Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book I: On Justifying Faith
Chapter 21: The third argument from the Scriptures for faith alone is solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book I. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The third argument they seek from those places in which a man is said to be justified freely. For to be justified freely and not from works is the same; and thereby the same to be justified freely and by faith alone. Romans 3: Being justified freely by his grace. Romans 4: To him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt; but to him that worketh not, yet believeth in him who justifieth the impious, his faith is reputed unto justice. Romans 11: If by grace, it is not now of works; otherwise grace is no more grace. Ephesians 2: By grace you are saved through faith, not of works. This argument not only proves that a man is justified by faith alone, but also that he is justified by faith alone relatively — that is, not on account of the worth or merit of faith, since then grace would not be grace.
I answer: that particle “Freely” can be taken in two ways. In one way, as it is opposed to debt from justice, or to merits (as the Theologians speak) of condignity, which are absolutely and simply merits. And in this manner gratuitous justification does not exclude works which are said to concur toward justification as dispositions, or as merits of congruity, provided merit of condignity be not attributed to them — of which the Council of Trent speaks, session 6, chapter 8, where it says that a man is justified freely, since neither faith nor works which precede justification merit it. And according to this manner it is not the same, that a man be justified freely, and that he be justified from faith alone. For to be justified freely is to be justified without merit of condignity; to be justified by faith alone is that nothing be required unto justification but faith — which has already been demonstrated to be false. In the other way the particle “Freely” can be taken as it is opposed to a work done without any grace, from the sole powers of nature — whether that work be called merit of condignity, or of congruity, or even be called only a condition, or some reason, why justification is given to a man. And in this manner gratuitous justification does not exclude merits absolutely, but one’s own merits — that is, those which are ours from ourselves, and not from God. For merits which are ours from God — that is, which draw their origin from preventing grace — do not fight with grace, unless one would have grace itself fight with grace. In this manner it is the same, that a man be justified freely, and be justified from faith, and be justified without works. For since faith is the first gift of God, he who is justified from faith is not justified from works preceding faith, but is justified from grace, and freely, because faith itself is from grace.
Nor does it hence follow that a man who is justified freely is justified by faith alone; for as gratuitous justification does not exclude faith, since faith is from grace, so it does not exclude penance, and love, and the works of penance and love, since these too all are from grace. And in this manner St. Augustine explains the particle “freely” wherever he writes of this matter. For in epistle 105, after he had said, “Neither is the remission of sins itself without some merit, if faith obtains it; for the merit of faith is not nothing,” he at once explains how this merit does not fight with gratuitous justification, and says: “It remains, therefore, that faith itself, whence all justice takes its beginning, we attribute not to the human will by which these men are lifted up, nor to any preceding merits, since from it begin whatever good merits there are, but confess it to be a gratuitous gift of God, if we conceive of true grace — that is, without merits.” And in epistle 106: “Let him not say to himself, if from faith, how freely? For what faith merits, why is it not rather rendered than given? Let not the faithful man say these things; for when he shall have said, ‘that I may merit justification, I have faith,’ it is answered him, What hast thou that thou hast not received? Since, then, faith obtains justification, it does not precede grace by any merits of man, but grace itself merits to be increased, that, increased, it may merit also to be perfected.”
But against this solution both the heretics and also certain Catholics object. For Chemnitz, in the Examination of the Council of Trent, session 6, at the end of the disputation on the works of infidels, contends that there is no merit of congruity. Nay, he says this merit is that Helen for which the seventh canon of the sixth session of the Council fights against the sentence of Scripture and of antiquity. But, merit of congruity being taken away, all worth and efficacy of faith and of the other dispositions unto justifying is taken away; and thence it follows that to be justified freely is nothing else than to be justified without any worth of faith or works, from faith alone apprehending the promise. And he proves that there is no merit of congruity, because then it would follow that a man is justified on account of the merit of his own dispositions, and not on account of the merit of Christ alone, which is against Scripture and all the Fathers. Some also of the Catholics, and above all Dominic Soto, book 2 On Nature and Grace, chapter 14, grant indeed dispositions unto justification, but deny that these can by any reason be called merits; and they contend that for a man to be justified freely is to be justified without any merit — whether of condignity, or of congruity, or proceeding from a special help of God, or from the powers of nature alone. And their chief reason is that merit and reward are relatives, so that to every merit a reward corresponds over against it; but a reward is rendered from debt and justice, and thereby is not given freely. For debt and grace are opposed by the Apostle, Romans 4. Moreover merit of congruity is not founded in any worth and proportion of the work to the grace of justification, but in the sole promise of God, who promised indulgence and justification to those believing and doing penance; but he to whom something is owed from the sole promise of another is not said to merit it, save very improperly. Therefore merit of congruity is not merit of a true name. To this can be added the testimony of St. Augustine, from the preface on Psalm 31: “Thou hast done nothing of good, and the remission of sins is given thee.” And he has the same on Psalm 110 and elsewhere. Nay, in epistle 105 the same Augustine affirms that in the sacred Scriptures justice is never called a reward, but always grace; whence he gathers that a reward is owed to justice, but that justice itself is always given freely.
