Faith & the Word

Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book IV: On the Justice of Works

Chapter 14: The objections of the heretics are solved

Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book IV. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).

It remains that we briefly dissolve the arguments of the heretics. First, Calvin in the Antidote and Chemnitz in the Examination object that of St. Peter, Acts 15: Why tempt you to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which neither we nor our fathers have been able to bear? But by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ we believe to be saved, in like manner as they also. For these words are said to the faithful, not to the unfaithful, lest perhaps it be answered that the law is an unbearable yoke without grace and to the unregenerate, but not to the reborn, and to those who have the grace of God. Moreover these words ought to be understood of every law, both ceremonial and moral: both because the ceremonies of the law alone do not surpass human powers, and because the adversative particle “but” opposes grace to the law simply, and because, if the ceremonial law is an unbearable yoke, how much more will the moral law be an unbearable yoke? I answer: St. Peter speaks only of the ceremonial law. Which I prove evidently: first, from the occasion of those words. For St. Luke writes that certain of the disciples rose up who said that the Gentiles converted to the faith must be circumcised and altogether keep the law of Moses; and that this was the cause why the Apostles gathered the Council, to see about this word. It is clear, then, that of circumcision and other ceremonies of that kind the Apostle Peter spoke. Second, the same is proved from the decree of that Council, which was constituted according to the sentence of Peter. For thus the decree runs: It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us to lay no further burden upon you than these necessary things: that you abstain from things offered to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication. I ask, then, whether these are said to be the only necessary things out of the ceremonial law of the Jews, or out of every law simply. If out of the ceremonial law of the Jews, we have what we will. If out of every law simply, this absurdity will follow: that it is not necessary for a Christian not to worship idols, not to commit adultery, not to steal, not to kill, not to bear false witness, and the others of which the Apostle says, Galatians 5, that they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God. They will say, perhaps, that all these are indeed necessary, but that men are not thence justified. But are men justified out of those four which alone are said to be necessary? Third, the same thing can be proved from the very sum of the decree and of the words of Peter. For Peter and the other Apostles will to remove the yoke of the law from the necks of the disciples. But what is it to remove the yoke of the law — to take away the obligation and abrogate the law, or to take away the opinion of justification, and teach that no one is justified by that law? If they say that to remove the yoke is to take away the obligation, then no law will any longer obligate Christians, except the law about things offered to idols, blood, things strangled, and fornication, if by the law be understood every law, not only ceremonial, but also moral. But that this is most absurd not even the adversaries themselves will dare deny. If they say that to take away the yoke is not to take away the obligation, but only the opinion of justification, then the ceremonial law about circumcision, sabbaths, new moons, sacrifices of cattle will not be taken away as to the obligation. But this conflicts with the Apostle, who writes to the Galatians 5: If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing. We are compelled, then, to say that the Apostles called the ceremonial law an unbearable yoke, and declared that its obligation was altogether taken away through Christ; yet that the same Apostles willed certain few ceremonies about blood, things strangled, and things offered to idols to be observed by the Gentiles for a time, to which they joined abstinence from fornication, because fornication among the Gentiles was not held for a sin, as adultery, murder, perjury, and the like were held. To that, then, which they object, that the ceremonies of the law do not surpass human powers, especially the grace of God being added, I answer that it is true, and therefore Zachary and Elizabeth walked in all the commandments and justifications of the Lord without blame; but that yet it is called an unbearable yoke, since it was borne with grief and difficulty, as St. Thomas rightly expounds, on the 2nd of the Sentences, distinction 28, sole question, article 4, to the 3rd, and Nicholas of Lyra on this place of the Acts; and Theophylact, expounding that of Matthew 23 and Luke 11, They bind heavy and unbearable burdens on men’s shoulders. But to that, that the adversative particle, “But by the grace of God,” etc., seems to oppose grace to the law simply, I answer that St. Peter indicated two reasons why Christians were not to be obligated to the ceremonies of the law. One, that those ceremonies were a most grievous yoke. The other, that they were useless unto justification. And so this is the sense of the words of St. Peter: Why tempt you God, to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples which neither we nor our fathers could bear? — especially since not by those ceremonies, but by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, we believe to be saved, as they too were saved — where in that adversative particle is included, or implicitly contained, that other reason about the uselessness of the ceremonies. To that, that the moral law is heavier than the ceremonial, and accordingly is more justly to be called an unbearable yoke than the ceremonial, I answer that the ceremonial law ought not to be compared with the moral precisely, but the ceremonial law joined to the moral ought to be compared with the moral itself, the ceremonial removed. For the ceremonial law is not called an unbearable yoke because it alone is unbearable, but since, joined to the moral law, it vehemently increases the burden, and becomes a yoke almost unbearable to a man already burdened with the moral law. Wherefore the moral law, the Jewish ceremonial removed, is not an unbearable yoke to one having the grace of God, but a sweet yoke and a light burden; and the Jewish ceremonial law, joined to the moral, is a most grievous yoke, so that it can be called unbearable. For although through the grace of God it was borne by some, yet even they are rightly said to have been unable to bear it, since they bore it not without great labor and sweat.

