Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book III: On the Uncertainty, Mutability, and Inequality of Justice
Chapter 4: The uncertainty of one's own grace and justice is proved by the testimonies of Solomon
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
But now let us come to the arguments, and first to those which are drawn from the testimonies of the divine Scripture. The first testimony is had in various places of the Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Ecclesiasticus. The first place is in the book of Proverbs, chapter 20: Who can say, My heart is clean, I am pure from sin? The venerable Bede notes rightly in the commentary on this place that Solomon did not say that no one is clean of heart and pure from sin, but that no one can say, “My heart is clean, and I am pure from sin.” For unless men could, through the grace of God, have a clean heart, David would not say, Psalm 50, Create a clean heart in me, O God; nor, Psalm 118, Blessed are the undefiled in the way; nor the Lord, Matthew 5, Blessed are the clean of heart. But because those very ones who are clean cannot know this for certain, nor have any infallible testimony of their own justice, therefore no one can glory and say, “My heart is clean.” Calvin, book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 13, section 3, answers that this was said because no one in this life is truly clean, and therefore all need the imputed justice of Christ. But the places cited a little before conflict with this: Blessed are the clean of heart. And, Blessed are the undefiled in the way. And, Create a clean heart in me, O God. And that of Ephesians 1, That we should be holy and unspotted in his sight. And chapter 5, Cleansing it by the laver of water. And Titus 2, Cleansing to himself an acceptable people, etc.
Catharinus answers that in the Hebrew it is, “Who can say, I have cleansed my heart, and purified myself from my sin?” and accordingly that in this place is reprehended the pride of those who thought that by their own powers they could be justified, but that the uncertainty of one’s own grace is not preached. But although in the Hebrew the words are of the active voice, yet without doubt they have the sense which both the Seventy Interpreters and St. Jerome rendered. For among the Hebrews it was a constant belief that the purgation of sins is made by God alone. For this Job signifies when he says, chapter 14: Who can make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed? Is it not thou who only art? Whence also David asks of God, Create a clean heart in me, O God. And the Pharisees, when they heard Christ saying, Thy sins are forgiven thee, were wont to say, He blasphemeth; who can forgive sins, but God alone? Mark 2, Luke 5, and elsewhere. And so, “I have cleansed my heart” signifies “my heart is clean,” as even the Rabbis themselves explain this place. It could perhaps be answered more solidly that Solomon said this on account of venial sins. But this solution first nothing helps the Lutherans, who do not distinguish mortal sin from venial. Then, it is not probable that Solomon speaks of venial sins alone, since venial sins alone do not hinder that men be called clean and unspotted. For those were not free of venial sins of whom it is said, Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord. The right sense, then, of those words is that there is no one who, however much he may not seem to himself conscious of sins, cannot with reason be in dread about his own justice.
The second place is in the book of Ecclesiastes, chapter 9: There are just men and wise, and their works are in the hand of God; and yet man knoweth not whether he be worthy of hatred or of love, but all things are kept uncertain for the time to come. Let us add to this place the commentary of St. Jerome: “The sense,” he says, “is: I have found that the works of the just are indeed in the hand of God, and yet whether they be loved by God or not, they cannot now know, and they waver in doubt whether they sustain what they sustain for trial or for punishment. In the future, then, they shall know, and in their countenance are all things — that is, when they depart from this life, the knowledge of this matter will precede them. For then is judgment, and now the struggle. And whoever sustain adversities, whether they sustain them through the love of God, as Job, or through hatred, as very many sinners, is now held uncertain.” To this place not only the heretics — Bucer, Calvin, and Chemnitz — but also Ambrose Catharinus strive to answer. Wherefore their objections must be briefly refuted.