I answer: as to Chemnitz, he is convicted of being either dishonest or unskilled, while he asserts that the Council of Trent fights for merit of congruity against the sentence of Scripture and of all antiquity. For either he speaks of the merit of works which are done from the sole powers of free choice, or of the merit of works which are born from preventing grace and from faith. If he speaks of the first kind of works, he is most openly dishonest, since he lies impudently and prodigally. For the Council of Trent not only nowhere names merit of congruity, but even rejects it, as regards works which are done from the sole powers of nature, as is clear from the sixth session, chapters 5 and 6, and canons 1, 2, and 3. For it teaches that the beginning of justification is taken from preventing grace, and that the dispositions unto justifying grace then first begin when a man, moved and helped by God, begins to believe; and that no one can, by the powers of nature or the knowledge of the law, without the grace of God, believe, love, do penance, etc. If he speaks of the second kind of works, he shows himself unskilled of all antiquity. For there is scarcely any among the ancients who does not acknowledge some merit in the works of penance which are done through the grace of God, as we showed in book 2 On Penance, chapter 12. Although not even about this second kind of works are the words of Chemnitz free of falsehood. For the Council, in that session 6, chapter 7, neither receives nor rejects this merit of congruity, nay makes not even a word about this matter — so far is it from fighting for it as for a Helen. The Council says indeed that justice is infused into us by God according to the disposition and cooperation of each; but whether that disposition be meritorious, at least of congruity, or rather in no way, but only a certain requisite condition, it does not explain.
Now, as regards the Catholics, the question seems to be almost of the mere name of merit, since otherwise it is agreed among all Catholics that dispositions are required, and that men are not justified by faith alone. But we certainly cannot understand why at this time the name of merit should not be used — especially with that addition, “of congruity” — when it is a question of works which are done from preventing grace. And if there were no other reason, the authority of all the Fathers, and especially of St. Augustine, ought altogether to suffice us. For if, at the time when the Pelagians extolled human merits, St. Augustine, the chief defender of grace, did not hesitate to call those works which are born from faith merits, how much more at this time, when the Lutherans take away all merits from the midst, ought the Catholics to name those same works merits? But St. Augustine, in book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 23, seems to have retracted that sentence, “faith merits the remission of sins,” when he retracted that other, “the beginning of faith is from us.” It is not so; for in epistles 105 and 106 Augustine teaches that faith merits justification, and yet in these epistles he affirms with the utmost contention that the beginning of faith is not from us. And in that very book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 23, where he retracts that sentence about the beginning of faith being from us, he writes that it was most truly said, “faith begins merit.” But St. Augustine, one will say, speaks of the merit of formed faith, by which we merit justification — that is, the increase of justice — not of the merit of unformed faith, by which we merit the remission of sins. Neither is this true; for in epistle 106, as we cited above, he speaks openly of the remission of sins: “Neither is the remission of sins itself without merit, if faith obtains it.” And book 1 Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets, chapter 17: “Faith obtains charity.” And in epistle 108: “Faith merits the grace of working well.” And tractate 44 on John: “This confession merited justification.” Augustine, therefore, speaks of the faith which precedes charity and the remission of sins, and attributes to it the merit of obtaining.