The second objection of Calvin is of this kind: Paul, Galatians 3, assumes as confessed that the law is impossible, when he says: As many as are of the works of the law are under a curse. For it is written: Cursed is every one that abideth not in all things which are written in the book of the law. Where the Apostle weaves this argument: He is cursed who keeps not the whole law, as Moses says, “Cursed is every one that abideth not,” etc.; therefore they who are of the works of the law — that is, who will to be justified by fulfilling the law — are cursed. Which consequence is none, unless that assumption be understood: But no one can keep the whole law. So, then, the entire argument will have to be framed thus: Cursed is every one who keeps not the whole law; no one can keep the whole law; therefore cursed is every one who is of the works of the law — that is, who, as subject to the law, seeks to be justified from its observance. I answer: the assumption necessary that the argumentation of the Apostle may conclude what he intends is not that, “But no one can keep the whole law,” but this, “But no one can keep the whole law by his own powers, without faith and grace.” That too, “They who are of the works of the law are under a curse,” does not signify that those are cursed who seek to be justified by fulfilling the law — since the same Apostle says, Romans 2, The doers of the law shall be justified — but signifies that those are cursed who believe that they can by their own powers, without faith and grace, fulfil the law and be justified. For a little before he had said that those who are of faith are to be blessed with faithful Abraham, because it is written: In thy seed shall all nations be blessed. Then, opposing to faith works without faith, he subjoins: For as many as are of the works of the law are under a curse. And so the Apostolic argument is this: Cursed is every one who keeps not the whole law; but no one can by his own powers, without faith and grace, keep the whole law; therefore cursed are all those who are of the works of the law — that is, who by their own powers, without faith and grace, seek to keep the whole law, and in that manner to be justified. And hence we understand what follows: Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us — that it signifies not, as the adversaries believe, that we are freed from the law by the non-imputation of transgression, but (as we have often said) that we are freed from the curse, because through the faith and grace of Christ we can fulfil the law and do fulfil it. Someone will say: the Apostle Paul in that place speaks of the law of circumcision, not of the moral law, as we too said above when we treated of Christian liberty; but the law of circumcision he contends is altogether to be taken away, or is taken away; therefore he says that those are cursed not who keep not the law from faith and grace, but who will to keep it in any manner whatever. I answer: blessed Paul in the epistle to the Galatians, as also in the epistle to the Romans, refutes two errors of the Judaizers, of which one is the reason of the other. One of their errors was that the law of circumcision and of other ceremonies of that kind must be kept. The other error was that the law of circumcision must therefore be kept, since the observance of the law was a necessary preparation for the faith and grace of Christ, and therefore that all could and ought to keep the law and be justified, that they might be worthy of the Gospel and the promises of Christ. The Apostle, then, against the former error, says that the ceremonial law was as it were a pedagogue, and imposed for a time, and is no longer to be kept — and this we said when we treated of Christian liberty. Against the latter error, which was more pernicious, the Apostle says that from the works of the law without faith there can be no justice, and that otherwise Christ died in vain; and in this disputation against the latter error he speaks of every law, not only ceremonial, but also moral. For there is no law which without faith and grace can justify.

The third objection is taken from those words of the Apostle, Romans 7: To will is present with me, but to accomplish that which is good I find not. I answer: the Apostle speaks of the act of coveting, which we often feel, when we even consent not. For although it be no sin to feel carnal concupiscence and not consent, yet a chaste man would not feel it, and counts it part of his unhappiness that he is compelled, even unwilling, to serve in the flesh the law of sin. Hence, then, the Apostle says: To will is present with me, but to accomplish I find not. And: Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? See Augustine, tractate 41 on John, book 6 against Julian, chapter 11, and book 1 to Boniface, chapter 10. The fourth objection: no one can avoid all sins, since it is written, James 3, In many things we all offend; and 1 John 1, If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves. But he who fulfilled the whole law would have no sin at all; therefore it cannot be that the whole law be fulfilled by us, even with faith and grace. I answer: from this argument, which Chemnitz greatly presses, they do not so easily extricate themselves who grant that a venial sin is properly against the law, as Vega, book 11 on the Council, chapter 20; for they are compelled to say that the law is not impossible, not because it can be kept whole at once, but because the greater part of it can be kept, and the denomination be made from the better part. But let them see what they answer to the Apostle James saying: Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all. The solid answer, then, is that venial sins, without which we do not live, are not sins simply, but imperfectly and in a certain respect, nor are they against the law, but beside the law, as St. Thomas rightly teaches in 1.2, question 88, article 1. For hence all things cohere. For he who offends in one point — transgressing, namely, one precept — is become guilty of all, and is constituted simply unjust; and yet in many things we all offend, because, although we do nothing against the law, yet we do many things beside the law. And he who is born of God sins not, by transgressing the law; and yet if we say that we have no sin — namely, doing nothing beside the law — we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.