First, then, Chemnitz complains that this place is depraved, to establish the dogma of doubt of faith in justification. For word for word from the Hebrew it could be rendered thus: “Both love and hatred man knowing not, all things before them.” But this is easily refuted. For since the Vulgate edition is most ancient, it could not have been depraved to establish a dogma which they themselves say to be recent and proper to the Papists. Or certainly they must confess that our sentence is most ancient, and that St. Jerome, who translated Ecclesiastes from the Hebrew as we have it in the Vulgate edition, was an excellent Papist. Moreover, the version of St. Jerome did not indeed render word for word, but expressed the sense faithfully and elegantly, and especially in Ecclesiastes, as all the learned confess; and if Chemnitz deny this, by this very thing he will show himself unskilled of the Hebrew tongue and of the method of interpreting. Second, they say that Solomon does not absolutely deny that a man can know whether he be worthy of hatred or love, but denies that this can be known from external events. And this they prove, since otherwise it would follow that men manifestly impious could not know that they are worthy of hatred, not of love, which is most absurd. But the answer is easy. For Solomon speaks only of the just, as those words declare: “There are just men and wise, and their works are in the hand of God; and yet man” (the just man, namely) “knoweth not whether he be worthy of hatred or of love.” The same can be perceived from the commentary of St. Jerome cited above, who thus says: “I have found that the works of the just are in the hand of God, and yet whether they be loved by God or not, they cannot now know.” Third, Calvin objects, book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 2, section 38, the words which immediately follow the cited place: “Because all things happen alike to the just and to the impious.” For this reason seems openly enough to show that Solomon speaks of the knowledge which can be had from external event. I answer: it is not necessary that the reason be of as wide extent as the conclusion itself which is to be proved by the reason. Solomon, then, wished to prove that just men cannot certainly know whether they be loved by God; and this he rightly proves from the fact that if they could certainly know it, they would chiefly know it from the benefits of God. But the benefits of God are common to the just and the impious, and all things happen alike to the just and to the impious. For God, that he may preserve his own in humility, sometimes suffers them to be afflicted; and again, lest they despair, sometimes wonderfully consoles them. And similarly the impious, now that he may allure them to himself, he heaps with temporal benefits; now that he may deter them from sins, he severely punishes. Thus the divine benefits and scourges are certain signs neither of hatred nor of love. But that that interpretation is false — “they know not whether they be worthy of hatred or love,” that is, they know it not absolutely, but from the present event of things — is clear from those words immediately following: “But all things are kept uncertain for the time to come.” For after this life there is not kept for us the knowledge whether we were worthy of hatred or love as to the signs of present events, but absolutely. For if we knew that we are now just and worthy of love, though we knew it not from the present event, it would not be true that all things are kept uncertain for the future, nor should we be solicitous about the future, content with present knowledge.
