Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book II: On Inhering Justice
Chapter 16: The objections against the doctrine of the preceding chapter are solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book II. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Against what we have said there can be objected, first, the testimonies of the Scriptures which teach that men are justified by works, as Romans 2, The doers of the law shall be justified; James 2, You see that by works a man is justified; 1 John 3, He that doeth justice is just. I answer: the first testimony can be explained in three ways. For, “the doers of the law shall be justified” — that is, they shall merit the increase of justice, and thereby shall be justified through works meritoriously, not formally. Likewise, “the doers of the law shall be justified” — that is, let those who desire to be truly doers of the law give diligence to be justified; for they do not do the justice of the law unless justified. So St. Augustine explains, book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 26. Finally, “the doers of the law shall be justified” — that is, in the divine judgment they shall be judged just, and shall justly obtain the crown of justice. So too, in the same place, the same Augustine expounds; and this, beyond the rest, is the most literal exposition. For in that place blessed Paul treats of rewards and punishments, in which there ought to be no respect of persons: Glory, honor, and peace to every one that worketh good; but wrath and indignation to every one that worketh evil. For there is no respect of persons with God. And whosoever have sinned without the law shall perish without the law; and whosoever have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law. For not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the law shall be justified.
The other testimony is explained by the Council of Trent itself, session 6, chapter 10, of the second justification, by which he who is just is justified still, while through just works he merits the increase of habitual justice. The third testimony teaches not what makes a man formally just, but whence it can be known whether anyone is just. For he is just who does justice, as he is living who moves; and that is a good tree which brings forth good fruits — nor yet is it therefore a good tree because it brings forth good fruits, nor does anyone therefore live because he moves, but contrariwise he therefore moves because he lives, and therefore brings forth good fruits because it is a good tree. So, then, he who does justice is just; but not therefore just because he has done justice, but therefore does justice because he is just.
Second, there can be objected a triple reason, drawn from the nature of habitual justice. First, if habitual justice were the formal cause of justification, it would be formally opposed to sin. But this is not so; for habitual justice is opposed to sin neither contrarily nor privatively, and accordingly in no way. It is not opposed contrarily, since the habit of justice is contrary to the habit of injustice, which is not sin, but a vice contracted from evil acts, such as can be found even in the justified. It is not opposed privatively, since sin is not the privation of habitual justice, but a deviation and departure from the rule of reason, or from the law of God. For a departure from the rule and the privation of habitual justice are not the same, as can be understood from this, that those who are in sin sin again if they transgress the law, and yet do not lose habitual justice, since they have it not — for that cannot be lost which is not had. Second, if habitual justice were the formal cause of justification, that justice would make us pleasing to God and accepted unto the kingdom. But it is not so; for habitual justice is a gift of God, and is given from predestination to the elect who are already before ordained to the kingdom. And so, because they are pleasing and elect in predestination, this gift is given them as a means to attaining the end. Third, if habitual justice were the formal cause of justification, no one could in any way be justified without the infusion of habitual justice; for the formal cause cannot even be supplied by God, as the schools commonly teach. But there are not lacking most grave Theologians who hold that by the absolute power of God sin can be taken away without the infusion of justice; therefore it is not altogether certain, nor ought it to be defended as an Ecclesiastical dogma, that the formal cause of justification is the infused habit of charity.
