Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book I: On Justifying Faith
Chapter 14: That faith alone does not justify is proved from another principle
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book I. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
I come now to the second principal argument, which can be concluded by this reasoning: if faith be separated from hope and love and the other virtues, it will without doubt not be able to justify; therefore faith alone cannot justify. The consequence of this argument is proved thus. If the whole power of justifying were in faith alone, so that the other virtues, though present, conferred nothing at all toward justification — as the adversaries teach — then faith itself would justify as much with them present as with them absent. Therefore, if with them absent it cannot justify, it follows that the power of justifying is not in it alone, but partly in it, partly in the others.
Further, the antecedent of the same argument — namely, that conditioned proposition, “if faith be separated from hope and love and the other virtues, it will without doubt not be able to justify” — is proved by this reasoning. Faith, according to the doctrine of the adversaries, justifies relatively; therefore, faith being posited in a man, in the same point of time justice too is posited — for relatives are posited together and taken away together, since the one cannot be, or be understood, without the other. And this indeed the adversaries willingly admit, seeing they teach that by every sin faith is lost. Again, if faith alone justifies because it justifies relatively, it cannot be in the soul of a man without justice being at the same time in the same man; but without love there cannot be justice, since he that loveth not abideth in death, 1 John 3; and, from Augustine in the book On Nature and Grace, last chapter, “inchoate charity is inchoate justice; perfect charity is perfect justice.” Therefore it cannot come to pass that faith, sundered from love, justify; and thereby faith does not justify alone — since (as has been proved) if it justified alone, it would justify even when sundered from all the other virtues. Moreover, if faith separated from the other virtues could justify, it could also do this with the vices which are contrary to those virtues; for as the presence of the other virtues profits faith nothing, as regards the office of justifying, since it alone justifies, so the presence of the vices will hinder it nothing, as regards the office of justifying, since accidentally they are joined with it — whether vices or virtues — and it alone justifies. But it can in no way be thought or feigned that he is just who hates God and neighbor, and who bears the will of fornicating, stealing, killing, lying, blaspheming; for he would be just who not only is not just, but is even a criminal and unjust. Therefore faith, joined with vices and disjoined from all virtues, cannot so justify that as soon as it is present justification too is present. But it would do this if it alone justified, as has been openly proved; therefore it does not justify alone, but necessarily needs, for the office of justifying, not only the presence, but also the help and efficacy, of fear, hope, love, penance, and the other virtues.
They will answer to this argument that we assume something impossible — namely, that faith can be alone; for that they everywhere deny. For thus Luther speaks in the commentary on chapter 15 of Genesis: “I know that these virtues are signal gifts of God; I know that faith does not exist without these gifts. But now our question is what is proper to each. Thou holdest in thy hand various seeds; I ask not which are joined with which, but what is the proper power of each. Here I say openly what faith alone does, not with what virtues it is joined. But faith alone apprehends the remission, believes God promising, moves its hand to God offering something, and receives it: this is proper to faith alone.” And below: “We know that faith is never alone, but brings with it charity and other manifold gifts; but not on that account are the things to be confounded, and what belongs to faith alone attributed to the others.” John Calvin, in the Antidote of the Council, on canon 11 of session 6: “It is faith alone that justifies; yet the faith which justifies is not alone. As the heat of the sun is alone which heats the earth; yet that heat is not alone in the sun, but with brightness.” The same teach Philip, both in the Commonplaces and in the Apology of the Confession; Brentius in the Catechism; Chemnitz in the Examination of the Council; and others.
