Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book IV: On the Justice of Works
Chapter 10: The question on the truth of the justice of works is proposed, and the opinions of the heretics are reviewed
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book IV. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
There follows the other question of actual justice, which is about the truth of actual justice, or of works. And this is the state of the controversy: whether justified men, by the help of the grace of the Lord, can so fulfil the divine law that their works are not only not to be called sins, but deserve even to be called truly and properly just. And indeed the heretics of this time defend the negative part. For they teach that the divine law is plainly impossible to a man, even a just one, and thence gather that there is in us no true actual justice, but that all the works of the just are of their own nature mortal sins. So Luther teaches in the book On Christian Liberty: “All the precepts are equally impossible to us, as that one, Thou shalt not covet.” The same, in the assertion of articles 2, 31, 32, and 36, openly writes that all the works of a just man are mortal sins. The same has John Calvin, book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 14, section 9: “No work can proceed from the saints which does not deserve a just reward of reproach.” The same too, in the Antidote of the Council, session 6, chapter 11, thus says: “They are not so greatly to be harassed who said that any good works whatever, if judged by exact rigor, are worthy rather of eternal damnation than of the reward of life.” In the same place he disputes against that which the Council has, that the law of God is not impossible. And in book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 7, section 5, he proves of set purpose that the fulfilment of the law is not possible even to the saints, especially as regards that, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and that, Thou shalt not covet. The same has Philip in the Commonplaces of the year 1521, under the title of sin: “It follows, then, that all the works of men, however laudable, are plainly vicious, and sins worthy of death.” The same he has in the Augsburg Confession, article 6, and in the Apology, under the title of the fulfilment of the law, and in the Commonplaces, under the title of free choice. Chemnitz, in the Examination of the Council, acting fraudulently after his manner, seems to admit that the law of God can be kept through grace, provided “perfectly” be not added. For, reprehending chapter 11 of session 6, he accuses the Fathers of the Council that they did not explain whether the law of God could be fulfilled perfectly, or inchoately: “For that the law can be fulfilled through grace,” he says, “is not itself the controversy.” And in the same place: “The persuasion which attributes perfection to the good works of the reborn in this life makes Christ idle after the first reconciliation.” Where, if Chemnitz thought that the law cannot be fulfilled so perfectly that the just in their whole life mingle no venial sins with their good works, he would agree with us, and with the Council itself, as is clear from that very chapter 11 of session 6; but he denies perfection to the works of the just not in this sense, but because with the other sectaries he judges that the law cannot be so fulfilled that the work can be called simply just. For he says that our observance of the law is imperfect, because he judges it contaminated and unclean. Whence he approves the saying of Luther, that all the works of the just are truly sins.
But all Catholics with the highest consent teach the contrary. For they confess: first, that the law of God is absolutely possible to just men — not indeed by the sole powers of free choice, as the heretics calumniate us to say, but by the help of the grace of God, and the spirit of faith and charity infused into us in justification itself. Second, that the works of the just are simply and absolutely just, and in their manner even perfect — though not with such perfection that they cannot grow, or that (as I said a little before) there be not sometimes mingled with the good works some evil works, not indeed deadly, but venial, which do not hinder that they who were just remain just; of which matter we discoursed in book 1 On the State of Sin. Third, that by just works a man is truly justified, not by the first, but by the second justification, which makes not just of impious, but juster of just. These three things are had in the Council of Trent, session 6, chapters 10 and 11; and we shall prove these same three in the following chapters, with the help of the Lord.