The fifth objection: Christ is Mediator not only in the first reconciliation, but also afterward in the whole time of our life; therefore we always need the intercession of Christ, and thereby always sin and transgress the law; otherwise, after the first reconciliation, Christ would be idle. This argument is common to Calvin, Philip, Chemnitz, and others, who thence conclude that, if there is in us any fulfilment of the law, it is not so much of works which answer to the perfection of the law as of faith, which perpetually apprehends remission. I answer: Christ is always Mediator to us, nor is he ever idle, and that for a double reason. First, since he always supplies to us the powers and grace by which we may do good works. For therefore he rightly compared himself to a vine and us to branches. For as a branch cannot bear fruit unless it abide in the vine, and draw the sap from the vine, so neither we, unless we abide in Christ, and draw the spirit from him. Second, since he purges our sins, though light and daily, and his blood cleanses us from all sin. And if perhaps by transgressing the law we fall from justice, he is nonetheless the propitiation for our sins, and not seven times, but seventy times seven, reconciles us to the Father, if by his grace, being converted, we begin seriously to do penance. And so it is not we, who say the law can be fulfilled, that make Christ the Mediator idle; but the adversaries truly make the merits of Christ inefficacious, when they teach that Christ, with so signal an obedience, could not effect that the justification of the law should be fulfilled in us. The sixth objection is taken from St. Augustine, who in book 1 of the Retractations, chapter 19, thus says: “All the commandments are reckoned as done, when whatever is not done is pardoned.” I answer: St. Augustine in that place speaks of the highest perfection of fulfilling the precepts, which he says was expressed by the Lord in those words, Matthew 5, One jot or one tittle shall not pass from the law, till all be fulfilled; but he asks whether this perfection can be had in this life, and answers that it cannot be had, save in this sense, that all the commandments are reckoned as done when whatever is not done is pardoned. For among the other commandments to be fulfilled is also that we pray, “Forgive us our debts.” From which we understand that the imperfection in keeping the divine law which is asserted by Augustine is not a transgression of an entire precept, but a lack of perfection in the very observance of the law — in the manner of one who, in writing or pronouncing the law, should pronounce indeed all the words and syllables, but not express some little letter, or part of a letter. For this similitude the Lord used, when he said not, “one word,” but “one jot, or one tittle, shall not pass from the law, till all be fulfilled.” And these things are said to explain the mind of St. Augustine in that testimony. For otherwise, if Augustine had openly said, “all the commandments are reckoned as done when, if any commandment is violated, it is pardoned,” it neither ought nor could thence be gathered that the law of the Lord is impossible. For it can be that one keep many commandments entirely, and yet afterward fulfil not some other commandment, of which transgression he does penance, and, indulgence being obtained, is so saved as if he had kept all the commandments. Another objection could be added, from the precepts, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart,” and, “Thou shalt not covet.” For that these two cannot be fulfilled in this life the adversaries prove from Augustine and Bernard. But these have been treated by us at length in book 2 On Monks, chapter 13, and in book 2 On Original Sin, which is the fifth On the State of Sin, chapter 10. Therefore they seem to be here passed over, lest we weary the reader with too much repetition.

Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT  XIV. 

Solvuntur  objectiones  hxreticorum. 

i 

Superest  ut  argumenta  haereticorum  bre¬ 
viter  dissolvamus. 

Primo  objiciunt  Calvinus  in  Antidoto,  et 
Kemnitius  in  Examin.  illud  S.  Petri  A- 
ctor.  xv.  Quid  lentalis  imponere  jugum  super 
cervices  discipulorum,  quod  nec  nos,  nec  pa¬ 
tres  nostri  portare  potuimus  ?  sed  per  gratiam 
Domini  nostri  Jesu  Christi  credimus  salvari, 
quemadmodum  et  illi.  Haec  enim  verba  di¬ 
cuntur  fidelibus,  non  infidelibus,  ne  forte 


respondeatur,  legem  esse  jugum  importabi¬ 
le  sine  gratia  et  non  renatis,  non  autem  re¬ 
natis,  et  qui  gratiam  Dei  habent.  Praeterea 
intelligi  debent  haec  verba  de  omni  lege, 
tam  caeremoniali,  quam  morali,  tum  quia 
solae  caeremoniae  legis  non  superant  vires 
humanas,  tum  quia  particula  adversativa, 
((  sed  »,  opponit  gratiam  legi  simpliciter, 
tum  quia  si  caeremonialis  lex  jugum  est  im¬ 
portabile,  quanto  magis  lex  moralis  jugum 
erit  importabile  ? 

