Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book III: On the Uncertainty, Mutability, and Inequality of Justice
Chapter 2: The state of the question on the uncertainty of justice is proposed
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
That the first error may be refuted distinctly and clearly, it will be worth while to explain what certitude is, and how manifold, and thence to set the state of the controversy manifestly before the eyes. Certitude, then, seems to be nothing else than a certain firmness and immutability of truth. For that is called certain which is clearly and immovably true. But there is a double certitude: one of the object — that is, of the thing known or believed; the other of the subject — that is, of the man knowing or believing. The former certitude is the immutability of the thing, which in fact cannot be otherwise than it is believed or known; in which notion we say it is certain that God is good, that sin is evil. The latter certitude is a certain firmness of our assent to the thing which is proposed to be known or believed; of which certitude we speak when we say, “this is certain to me, I am certain of this thing, I hold this for ascertained” — that is, I so firmly adhere to this sentence that I in no wise doubt of its truth. The former certitude arises either from the necessity of the thing itself, if perhaps it be not contingent but necessary; or from a determination already made, if it be not necessary but contingent. That God is good is certain, since it is in itself necessary. That Christ will come to judge the living and the dead is certain, since it is determined by the divine will, although otherwise it were contingent, in itself not necessary. The latter certitude is born partly of the means by which some thing is persuaded to us, partly of the goodness of the understanding and the affection of the will. For some means have the force of begetting a firm assent, some also which have it not. So also some, from the goodness or exercise of their understanding, plainly perceive the force of the means, and are rendered certain; others contrariwise, from the slowness of their understanding, do not attain the efficacy of the means, and therefore cannot be rendered certain. A learned and acute man is certain that the Sun is much greater than the whole earth; which many rude men not only do not believe, but even think those to be laughed at who believe it. Finally, that the affection too avails not a little to effect certitude on the part of the subject, the ruder heretics can be witnesses, who often themselves know not what they believe, and yet so firmly adhere to the heresies which are preached in their country that sometimes they would rather be killed than not believe them. Although, if we are to speak properly, true certitude on the part of the subject is never separated from certitude on the part of the object. For those who believe for certain things that are false ought to be called not so much certain as persuaded. Yet true certitude on the part of the object can be separated from certitude on the part of the subject, since there are many things in themselves certain which seem to us uncertain.
But there is also another partition of certitude. For there is a certain evident certitude, a certain obscure; and in each three grades, as it were, can be distinguished. Evident certitude is of those things which are in some manner seen. Of which certitude the first grade the first principles of things obtain, which, the words alone being explained, without any other reasoning, are believed by all to be true — as that the same cannot be and not be; that the whole is greater than the part, and the like; and this is called the certitude of the understanding, or of the habit of principles. The second grade of evident certitude conclusions evidently deduced from the first principles obtain; and this is called the certitude of science. The third grade those things obtain which are perceived by the senses of the body, which is called the certitude of experience. Obscure certitude is of those things which rest on faith or opinion alone. Of which certitude the first grade those things have which are believed for certain on account of divine authority; and this is the certitude of Catholic and divine faith, and is absolutely and simply certitude, since in no wise can falsehood underlie it. The second grade of obscure certitude those things have which are believed on account of human authority, but so confirmed and celebrated that it altogether excludes all fear — such as, that Cicero and Virgil were signal men; that Augustus happily ruled a great part of the world; that there are many famous cities in provinces far distant from us, Alexandria in Egypt, Constantinople in Thrace, Jerusalem in Palestine, Antioch in Asia. And this is called the certitude of human faith, or moral certitude; which, although it be not so great that in no wise can falsehood underlie it (for every man is a liar), yet is so great that he is with reason judged rash who thinks or disputes the contrary. The third grade those things have which rest on so many signs and conjectures as to render a man secure, and exclude anxiety, yet not to expel all fear; and this is called conjectural certitude, and is of opinion rather than of faith.