Fourth, Calvin objects a like place from chapter 3 of the same book of Ecclesiastes. For when Solomon says that it cannot be known what is the difference between the soul of a man and the soul of a beast, since both alike perish, certainly he does not signify that it is unknown absolutely whether the soul of a man be immortal, the soul of a beast mortal; but that this cannot be gathered from bodily death, since that is common to man with the beast. I answer: in that chapter Solomon speaks in the person of the unwise, who measure all things by present pleasure or pain, and who, from the fact that they see men and beasts alike perish, can scarcely be brought to believe that the soul of a man is immortal. “Who knoweth,” he says, “whether the spirit of the children of Adam ascend upward, and the spirit of the beasts descend downward?” — that is, how few there are of the common sort of men who understand or consider that the spirit of a man returns to God, to be judged by him for his deeds, but the spirit of beasts descends downward, that is, is resolved into the earth whence it was taken. For that Solomon himself was not ignorant of this is clear from chapter 12, where in express words he says that the spirit of a man returns to God who gave it. But if many, on account of that communion of death which we have with beasts, are ignorant of that which they could otherwise have learned by natural reason, how much more will all men be ignorant of the state of grace, which cannot be known save by divine revelation? Fifth, Catharinus objects that the place of Solomon can be expounded as proposed of the knowledge which a man has, as man, but not of that which he has as he is a son of God. For a man cannot, as man — that is, by human reasoning alone — know whether he be worthy of hatred or love; but yet he can know this from the testimony of the spirit which we have in the heart, if we are sons of God. I answer: a just man can indeed, if the spirit will clearly reveal it to him, know that he is worthy of love, not of hatred; yet ordinarily the spirit does not reveal it by manifest knowledge, but by certain experiences and internal consolations, which do not make certain faith, as below in its place we shall say. But that in this place Solomon speaks absolutely of the uncertainty which the just have, whether as men or as sons of God, about their own grace, can be understood from two things: first, from those words, “But all things are kept uncertain for the time to come”; then, from the intention of Solomon, which was to show that one of the miseries of this life, and that not the least, is that just men can with reason be in dread lest perhaps they be not truly just. But if they knew that they were truly just, from whatever source they knew it, all things would not be kept uncertain for the future, nor would they experience that misery which Solomon teaches to be common to all the just. Sixth, the same Catharinus does not disdain to receive testimony from Rabbi Solomon, who so expounds this place: “Man knoweth not — that is, the carnal and the sinner.” But Rabbi Solomon manifestly conflicts with King Solomon. For he testifies that he speaks of the just, not of sinners, when he says, “The works of the just are in the hand of God,” etc. Then, the carnal and sinners can easily know that they are worthy of hatred, not of love. For it is not so difficult to know oneself a sinner as to know oneself just, since sin is our own work, but inhering and infused justice, of which we speak, is the work of God alone, and indeed hidden and very secret. Finally it is a wonder why Catharinus would have us give credence rather to a Jew, and an architect of fables, than to St. Jerome, a doctor of the Church, and most skilled not only of tongues but also of dogmas. Lastly, some object that this place is wont to be expounded by St. Bernard of the uncertainty of predestination, as in sermon 1 on Septuagesima, and in sermon 2 on the octave of Easter, on the words of John, There are three that give testimony in heaven. I answer: the uncertainty of present justice and the uncertainty of predestination do not conflict; nay, from the one the other is gathered. And therefore this place can rightly be expounded of both.