But this response can be overthrown in many ways. First, since the Patriarch of all the innovators, Luther, wrote in express words, on chapter 2 to the Galatians: “Faith justifies without and before charity.” And in the disputation whether works make toward justification: “Faith, unless it be without even the least works, does not justify — nay, is not faith.” Which certainly do not cohere well with the words cited a little before. Calvin too, the supreme Prophet of the Genoese, in the Antidote on canon 28 of session 6 of the Council of Trent, admits that some seed of faith remains amid the gravest falls, and that this, however small it be, is a particle of true and living faith. But if a particle of true and living faith remains amid the gravest falls — that is, with deadly sins — how can it not be separated from charity? How can it not be alone? How does it make those just who at that very time sin most gravely? Second, since our argument does not assume that faith can be alone, but that, if faith alone justified, it would do so even were it alone. For, this conditioned proposition being conceded, whatever be the case with the absolute, our reasoning manifestly and efficaciously concludes. And that conditioned proposition we proved openly enough a little before. And it can be confirmed by the similitude of the Sun which Calvin adduces. For although it cannot come to pass that the heat of the Sun be separated from its brightness, yet if it were done, that heat of the Sun would nonetheless heat the earth — as also, contrariwise, the brightness, if it were disjoined from the heat, would nonetheless illuminate. Nay, what of this: that (if we believe St. Basil, in the oration on Psalm 33) the fire of gehenna has the power of burning, and lacks all brightness? Third, since, if it were true, as the adversaries teach, that faith is never alone, it would be true because (as they themselves say) true faith begets, like a good tree, good fruits — love and the other virtues. But even this being conceded, faith is prior to love and all the other virtues, if not in time, certainly in nature; for there is no cause which is not prior to its effect, and accordingly which cannot be understood without its effect. But faith cannot be, nor be understood, prior — not even in nature — to justification itself, since they are relatives (as they themselves say): God justifying, and faith receiving justification; for relatives must be altogether together, so that the one cannot even be understood without the other. Therefore faith will justify prior, at least in nature, and will be understood to be conjoined with justice, before it has brought forth love and the other virtues. Accordingly the absurdities will follow which we noted above: that a man is just and not just, justified and criminal, living and dead — because the just man liveth by faith, and yet he that loveth not abideth in death. Fourth, finally, since it is false, what they say, that true faith cannot be disjoined from the other virtues, and conjoined with sins and vices. Which, that all entrance to falsehood may be closed off, I shall set about demonstrating in the following chapter.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XIV. Fidem solam non justificare, probatur ex alio principio . Venio nunc ad Alterum argumentum prin¬ cipale, quod hac ratiocinatione concludi po¬ test, si fides a spe et dilectione, aliisque vir- (1) Rom. V, 5. — (2) Rom. V, 1. — (3) Act. XI, 18 ; II Cor. VII, 10 ; Ezech. XVIII, 27.-(4) Joan. III, 3; ibid. XX, 23. - (5) Act. II, 38. — Ezec. XVIII, 31. 178 LIBER I. tutibus separetur, sine dubitatione justificare non poterit ; non igitur fides sola justificare potest. Consecutio hujus argumenti proba¬ tur hoc modo. Si tota vis justificandi esset in sola fide, ita ut caeterae virtutes, quamvis praesentes adessent, ad justificationem nihil omnino conferrent, ut adversarii docent, profecto fides ipsa tam justificaret illis prae¬ sentibus, quam absentibus. Igitur si absen¬ tibus illis justificare non potest, efficitur, ut vis justificandi non sit in ipsa sola, sed par- tim in ipsa, partim in aliis. Porro Antecedens ejusdem argumenti, propositio videlicet illa conditionata, si fides a spe et dilectione, aliisque virtutibus sepa¬ retur, sine dubitatione justificare non pote¬ rit : hac ratione probatur ; Fides ex doctrina adversariorum relative justificat, igitur po¬ sita fide in homine, in eodem puncto tempo¬ ris ponitur et justitia : relativa enim simul ponuntur, et simul tolluntur, cum non pos¬ sit unum esse, aut intelligi sine altero. Et hoc quidem adversarii libenter admittunt, quippe qui docent , per omne peccatum amitti fidem. Rursus, si fides sola justificat, quia rela¬ tive justificat, non potest esse in animo ho¬ minis, quin simul in eodem sit etiam justitia, at sine dilectione non potest esse justitia, quoniam qui non diligit , manet in morte , I Joan. iii (I). Et ex Augustino, in lib. de na¬ tura et gratia cap. ult. « inchoata charitas, inchoata justitia est; perfecta charitas, per¬ fecta justitia est ». Igitur fieri non potest, ut fides a dilectione sejuncta justificet. Ac per hoc non ipsa sola justificat, quoniam (ut probatum est) si sola justificaret, etiam ab omnibus aliis virtutibus sejuncta justifi¬ caret. Praeterea, si fides a virtutibus caeteris se- • parata