Respondeo  :  non  loquitur  S.  Petrus  nisi 
de  lege  caeremoniali.  Id  quod  evidenter 
probo,  primum  ex  occasione  illorum  ver¬ 
borum.  Scribit  enim  S.  Lucas,  surrexisse 
quosdam  ex  discipulis,  qui  dicerent,  opor¬ 
tere  gentiles  conversos  ad  fidem  circumcidi, 
et  Mosis  legem  omnino  servare  :  atque  istam 
fuisse  causam,  cur  Apostoli  Concilium  coe¬ 
gerint,  ut  viderent  de  verbo  hoc.  Perspi¬ 
cuum  est  igitur,  de  circumcisione  aliisque  id 
genus  caeremoniis  Apostolum  Petrum  esse 
locutum. 

Secundo,  idem  probatur  ex  decreto  illius 
Concilii,  quod  juxta  Petri  sententiam  consti¬ 
tutum  fuit.  Sic  enim  habet  decretum  :  Vi¬ 
sum  est  Spiritui  sancto  et  nobis,  nihil  ultra 
imponere  vobis  oneris,  quam  hxc  necessaria, 
ut  abstineatis  vos  ab  immolatis  simulacro¬ 
rum,  a  sanguine,  suffocato  et  fornicatione. 
Quaero  igitur,  utrum  ista  dicantur  sola  ne¬ 
cessaria  ex  lege  caeremoniali  Judaeorum,  an 
ex  omni  lege  simpliciter.  Si  ex  lege  Cceremo- 
niali  Judsorum,  habemus  quod  volumus.  Si 
ex  omni  lege  simpliciter,  id  sequetur  ab¬ 
surdi,  ut  non  sit  necessarium  Christiano  non 
colere  idola,  non  moechari,  non  furari,  non 
occidere,  non  falsum  testimonium  dicere,  et 
alia,  de  quibus  Apostolus  ait  Gal.  v.  Quo¬ 
niam  qui  talia  agunt,  regnum  Dei  non  conse- 
quentur.  Dicent  fortasse,  necessaria  qui¬ 
dem  esse  haec  omnia,  sed  non  inde  homines 
justificari.  At  num  ex  illis  quatuor,  quae  so¬ 
la  dicuntur  necessaria,  homines  justifican¬ 
tur  ? 

Tertio,  probari  potest  res  eadem  ex  ipsa 
summa  decreti,  et  verborum  Petri,  Volunt 
enim  Petrus  et  Apostoli  cieteri  removere  ju¬ 
gum  legis  a  cervicibus  discipulorum.  Quid 
vero  est  removere  jugum  legis,  tollere  obli¬ 
gationem,  atque  abrogare  legem,  an  tollere 
opinionem  justificationis,  ac  docere,  nemi- 


(1)  Rom.  VIII,  2.—  pi)  Joan.  1,  13;ibid.  III,  3:  I  Pet.  II,  2;  I  Joan.  IV,  7;  Rom.  VIII,  15.-(3)  Act. 
XV,  10.  -  (4)  Gal.  V,  21. 


CAPUT  XIV. 


323 


nem  per  eam  legem  justificari  ?  si  dixerint, 
removere  jugum,  esse  tollere  obligationem, 
ergo  nulla  jam  amplius  lex  obligabit  Chri¬ 
stianos,  excepta  lege  de  immolatis  simula¬ 
crorum,  sanguine,  suffocato  et  fornicatione, 
si  per  legem  intelligatur  lex  omnis  non  so¬ 
lum  ca)remonialis,  sed  etiam  moralis.  Atqui 
hoc  absurdissimum  esse  neque  ipsi  quidem 
adversarii  negare  audebunt.  Si  dixerint  tol¬ 
lere  jugum,  non  esse  tollere  obligationem, 
sed  opinionem  tantum  justificationis,  ergo 
lex  caeremonialis  de  circumcisione,  sabba¬ 
tis,  neomeniis,  sacrificiis  pecorum  non  erit 
sublata,  quoad  obligationem. 

Atqui  id  repugnat  Apostolo,  qui  ad  Gala¬ 
tas  v.  scribit  :  Si  circumcidemini ,  Christus 
vobis  nihil  proderit  (1).  Cogimurigiturdicere, 
Apostolos  jugum  importabile  appellasse  le¬ 
gem  caeremonialem,  atque  ejus  obligationem 
declarasse  per  Christum  omnino  esse  subla¬ 
tam.  Voluisse  tamen  eosdem  Apostolos  pau¬ 
cas  quasdam  caeremonias  de  sanguine,  suffo¬ 
cato  et  immolatis  idolorum  a  gentibus  ad 
tempus  obsei’vari,  quibus  adjunxerunt  con¬ 
tinentiam  a  fornicatione,  quod  fornicatio 
apud  Gentiles  non  haberetur  pro  peccato, 
sicut  habebatur  adulterium,  homicidium, 
perjurium  et  alia  id  genus. 