But St. Augustine, one will say, when he says that faith merits justification, understands that faith shows from whom help is to be sought, whence justification, and after justification merits, are acquired. But this response is unworthy of a learned man, such as is he with whom we dispute. For if that were to merit justification, then the Word of God, and preachers, and God himself could be said to merit justification for us. Then, St. Augustine explains how faith merits, when he says that it obtains the remission of sins. Finally, both Augustine himself and all the rest of the Fathers attribute the merit of justification not only to faith, but also to love and penance. But certainly love and penance do not show from whom help is to be sought. But St. Augustine, one will say, speaks improperly of merit; and accordingly there is no cause why we should wish to imitate him in this part. If this word had fallen from Augustine alone once or twice only, perhaps that response could be tolerated. But that all the Fathers — most of whom had learned the Latin tongue from their very nurse — should in a matter so grave perpetually speak improperly, seems incredible. See Tertullian book 4 Against Marcion; Cyprian sermon 6 on the Lord’s Prayer; Ambrose books 7 and 10 on Luke, and book 2 On Penance, chapter 8; Jerome book 2 Against the Pelagians; Augustine epistle 89 question 4, tractate 44 on John, on Psalm 50, and elsewhere everywhere; and Gregory on 1 Kings, book 3, chapter 4. Then, our chief question is not whether the works from faith by which we are disposed unto justification are merits properly or improperly so called, but whether they are to be called by this name; and we indeed prove that they are so to be called, since so all the Latin Fathers call them. Nor do those arguments about the relation of merit and reward convince; for we confess that to every merit a reward corresponds, but as we say there is a certain merit of congruity, so we shall say there is a certain reward of congruity, which is owed more from grace than from justice. For the Apostle himself too, Romans 4, when he says, To him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt, indicates openly enough that there is a certain reward which can be reckoned according to grace, not according to debt.
But to that which was objected, that merit of congruity is not founded in the worth of the work, but in the sole promise of God, we answer that the contrary is true. For if the promise require no condition of a work, then indeed no merit will arise thence; as if a king promise to some needy man a certain number of coins each year without any condition, the royal moneys will be owed to that needy man, but without any merit of his; but if the promise contain the condition of a work, merit will arise thence, even though that work be not otherwise of itself equal to the reward. For truly he who shall have done that work will be able to sue the promiser, and say that he has merited the reward promised by him. Wherefore, if merit of congruity were founded in a promise with the condition of a work, it would be truly merit from justice, and to be named rather of condignity, though imperfectly, than of congruity. And therefore we think that merit of congruity is founded rather in some worth of the work than in the promise. For the promises by which God promises pardon to the penitent are not such as those by which he promises the crown of glory to those working well. For these latter contain a true covenant, which God makes with man as with a workman about a reward to be rendered; but those former do not properly contain a covenant about a reward to be rendered, but the assertion of a thing certainly to be, that a man may be made secure of obtaining pardon, if he do penance.
And that this is so can be understood: first, from this, that eternal life is often called a reward, a prize, a wage; justification is never called anything but grace and mercy. Second, from this, that when the Scriptures promise pardon to the penitent, they render the reason, because God is merciful; as Joel 2, Turn to the Lord your God, for he is gracious and merciful, etc. But when they promise eternal life to those working well, they allege not so much mercy as justice and fidelity; as 1 Timothy 4, Which the just judge will render to me. But if, 1 John 1, it is said, If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just, to forgive us our sins, it must be known that he speaks of the remission of venial sins, which by the just judgment of God is rendered to the good merits of the just, as St. Augustine teaches in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 13. Third, the same is clear from this, that the Prophets, when they promise indulgence to the works of penance, are wont to add a doubting particle, as, “Who knoweth?” “Perhaps,” etc., as is clear in Joel 2, Daniel 4, Jonas 3. But nothing of the kind is added in the promise of eternal life to the merits of the just. It is true, therefore, what we said, that the promises of indulgence are not properly covenants in which the merit of penance can be founded, as the promises of eternal life are true covenants in which is founded the merit of the good works which are done by the just.
Further, we deny that there is no worth in merit of congruity. For since that work is from God, and is a work of grace, and a gift of the Holy Spirit, in what way can it be that it has no worth? This indeed is true, that the whole worth of that work depends on grace, and therefore that it is not so much the man who merits as grace itself, which (as Augustine speaks in epistle 106) merits to be increased, that, increased, it may merit also to be perfected. Nor yet will it hence be lawful to gather that this is merit of condignity; for although it is from God, yet it is not from God dwelling within through justifying grace, but exciting and helping from without, as the same Augustine teaches in epistle 105; and besides it is from God beginning and inchoating, not yet completing and perfecting: accordingly it is merit inchoate and imperfect, and has some worth and proportion to its end, but not so much as merit of condignity requires. Finally there is lacking, as we said, a covenant properly so called, without which there can be no merit from justice, or of condignity.
