Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book II: On Inhering Justice
Chapter 2: The sentence of the Church is proposed, and the state of the question is opened
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book II. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The sentence of the Catholic Church on the formal cause of justification is explained by the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 7, in these words: “The single formal cause is the justice of God — not that by which he himself is just, but that by which he makes us just; by which, namely, being endowed by him, we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and are not only reputed, but are truly named, and are, just.” And a little below: “This comes to pass in this justification of the impious, when, by the merit of that same most holy passion, the charity of God is diffused, through the Holy Ghost, in the hearts of those who are justified, and inheres in them. Whence, in justification itself, together with the remission of sins, a man receives, through Jesus Christ, into whom he is ingrafted, all these infused at once: faith, hope, and charity.”
By these words all the five errors are condemned which we numbered in the preceding chapter. For when it is said that the formal cause is single, the opinion of Bucer and Pighius about a double justice is rejected. When it is said that it is the justice of God, not that by which he himself is just, the opinion of Osiander about the divine justice by essence is rejected. When it is said, by which we are renewed in the spirit of the mind, and which inheres, and by which we are truly named and are just, the opinion of the Lutherans about imputative justice is rejected. When it is said that that justice does not consist in the remission of sins alone, the opinion of Calvin about justification in the forensic manner is rejected. When it is said that our justice is faith, hope, and charity infused, the opinion of Luther about faith alone is rejected.
Further, the state of the whole controversy can be recalled to this simple question: whether the formal cause of absolute justification is a justice inhering in us, or not. For if anyone prove the affirmative part, at the same time he will refute all the contrary errors. For if the formal cause of justification is inhering justice, then it is not the indwelling justice of God, nor the imputed justice of Christ, nor the remission of sin alone without the renovation of the interior man. And if inhering justice is the formal cause of absolute justification, then there is not required the imputation of the justice of Christ to complete a justification otherwise inchoate and imperfect. Nor is faith alone our justice, since faith (even by the Lutherans’ own witness) cannot absolutely justify, and therefore (as the Augsburg Confession speaks, article 4) is not so much justice as reputed for justice by God. And so all those errors either do not posit inhering justice, but extrinsic; or, if they posit inhering justice, they will not have it absolutely justify. Accordingly all are refuted, if there be proved an inhering justice which absolutely and simply justifies.
But it is here to be briefly noted that Chemnitz, after his manner, proposes very fraudulently the state of the question about formal justification. For he says that this is called into controversy: what is that on account of which God receives a man into grace — whether it be the merit of the Son of God, or the newness inchoate in us? And he plainly complains, tragically, that we detract from the merit of Christ the power of justifying, to attribute it to our virtues and qualities. Where, first, he speaks improperly of set purpose, that he may be able to confound the formal cause with the meritorious, and by that ambiguity render the Catholic opinion odious. For if anyone would speak properly, he will not use the word “on account of,” but “by,” when he wishes to designate the formal cause. For if anyone ask, by what does a man live? by what is fire hot? by what do the stars shine? it is rightly answered, by the soul, by heat, by light, which are formal causes. But if he ask, on account of what does the Emperor triumph? on account of what do the soldiers fight? it will be answered, not by rendering the formal cause, but the meritorious or final. For we shall say that the soldiers fight that they may conquer, that the Emperor triumphs because he has conquered, and by conquering merited the triumph. So, then, if Chemnitz acted without fraud, he would speak properly, and say that this is what is asked: what is that by which a man is justified — whether the justice given to him by God through the merits of Christ, and inhering, or the very merit of Christ imputed from without. Then, in this too he acted fraudulently, that he opposed to the merit of the Son of God, as it were over against it, our inchoate renovation, thence conciliating envy against us among his followers, as though we made more of our renovation, however imperfect and inchoate, than of the most perfect and most absolute merit of the Son of God.