The third place is in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chapter 5: Be not without fear about sin forgiven, and add not sin upon sin; and say not, The mercy of the Lord is great, he will have mercy on the multitude of my sins. This place wonderfully pricks the heretics of this time. For they properly are those who, when by faith they have seemed to themselves to have apprehended the justice of Christ, are thenceforth touched by no fear. And although they add sin upon sin, they think that salvation cannot perish for them, because the mercy of the Lord is great, and to believers he imputes not the multitude of sins. Whom indeed Ecclesiastes judges most vain, chapter 8, when he says: There are impious men who are as secure as if they had the deeds of the just; but this also I judge most vain. To this place Chemnitz answers that those words are depraved by the Papists, since from the Greek it must be read “concerning propitiation, not concerning sin forgiven.” He adds moreover that this place fights against the carnal security of those who by the hope of mercy do not cease to sin. But it is empty, what he complains of the corruption of the words. For the sense is altogether the same, whether you say “concerning sin forgiven” or “concerning the propitiation of sin.” For he speaks not of future propitiation, but of past. For of the future he adjoins what follows: “And say not, The mercy of the Lord is great, he will have mercy on the multitude of my sins.” This place is like that which is had in chapter 21: “Son, hast thou sinned? do so no more; but for thy former sins also pray that they may be forgiven thee.” Where he enjoins a double solicitude: one for the future, the other for the past. So, then, in this place too he first admonishes that one be not without fear about sin forgiven, or about the propitiation of sin which one thinks he has received, but still solicitously pray that it be forgiven him; then, that he beware for the future, and add not sin upon sin by the hope of easy indulgence. But if we should grant that Ecclesiasticus speaks of future propitiation, still the error of the adversaries would not with difficulty be overturned. For we cannot be secure of future propitiation, because we know not whether we shall have space for penance. Which the same Ecclesiasticus explains when he says: Delay not to be converted to the Lord, and defer it not from day to day; for his wrath shall come suddenly. And accordingly, to obtain indulgence, there is required something also on our part — namely, serious conversion and penance. But who can be certain, especially by divine faith, that he has true conversion and penance? And so Ecclesiasticus speaks indeed against carnal security, but he constitutes that security not only in this, that some by the hope of mercy add sin upon sin, but also in this, that some do not pray for their former sins that they may be forgiven them, but believe for certain that they are remitted them, for this alone, that they believe them to be remitted them; and, with Luther the author of carnal security, say that they cannot lose their salvation, even if they would, provided they will not to disbelieve.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT IV. Probatur testimoniis Salomonis incertitudo proprix gratix, atque justitix. Sed jam ad argumenta veniamus, ac pri¬ mum ad ca, qua; ex testimoniis divina) Seri- CAPUT IV. pturse ducuntur. Primum testimonium habe¬ tur in variis locis Proverbiorum, Ecclesiaste et Ecclesiastici. Primus locus est in lib. Pro- verb. cap. xx : Quis potest dicere , mundum est cor meum , purus sum a peccato (1). Notat hoc loco venerabilis Beda in comment. recte Salomonem non dixisse, neminem esse mun¬ dum corde et purum a peccato, sed neminem posse dicere, mundum est cor meum, et, purus sum a peccato. Nam nisi possent ho¬ mines per gratiam Dei mundum cor habere, non diceret David Psalm. l. Cor mundum crea in me Deus. Neque in Psalm. cxvin. Beati immaculati in via. Neque Dominus Matth. v. Beati mundo corde (2). Sed quo¬ niam illi ipsi, qui mundi sunt, non possunt, hoc certo scire, neque testimonium aliquod infallibile habent de sua justitia, ideo nemo potest gloriari, ac dicere, mundum est cor meum. Calvinus lib. m. Institut. cap. 13. §. 