But to that of St. Augustine, in the preface on Psalm 31, “Thou hast done nothing of good, and the remission of sins is given thee; thy works are looked at, and all are found evil,” I answer that St. Augustine by remission understands the whole justification from the beginning of the first disposition, which is faith, unto full reconciliation. For then God begins to remit sins, when he inspires faith, which, by praying, obtains the other gifts. And so that, “Thou hast done nothing of good,” is understood before faith; as also that which follows, “thy works are looked at, and all are found evil.” For works which are done from faith cannot be called evil. That this is so is clear from what precedes and follows. For in the preceding he says: “How then is a man justified from faith without works? The Apostle himself answers: therefore I have said this to thee, O man, lest thou shouldst seem as it were to presume of thy works, and to have received the grace of faith by the merit of thy works. Do not, then, presume of thy works; know that before faith, faith found thee a sinner,” etc. In the following also he says: “God owed thee vengeance, he gives indulgence. Thou beginnest, therefore, to be in faith through indulgence. Now that faith, hope and love being taken up, begins to work well,” etc. Seest thou how the remission of sins — that is, indulgence — then begins, when faith begins? Accordingly, before the remission of sins, which is begun in faith, we have done nothing of good, since before faith nothing of good can be done; for from faith begin whatever things are good. In the same sense Augustine writes, in epistle 105, that justice is never called a reward, since he takes justice for the whole benefit of justification, so that in it is included also faith, which alone cannot be a reward, since no merits at all, whether of congruity or of condignity, precede it. All the other gifts can be called by the name both of grace and of reward. Hence, then, is clear the explanation of all the testimonies which teach that a man is justified freely: for they signify that there are no merits before the gift of faith.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXI. Solvitur argumentum tertium , ex Scripturis desumptum pro sola fide. Tertium argumentum petunt ab iis locis, in quibus dicitur homo gratis justificari. Idem enim est gratis, et non ex operibus ; ac per (i) Psal LXXXIII, S; ibid. XCIX, 5: II Cor. III, 18; Luc. I, 30. - (2) Gen. XV. 198 LIBER I. hoc idem gratis, et sola fide, ttoman.. ni. Justificati gratis per gratiam ipsius. Roman. lv. Ei qui operatur, merces non imputatur se¬ cundum gratiam , sed secundum debitum. Ei autem, qui non operatur, credenti autem in cum, qui justificat impium, deputatur fides ejus ad justitiam. Roman. xi. Si gratia, jam non ex operibus, alioqui gratia jam non est gratia. Ephes. ii. Gratia estis salvati per fidem, non ex operibus (1). Iloc argumentum non solum probat, sola fide hominem justificari, sed etiam justificari sola fide relative, id est, non propter dignitatem, aut meritum fidei, quia tunc gratia non esset gratia. Respondeo : particula illa Gratis duobus modis accipi potest. Uno modo, ut oppona- lur debito ex justitia, sive meritis, ut loquun¬ tur Theologi, de condigno, qua) sunt absolute et simpliciter merita. Et hoc modo justifi¬ catio gratuita non excludit opera, qua) di¬ cantur concurrere ad justificationem ut dis¬ positiones, vel ut merita de congruo, modo non tribuatur eis meritum de condigno, de quo loquitur Concilium Tridentinum sess. 6. cap. 8. ubi dicit, hominem justificari gratis, quoniam neque fides , neque opera, quee ju¬ stificationem preecedur.t, eam merentur. Et juxta hunc modum non est idem, hominem justificari gratis, et justificari ex sola fide. Nam justificari gratis, est justificari sine me¬ rito de condigno. Justificari sola fide, est ni¬ hil requiri ad justificationem nisi fidem, quod esse falsum jam demonstratum est. Altero modo potest accipi particula, Gra¬ tis, ut opponitur operi facto sine ulla gratia, ex solis naturae viribus, sive illud opus dica¬ tur meritum