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT X. Proponitur quaestio de veritate justitiae ope¬ rum, et sententice referuntur Haereticorum et Catholicorum. Sequitur altera quaestio de justitia actua¬ li, quae est de veritate justitia} actualis, sive operum. Est autem hic controversiae status : « Utrum homines justificati, et gratia Do¬ mini adjuvante, possint ita legem divinam implere, ut opera ipsorum non modo non sint appellanda peccata, sed etiam vere ac proprie justa dici mereantur <>. Et quidem Haeretici hujus temporis par¬ ti, Rom. II, 9; I Cor. VI, 0 Gal. V, 9; Eph. V, 5. CAPUT XI. 319 tem negantem defendunt. Docent enim, le¬ gem divinam esse plane impossibilem homi¬ ni, etiam justo, et inde colligunt, nullam es¬ se in nobis veram actualem justitiam, sed omnia opera justorum esse peccata mortalia ex natura sua. Ita Lutherus docet in lib. de libertate Christiana : « ASque, inquit, nobis impossibilia sunt omnia praecepta, atque illud unum : non concupisces ». Idem in as- sert. artic. 2. 31. 32 et 36, aperte scribit, omnia opera hominis justi esse peccata mortalia. Idem habet Joannes Calvinus lib. 3. In- stit. cap. 14. §. 9. « Nullum, inquit, a san¬ ctis exire potest opus, quod non mereatur justam opprobrii mercedem ». Idem etiam in Antidoto Concilii sess. 6. cap. 11. sic ait : « Non sunt tantopere exagitandi, qui dixerunt quaelibet bona opera, si exacto ri¬ gore censeantur, aeternapotius damnatione, quam vitae praemio digna esse ». Ibidem disputat contra id quod habet Concilium, legem Dei non esse impossibilem. Et in lib. 2. Institut. cap. 7. §. 5. ex instituto probat, ne sanctis quidem possibilem esse legis im- pletionem, praesertim quod attinet ad illud : Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo. Et illud : Non concupisces. Idem habet Philippus in locis anni 1521. tit. de peccato : « Consequitur itaque, in¬ quit, omnia hominum quantumvis laudabi¬ lia opera, plane vitiosa esse, et morte dig¬ na peccata ». Idem habet in Confessione Augustana, art. 6. et in Apologia tit. de jmpletione legis, et in locis, tit. de libero arbitrio. • Kemnitius in Examine Concilii, more suo fraudulenter agens, videtur admittere, le¬ gem Dei per gratiam posse servari, modo non addatur, perfecte. Nam reprehendens, cap. 11. sess. 6. accusat Patres Concilii, quod non explicaverint, an lex Dei posset impleri perfecte, an inchoate : « Nam posse per gratiam legem impleri, non est, inquit, ipse, controversia ». Et ibidem :« Persuasio, inquit, quae renatorum operibus bonis in hac vita tribuit perfectionem, facit Christum post primam reconciliationem otiosum ». Ubi si existimaret Kemnitius, non posse le¬ gem impleri ita perfecte, ut justi in tota vita non admiscerent operibus bonis ulla pecca¬ ta venialia, nobiscum sentiret, et cum ipso Concilio, ut patet ex illo ipso cap. 11. sess. 6. sed non hoc sensu negat ille perfectionem operibus justorum, sed quia cum caeteris sectariis censet, non posse ita legem impleri, ut opus simpliciter justum appellari queat. Imperfectam enim dicit esse nostram ob¬ servantiam legis, quia judicat eam conta¬ minatam et immundam. Unde approbat di¬ ctum Lutheri, quod omnia opera justorum sint vere peccata. Porro Catholici omnes summa consensione contrarium docent. Fatentur enim primo, legem Dei justis hominibus absolute esse possibilem, non quidem per solas vires li¬ beri arbitrii, ut Haeretici calumniantur nos dicere, sed per auxilium gratiae Dei, et spi¬ ritum fidei et charitatis in ipsa justificatione nobis infusum. Secundo, opera justorum simpliciter, et absolute justa, et suo etiam modo esse per¬ fecta, quamvis non ea perfectione, quin cre¬ scere possint, et quin (ut paulo ante dixi) non admisceantur interdum operibus bonis aliqua opera mala, non quidem mortifera, sed venialia, quae non impediunt, quo minus justi maneant, qui justi erant. De qua re dis¬ seruimus in i. lib. de statu peccati. Tertio, operibus justis hominem vere ju¬ stificari, non prima, sed secunda justifica¬ tione, quae non facit justos ex impiis, sed ju¬ stiores ex justis. Haec tria habentur in Con¬ cilio Tridentino sess. 6. cap. 10 et 11, et nos eadem tria in sequentibus capitibus, Domino adjuvante, probabimus.