribuunt  Illyriciani  Wittembergen- 
sibus,  affirmantes  a  Georgio  majore,  dictum 
esse,  fidem  esse  causam,  cur  detur  justifica¬ 
tio.  Alii  tamen  plurimi,  ac  fere  omnes  hoc 
tempore  docent,  fidem  non  justificare,  per 
modum  causae  formalis,  aut  efficientis  phy¬ 
sicae  vel  meritoriae,  quasi  aut  ipsa  sit  justi¬ 
tia,  vel  initium  justitiae,  aut  ejus  intuitu,  sive 
respectu  Deus  nos  justificet,  sed  solum  re¬ 
lative,  quia  respicit,  ac  recipit  oblatam  in¬ 
dulgentiam. 

Itaque  sensum  hujus  propositionis :  Homo 
fide  justificatur,  hunc  esse  volunt.  Homo  ju¬ 
stificatur  per  gratiam  Dei,  non  imputantis 
peccata,  quam  gratiam  fides  credendo  reci- 


(1)1  Joan.V,  13. 


CAPUT  XIII. 


173 


pit.  Explicant  sententiam  suam  exemplo  ma¬ 
nus,  qua  pauper  eleemosynam  a  divite  reci¬ 
pit.  Nam  manus  illa  recipiens  eleemosynam, 
non  est  ipsa  eleemosyna,  neque  est  causa 
efficiens  eleemosynae,  neque  propter  ipsam, 
quasi  sua  pulchritudine  id  mereatur,  datur 
eleemosyna,  sed  solum  relative  concurrit  ad 
eleemosynam  obtinendam,  quoniam  dare  et 
accipere,  sunt  relativa,  neque  enim  dari  po¬ 
test  eleemosyna,  nisi  ab  aliquo  recipiatur. 
Ita  explicant  modum,  quo  fides  justificat, 
Philippus  in  locis  communibus,  titulo  de 
bonis  operibus,  in  dilutione  argumentorum. 
Et  Kemnitius,  in  Examine  Concilii  Triden- 
tini  sess.  6.  Et  Joannes  Calvinus,  in  Anti¬ 
doto  Concilii,  ad  Canon.  11.  sess.  6.  Item  in 
Colloquio  Altemburgensi,  non  solum  Illyri- 
ciani,  sive  Saxonici,  sed  etiam  Wittember- 
genses  Electorales  convenerunt  in  eo,  quod 
fides  non  sit  dicenda  causa,  sed  merum  or¬ 
ganum  justificationis,  et  verba  Georgii  Ma¬ 
joris  sibi  objecta,  non  tam  defenderunt, 
quam  excusarunt.  Ex  quo  intelligimus  Lu- 
theranos,  qui  se  jactant  omnia  tribuere  soli 
fidei,  re  vera  nihil  omnino  ei  tribuere,  sed 
eam  plane  contemnere,  ac  nihili  facere. 

Secundo,  dissentiunt  de  actibus  aliarum 
virtutum,  sive  operum,  ut  spei,  dilectionis, 
poenitentiae  et  similibus,  an  videlicet  requi¬ 
rantur  ad  justificationem  aliquo  modo.  Nam 
etsi  conveniant  in  eo,  quod  isti  actus  non 
sint  causa  justificationis,  neque  dicantur  ju¬ 
stificare,  tamen  aliqui  existimant,  requiri 
eorum  praesentiam,  vel  ut  signa  verae  fidei, 
vel  aliis  de  causis.  Ita  docent  Wittember- 
genses,  in  Colloquio  Altemburgensi,  idem 
etiam  docet  Philippus,  in  locis  communibus, 
paulo  ante  citatis.  «  Clara,  inquit  Philippus, 
docemus,  oportere  in  homine  existere  noti¬ 
tiam  articulorum,  item  contritionem,  bonum 
propositum,  inchoari  dilectionem.  De  his 
dimicant  adversarii,  quae  tamen  fatemur 
ipsi,  in  homine  oportere  existere.  Sed  addi¬ 
mus  oportere  accedere  fidem,  id  est,  fidu¬ 
ciam  misericordiae,  quod  propter  filium  Dei 
habeamus  remissionem  peccatorum ,  non 
propter  has  nostras  virtutes  »'. 