These things being explained, let us come to the state of the controversy. Calvin, in the Antidote of the Council, and Chemnitz, in the Examination of the same Council, session 6, that they may kindle, after their wonted manner, envy against the Catholics, and placing their hope in a lie, neither rightly propose the state of the question, and most openly lie. For Calvin indeed writes that the Fathers of the Council mingle doubt with faith. Chemnitz, however, still more impudently says that the Council of Trent makes doubt a virtue and ornament of faith, so that without doubt there is no true and justifying faith. And in another place he writes that the question between us and the Lutherans is whether justifying faith is confidence, or doubt about the remission of sins — as though we taught justifying faith to be doubt. But the Council of Trent is so far from having mingled doubt with faith that rather it therefore rejected the special faith of the heretics, and said it to be not faith, but a vain confidence, because that faith cannot be certain, whereas true faith ought to be most certain.
Further, Chemnitz thus proposes the state of the question: “Whether a sinner in serious penance, from true faith in Christ, can with certain confidence determine that his sins are remitted him.” But that this is not the state of our question can be understood from two things: both because the question would be conditional, not absolute, and because we dispute not of the certitude of confidence, but of faith. The question, I say, would be conditional; for that, “in serious penance,” signifies the same as if it were said, “if the penance be serious.” But if the question be so proposed conditionally — whether a man can determine for certain that his sins are remitted him, if it be established that he has done, or does, serious penance — there will be no Catholic who does not answer that he can and ought. Not conditionally, then, but absolutely, is the controversy between Catholics and heretics at this time, concerning the certitude of justice, treated with great contention. Then, if it were only a question of confidence, as Chemnitz proposes, there would be no need of a long disputation. For neither do the Catholics deny that a certain confidence is to be placed in God, and that one ought to trust for certain, after penance legitimately done, and the Sacrament of Baptism or of Absolution rightly received, that sins are remitted. But the adversaries, as they confound faith with confidence, so they confound the certitude of faith with the certitude of confidence. But there is much difference between the two certitudes; for the certitude of faith, because it rests on the sole authority of God, excludes doubt on every side. The certitude of confidence (as in its place below we shall explain more fully) rests partly on the divine promise, partly on one’s own disposition; and as regards the divine promise, it likewise excludes all fear, and is absolutely and simply certitude; as regards one’s own disposition, it does not indeed utterly exclude fear, nor is it certitude simply, but in a certain respect and conjectural; yet it is so great as to be able to be enough for begetting security. But of this matter we shall speak in its place. The state of the question, then, if it be constituted without fallacy and ambiguity, will be this: whether anyone ought, or can, without special revelation, be certain, with the certitude of divine faith to which in no wise falsehood can underlie, that his sins are remitted him. Nor is it necessary in this place to distinguish Catholic faith from special divine faith; for although they differ among themselves — in that Catholic faith is not only divine, but also necessary to all men, while special divine faith pertains only to those to whom the revelation pertains — yet they do not differ as to certitude, nor are they diverse habits, but one and the same, since they rest on the authority of the same eternal truth.