Ad  illud  igitur  quod  objiciunt,  caeremo¬ 
nias  legis  non  superare  vires  humanas  prae- 
sertim  addita  gratia  Dei,  respondeo  verum 
esse,  et  ideo  Zachariam  et  Elisabetham  am¬ 
bulasse  in  omnibus  mandatis,  et  justifica¬ 
tionibus  Domini  sine  querela,  sed  tamen  dici 
jugum  importabile,  quoniam  aegre  ac  diffi¬ 
culter  portabatur,  ut  recte  exponit  S.  Tho- 
mas  in  2.  sentent.  dist.  28.  quaest.  unica, 
art.  4,  ad  3.  et  Nicolaus  Lyranus  in  hunc 
locum  Actorum.  EtTheophylactus  exponens 
illud  Matth.  xxm,  et  Luc,  xi.  Alligant  one¬ 
ra  gravia  et  importabilia  in  humeros  homi¬ 
num  (2). 

Ad  illud  autem,  quod  adversativa  parti¬ 
cula,  Sed  per  gratiam  Dei  ctc.  videatur  op¬ 
ponere  gratiam  legi  simpliciter,  respondeo, 
S.  Petrum  duas  rationes  indicasse,  cur  non 
essent  obligandi  Christiani  ad  caeremonias 
legis.  Unam,  quod  ea)  caeremoniee  essent 
jugum  gravissimum. 

Alteram,  quod  essent  inutiles  ad  justifica¬ 
tionem.  Itaque  sensus  hic  est  verborum  S. 
Petri :  Quid  tentatis  Deum,  imponere  jugum 
super  cervices  discipulorum,  quod  nec  nos, 


nec  patres  nostri  portare  potuimus  ?  prae- 
sertirn  cum  non  per  eas  CEeremonias,  sed 
per  gratiam  Domini  nostri  Jesu  Christi  cre¬ 
damus  salvari,  sicut  et  illi  salvati  sunt  :■  ubi 
in  illa  particula  adversativa  includitur,  sive 
implicite  continetur  altera  illa  ratio  de  inu¬ 
tilitate  caeremoniarum. 

Ad  illud  quod  lex  moralis  sit  gravior 
caeremoniali,  ac  proinde  justius  dicenda  sit 
jugum  importabile,  quam  caeremonialis,  re¬ 
spondeo  legem  caeremonialem  non  debere 
comparari  cum  morali  praecise,  sed  conferri 
debere  legem  caeremonialem  adjunctam  mo¬ 
rali,  cum  ipsa  morali  remota  caeremoniali. 
Non  enim  lex  caeremonialis  dicitur  jugum 
importabile,  quia  sola  ipsa  sit  importabilis, 
sed  quoniam  adjuncta  legi  morali,  auget  ve¬ 
hementer  onus,  et  fit  jugum  fere  importabi¬ 
le  homini  jam  onerato  lege  morali.  Quare  lex 
moralis,  remota  caeremoniali  Judaica,  non 
est  jugum  importabile  habenti  gratiam  Dei, 
sed  jugum  suave,  et  onus  leve  ;  et  lex  caere¬ 
monialis  Judaica,  adjuncta  morali,  jugum  est 
gravissimum,  ita  ut  importabile  dici  possit. 
Quamvis  enim  per  gratiam  Dei  portatum 
fuerit  a  nonnullis,  tamen  recte  dicuntur  etiam 
illi  portare  non  potuisse,  quod  non  sine  ma¬ 
gno  labore  et  sudore  portarunt. 

Secunda  objectio  Calvini  ejusmodi  est, 
Paulus  ad  Galat.  m.  pro  confesso  assumit  le¬ 
gem  esse  impossibilem,  cum  dicit :  Qui  ex 
operibus  legis  sunt ,  sub  maledicto  sunt.  Scri¬ 
ptum  est  enim,  maledictus  omnis  qui  non  per¬ 
manserit  in  omnibus,  quae  scripta  sunt  in  libro 
legis  hujus  (1).  Ubi  hoc  argumentum  texit 
Apostolus  :  Maledictus  est  qui  non  servat  to¬ 
tam  legem,  ut  Moses  dicit :  Maledictus  omnis 
qui  non  permanet  ctc.,  igitur  qui  ex  operibus 
legis  sunt,  id  est,  qui  justificari  volunt  im¬ 
plendo  legem,  maledicti  sunt.  Quae  consecu¬ 
tio  nulla  est,  nisi  subinteilligatur  assumptio 
ista.  Atqui-nullus  legem  totam  servare  potest. 
Sic  igitur  argumentum  integrum  conficien¬ 
dum  erit:  Maledictus  omnis,  qui  totam  legem 
non  servat;  Nemo  potest  legem  totam  ser¬ 
vare  ;  igitur  maledictus  omnis  qui  ex  operi¬ 
bus  legis  est,  id  est,  qui  ut  legi  subjectus  ex 
ipsiu&  observatione  justificari  quEerit. 