3. respondet, hoc dictum esse, quia nemo est in hac vita vere mundus; et ideo egent om¬ nes Christi justitia imputata. At repugnant loca paulo ante citata : Beati mundo corde. Et ; Beati immaculati in via. Et : Cor mun¬ dum crea in me Deus. Et illud ad Ephes. i. Ut essemus sancti et immaculati in conspectu ejus. Et cap. v. Mundans eam lavacro aquae. Et ad Tit. ii. Mundans sibi populum accepta- bilem, etc. (3). Catharinus respondet, in Hebraeo esse ; Quis potest dicere : mundavi cor meum ? et purificavi me a peccato meo? proinde re¬ prehendi hoc loco superbiam eorum, qui suis viribus existimabant se posse justificari, non autem praedicari incertitudinem propriae gra¬ tiae. Sed quamquam in Hebraeo verba sint activm vocis, tamen sine dubio eum habent sensum, quem et 70. Interpretes, et Sanctus Hieronymus reddiderunt. Nam apud He¬ braeos constans erat fides, purgationem pec¬ catorum a solo Deo fieri. Id enim significat Job, cum ait cap. xiv. Quis potest facere mundum de immundo , conceptum semine ? nonne tu qui solus es (-4) ? Unde et David a Deo *petit, Cor mundum crea in me Deus. Et Pharissei, cum audiebant Christum dicen¬ tem : Remittuntur tibi peccata tua ; dicere so¬ lebant, hic blasphemat , quis potest dimittere peccata , nisi solus Deus? Mare. 2. Luc. 5. et alibi. Itaque, mundavi ccr meum, significat, 253 mundum est cor meum, ut etiam Rabbini ipsi hunc locum enarrant. Posset fortasse solidius responderi, Salo¬ monem hoc dixisse propter peccata venialia. Sed haec solutio primum nihil juvat Luthe- ranos, qui non distinguunt peccatum mor¬ tale a veniali. Deinde, non est probabile, Salomonem loqui de solis venialibus, quo¬ niam sola venialia non impediunt, quo mi¬ nus homines mundi et immaculati esse di¬ cantur. Non enim peccatis venialibus care¬ bant, de quibus dicitur : Beati immaculati in via, qui ambulant in lege Domini. Rectus igitur sensus eorum verborum est, ut nemo sit, qui quantumvis sibi conscius non videa¬ tur esse peccatorum, non possit merito de sua justitia formidare. Secundus locus est in lib. Ecclesiaste, cap. 9 : « Sunt justi, atque sapientes, et opera eorum in manu Dei ; et tamen nescit homo, utrum odio vel amore dignus sit, sed omnia in futurum servantur incerta». Adda¬ mus huic loco commentarium Sancti Hiero¬ nymi : « Sensus, inquit, est, inveni justorum quidem opera in manu Dei esse, et tamen utrum amentur a Deo, an non, nunc eos scire non posse , et ambiguos fluctuare , utrum ad probationem sustineant, quse su¬ stinent, an ad supplicium. In futuro igitur scient, et in vultu eorum sunt omnia, id est, antecedet eos, cum de hac vita discesserint, notitia istius rei. Quia tunc est judicium, et nunc certamen. Et quicumque adversa susti¬ nent, utrum per amorem Dei sustineant, ut Job, an per odium, ut plurimi peccafimes, nunc habetur incertum. Ad hunc locum respondere nituntur, non solum haeretici, Bucerus, Calvinus, atque Kemnitius, sed etiam Ambrosius Catharinus. Quare ipsorum objectiones breviter refel¬ lendae erunt. Primum igitur queritur Kemnitius, locum hunc esse depravatum, ad stabiliendum do¬ gma de dubitatione fidei in justificatione. Nam ad verbum ex Hebraeo sic reddi posset : « Et amorem et odium non sciens homo, om¬ nia ante eos » . Sed hoc facile refellitur. Nam cum editio vulgata antiquissima sit, non potuit depra¬ vari ad stabiliendum dogma, quod ipsi re¬ cens et Papistarum proprium esse dicunt. Vel certe fateri debent, sententiam nostram (I) Rom. XX, 9. — (2) Psal. L, 12; ibid. CXVIII, i ; Matth. Y, 8. - (5)Eph. I, 4 ; ibid. V, 26 ; Tit. II, 14. - (4) Job. XIY, 4. 254 LIBER III. esse antiquissimam, et sanctum Hierony¬ mum, qui Ecclesiastem vertit ex Hebraeo, ut. nos habemus in editione vulgata* egregium fuisse Papistam. Caeterum , versio sancti Hieronymi non reddidit quidem verbum verbo, sed sententiam fideliter et eleganter expressit, ac praesertim in Ecclesiaste, ut omnes eruditi fatentur, et si id Kemnitius neget, hoc ipso se imperitum linguae Hebrai¬ cae et rationis interpretandi demonstrabit. Secundo dicunt, Salomonem non absolute negare, posse hominem scire, sit ne dignus odio vel amore, sed negare, id posse cogno¬ sci ex eventis externis. Id vero probant, quo¬ niam alioqui sequeretur, non posse homines manifeste impios scire, se dignos esse odio, non amore, quod absurdissimum est. Sed facilis est responsio. Nam Salomon non loquitur, nisi de justis, ut verba illa declarant : « Sunt justi, atque sapientes, et opera eorum in manu Dei, et tamen nescit homo (justus videlicet) utrum odio vel amo¬ re dignus sit». Idem perspici potest ex com¬ mentario sancti Hieronymi supra citato, qui sic ait : cc Inveni justorum opera in manu Dei esse, et tamen utrum amentur a Deo, an non, nunc eos scire non posse ». Tertio objicit Calvinus lib. m. Institut. cap. 2. §. 