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT II. Proponitur status quaestionis de incertitudine justitiae. Ut primus error distincte et perspicue re¬ fellatur, operae pretium erit explicare quid sit, et quotuplex certitudo, et inde contro¬ versiae statum ob oculos manifeste ponere. Certitudo igitur nihil aliud esse videtur, nisi firmitas quaedam, et immutabilitas ve¬ ritatis. Illud enim dicitur certum, quod ex¬ plorate, et immobiliter est verum. Est autem, duplex certitudo ; Una objecti, id est, rei cognitae, vel creditae ; Altera subjecti, id est hominis cognoscentis, vel credentis. Prior certitudo est immutabilitas rei, quae re vera aliter se habere nort potest, quam creditur, vel cognoscitur : qua notione dicimus, cer¬ tum esse, Deum esse bonum, peccatum esse malum. Posterior certitudo est firmitas quae¬ dam assensus nostri ad rem, quae cogno¬ scenda vel credenda proponitur ; de qua cer¬ titudine loquimur, cum dicimus, hoc jmilii CAPUT II. m est certum, ego de hac re certus sum, hoc habeo pro comperto : id est, ita firmiter adhaereo huic sententiae, ut prorsus de illius veritate non dubitem. Oritur prior certitudo vel a necessitate ipsius rei, si forte non sit contingens, sed ne¬ cessaria; vel a. determinatione jam facta, si non sit necessaria, sed contingens. Deum esse bonum, certum est, quoniam est in se necessarium. Christum venturum esse ad judicandos vivos et mortuos , certum est, quoniam a divina voluntate determinatum est, quamvis alioqui contingens esset in se non necessarium. Certitudo posterior nascitur partim a me¬ dio, quo nobis res aliqua suadetur, partim ab ingenii bonitate, et voluntatis affectu. Quae¬ dam enim sunt media , quae vim habent gignendi firmum assensum, quaedam sunt etiam, quae non habent. Sic etiam aliqui exbo- nitate, vel exercitatione ingenii plane perci¬ piunt vim mediorum, et certi redduntur ; alii contra ex ingenii tarditate non assequuntur efficaciam mediorum ;. et ideo certi reddi nonpossunt. Vir doctus, et acutus certus est, Solem multo terra tota esse majorem : quod multi rudes non modo non credunt, sed etiam ridendos existimant esse eos, qui credunt. Denique ipsum quoque affectum non parum valere ad certitudinem ex parte sub¬ jecti efficiendam, testes esse possunt ha;re- tici rudiores, qui saepe nesciunt ipsi quid credant, et tamen ita firmiter adhaerent haereribus, quae in sua patria praedicantur, ut aliquando malint occidi, quam illas non credere. Quamquam, si proprie loquendum sit, certitudo vera ex parte subjecti, njim- quam separatur a certitudine ex parte ob¬ jecti. Qui enim certo credunt ea, quae falsa sunt, non tam certi, quam persuasi dici debent Potest tamen certitudo vera ex parte objecti separari a certitudine ex parte sub¬ jecti, cum multa sint in se certa, quae no¬ bis videntur incerta. Sed estalia etiam partitio certitudinis. Quae¬ dam enim est certitudo evidens, quaedam ob¬ scura et in utraque tres quasi gradus distin¬ gui possunt. Certitudo evidens est earum rerum, quae aliquo modo videntur. Cujus certitudinis primum gradum obtinent prima rerum principia, quae solis vocabulis expli¬ catis, sine alia ratiocinatione ab omnibus vera esse creduntur, ut non posse idem esse, et non esse; totum majus esse, quam par¬ tem, et similia ; atque haec dicitur certitudo Tom. VI. / intellectus, sive habitus principiorum. Se¬ cundum gradum certitudinis evidentis ob¬ tinent conclusiones ex principiis primis evidenter deductae : atque haec dicitur cer¬ titudo scientiae. Tertium gradum obtinent ea, quae sensibus corporis percipiuntur, quae dicitur certitudo experientiae. Certitudo obscura est earum rerum, quae sola fide, vel opinione nituntur. Cujus cer¬ titudinis primum gradum habent, quae pro¬ pter divinam auctoritatem certo creduntur, et haec est certitudo fidei Catholicae et divi¬ na;, estque absolute, ac simpliciter certitu¬ do, quoniam nulla ratione potest ei subesse falsum. Secundum gradum obscurae certitu¬ dinis habent ea, quae creduntur ob auctori¬ tatem humanam, sed ita confirmatam et celebrem, ut omnem formidinem prorsus ex¬ cludat, qualia sunt, Ciceronem et Virgilium fuisse insignes viros; Augustum magnae parti orbis terrarum fceliciter imperasse ; multas esse civitates praeclaras in provinciis a nobis longe dissitis, Alexandriam in iEgypto, Consta ntinopolim in Thracia, Hie- rosolymam in Palaestina, Antiochiam in Asia. Atque haec