Calvinus  item  in  Antidoto  Concilii,  ad 
artic.  11.  sess.  6.  docet,  fidem  solam  justifi¬ 
care,  sed  eam  fidem  non  esse  solam,  quo 
modo  solis  calor  solus  accendit,  quamvis 
non  sit  solus,  sed  cum  splendore  conjun¬ 
ctus.  Similia  habet  Kemnitius  loco  notato. 

Contra  autem  Illyriciani,  sive  Saxonici, 
hoc  est,  rigidi  Lutherani  in  eodem  Altem¬ 


burgensi  Colloquio  contendunt,  ita  solam 
fidem  justificare,  ut  illud  solam,  non  solum 
meritum,  sed  etiam  praesentiam  aliarum  vir¬ 
tutum  excludat.  Et  hanc  fuisse  volunt  Lu- 
theri  sententiam.  Et  sane  Lutherus  in  c.  n. 
ad  Galat.  ita  loquitur  :  «  Fides  sine  et  ante 
charitatem  justificat ».  Et  in  disputatione: 
Utrum  opera  faciant  ad  justificationem,  an 
non,  tom.  1.  operum  suorum,  sic  ait,  in  3. 
propositione: «  Fides,  nisi  sit  sine  ullis  etiam 
minimis  operibus,  non  justificat,  immo  non 
est  fides  » . 

Tertio,  dissentiunt  de  voce  Sola,  an  sit 
omnino  necessaria,  an  vero  posset  justa  ali¬ 
qua  de  causa  reticeri.  Non  desunt  enim  in¬ 
ter  Lutheranos,  qui  dicant,  voculam  illam 
«sola»  in  propositione  :  Fides  sola  justificat, 
etiamsi  non  exprimatur,  subintelligi,  et  ideo 
non  esse  de  ea  pertinacius  altercandum, 
praesertim  cum  non  inveniatur  in  sacris  lite¬ 
ris,  immo  posse  utiliter  reticeri  concordiae 
causa.  Alii  tamen  contra,  pro  vocula  <c  sola  » 
acerrime  dimicandum  esse  censent,  atque 
omnia,  priusquam  ut  ea  vox  sibi  eripiatur, 
toleranda  esse  contendunt.  Yide  de  hac  eo¬ 
rum  digladiatione  Joan.  Cochlaeum  in  Actis 
Lutheri,  anno  1530.  Et  Laurentium  Surium, 
in  commentario  rerum  gestarum,  ejusdem 
anni,  vel  ex  haereticis,  Joan.  Sleidanum,  ad 
eumdem  annum,  et  Davidem  Chythraeum,  in 
hist.  confess.  Augustanae,  et  ipsum  etiam 
Altemburgense  Colloquium,  ubi  multa  de 
hac  re  ab  Illyricianis  referuntur.  Sed  nos 
parum  laborantes  de  ipsorum  contentioni¬ 
bus,  ad  eam  tantum  controversiam  explican¬ 
dam  aggredimur,  quam  nobiscum,  id  est, 
cum  Catholicis  habent. 

Igitur  adversarii,  ut  paulo  ante  diximus, 
Sola  fide  justificationem  acquiri,  sive  ap¬ 
prehendi  docent :  Catholici  contra,  ac  prae¬ 
sertim  Synodus  ipsa  Tridentina  (quam  om¬ 
nes  Catholici  ut  magistram  sequuntur)  sess. 
6.  cap.  6.  Septem  actus  enumerat,  quibus 
impii  ad  justitiam  disponuntur,  videlicet  fi¬ 
dei,  timoris,  spei,  dilectionis,  poenitentiae, 
propositi  suscipiendi  sacramenti,  et  propo¬ 
siti  novae  vitse,  atque  observationis  manda¬ 
torum  Dei.  Quam  sententiam  veram  esse  in 
sequentibus  capitibus,  Deo  bene  juvante, 
probabimus. 


174 


LIBER  I.
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