38, verba quae locum citatum pro¬ xime consequuntur : « Eo quod universa seque eveniant justo et impio ». Haec enim ratio satis aperte ostendere videtur, loqui Salomonem de notitia, quae haberi potest ex eventu externo. Respondeo : Non est necesse, ut ratio se¬ que late pateat, atque ipsa conclusio, quae ratione probanda est, Salomon igitur pro¬ bare voluit, non posse homines justos certo cognoscere, utrum diligantur a Deo; id au¬ tem recte probat ex eo, quod si possent id certo cognoscere, maxime cognoscerent ex beneficiis Dei. At beneficia Dei communia sunt justis et impiis, et universa a3que eve¬ niunt justo et impio. Deus enim ut suos in humilitate conservet, interdum sinit eos af¬ fligi, et rursus ne desperent, interdum eos mirifice consolatur. Et similiter impios nunc ut alliciat ad se, beneficiis temporalibus cu¬ mulat, nunc ut eosdem deterreat a peccatis, severe punit. Ita beneficia et flagella divina nec odii, nec amoris certa sunt indicia. Falsam autem esse illam interpretationem; nesciunt an odio, vel amore digni sint, id est, nesciunt id non absolute, sed ex prae- senli rerum eventu, perspicuum est ex illis v ntis proxime sequentibus : « Sed omnia in futurum servantur incerta». Non enim post hanc vitam servatur nobis cognitio, an digni essemus odio, vel amore, quantum ad signa praesentium eventuum, sed absolute. Nam si sciremus, nunc esse nos justos et dignos amore, quamvis non sciremus ex eventu praesenti, non esset verum, omnia in futu¬ rum incerta servari, neque nos de futuro solliciti essemus contenti cognitione prae¬ senti. Quarto objicit Calvinus similem locum ex cap. 3. ejusdem libri Ecclesiastae. Nam cum Salomon ait, non posse sciri quid intersit inter animam hominis et animam jumenti, cum utrumque similiter intereat; certe non significat ignorari absolute, utrum anima hominis sit immortalis, anima jumenti mor¬ talis; sed non posse id colligi ex morte cor¬ porali, cum illa communis sit homini cum jumento. Respondeo : loquitur in eo cap. Salomon ex persona insipientium, qui omnia metiun¬ tur praesenti voluptate, aut dolore, quique ex eo, quod cernunt homines et jumenta si¬ militer interire, vix adduci possunt, ut cre¬ dant, animam hominis esse immortalem : « Quis novit, inquit, utrum spiritus filiorum Adam ascendat sursum, et spiritus jumento¬ rum descendat deorsum? » id est, quotus quisque est ex vulgo hominum, qui intelligat aut cogitet, spiritum hominis redire ad Deum, ut ab illo pro factis judicetur; spiritum au¬ tem jumentorum descendere deorsum, id est, resolvi in terram, unde sumptus erat. Ipsum enim Salomonem hoc non ignorasse, per¬ spicuum est ex cap. 12. ubi disertis verbis dicit, spiritum hominis redire ad Deum, qui dedit illum. Quod si multi ob istam mortis communionem, quam cum jumentis habe¬ mus, ignorant id, quod alioqui naturali ra¬ tione discere potuissent, quanto magis igno¬ rabunt omnes homines statum gratiae, qui nisi ex divina revelatione cognosci non po¬ test ? Quinto objicit Catharinus, posse exponi locum Salomonis, propositum de cognitione, quam habet homo, ut homo, non autem de ea, quam habet, ut est filius Dei. Neque enim scire potest homo, ut homo, id est, per so¬ lam ratiocinationem humanam, utrum di¬ gnus sit odio, vel amore, sed tamen id scire, potest ex testimonio spiritus, quem habemus in corde, si filii Dei sumus. Respondeo : Potest quidem homo justus, CAPUT TV. 253 si spiritus ei perspicue id revelare voluerit, scire, se dignum esse amore, non odio : ta¬ men ordinarie spiritus id non revelat per ma¬ nifestam notitiam, sed per experimenta qu®- dam et internas consolationes, qu® non fa¬ ciunt certam fidem, ut infra suo loco dice¬ mus. Hoc autem loco Salomonem absolute loqui de in certitudine, quam habent justi, sive ut homines, sive ut filii Dei, de propria gratia, intelligi potest ex duobus, primum ex illis verbis : « Sed omnia in futurum ser¬ vantur incerta » . Deinde, ex intentione Sa¬ lomonis, quse erat ostendere, unam ex mi¬ seriis hujus vitae, eamque non minimam esse, quod homines justi merito formidare possint, ne forte non sint vere justi. At si scirent, se vere esse justos, undecumque id scirent, non omnia in futurum servarentur incerta, neque miseriam illam experirentur, quam Salomon docet, justis omnibus esse communem. Sexto, idem Catharinus non dedignatur testimonium