Respondeo  :  Assumptio  necessaria,  ut  ar¬ 
gumentatio  Apostoli  concludat,  quod  ipse  in¬ 
tendit,  non  est  illa  :  Atqui  nemo  totam  le¬ 
gem  servare  potest;  sed  ista:  Atqui  nemo 
suis  viribus,  sine  fide  et  gratia  servare  po- 


(Ij  Gal.  V,  2.  -  (2)  Matth.  XXIII,  4.  —  (3)  Gal.  III,  10. 


SI6 


LIBER  IT. 


test  iotam  legem.  Illud  quoque  :  qui  ex  ope-% 
ribus  legis  sunt ,  sub  maledicto  sunt ,  non  si¬ 
gnificat,  eos  esse  maledictos,  qui  legem  im¬ 
plendo  justificari  quaerunt,  cum  dicat  idem 
Apostolus  ad  Rom.  xi.  Factores  legis  justifi¬ 
cabuntur;  sed  significat,  maledictos  esse  eos, 
qui  suis  viribus  sine  fide  et  gratia  legem  im¬ 
plere,  et  justificari  se  posse  credunt.  Nam 
paulo  ante  dixerat,  eos  qui  ex  fide  sunt,  be¬ 
nedicendos  esse  cum  fidei  Abrahamo,  quia 
scriptum  est :  Benedicentur  in  semine  tuo  om¬ 
nes  gentes.  Inde  opponens  fidei  opera  sine  fi¬ 
de,  subjungit:  Quicumque  enim  ex  operibus 
legis  sunt,  sub  maledicto  sunt. 

Itaque  argumentum  Apostolicum  est  boc  : 
Maledictus  est  omnis  qui  non  servat  totam 
legem,  at  nemo  potest  suis  viribus,  sine  fide 
et  giatia  totam  legem  servare,  igitur  male¬ 
dicti  sunt  omnes  illi,  qui  ex  opexibus  legis 
sunt,  id  est,  qui  suis  viribus,  sine  fide  et 
gratia  totam  legem  servare,  et  eo  modo  ju¬ 
stificari  quaerunt.  Atque  hinc  intelligimus  id 
quod  sequitur  :  Christus  nos  libravit  de  male¬ 
dicto  legis  factus  pro  nobis  maledictum.  Non 
significare,  ut  adversarii  credunt,  nos  libe¬ 
ratos  a  lege  per  non  imputationem  praevari¬ 
cationis,  sed  (ut  nos  saepe  diximus)  nos  libe¬ 
ratos  a  maledicto,  quia  per  Christi  fidem  et 
gratiam  legem  implere  possumus  et  imple¬ 
mus. 

Dicet  aliquis  :  Apostolus  Paulus  loquitur 
eo  loco  de  lege  circumcisionis,  non  de  lege 
morali,  ut  nos  etiam  supradiximus  cumage- 
i'emus  de  libertate  Christiana  .  legem  autem 
cii’Cumcisionis  omnino  tollendam,  vel  subla¬ 
tam  esse  contendit  :  non  igitur  maledictos 
eos  esse  dicit,  qui  legem  non  servant  ex  fide 
et  gi'atia,  sed  qui  eam  quomodocumque 
sei‘vare  volunt. 

Respondeo  :  Beatus  Paulus  in  epistola  ad 
Galatas,  ut  etiam  in  epistola  ad  Romanos, 
duos  errores  Judaizantium,  quorum  unus  est 
ratio  alterius,  refellit.  Unus  error  eorum 
erat,  servandam  esse  legem  circumcisionis, 
atque  aliarum  id  genus  caeremoniarum. 

Alter  error  erat,  ideo  servandam  esse  le¬ 
gem  circumcisionis,  quoniam  observatio  le¬ 
gis  esset  necessaria  praeparatio  ad  fidem  et 
gratiam  Christi,  et  ideo  possent  et  deberent 
omnes  servare  legem,  et  justificari,  ut  digni 
essent  Evangelio  et  promissis  Christi.  Apo¬ 
stolus  igitur  contra  priorem  errorem,  dicit 
legem  caeremonialem  fuisse  quasi  paedago- 


um  ,  et  ad  tempus  impositam,  non  esse  am¬ 
plius  servandam,  et  hoc  diximus  cum  age¬ 
remus  de  libertate  Christiana.  Contra  poste- 
liorem  errorem,  qui  perniciosior  ei’at,  Apo¬ 
stolus  dicit,  ex  operibus  legis  sine  fide  nul¬ 
lam  posse  esse  justitiam,  et  alioqui  Christum 
gratis  mortuum  esse,  et  in  hac  disputatione 
contra  posteriorem  errorem  loquitur  de  omni 
lege,  non  solum  caeremoniali,  sed  etiam  mo¬ 
rali.  Nulla  enim  lex  est,  quae  sine  fide  et  gra¬ 
tia  justificai-e  possit. 