justificare posset, posset etiam id praestare cum vitiis, quae virtutibus illis con¬ traria sunt ; nam quemadmodum nihil pro¬ dest fidei, quod attinet ad officium justifi¬ candi, praesentia aliarum virtutum , quia ipsa sola justificat, ita nihil oberit ei, quod attinet ad officium justificandi , praesentia vitiorum, quia per accidens cum ea jungun¬ tur, sive vitia, sive virtutes, et ipsa sola justificat. At nulla ratione cogitari, aut fingi potest, ut ille sit justus, qui odit Deum, et proximum, quique voluntatem gerit forni¬ candi, furandi, necandi, mentiendi, blasphe¬ mandi; esset enim justus is, qui non solum, non est justus, sed etiam sceleratus et inju¬ stus. Igitur non potest fides, cum vitiis con¬ juncta, et a virtutibus omnibus disjuncta ita justificare, ut statim atque ipsa adest, et justificatio adsit. Id autem faceret, si sola ipsa justificaret, ut aperte probatum est, igitur non sola ipsa justificat, sed eget ne¬ cessario ad officium justificandi non solum praesentia, sed etiam ope et efficentia timo¬ ris, spei, dilectionis, poenitentiae, aliarumque virtutum. Respondebunt ad hoc argumentum, nos assumere aliquid impossibile, fidem videlicet esse posse solam. Id enim ipsi passim ne¬ gant ; sic enim Lutherus loquitur in com¬ mentar. ad cap. xv. Genes. « Scio, has vir¬ tutes esse insignia Dei dona, scio fidem sine his donis non existere. Sed nunc nobis quae¬ stio est, quid cujusque proprium sit, tenes manu varia semina, non quaero ego quae quibus conjuncta sint, sed quae cujusque propria virtus sit. Hic aperte dico, quid fa¬ ciat sola fides, non cum quibus virtutibus conjuncta sit. Sola autem fides apprehendit remissionem, credit promittenti Deo, Deo porrigenti aliquid admovet manum, et acci¬ pit, hoc proprium solius fidei est » . Et infra : « Scimus quod fides numquam est sola, sed adfert secum charitatem, et alia multiplicia dona, sed nQn ideo confundendae res, et quod solius fidei est, aliis tribuendum » . Joannes Calvinus in antidoto Concilii, ad Canon. 11. sess. 6 :« Sola, inquit, fides est, quae justificat, fides tamen, quae justificat, non est sola. Sicut calor Solis solus est, qui terram calefacit, ipse tamen calor, non est solus in Sole sed cum splendore » . Idem do¬ cent Philippus, tum in locis, tum in Apolo- gia Confess. Brentius in Catechismo, Kemni- tius in Examin. Concili, et alii. Sed haec responsio multis modis laibefa- ctari potest. Primo, quoniam Patriarcha no¬ vatorum omnium Lutherus disertis verbis scripsit, in cap. n. ad Galat. « Fides sine, et ante charitatem justificat » . Et in dispu¬ tatione, utrum opera faciant ad justificatio¬ nem : « Fides nisi sit sine ullis etiam mini¬ mis operibus, non justificat, immo non est fides » . Quae certe cum verbis paulo ante citatis, non bene cohaerent. Calvinus quoque summus Propheta Genevensium, in Antidoto ad Canon. 28. sess. 6. Cone. Trid. admittit, (1)1 Joan. III, 14. CAPUT XV. 179 semen aliquod fidei manere inter gravissi- simos lapsus, atque id quantulumcumque est, particulam esse verse ac vivae fidei. At si particula verae et vivae fidei manet inter gravissimos lapsus, id est, cum mortiferis peccatis ; quomodo non potest separari a charitate ? Quomodo non potest esse sola ? Quomodo facit esse justos eos, qui illo ipso tempore gravissime peccant? Secundo, quoniam nostrum argumentum non assumit, fidem esse posse solam ; sed, si fides sola justificaret, id praestituram , etiamsi esset sola. Hac enim conditionata propositione concessa, quicquid sit de abso¬ luta, ratiocinatio nostra manifeste, efficaci- terque concludit. Conditionatam autem illam propositionem satis aperte paulo ante pro¬ bavimus. Et confirmari potest similitudine Solis, quam Calvinus adducit. Quamquam enim fieri nequeat, ut Solis calor a splendore separetur, tamen si id fieret, nihilominus calor ille Solis terram calefaceret , sicut etiam contra, splendor si a calore disjunge¬ retur nihilominus illuminaret. Quid? quod (si S. Basilio credimus oratione in Psalm. 33). Ignis gehennae vim habet urendi, et omni splendore caret. Tertio , quoniam si verum esset , quod adversarii docent fidem numquam esse so¬ lam, ideo verum esset, quoniam ut ipsi di¬ cunt, fides vera gignit, tamquam arbor bona fructus bonos, dilectionem, aliasque virtutes. At hoc etiam concesso, fides est prior dile¬ ctione, aliisque virtutibus omnibus, si non tempore, certe natura. Nulla enim est causa, quae non sit prior suo effectu, ac proinde quae non possit intelligi, sine suo effectu. Fides autem non potest esse, nec intelligi prior, ne natura quidem, ipsa justificatione, cum sint relativa, ut ipsi dicunt, Deus justi¬ ficans , et fides justificationem accipiens ; relativa enim simul omnino esse debent, ut ne intelligi quidem possit unum sine altero. Igitur fides prius, saltem natura, justificabit, et cum justitia conjuncta esse intelligetur, et quam dilectionem, aliasque virtutes attulerit. Proinde sequentur absurda, quae supra no¬ tavimus, ut homo sit justus et non justus, justificatus et sceleratus, vivens et mortuus, quia justus ex fide vivit, et tamen qui non diligit, manet in morte. Quarto denique, quoniam falsum est, quod ipsi dicunt, fidem veram non posse a virtu¬ tibus caeteris esse disjunctam, et cum pec¬ catis, vitiisque conjunctam. Quod in sequenti capite, ut omnis falsitati aditus praecludatur demonstrare aggrediar.