To all these arguments the answer will be at hand, if we briefly explain and prove that habitual justice has four formal effects — namely, to purge sin, to make just, to conciliate to God, and to ordain unto the kingdom. Of the first effect we discoursed much in the fifth book On the State of Sin, which was the second on original sin, in the two last chapters. Now we shall contract the matter into few words. It is to be known, then, that there is no need to labor much how the act of sin be taken away; for it passes of itself while it is done; but how that be taken away which remains, the act passing, and whence a man is called formally a sinner. And these are: the aversion from God, the stain, the worthiness of punishment and the unworthiness of grace, the guilt or obligation to punishment, and the offence and enmity of God. Further, the aversion, or turning away, from God and from the law, which most properly is habitual sin, is privatively opposed to the conversion to God and the conformity to the law; and accordingly it cannot be taken away, even by the absolute power of God, without that conversion and conformity. But this conversion and conformity must be habitual, as the aversion and turning away is habitual. But true and perfect habitual conversion and conformity, which is, or ought to be, in a man, is nothing else than the habit of charity, which eminently contains all the virtues, and (as Augustine speaks) is the fullest justice. Therefore the habit of charity alone formally takes away that which in a sinful man most properly has the notion of sin. The stain too cannot by any reason be formally taken away save through the same habit of charity. For as from that aversion the stain arose, so from the contrary conversion the stain is taken away. Nor do aversion and stain differ save in reason, and thereby the reasoning of both is the same. The worthiness, or merit, of punishment, and the unworthiness of grace, is born from the aversion and stain; and accordingly it will be taken away by the conversion and the restored comeliness. For as he who has departed from God, and become distorted and deformed, is worthy to be held in hatred, and unworthy to be loved, so also, if he again approach to God, and receive from him light and comeliness, he will be worthy to be loved, and unworthy to be held in hatred. The guilt of punishment and the offence could indeed be taken away without the infusion of justice; for nothing seems to hinder that God be able to will not to ordain to punishment, and to pardon the offence, and not to hold for an enemy him to whom he has not granted the gift of habitual justice; yet these too are taken away through habitual justice, and without it are ordinarily not taken away, nor can they but be taken away, if that gift precede. For how can it be that God will to be an enemy to him, and to destroy him eternally, whom by the infusion of charity he has made his friend, nay even his son? We have, then, that the first formal effect of justice — that is, of habitual charity divinely infused — is to take away from the midst and blot out sin.
Of the second effect the matter will be still easier. For although a man can somehow be made just through human virtues acquired, with the help of God chiefly concurring, yet just with that justice which perfectly disposes a man in order to the last end, even supernatural, and to all laws, even supernatural, he can in no way be made save through charity diffused in the heart by the Holy Ghost; for that is the truest, fullest, and most perfect justice, as St. Augustine rightly teaches in the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 42. Nor does actual love suffice, such as can be had by the special help of God; but habitual is required. For (as we said above) he is not just who at times does just works, but he who is perfectly and intrinsically so disposed that he can, when he will, promptly, easily, and with delight work. The third effect of infused charity is to reconcile a man to God — that is, to make him pleasing and a friend to God; and this indeed is not the immediate effect of charity, but consequent from the nature of the thing absolutely. For infused charity, if it be considered as it has order to the subject, properly makes a man just, good, beautiful; if it be considered as it has order to the work, it makes a man expedite to love God and neighbor, and thereby to fulfil the law. But because, from the nature of the thing, love seeks mutual and reciprocal love, thence it follows that he who loves God is loved by God. Again, because, from the nature of the thing, like is loved by like, and there is nothing which renders us more like to God than love, as St. Augustine teaches on Psalm 99, therefore he who loves God is loved by God. Finally, because the Lord is just, and loves justice, it cannot be that charity, which makes a man just and good, should not also make him pleasing and a friend to God. The fourth effect is to ordain unto glory. And indeed God could perhaps ordain unto glory a man lacking this habit, and contrariwise not ordain unto glory a man endowed with this habit; for the force of this habit, absolutely considered, does not seem so great as to demand of necessity beatitude as owed to it. Yet since God has promised (as St. James, chapter 1) the crown of life to all that love him, therefore infused charity makes men not only just and friends, but also heirs of the kingdom; nor can anyone, according to the ordinary law of God, be accepted unto the kingdom who is not, through infused charity, adopted into a son.
From these things the reasons which were objected against us will easily be answered. To the first I say that habitual justice is opposed to sin privatively — that is, as a habit is opposed to a privation. Nor is it true, what was assumed in the argument, that a departure from the rule and the privation of habitual justice are not the same; nay, they are altogether the same, if the discourse be of habitual departure and aversion, of which we here speak: for it is that which remains in a man, the act of sin passing, and which makes a man formally a sinner. But it is accidental that he who has once sinned, when he sins again, does not lose the justice which he has not. For it is enough that sin of its own nature would expel justice, if it found it in a man. For the act of sin is opposed to habitual grace not privatively, but contrarily, and expels it efficiently, or dispositively; in the manner that the act of love above all things is opposed to habitual sin, not privatively, but contrarily, and expels it efficiently, or dispositively, by way of an ultimate disposition, so that from the nature of the thing, and infallibly, there follows upon that act the infusion of grace and the blotting out of habitual sin, as upon the ultimate disposition in human generation there follows, from the nature of the thing and infallibly, the infusion of the rational soul. And so, without a miracle, grace cannot remain after the act of sin, nor sin remain after the act of love above all things.