de condigno, sive de congruo, sive etiam solum dicatur conditio, aut ratio aliqua, cur detur homini justificatio. Et hoc modo justificatio gratuita non excludit me¬ rita absolute, sed merita propria, id est, qua) sint nobis ex nobis, et non ex Deo. Nam me¬ rita qua) sunt nobis ex Deo, id est, quae ori¬ ginem ducunt ex gratia prmveniente, non pugnant cum gratia , nisi quis velit ipsam gratiam pugnare cum gratia. Iloc modo idem est, hominem justificari gratis, et justi¬ ficari ex fide , et justificari sine operibus. Nam cum fides sit primum Dfei donum ; qui justificatur ex fide, non justificatur ex ope¬ ribus pra)cedentibus fidem, sed justificatur ex gratia, et gratis, quia ipsa fides est ex gratia. Neque hinc sequitur, hominem qui justifi¬ catur gratis, justificari sola fide ; nam sicut , justificatio gratuita non excludit fidem, quia fides est ex gratia, ita non excludit poeniten¬ tiam, et dilectionem, et opera poenitentiae et dilectionis, quoniam etiam ista omnia sunt ex gratia. Et hac ratione explicat sanctus Augustinus particulam, gratis, ubicumque de hac re scribit. Nam in epist. 105. postea- quam dixerat : «Nec ipsa remissio peccato¬ rum sine aliquo merito est, si fides hanc im¬ petrat. Neque enim nullum est meritum fi¬ dei » . Continuo explicat, quomodo hoc me¬ ritum non pugnet cum gratuita justificatione, et ait : « Restat igitur, ut ipsam fidem, unde 'omnis justitia sumit initium, non humano, (juo isti extolluntur, tribuamus arbitrio, nec ullis pra)cedentibus meritis, quoniam inde incipiunt bona qumcumquc sunt merita, sed gratuitum Dei donum esse fateamur, si gra¬ tiam veram, id est, sine meritis cogitamus ». Et in epist. 106. « Non dicat, inquit, sibi, si ex fide, quomodo gratis? quod enim fides meretur, cur non potius redditur, quam do¬ natur ? non dicat ista homo fidelis, quia cum dixerit, ut merear justificationem, habeo fidem : respondetur ei , Quid enim habes, quod non accepisti? cum ergo fides impe¬ trat justificationem , jion gratiam aliquid meritis praecedit humani, sed ipsa gratia meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur et per¬ fici » . At contra hanc solutionem objiciunt tum haeretici, tum etiam quidam Catholici. Nam Kemnitius in Examine Concilii Tridentini sess. 6. in fine disputationis de operibus in¬ fidelium, contendit, nullum esse meritum de congruo. Immo hoc meritum dicit, esse illam Helenam, de qua septimus, canon sextae ses¬ sionis Concilii contra Scripturae, et antiqui¬ tatis sententiam dimicat. Sublato autem me¬ rito de congruo, tollitur omnis dignitas, et efficacia fidei, et aliarum dispositionum ad justificandum, et inde sequitur, ut justificari gratis nihil sit aliud, nisi justificari sine ulla dignitate fidei, aut operum, ex sola fide ap¬ prehendente promissionem. Probat autem nullum esse meritum de congruo; quia tunc sequeretur, hominem justificari propter me¬ ritum suarum dispositionum , non autem propter meritum solius Christi, quod est con¬ tra Scripturam, et omnes Patres. Aliqui etiam ex Catholicis, atque in. primis (I) Rom. III, 24 ; Roro. IV, 4; Rom. XI, 6; Eph. 11, 8. CAPUT XXI. 199 Dominicus a Soto lib. 2. de natura et gratia, cap. 14. concedunt quidem dispositiones ad justificatio nen], sed negant eas posse voca i ulla ratione merita; et justificari hominem gratis, contendunt esse, justificari sine ullo merito, sive de condigno, sive de congruo, sive procedente ex auxilio Dei speciali, sive ex viribus solius naturae. Ratio autem eorum potissima est, quoniam meritum, et merces relativa sunt, ita ut omni merito merces e regione respondeat : merces autem ex de¬ bito, et justitia redditur : ac per hoc non gratis datur. Debitum enim et gratia oppo¬ nuntur ex Apostolo ad lloman. 4. Prajterea meritum ex congruo non funda¬ tur in ulla dignitate, et proportione operis ad gratiam justificationis, sed in sola promis¬ sione Dei, qui credentibus et poenitentiam agentibus indulgentiam et justificationem promisit : at cui debetur aliquid ex sola pro¬ missione alterius, is non dicitur illud mereri, nisi valde improprie. Igitur meritum de con¬ gruo non est veri nominis meritum. Jluic addi potest testimonium S. Augustini ex praefatione in Psal. xxxi. « Nihil, inquit, boni fecisti, et datur tibi remissio peccato¬ rum. » Et idem habet in Psalm. cx. et alibi, lmmo in epist. 