The frauds, then, and the ambiguity of words being removed, to the question (as it is proposed by Chemnitz) — namely, whether we are justified on account of the merit of the Son of God, or on account of our inchoate renovation — we answer: if that “on account of” signify the formal cause, we are justified on account of the newness inhering in us, not on account of the merit of Christ, which cannot inhere. But if it signify the meritorious cause, we shall say that we are justified on account of the merit of the Son of God, not on account of the newness inhering in us. If, finally, it signify cause in general, we shall assert that a man is justified on account of both — but on account of the merit of the Son of God meritoriously, on account of the newness inhering in us formally.
But with no less fraud did Calvin set forth the sentence of the Council of Trent. For thus he wrote in the Antidote on session 6: “At Trent they make the cause of justification double, as though we were just partly by the remission of sins, partly by spiritual regeneration. Or, to express in other words what they hold, as though our justice consisted partly of imputation, partly of quality. But I assert it to be single and simple.” But this very thing we can turn back upon him with better reason, seeing that he, book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 11, section 2, wrote in express words that justification is placed in the remission of sins and in the imputation of the justice of Christ. For what else is this than to make the cause of justification double? But the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 7, said in most open words that the formal cause of justification is single — namely, the justice of God infused into us and inhering. But if the Council in the same place separately made mention of the remission of sins and of the infusion of grace, it did this not to signify that the formal cause of justification is double, but to indicate that there are two terms of that motion which is called justification, or two effects of the same cause. For (as the same Council rightly defines) justification is the translation of a man from that state in which he is born a son of the first Adam into the state of the adoption of the sons of God, according to that of the Apostle, Colossians 1: “Who hath delivered us from the power of darkness, and hath translated us into the kingdom of the Son of his love.” But this translation cannot be made, unless a man, through the remission of sin, cease to be impious, and, through the infusion of justice, begin to be pious. But as the air, when it is illumined by the sun, by the same light which it receives ceases to be dark and begins to be light, so also a man, by the same justice given and infused into him by the Sun of justice, ceases to be unjust — the light of grace blotting out the darkness of sins — and begins to be just, the very light of justice succeeding to the darkness of sins.
But as to what Calvin says, that according to the sentence of the Council a man is justified partly by imputation, partly by quality, it is a wonder whence it came into his mind, unless perhaps he read the opinion of Pighius, and judged it common to all Catholics. Certainly the Council not only, in chapter 7, makes but a single formal cause of justification, and constitutes it in the infusion of that inhering justice, but also, in canon 10, in express words pronounces anathema against those who hold that we are formally just by the justice of Christ — by which canon the opinion of Pighius is without doubt condemned. But as to that, in canon 11, that the same Council pronounces anathema against those who teach that a man is justified either by the sole imputation of the justice of Christ, or by the sole remission of sins, there are condemned by that canon two errors — the one of the Lutherans, the other of Calvin; but it is not signified that the sentence of the Council is that a man is justified indeed by the imputation of the justice of Christ, but not by that alone; for already, as we said, in canon 10 it had been absolutely defined that a man is not justified formally by the justice by which Christ himself is just. And of the state of the question enough has been said.