To the second reason I say that God in predestination accepted the elect unto glory, but willed that they should not attain to it unless first, through infused charity, they were made just, pleasing, friends, and sons. And accordingly we confess that God accepted the elect unto glory in predestination, though not yet endowed with charity; but that he does not accept them, in execution, unto the same glory, save endowed with charity. Just as God also loved us when we were yet sinners, that he might make us just; and when we were enemies, that he might make us friends; and when we were dead, that he might make us living — whom afterward he loves, since he beholds them just, friends, and living. To the third reason I say that the authors who teach that sin can be remitted without the infusion of justice either rely on a certain false foundation — namely, that nothing remains in the sinner besides the guilt of punishment — or certainly speak of a sin that would be committed by a man constituted in pure naturals. For if anyone admit that the sin from which a man is formally named a sinner is not only the guilt of punishment, but the aversion and stain, as we have above manifestly proved from the divine letters, and speak of a man such as he now is after the fall of Adam, not such as he would be if he were constituted in pure naturals, certainly he cannot deny that it can in no way be that he who is a sinner, and thereby habitually averted from God and from the divine law, can be justified from sin without habitual conversion to God and to the divine law. For neither can a privation be formally taken away save through a habit, as neither a habit save through a privation.
But as to what some say, that sin and justice are not immediate contraries, so that necessarily one must succeed to the other, since there is a middle state of natural innocence, it is rightly refuted by St. Thomas in question 28 On Truth, article 2, where he teaches that sin and justice are immediate contraries, if not in respect of man absolutely, at least in respect of man constituted in grace. Just as sight and blindness are not immediate contraries in respect of a dog before the ninth day, when it is not apt for seeing; but yet after that day they are altogether immediate contraries. But, say they, if God could constitute a man in pure naturals, and thereby not converted to God as a supernatural object, why cannot he now also will that some sinner be not bound to be converted to God as a supernatural object, and thereby effect that the lack of divinely infused justice be no longer to him a privation, but a simple negation, and consequently have not the notion of fault? I answer: if that be posited, it will be just as if that man had been constituted in pure naturals. Wherefore that supposition will nothing hinder that it be true, what we said — that it cannot be that a man, such as he is now born, be justified from sin without the infusion of habitual justice. But of these matters it is not necessary in this place to dispute more subtly.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XYI. Solvuntur objectiones contra doctrinam capitis superioris. Adversus ea, quae diximus objici possunt, Primo, testimonia Scripturarum, quae docent, homines justificati operibus, ut ad Roman. ii. Factores legis justificabuntur, Jacobi ii. Videtis , quoniam ex operibus justificatur homo. I Jean m. Qui facit justitiam, justus est ( 1). Respondeo, primum Testimonium Tribus modis explicari potest. Nam factores legis justificabuntur, id est, augmentum justitiae merebuntur, ac per hoc justificabuntur per opera meritorie, non formaliter. Item, facto¬ res legis justificabuntur, id est, qui cupiunt vere legis esse factores, dent operam, ut justificentur. Non enim!justitiam legis faciunt, nisi justificati. Ita explicat S. Augustinus lib, de Spiritu et littera cap. 26. Denique, factores legis justificabuntur, id est, in divino judicio justi judicabuntur, ^t justitias coronam juste consoquentur. Sic etiam exponit in eodem loco idem Augustinus. Estque haec, prajter cieteras, maxime litteralis expositio. Siqui¬ dem tractat eo loco B. Paulus do prasmiis et • (1) Rom. II, 13: Jacob. Ii, 