Tertia  objectio  sumitur  ex  illis  verbis  Apo¬ 
stoli  ad  Itoman.  vn.  Velle  adjacet  mihi ,  per¬ 
ficere  autem  non  invenio  (1). 

Respondeo  :  loquitur  Apostolus  de  actu 
concupiscendi,  quem  sajpe  sentimus,  quando 
etiam  non  consentimus.  Quamvis  enim  non 
sit  peccatum  sentire  carnalem  concupiscen¬ 
tiam,  et  non  consentire,  tamen  nollet  homo 
castus  eam  sentire,  et  in  partem  in  fcelicitatis 
suae  ponit,  quod  cogatur  etiam  nolens,  carne 
servire  legi  peccati.  Hinc  igitur  Apostolus 
dicit :  Velle  adjacet  mihi,  perficere  autem  non 
invenio.  Et :  Infoelix  ego  homo  f  quis  me  Ubera¬ 
bit  de  corpore  mortis  hujus  ?  Vide  Augusti¬ 
num  tract.  41.  in  Joan.  lib.  vi.  in  Julian. 
cap.  11.  et  lib.  i.  ad  Bonifacium  cap.  10. 

Quarta  objectio,  nemo  potest  vitare  omnia 
peccata,  cum  scriptum  sit  Jacobi  n.  3.  In 
multis  offendimus  omnes.  Et  I  Joan.  I.  Si 
dixerimus  quia  peccatum  non  habemus ,  nos 
ipsos  seducimus.  At  qui  legem  omnem  imple¬ 
ret,  nullum  haberet  omnino  peccatum  :  igi¬ 
tur  fieri  non  potest,  ut  lex  omnis  a  nobis, 
etiam  cum  fide  et  gratia,  impleatur. 

Respondeo  :  Ab  hoc  argumento,  quod  valde 
Kemnitius  urget,  non  tam  facile  se  expediunt, 
qui  concedunt,  peeeatum  veniale  esse  pi’0- 
pi’ie  eontra  legem,  ut  Vega  lib.  xx.  in  Con¬ 
cilium  cap.  20.  coguntur  enim  dicere,  legem 
non  esse  impossibilem,  non  quod  tota  simul 
servari  possit,  sed  quod  servari  possit  major 
ejus  pars,  et  a  meliori  parte  fiat  denominatio. 
Sed  videndum  est  illis,  quid  respondeant 
Apostolo  Jacobo  dicenti  :  Quicumque  totam 
legem  servaverit,  offendat  autem  in  uno,  fa¬ 
ctus  est  omnium  reus. 

Solida  igitur  responsio  est,  peccata  venia¬ 
lia,  sine  quibus  non  vivimus,  non  esse  pec¬ 
cata  simpliciter,  sed  imperfecte,  et  secun¬ 
dum  quid,  neque  esse  contra  legem,  sed 
prseter  legem,  ut  S.  Thomas  recte  docet  in 
1.  2.  quaxst  88.  art.  1.  hinc  enim  omnia  co- 


(1)  Rom.  VII,  18.  -  (2)  Jacob.  111,2;  IJoan.  I,  8. 


CAPUT  XV. 


327 


haerent.  Nam  qui  offendit  in  uno,  praevari- 
.  cans  videlicet  unum  praeceptum,  factus  est 
omnium  reus,  et  injustus  simpliciter  consti¬ 
tuitur,  et  tamen  in  multis  offendimus  omnes, 
quia  tametsi  nihil  facimus  contra  legem, 
tamen  multa  facimus  praeter  legem.  Et  qui 
natus  est  ex  Deo  non  peccat,  transgrediendo 
legem,  et  tamen  si  dixerimus,  quia  peccatum 
non  habemus,  nihil  videlicet  praeter  legem 
faciendo,  nos  ipsos  seducimus,  et  veritas  in 
nobis  non  est. 

Quinta  objectio,  Christus  Mediator  est  non 
solum  in  prima  reconciliatione,  sed  etiam 
postea  in  toto  vitae  nostrae  tempore,  ergo 
semper  egemus  intercessione  Christi,  ac  per 
hoc  semper  peccamus  legemque  transgredi¬ 
mur,  alioqui  post  primam  reconciliationem 
Christus  otiosus  esset.  Hoc  argumentum 
commune  est  Calvino,  Philippo,  Kemnitio  et 
aliis,  qui  inde  concludunt,  si  qua  est  in  no¬ 
bis  legis  impletio,  illam  non  tam  esse  operum, 
quae  respondeant  perfectioni  *  legis,  quam 
fidei,  quae  perpetuo  apprehendit  remissio  - 
nem. 