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT II. Proponitu r sententia Ecclesiae , et aperitur status quaestionis. Ecclesiae Catholicae sententia de causa for¬ mali justificationis, explicatur a Tridentina Synodo sess. 6. cap. 7. his verbis : « Unica formalis causa est justitia Dei, non qua ipse justus est, sed qua nos justos facit, qua vi¬ delicet ab eo donati , renovamur spiritu mentis nostrae, et non modo reputamur, sed vere justi nominamur, et sumus ». Et paulo infra : « Id in hac impii justificatione fit, dum ejusdem sanctissimae passionis merito, per Spiritum sanctum charitas Dei diffunditur in cordibus eorum, qui justificantur, atque ipsis inhaeret. Unde in ipsa justificatione cum remissione peccatorum hac simul in¬ fusa, accipit homo per Jesum Christum, cui inseritur, fidem, spem et charitatem ». His verbis, omnes quinque errores dam¬ nantur, quos capite superiore numeravimus. Nam cum dicitur, Unica esse formalis causa ; rejicitur sententia Buceri, et Pighii, de du¬ plici justitia; cum dicitur <?a esse justitia Dei, non qua ipse justus est, rejicitur sen¬ tentia Osiandri de justitia divina per essen¬ tiam ; cum dicitur, qua renovamur spiritu mentis, et quae inhamet, et qua justi vere nominamur et sumus , rejicitur sententia Lutheranorum de justitia imputativa ; cum dicitur ea justitia non consistere in sola re¬ missione peccatorum , rejicitur sententia Calvini de justificatione more forensi ; cum dicitur, justitia nostra esse fides, spes et charitas infusa, rejicitur sententia Lutheri de sola fide. Porro status totius controversiae revocari potest ad hanc simplicem quaestionem, sit ne formalis causa absolutae justificationis justitia in nobis inhaerens, an non. Nam si quis probet partem affirmantem , eodem tempore refellet omnes contrarios errores. Nam si formalis causa justificationis est justitia inhaerens, non igitur justitia Dei in¬ habitans; vel justitia Christi imputata; vel sola remissio peccati sine renovatione homi¬ nis interioris. Et si justitia inhaerens est formalis causa absolutae justificationis, non igitur requiritur imputatio justitiae Christi, quae justificationem alioqui inchoatam et imperfectam absolvat. Neque sola fides est nostra justitia, cum fides (ipsis etiam Luthe- ranis testibus) non possit absolute justificare et ideo (ut loquitur Confessio Augustana art. 4.) non tam sit, quam reputetur a Deo justitia. Itaque omnes illi errores, aut non ponunt justitiam inhaerentem, sed extrinse- cam, aut si ponunt inhaerentem, nolunt eam absolute justificare. Proinde omnes refutan¬ tur, si probetur justitia inhaerens, quae ab¬ solute simpliciterque justificet. Est autem hoc loco breviter annotandum, Kemnitium more suo fraudulenter admodum proponere statum quaestionis de formali ju¬ stificatione. Dicit enim id in controversiam vocari, Quid sit id, propter quod Deus homi¬ nem in gratiam recipiat? an sit meritum filii Dei, an inchoata in nobis novitas ? et plane tragice queritur, nos detrahere vim justifi- CAPUT H. il) candi merito Christi, ut tribuamus eam vir¬ tutibus, et qualitatibus nostris. Ubi primum de industria loquitur improprie, ut confun¬ dere possit causam formalem cum meritoria, et illa ambiguitate sententiam Catholicam odiosam reddat. Nam si quis proprie loqui velit, non utetur voce, « propter », sed, « per », cum formalem causam designare voluerit. Si quis enim quaerat, per quid vivit homo? per quid ignis est calidus? per quid lucent sidera? recte respondetur, per ani¬ mam, per calorem, per lucem, quae sunt causae formales. Si vero quaerat, propter quid Imperator triumphat ? propter quid milites pugnant? respondebitur, non red¬ dendo causam formalem, sed meritoriam, aut finalem. Dicemus enim milites pugnare, ut vincant, imperatorem triumphare, quia vicit et vincendo triumphum promeruit. Sic igitur, si Kemnitius sine fraude ageret, proprie loqueretur, ac diceret id esse quod quaeritur, quid illud sit, per quod homo justificatur, an justitia sibi a Deo per Christi merita donata et inhaerens, an ipsum Christi