24; ibid . Joan. III, 7. pcenis, in quibus non debet esse acceptio personarum : Gloria, inquit, honor et pax omni operanti bonum ; ira et indignatio omni operanti malum. Non enim est acceptio perso¬ namini apud Deum, et quicumque sine lege pec¬ caverunt, sine lege peribunt, et quicumque in lege peccaverunt, per legem judicabuntur. Non enim auditores legis justi sunt apud Deum, sed factores legis justificabuntur. Alterum testimonium explicatur ab ipso Tridentino Concilio sess. 6 cap. 10. de secun¬ da justificatione, qua qui justus est, justifi¬ catur adhuc, dum per opera justa justitiae habitualis augmentum promeretur. Tertium testimonium non docet, quid faciat hominem formaliter justum, sed nnde possit cognosci, an aliquis sit justus. Ille enim ju¬ stus est, qui justitiam facit, sicut ille vivens est, qui movetur ; et illa est arbor bona, qu:e fructus facit bonos, nec tamen ideo est arbor bona quia facit fructus bonos, nec ideo vivit aliquis, quia movetur sed contra ideo move¬ tur, quia vivit et ideo facit fructus bonos, quia est abor bona ; Sic igitur qui facit ju¬ stitiam, justus est ; sed non ideo justus, quia fecit justitiam, sed ideo justitiam facit, quia justus est. Secundo, objici potest Triplex ratio, du¬ cta ex natura justitiae habitualis. Primo, si justitia habitualis esset formalis causa justi¬ ficationis, formaliterjpeccato opponeretur. Id autem non ita est; nam justitia habitualis non opponitur peccato contrarie, nec priva¬ tive, proinde nullo modo : non opponitur contrarie, quoniam habitus justitiae con¬ trarius est habitui injustitiae, qui non est peccatum, sed vitium ex malis actibus con¬ tractum, quale etiam in justificatis reperiri potest ; non opponitur privative, quoniam peccatum non est privatio justitiae habitualis, sed deviatio, ac recessus a regula rationis, sive a lege Dei. Neque enim sunt idem reces¬ sus a regula, et privatio justitiae habitualis, ut ex eo potest intelligi, quod qui in peccato sunt, iterum peccant, si praevaricentur legem, et tamen justitiam habitualem non amittunt, cum eam non habeant, neque enim amitti potest, quod non habetur. Secundo, si justitia habitualis, esset for¬ malis causa justificationis, ea justitia faceret nos gratos Deo, et acceptos ad regnum : at non ita est, nam justitia habitualis donum Dei est, et ex praedestinatione datur electis CAPUT XVI. 245 jam ante ad regnum. Itaque quia sunt grati, et electi in praedestinatione, datur illis hoc donum, tamquam medium ad consequendum finem. Tertio, si justitia habitualis esset formalis causa justificationis, non posset ullo modo aliquis justificari sine infusione justitia; habi¬ tualis, causam enim formalem, ne a Deo qui¬ dem suppleri posse scholae communiter do¬ cent. At non desunt gravissimi Theologi, qui sentiant, posse per Dei potentiam absolutam, tolli peccatum, sine infusione justitiae : igitur non est omnino certum, nec tamquam dog¬ ma Ecclesiasticum defendi debet, causam formalem justificationis esse habitum charita- tis infusum. Ad haec omnia argumenta Responsio erit in promptu, si breviter explicemus, ac pro¬ bemus, habitualem justitiam Quatuor habere formales effectus, videlicet, purgare pec¬ catum, efficere justum, conciliare Deo, ordi¬ nare ad regnum. De Primo effectu multa disseruimus in 5. lib. de statu peccati, qui erat secundus de peccato originis, in duobns extremis capiti¬ bus. Nunc in pauca rem contrahemus. Scien¬ dum igitur est, non esse multum laboran¬ dum, quem ad modum tollatur actus peccati ; is enim per se transit, dum fit : sed quem ad modum tollatur id, quod manet, transeunte actu, et unde dicitur homo formaliter pec¬ cator. Hmc autem sunt aversio a Deo, ma¬ cula, dignitas ^poenae, et indignitas gratiae, reatu, sive obligatio ad poenam, et offensa, atque inimicitia Dei. Porro aversio, sive declinatio a Deo, et a lege, quae maxime proprie peccatum est habituale, privative opponitur conversioni ad Deum, et conformitati ad legem: proin¬ de non potest tolli, etiam de potentia Dei absoluta, sine ipsa conversione et con- formitate, Haec autem conversio, et con- formitas habitualis esse debet, sicut aver¬ sio et declinatio habitualis est. Conversio ve¬ ro et conformitas habitualis vera, atque per¬ fecte, qua; est, vel