accipere a Rabbi Salomone, qui hunc locum ita exponit : « Nescit homo, id est, carnalis et peccator » . At Rabbi Salo¬ mon Regi Salomoni manifeste repugnat. De justis enim, non de peccatoribus se loqui testatur, cum ait : « Sunt justorum opera in manu Dei, etc. ». Deinde carnales et pecca¬ tores facile scire possunt, se odio esse di¬ gnos, non amore. Non enim tam difficile est cognoscere se peccatorem, quam cognoscere se justum, cum peccatum sit opus nostrum, justitia inhaerens et infusa, de qua loquimur, sit opus solius Dei, et quidem occultum et abditum valde. Denique mirum est, cur Ca¬ tharinus velit nos homini Judaeo, et fabella¬ rum architecto, potius fidem habere, quam sancto Hieronymo, Ecclesiae doctori, et non solum linguarum, sed etiam dogmatum pe- ritissimo. Ultimo objiciunt aliqui, quod hic locus a sancto Bernardo exponi soleat de incertitu- dine praedestinationis, ut in serm. 1. de Sep¬ tuagesima, et in serm. 2. in octava Paschae, de verbis Joannis ; Tres sunt qui testimonium dant in coelo (1). Respondeo : non pugnant inter se incerti- tudo justitiae praesentis, et incertitudo prae¬ destinationis. immo ex una colligitur altera. Et ideo hic locus de utraque recte exponi potest. Tertius locus est in libro Ecclesiastici, cap. v. De propitiato peccato noli esse sine metu, neque adjicias peccatum super pecca¬ tum, et ne dicas : Miseratio Domini magna est, multitudinis peccatorum meorum misere¬ bitur (2). Hic locus mirifice pungit haereticos hujus temporis. Ipsi enim proprie illi sunt, qui ubi fide sibi visi sunt Christi justitiam apprehendisse, nullo deinceps metu tangun¬ tur. Et quamvis adjiciant peccatum super peccatum, putant sibi salutem perire non posse, quia miseratio Domini magna est, et credentibus non imputat multitudinem pec¬ catorum. Quos sane vanissimos judicat Ec¬ clesiastes cap. vili, cum ait : Sunt impii, qui ita securi sunt, quasi jus torum facta habeant. Sed et hoc vanissimum judico (3). Respondet ad hunc locum Kemnitius ver¬ ba illa depravata esse a Papistis, cum ex Greeco legendum esse constet « de propitia¬ tione, non de propitiato ». Addit praeterea, locum istum pugnare contra carnalem secu¬ ritatem eorum, qui spe misericordi® peccare non desinunt. Sed inane est, quod queritur de corrup¬ tione verborum. Idem enim prorsus est sen¬ sus, sive dicas, de propitiato peccato, sive de propitiatione peccati. Non enim loquitur de propitiatione futura, sed praeterita. Nam de futura adjungit quse sequuntur : a Et ne dicat, miseratio Domini magna est, multitu¬ dinis peccatorum meorum miserebitur ». Similis est hic locus illi, qui habetur cap. 21. « Fili, peccasti, ne adjicias iterum, sed et de pristinis deprecare, ut tibi dimittantur». Ubi duplicem sollicitudinem injungit. Unam pro futuris ; alteram pro praeteritis. Sic igi¬ tur et hoc loco primum admonet, ut de pro¬ pitiato peccato, sive de propitiatione pec¬ cati, quam quis existimat se accepisse, non sit absque metu, sed adhuc sollicite oret, ut sibi dimittatur. Deinde, ut caveat in futu¬ rum, et non adjiciat peccatum super pecca¬ tum spe facilis indulgenti®. Sed, si daremus, loqui Ecclesiasticum de propitiatione futura, adhuc error adversa¬ riorum non difficulter everteretur. Nam ideo de propitiatione futura non possumus esse securi, quia nescimus, an habebimus spa¬ tium poenitenti®. Quod explicat idem Eccle¬ siasticus, cum ait : Non tardes converti ad Dominum, neque differas de die in diem, su¬ bito enim veniet ira illius (4). Proinde requi¬ ritur ad obtinendam indulgentiam aliquid (I) Joan. V, 8. — (2) Eccl. V, 5. — (3) Eccl. VIII, 14. — ^ 1 Eccl. V, 8. 2.10 L1BEK 111. etiam ex parte nostra, nimirum seria con¬ versio , et poenitentia. Quis autem potest certus esse, prsesertim ex fide divina, se veram habere conversionem et poeniten¬ tiam? Itaque loquitur quidem Ecclesiasticus con¬ tra carnalem securitatem, sed eam securi¬ tatem non solum constituit in eo, quod ali¬ qui spe misericordiae adjiciunt peccatum super peccatum : sed etiam in eo, quod aliqui non precantur pro pristinis, ut sibi dimittantur, sed certo credunt, sibi esse remissa, ob id solum, quia credunt sibi esse remissa; et cum Luthero auctore carnalis securitatis , dicunt : se non posse perdere salutem suam, etiamsi velint, modo nolint credere.