105. affirmat idem Augusti¬ nus, in Scripturis sacris justitiam numquam vocari mercedem , sed semper gratiam ; unde colligit, justitia: deberi mercedem, sed ipsam justitiam semper gratis dari. Respondeo : quod attinet ad Kemnitium^ is aut improbus, aut imperitus esse convin¬ citur. Dum asserit, Concilium Tridentinum pro merito de congruo contra Scriptura:, et totius antiquitatis sententiam dimicare. Nam aut loquitur de merito operum, qua: fiunt ex solis viribus liberi arbitrii, aut de merito ope¬ rum, qua: nascuntur ex gratia praeveniente, et cx fide : si de primo genere operum lo¬ quitur, apertissime improbus est, cum impu¬ denter, et prodige mentiatur. Concilium enim Tridentinum non solum nusquam nominat meritum de congruo, sed etiam illud rejicit, quod attinet ad opera, qua: fiunt ex solis vi¬ ribus naturae, ut patet ex ipsa G. sess. cap. 5. et G. etean. 1. 2. et 3. nam docet, initium justificationis sumi a gratia praeveniente, et tunc primum incipere dispositiones ad gra¬ tiam justificantem, cum homo a Deo motus, et adjutus incipit credere ; et neminem posse per natura: vires, aut scientiam legis sine ; gratia Dei credere, diligere, poenitentiam i agere etc. Si loquitur de Secundo genere operum, imperitum se totius antiquitatis ostendit. Vix enim est ullus inter veteres, qui non agno¬ scat meritum aliquod in operibus poenitentia:, qua: per Dei gratiam fiunt, ut ostendimus in n. lib. de poenitentia, cap. 12. Quamvis ne¬ que de hoc secundo genere operum mendacio careant verba Kemnitii. Concilium enim in illa sess. G. cap. 7. hoc meritum congrui ne¬ que recipit, neque rejicit, immo ne verbum quidem de hac re facit, tantum abest, ut pro illo quasi pro Helena dimicet. Dicit qui¬ dem Concilium, Justitiam a Deo nobis infun¬ di secundum dispositionem, et cooperationem uniuscujusque. Sed an ea dispositio sit meri¬ toria, saltem de congruo, an vero nullo mo¬ do, sed tantum sit conditio quaedam requi¬ sita, non explicat. Jam vero quod attinet ad Catholicos, qute- stio videtur esse fere de solo nomine meriti, cum alioqui conveniat inter omnes Catho¬ licos, dispositiones requiri, et non sola fide homines justificari. Nos autem intelligere certe non possumus, cur non sit hoc tempore utendum nomine meriti, praesertim cum ad¬ ditione illa, de congruo, cum agitur de ope¬ ribus, quae fiunt ex gratia praeveniente. Et si nulla esset alia ratio , auctoritas omnium Patrum, et praesertim S. Augustini omnino sufficere nobis deberet. Nam si quo tempore Pelagiani humana merita extollebant, san¬ ctus Augustinus praecipuus grafiae defensor merita appellare non dubitavit opera illa quae nascuntur ex fide, quanto magis hoc tempore, quo Lutherani merita omnia tollunt e medio, deberent Catholici eadem illa ope¬ ra, merita nominare? At S. Augustinus lib. 1. Retractationum, cap. 23. retractasse videtur sententiam illam, fides meretur remissionem peccatorum , quando illam aliam retractavit, initium fidei est cx nobis. Non ita est, nam in epist. 105. et 106. docet Augustinus, fidem mereri justi¬ ficationem, et tamen in his epistolis summat contentione affirmat, initium fidei non esse ex nobis. Et in ipso lib. 1. Retractationum, cap. 23. ubi retractat illam sententiam de initio fidei ex nobis, scribit verissime dictum esse, fides inchoat meritum. At S. Augustinus loquitur de merito fidei formatae, quo meremur justificationem, id est, incrementum justitiae, non de merito fidei informis , quo meremur remissionem peccatorum. Neque hoc est verum, nam in epist. 106. ut supra citavimus, loquitur aper- 200 LIBER I. tc de remissione peccatorum : « Neque ipsa, inquit, remissio peccatorum sine merito est; si fides hanc impetrat ». Et lib. 1. contra ad¬ versarium legis et prophetarum, cap. 17. « Fides, inquit, impetrat charitatem ». Et in epistol. 108. « Fides meretur gratiam bene ' operandi ». Et tractat. 