esse debet in homine, ni¬ hil est aliud, nisi habitus charitatis, qui om¬ nes virtutes eminenter continet, et (ut loqui¬ tur Augustinus) plenissima justitia est. Ergo solus habitus charitatis formaliter tollit, quod in homine peccatore maxime proprie habet rationem peccati. Macula quoque non potest ulla ratione for- maliter tolli, nisi per eumdem habitum cha¬ ritatis. Nam quemadmodum ex aversione illa orta est macula, ita ex conversione contraria tollitur macula. Neque differunt, nisi ratione aversio et macula, ac per hoc eadem est ra¬ tio utriusque. Dignitas, sive meritum poena;, et indigni¬ tas gratia;, nascitur ex aversione et macula : proinde ex conversione, et restituto decore tolletur. Nam quemadmodum qui a Deo re¬ cessit et distortus ac deformis evasit, dignus est qui odio habeatur, et iudignus qui dili¬ gatur; sic etiam, si rursus ad Deum accesse¬ rit, atque ab eo lumen et decorem acceperit, dignus erit qui diligatur, indignus qui odio habeatur. Reatus poena; et offensa, possent quidem tolli sine infusione justitia; ; nihil enim impe¬ dire videtur, quo minus possit velle non or¬ dinare ad poenam, et condonare offensam, et non habere pro inimico illurp, cui donum habitualis justitias non concesserit, tamen tolluntur etiam ista per habitualem justitiam : et sine ea ordinarie non tolluntur, nec possunt non tolli ; si donum illud praecesserit. Quo¬ modo enim fieri potest, ut velit Deus inimi¬ cus esse illi, atque eum in «ternum perdere, quem per infusionem charitatis amicum su¬ um, imrno et filium fecerit? Habemus igitur primum effectum formalem justitia;, id est, charitatis habitualis, divinitus infusa;, esse de medio tollere, ac delere peccatum. De altero effectu res erit adhuc facilior. Nam tametsi possit homo utcumque justus fieri, per humanas virtutes, Dei potissimum adjutorio concurrente, acquisitas ; tamen justus ea justitia, qua; hominem perfecte dis_ ponat in ordine ad ultimum finem etiam su- pernaturalem, et ad omnes, leges etiam su- pernaturales, nullo modo fieri poterit, nisi per charitatem diffusam in corde, per Spiri¬ tum sanctum, ea siquidem est verissima, plenissima, perfectissimaque justitia, ut S. Augustinus recte docet in lib. de natura et gratia cap. 42. neque sufficit actualis dilectio, qualis per auxilium, Dei speciale haberi po¬ test ; sed requiritur habitualis. Nam (ut su¬ pra diximus) non est justus, qui interdum juxta opera facit, sed qui perfecte, atque in¬ trinsece ite dispositus est, ut possit, quando velit, prompte, facile, cum delectatione ope¬ rari. Tertius effectus infusa; charitatis, est re¬ conciliare hominem Deo, id est, gratum, et amicum Deo facere, et hic quidem non est immediatus charitatis effectus, sed conse¬ quens ex natura rei absolute. Charitas enim 246 L1BEH II. infusa, si consideretur, ut habet ordinem ad subjectum, proprie facit hominem justum, bonum, formosum, si consideretur, ut habet ordinem 'ad opus, facit hominem expeditum ad diligendum Deum, et proximum, et per hoc ad legem implendam. Sed quia ex natu¬ ra rei, amor petit amorem mutuum et reci¬ procum, inde consequitur, ut qui diligit Deum, diligatur a Deo. Rursus, quia simile, ex natura rei, diligitur a simili, et nihil est, quod similiores nos Deo i’eddat, quam dile¬ ctio, ut S. Augustinus docet in Psalm. 99. ideo qui diligit Deum, diligitur a Deo. Deni¬ que, quia justus Dominus est, et justitiam diligit, fieri non potest, ut charitas, qua; fa¬ cit hominem justum et bonum, non faciat etiam Deo gratum et amicum. Quartus effectus est ordinare ad gloriam. Et quidem posset fortasse Deus ordinare ad gloriam hominem carentem isto habitu, et contra non ordinare ad gloriam hominem isto habitu praeditum; Non enim videtur tanta esse vis hujus habitus absolute considerati, ut ex necessitate petat, tamquam sibi debi¬ tam beatitudinem. Tamen quoniam Deus promisit (ut S. Jacobus cap. 1.) coronam vitae omnibus diligentibus se : ideo charitas in¬ fusa, non solum facit justos et amicos, sed etiam haeredes regni : nec potest ullus, se¬ cundum ordinariam Dei legem, acceptus esse ad regnum, qui non sit per infusam charita- tem adoptatus in filium. Ex his ad rationes, quae contra objicie¬ bantur, facile respondebitur. Ad Primam