meritum extrinsecus imputatum. Deinde, in eo quoque fraudulenter egit, quod merito filii Dei opposuit quasi e regio¬ ne inchoatam renovationem nostram, inde invidiam nobis apud suos concilians, quasi pluris faciamus renovationem nostram quan¬ tumvis imperfectam et inchoatam, quam ip¬ sum perfectissimum atque absolutissimum meritum filii Dei. Remotis igitur fraudibus, et ambiguitate verborum, ad quaestionem (ut a Kemnitio proponitur) an videlicet justificemur propter meritum filii Dei, an propter inchoatam re¬ novationem nostram, respondemus, si illud, « propter, » significet causam formalem, nos justificari propter novitatem nobis inhaeren¬ tem, non propter meritum Christi, quod in¬ haerere non potest. Si vero significet causam meritoriam, non justificari dicemus propter meritum filii Dei, non propter novitatem in nobis inhaerentem. Si denique significet cau¬ sam in communi, asseremus, justificari ho¬ minem propter utrumque, sed propter me¬ ritum filii Dei meritorie, propter novitatem in nobis inhaerentem formaliter. Sed non minori fraude Concilii Tridentini sententiam Calvinus exposuit. Sic enim scri¬ psit in antidoto ad sess. 6. « Causam justifi¬ cationis Tridenti faciunt duplicem, ac si partim remissione peccatorum, partim spi¬ rituali regeneratione justi essemus. Vel ut aliis verbis exprimam, quod sentiunt, ac si partim imputatione, partim qualitate justitia nostra constaret. Ego autem unicam et sim¬ plicem esse assero. » Sed hoc ipsum nos in illum majori ratione regenere possumus, quippe qui lib. iii. Institution. cap.ll. §. 2. disertis verbis justificationem in peccatorum remissione, et justitiae Christi imputatione sitam esse scripsit. Quid enim hoc aliud est, nisi causam justificationis duplicem facere ? Concilium autem Tridentinum sess. 6. cap. 7. apertissimis verbis unicam esse dixit for¬ malem causam justificationis, justitiam vi¬ delicet Dei, nobis infusam et inhaerentem. Quod si Concilium in eodem loco separa¬ rim meminit remissionis peccatorum et infu¬ sionis gratiae, id fecit, non ut significaret, duplicem esse causam formalem justificatio¬ nis, sed ut indicaret, duos esse terminos ejus motus, qui dicitur justificatio, sive duos ef¬ fectus ejusdem causae ; nam (ut idem Con¬ cilium recte definit) justificatio est translatio hominis ab eo statu, in quo nascitur filius primi Adami in statum adoptionis filiorum Dei, juxta illud Apostoli, ad Coloss. i. « Qui eripuit nos de potestate tenebrarum, et trans¬ tulit in regnum filii dilectionis suae ». Non potest autem haec translatio fieri, nisi homo per remissionem peccati desinat esse impius; et per infusionem justitiae incipiat esse pius. Sed sicut aer cum illustratur a sole, per idem lumen, quod recipit, desinit esse tene¬ brosus, et incipit esse lucidus : sic etiam homo per eamdem justitiam sibi a sole justi¬ tiae donatam, atque infusam, desinit esse injustus, delente videlicet lumine gratiae te¬ nebras peccatorum, et incipit esse justus, succedente nimirum tenebris peccatorum ip¬ sa luce justitiae. Quod autem Calvinus dicit ex sententia Concilii, justificari hominem partim imputa¬ tione, partim qualitate, mirum est, unde illi venerit in mentem, nisi forte sententiam Pi- ghii legerit, et eam Catholicis omnibus com¬ munem esse censuerit. Certe Concilium non solum cap. 7. unicam tantum facit causam formalem justificationis, et eam in ipsius ju¬ stitiae inhaerentis infusione constituit, sed etiam can. 10. disertis verbis anathema dicit iis, qui sentiunt, nos per Christi justitiam, justos esse formaliter, quo canone sententia Pighii sine dubitatione damnata est. Quod autem can. 11. idem Concilium ana¬ thema dicit iis, qui docent ; hominem justi¬ ficari aut sola imputatione justitiae Christi 212 LIBER II. aut sold remissione peccatorum, damnantur eo canone duo quidam errores, alter Luthe- ranorum, Calvini alter, sed non significatur, Concilii sententiam esse, hominem justifica¬ ri quidem imputatione justitias Christi, sed non sola : jam enim, ut diximus can. 10. ab¬ solute fuerat definitum, non justificari ho¬ minem formaliter per justitiam, qua Chri¬ stus ipse justus est. Ac de statu quidem qmestionis satis est dictum.