Respondeo  :  Christus  semper  nobis  Media¬ 
tor  est,  nec  unquam  est  otiosus,  idque  du¬ 
plici  ratione.  Primo,  quoniam  semper  nobis 
vires  et  gratiam  subministrat,  per  quam 
bona  opera  faciamus.  Ideo  siquidem  recte 
comparavit  se  ipse  viti  et  nos  palmitibus.  Ut 
enim  palmes  non  potest  ferre  fructum,  nisi 
manserit  in  vite,  et  succum  traxerit  ex  vite, 
sic  nec  nos  nisi  manserimus  in  Christo,  et 
spiritum  hauserimus  ex  ipso. 

Secundo,  quoniam  peccata  nostra,  quam¬ 
vis  levia  et  quotidiana,  ipse  purgat,  et  san¬ 
guis  ejus  emundat  nos  ab  omni  peccato.  Et 
si  forte  legem  praevaricando  a  justitia  exci¬ 
damus,  ipse  nihilominus  propitiatio  est  pro 
peccatis  nostris,  et  non  septies,  sed  septua¬ 
gies  septies  nos  Patri  reconciliat,  si  per  ejus 
gratiam  conversi  serio  poenitentiam  agere 
incipiamus.  Itaque  non  fuimus  nos,  qui  le¬ 
gem  impleri  posse  dicimus,  Christum  Media¬ 
torem  otiosum,  sed  vere  faciunt  adversarii 
Christi  merita  ineflicacia,  cum  docent  Chri¬ 
stum  tam  insigni  obedientia  id  efficere  non 
potuisse,  ut  justificatio  legis  impleretur  in 
nobis. 

Sexta  objectio  sumitur  ex  S.  Augustino, 
qui  in  lib.  1  Retract.  cap.  19.  sic  ait  :  «  Om¬ 
nia  mandata  facta  deputantur,  quando  quic- 
quid  non  sit.  ignoscitur  » . 


Respondeo  :  loquitur  eo  loco  sanctus  Au¬ 
gustinus  de  summa  perfectione  implendi 
praecepta,  quam  dicit  expressam  fuisse  a 
Domino  per  illa  verba,  Matthaei  v.  Iota  unum, 
aut  unus  apex  non  praeteribit  a  lege ,  donec 
omnia  fiant ;  quaerit  autem  num  haec  per¬ 
fectio  possit  haberi  in  hac  vita,  et  respon¬ 
det,  non  posse  haberi,  nisi  in  hoc  sensu 
quod  omnia  mandata  facta  deputantur, 
quando  quicquid  non  fit  ignoscitur.  Nam  in¬ 
ter  alia  mandata  implenda  est  etiam  illud,  ut 
oremus  :  Dimitte  nobis  debita  nostra.  Ex  quo 
intelligimus  eam  imperfectionem  in  lege  di¬ 
vina  servanda  asseri  ab  Augustino,  quae  non 
sit  praevaricatio  integri  praecepti,  sed  caren¬ 
tia  perfectionis  in  ipsa  legis  observatione, 
quomodo  qui  scribendo,  aut  proferendo  le¬ 
gem,  proferret  quidem  omnes  dictiones  et 
syllabas,  sed  litterulam,  aut  litterae  partem 
aliquam  non  exprimeret.  Hac  enim  similitu¬ 
dine  Dominus  usus  est,  cum  non  ait,  verbum 
unum,  sed  iota  unum,  aut  unus  apex  non 
praeteribit  a  lege,  donec  omnia  fiant. 

Atque  haec  dicta  sint  ad  mentem  sancti 
Augustini  in  eo  testimonio  explicandam, 
Alioqui  enim  si  aperte  dixisset  Augustinus 
omnia  mandata  facta  deputantur,  quando  si 
quod  mandatum  violatur,  ignoscitur  :  non 
deberet,  nec  posset  inde  colligi,  legem  Do¬ 
mini  esse  impossibilem.  Potest  enim  fieri,  ut 
quis  multa  mandata  integre  servaverit,  et 
postea  tamen  aliquod  aliud  mandatum  non 
impleat,  cujus  praevaricationis  poenitentiam 
agat,  et  indulgentia  impetrata  ita  salvetur, 
ac  si  mandata  omnia  custodisset. 

Addi  posset  alia  objectio  ex  praeceptis  : 
Diliges,  Dominum  Deum  tuum  ex  toto  corde 
tuo  ;  et  :  Non  concupisces.  Haec  enim  duo  in 
hac  vita  impleri  non  posse  probant  adversa¬ 
rii  ex  Augustino  et  Bernardo.  Sed  haec  a  no¬ 
bis  fuse  tractata  sunt  in  lib.  2.  de  Monachis, 
cap.  13.  et  in  lib.  2.  de  peccato  originis,  qui 
est  quintus  de  statu  peccati,  cap.  10.  Ideo 
videntur  hoc  loco  praetermittenda,  ne  fatige¬ 
mus  nimia  repetitione  lectorem.
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