dicitur certitudo fidei hu¬ manae, sive certitudo moralis : quae tametsi non tanta sit, ut ei nullo modo falsum su¬ besse possit (omnis enim homo mendax) tamen tanta est, ut temerarius merito judice¬ tur, qui contra sentiat, aut disputet. Tertium gradum habent illa, quae tot signis, et con¬ jecturis nituntur, ut securum hominem red¬ dant, et anxietatem excludant, non tamen formidinem omnem expellant, atque haec dicitur certitudo conjecturalis et opinionis est potius, quam fidei. His explicatis, ad statum controversiae ac¬ cedamus. Calvinus in Antidoto Concilii, et Kcmnitius in Examine ejusdem Concilii, sess. 6. ad invidiam Catholicis solito more conflandam , et ponentes mendacium spem suam, nec recte statum quaestionis propo¬ nunt , et apertissime mentiuntur . Nam Calvinus quidem scribit, Patres Concilii mis¬ cere dubitationem cum fide. Kemnitius autem adhuc impudentius dicit, Concilium Tridentinum facere dubitationem virtutem fidei et ornamentum, ita ut sine dubitatione non sit fides vera, neque justificans. Et in alio loco scribit, quaestionem inter nos et Lutheranos esse, «An fides justificans sit fi¬ ducia, an dubitatio de remissione peccato¬ rum )>, quasi nos fidem justificantem docea¬ mus esse dubitationem. At Concilium Tri- 17 250 LIBER ili. dentinum, tantum abest, ut dubitationem cum fide miscuerit, ut potius ideo rejecerit fidem specialem haereticorum, et non fidem, sed inanem fiduciam esse dixerit, quoniam ea fides certa esse non potest, cum fides ve¬ ra certissima esse debeat. Porto statum quaestionis ita proponit Kem- nitius : « Utrum peccator in seria poeniten¬ tia ex fide vera in Christum possit certa fi¬ ducia statuere, sibi remissa esse peccata. Sed non istum esse qusestionis nostrse sta¬ tum ex duobus intelligi poterit, tum quia qusestio esset conditionalis, non absoluta, tum quia non de fiduciae, sed de fidei, cer¬ titudine disputamus. Quaestio (inquam) es¬ set conditionalis; nam illud, « in sei'ia poe¬ nitentia », idem significat, ac si diceretur, si seria sit poenitentia. Quod si quaestio ita conditionaliter proponatur : an possit homo certo statuere, sibi remissa esse peccata, si, constet eum seriam egisse, vel agere poeni¬ tentiam : nemo Catholicorum erit, qui non respondeat, posse, atque debere. Non igitur conditionaliter, sed absolute controversia hoc tempore inter Catholicos atque haereti¬ cos, de certitudine justitiae magna conten¬ tione tractatur. Deinde, si de fiducia tantum ageretur, ut Kemnitius proponit, non esset etiam opus longa disputatione. Neque enim Catholici ,negant, certam fiduciam in Deo collocan¬ dam esse, et certo confidendum post actam legitime poenitentiam, et Sacramentum Baptismi, vel Absolutionis rite perceptum, remissa esse peccata. Sed adversarii, ut fidem cum fiducia, ita certitudinem fidei cum certitudine fiduciae confundunt. Mul¬ tum autem interest inter utramque certitu¬ dinem, nam certitudo fidei, quia nititur so¬ la Dei auctoritate, omni ex parte dubita¬ tionem excludit. Certitudo fiduciae (ut suo loco inferius fusius explicabimus) partim ni¬ titur divina promissione, partim propria di¬ spositione ; et quod attinet ad divinam pro¬ missionem, omnem similiter formidinem ex¬ cludit, et est absolute, et simpliciter certitu¬ do : quod attinet ad propriam dispositio¬ nem, non excludit quidem penitus formidi¬ nem, neque est certitudo simpliciter, sed secundum quid, et conjecturalis, tamen tanta est, ut satis esse possit ad securitatem gignendam. Sed de hac re suo loco di¬ cemus . Status igitur qusestionis, si absque fallacia, et ambiguitate constituatur hic erit : « Utrum debeat, an possit aliquis, sine spe ciali revelatione certus esse, certitudine fi¬ dei divinae, cui nullo modo potest subessc falsum, sibi remissa esse peccata». Neque necesse est hoc loco distinguere fidem Ca¬ tholicam a fide divina speciali, quamvis enim inter se differant, quod fides Catholica non tantum divina sit, sed etiam omnibus hominibus necessaria : fides autem divina specialis ad eos tantum pertineat, ad quos revelatio pertinet.; tamen non differunt, quantum ad certitudinem , neque sunt ha¬ bitus diversi, sed unus et idem, cum ejus¬ dem affernae veritatis auctoritate nitan¬ tur.