44. in Joan. « Hicc, inquit, confessio meruit justificationem ». Loquitur igitur Augustinus de fide, qua; praecedit charitatem, et remissionem pec¬ catorum, et illi meritum impetrationis attri¬ buit. At S. Augustinus cum dicit, fidem mereri justificationem, intelligit, fidem ostendere a quo sit petendum auxilium, unde justificatio, et post justificationem merita acquirantur. Ileec vero responsio indigna est viro docto, qualis est is, cum quo disserimus. Nam si id esset mereri justificationem, posset etiam Verbum Dei, et concionatores, et ipse Deus dici, mereri nobis justificationem. Deinde S. Augustinus explicat, quomodo fides merea¬ tur, cum dicit, eam impetrare remissionem peccatorum. Denique et ipse Augustinus, et reliqui Patres omnes non solum fidei, sed etiam dilectioni, et poenitentia; tribuunt meri¬ tum justificationis. Certe autem dilectio, et poenitentia non ostendunt, a quo sit peten¬ dum auxilium. At S. Augustinus improprie loquitur de merito, proinde nulla est causa, cur eum in hac parte imitari velimus. Si semel tantum, aut iterum haec vox uni Augustino excidis¬ set, fortasse tolerari posset ista responsio. At quod omnes Patres, quorum plerique Latinam linguam ab ipsa nutrice didicerant, in re tam gravi perpetuo improprie loquan¬ tur, incredibile videtur. Vide Tertullianum lib. 4. in Marcionem, Cyprianum serm. G. de oratione Dominica, Ambrosium lib. vix, et x. in Lucam, et lib. ii. de paenitentia, cap. 8. Hieronymum lib. ii. contra Pelagianos, Augustinum epist. 89. quaest. 4 tract. 44. in Joan. in Psalm. l. et alibi passim. EtGrego- rium i. Ileg. lib. m. cap 4. Deinde non est potissima nostra queestio, an opera ex fide, quibus disponimur ad ju¬ stificationem sint merita proprie, vel impro¬ prie dicta , sed an sint hoc nomine appel¬ landa, et nos quidem probamus ita esse vo¬ canda, quoniam sic ea vocant omnes Latini Patres. Neque argumenta illa de relatione meriti, et mercedis convincunt, fatemur enim omni merito respondere meroedem, sed si¬ cut meritum quoddam esse dicimus ex con¬ gruo, ita mcrcedem quamdam esse dicemus ex congruo, qua; magis debeatur ex gratia, quam ex justitia. Nam ipse etiam Apostolus ad Rom. iv. cum dicit : Ei qui operatur, merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed se¬ cundum debitum (1). Satis aperte indicat, esse quamdam mcrcedem, qua; imputari possit secundum gratiam, non secundum debitum. Ad illud autem quod objiciebatur, meritum de congruo non fundari in dignitate operis, sed in sola promissione Dei, Respondemus, contrarium esse verum. Nam si promissio non requirat ullam conditionem operis, tunc quidem nullum inde orietur meritum ; ut si Rex egenti alicui promittat in singulos annos certum nummorum numerum sine ulla con¬ ditione ; debebuntur egenti illi pecunia; re¬ gia;, sed absque ullo ejus merito ; at si pro¬ missio contineat operis conditionem, orietur inde meritum , etiamsi opus illud alioqui non sit per se aequale mercedi. Vere enim, qui opus illud fecerit, convenire poterit pro¬ missorem, ac dicere, se meruisse pramiium ab illo promissum. Quare si meritum de congruo fundaretur in promissione cum conditione operis, esset vere meritum ex justitia, et potius de con¬ digno , licet imperfecte, quam de congi-uo nominandum. Et ideo nos existimamus, po¬ tius fundari meritum de congruo in aliqua dignitate operis, quam in promissione. Nam promissiones, quibus Deus veniam perniten¬ tibus pollicetur, non tales sunt, quales illa; quibus bene operantibus coronam gloria; pollicetur. Nam ista; posteriores verum pa¬ ctum continent : quod Deus facit cum homi¬ ne tanquam cum operario de mercede red¬ denda ; illa; alitem priores non proprie con¬ tinent pactum de mercede reddenda, sed assertionem rei certo futura;, ut homo secu¬ rus reddatur veniae obtinenda;, si poeniten¬ tiam egerit. Id autem ita esse intelligi potest, Primo ex eo, quod vita aeterna saepe vocatur mer¬ ces, bravium, stipendium; justificatio num- quam vocatur, nisi gratia et misericordia. Secundo ex eo, quod Scriptura; cum poeni- tentibus veniam promittunt, reddunt ratio¬ nem, quia Deus misericors est : ut Joci. ii. Convertimini ad Dominum Deum vestrum , quia benignus , et misericors est ete (2). At cum pro- * (1) Rom. IV, 4. — (2) Joel. II, 13. CAPUT XXI/. 