Dico, justitiam habitualem opponi peccato privative, id est, ut opponitur habitus priva¬ tioni. Neque verum est, quod in argumento assumebatur, non idem esse recessum a re¬ cula , et privationem justitia; habitualis; immo sunt prorsus idem, si de recessu, et aversione habituali sermo sit, de qua nos in praesentia loquimur : illa est enim, quae re¬ manet in homine, transeunte actu peccati, et quae facit hominem formaliter peccatorem : per accidens autem est, quod qui semel pec¬ cavit, cum iterum peccat, nou amittat justi¬ tiam, quam non habet. Satis est enim, quod peccatum ex natura sua justitiam expelieret, si in homine reperiret. Actus enim peccati opponitur gratiae habituali, nou privative, sed contrarie, et eam expellit efficienter, sive dispositive : quomodo actus dilectionis super omnia opponitur peccato habituali, non privative, sed contrarie, et expellit illud efficienter, sive dispositive per modum ulti¬ mae dispositionis, ita ut ex natura rei, et in. faillibiliter sequafur ad illum actum infusio gratae, et deletio peccati habitualis, sicut ad ultimam dispositionem in generatione hu¬ mana sequitur ex natura rei, et infaillihili ter infusio animae rationalis. Itaque sine mira¬ culo non potest post actum peccati manere gratia , nec post actum dilectionis super omnia manere peccatum. Ad secundam rationem dico. Deum in praedestinatione acceptasse electos ad gloriam sed voluisse, ut ad eam non pervenirent, nisi prius per infusam charitatem justi, grati, amici et filii facti essent. Proinde acceptasse fatemur. Deum electos ad gloriam in praede¬ stinatione, quamvis nondum cliaritate p ne¬ ri ito s, sed non acceptare in exeeutione ad eamdem gloriam, nisi praeditos cliaritate. Sicut etiam dilexit nos Deus, cum adhuc peccatores essemus, ut justos faceret, ef cum inimici essemus, ut amicos faceret : et cnm mortui essemus, ut viventes faceret quos postea diligit, quoniam justos, amicos, et l i¬ ventes cernit. Ad tertiam rationem dico, auctores, qui docent, peccatum remitti posse sine infusi¬ one justitiae, vel niti falso quodam funda¬ mento, quod videlicet nihil maneat in pec¬ catore praeter reatum poenae; vel certe loqui de peccato, quod ab homine in puris natu¬ ralibus condito committeretur; nam si quis admittat, peccatum, a quo formaliter nomi¬ natur homo peccator, non esse solum reatum poena;, sed aversionem et maculam, ut supra ex divinis litteris manifeste probavimus ; et loquatur de homine qualis nunc est post lapsum Adee, non qualis esset, si in puris naturalibus conderetur, certe negare non po¬ terit, nullo modo fieri posse, ut qui pecca¬ tor est, et per hoc habitualiter aversus a Deo, et a divina lege, justificari possit a pec¬ cato, sine conversione habituali ad Deum, et ad divinam legem. Neque enim privatio tolli potest formaliter, nisi per habitum, ut neque habitus, nisi per privationem. Quod autem quidam dicunt, peccatum et justitiam, non esse contraria immediata, ut necessario unum alteri succedere debeat, cum sit medius status innocentia; naturalis; recte refellitur a S. Thoma in qua;st. 28. de veritate, artic. 2. ubi docet, peccatum et justitiam, esse contraria immediata, si non respectu hominis absolute, saltem respectu hominis conditi in gratia. Quemadmodum visus et coecitas, non sunt contraria imme- CAPUT XVI. 247 diata, respecta canis, ante novum diem, quando non est aptus ad videndum ; sed tamen post eum diem sunt omnino contraria immediata. At, inquiunt illi, si potuit Deus condere hominem in puris naturalibus, ac per hoc non conversum ad deum, ut objectum su- pornaturale ; cur non poterit nunc etiam velle, ut aliquis peccator non teneatur essd con¬ versus ad Deum, ut objectum supernaturale, ac per hoc efficere, ut carentia justitia; divi¬ nitus infusae, non sit illi amplius privatio, sed simplex negatio, et consequenter non habeat culpa; rationem ? Respondeo, si id ponatur, perinde erit, ac si conditus fuisset homo ille in puris naturalibus. Quare nihil impediet ista positio, quo minus verum sit, quod diximus, non posse fieri, ut homo, qualis nunc nascitur, justificetur a peccato, sine infusione justiti.ee habitualis. Sed de his rebus non est necesse hoc loco subtilius di¬ sputare. CONTROVERSIARUM DE JUSTIFICATIONE