201 mittunt bene operantibus vitam aeternam, non tam allegant misericordiam, quam justitiam, et fidelitatem, ut I Timoth. iv. Quam reddet mihi justus judex. Quod si 1 Joan. i. di¬ citur : Si confiteamur peccata nostra , fidelis est et justus, ut remittat nobis peccata (i). Sciendum est eum loqui de remissione venia¬ lium, qua? justo Dei judicio redditur bonis meritis justorum, ut S. Augustinus docet in libro de correptione et gratia, cap. 13. Ter¬ tio idem patet ex co, quod Prophetae, cum promittunt indulgentiam operibus poeniten¬ tia?, addere solent particulam dubitantem, ut, Quis Scit, Forsan etc. ut patet Joelis it. Dan. iv. Jonae v. At nihil tale additur in pro¬ missione vitae seternse meritis justorum. Ve¬ rum est igitur, quod diximus, promissiones indulgenti* non esse proprie pacta, in qui¬ bus fundari possit meritum poenitentia ; sicut promissiones vitae aeternae vera sunt pacta, in quibus fundatur meritum operum bonorum, quae a justis fiunt. Porro negamus, nullam esse in merito de congruo dignitatem. Nam cum sit opus illud a Deo, et sit opus grati*, et donum Spiritus sancti, quo pacto fieri potest, ut nullam ha¬ beat dignitatem? Illud quidem est verum, totam ejus operis dignitatem pendere a gra¬ tia, et ideo non tam esse hominem, qui me¬ retur, quam ipsam gratiam, quse (ut loquitur Augustinus in epist. 106.) meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur et perfici. Neqne tamen hinc jam licebit colligere , hoc esse meritum de condigno; nam etiamsi est a Deo, tamen non est a Deo intus inha¬ bitante per gratiam justificantem, sed extrin¬ secus excitante et adjuvante, ut idem Angu- stinus docet in epist. 105. et praeterea est a I).eo incipiente ct inchoante, nondum com¬ plente et perficiente: proinde est meritum inchoatum et imperfectum ; et habet aliquam dignitatem, et proportionem ad suum finem, sed non tantam, quantam requirit meritum de condigno. Denique deest, ut diximus, pactum proprie dictum , sine quo nullum potest esse meritum ex justitia, sive de con¬ digno. Ad illud autem S. Augustini praefatione in Psal. xxxi. « Nihil boni fecisti, et datur tib- remissio peccatorum, attenduntur opera tua? et inveniuntur omnia mala ». Respondeo, sanctum Augustinum per remissionem intel- ligere totam justificationem ab initio prinue dispositionis, quae est fides, usque ad ple¬ nam reconciliationem. Tunc enim Deus in¬ cipit remittere peccata, cum inspirat fidem, qua?, orando impetrat caetera dona. Itaque illud : « Nihil boni fecisti, intelligitur ante fidem : sicut etiam id quod sequitur, atten¬ duntur opera tua , et inveniuntur omnia mala ». Neque enim mala dici possunt ope¬ ra, qua? fiunt ex fide. Id ita esse patet ex pra?cedentibus et se¬ quentibus. Sic enim in pra?cedentibus ait : « Quomodo ergo justificatur homo ex fide sine operibus ? respondet ipse Apostolus, propterea hoc dixi tibi, o homo^ ne quasi de operibus tuis praesumere videreris, et merito operum tuorum te accepisse fidei gratiam. Noli ergo praesumere de operibus tuis; ante fidem noveris, quia peccatorem te fides in¬ venit etc. ». In sequentibus etiam ait : « De¬ bebat tibi Deus vindictam, dat indulgentiam. Incipis ergo esse in fide per indulgentiam. Jam fides illa assumpta spe, et dilectione in¬ cipit bene operari, etc. » Vides quomodo remissio peccatorum, id est, indulgentia, tunc incipi t, cum incipit fides ? proinde ante remissionem peccatorum, qua? inchoatur in fide, nihil boni fecimus, quia ante fidem nihil boni fieri potest. Ex fide enim incipiunt qua?- cumque sunt bona. In eumdem sensum scri¬ bit Augustinus in epistol. 105. justitiam numquam- vocari mercedem, quoniam ac¬ cipit justitiam pro toto beneficio justificatio¬ nis, ita ut in ea includatur etiam fides, qua? sola non potest esse merces, cum eam nulla omnino merita, neque de congruo, neque de condigno, praecedant. Csetera omnia dona et gratiae, et mercedis nomine appellari possunt. Hinc igitur patet explicatio omnium testi¬ moniorum, qua? docent hominem justificari gratis. Significant euim nulla esse merita ante donum fidei.