Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On Justification · Book V: On the Merits of Works
Chapter 10: That for constituting merit free choice of the will is required
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. VI, De Justificatione, Book V. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
There follows the other part of the disputation on merit, in which it is to be discussed what and how many are the conditions necessary that a work may be called truly and properly meritorious of eternal felicity. For of this above all we inquire. And seven conditions in all seem to be required, of which three are granted by all, the other four are in controversy. The first condition is that it be a good work. For evil works indeed merit, but punishment, not reward. “The evil God crowns not,” says Augustine, On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 6. But we in this place discourse of good merits. The second condition is that that good work be done in homage to God. For merit implies a relation to a reward to be received from another; and thereby he who merits, merits before someone. The third, that he who merits be a wayfarer. For in this life is the stadium and the battle; in the other, the prize and the crown. But of this condition see below, chapter 14, where the sixth condition is treated. The fourth, that the work be not only good, but also free. The fifth, that he who merits be a friend and pleasing to God. The sixth, that a promise intervene. The seventh, that the work proceed from the virtue of charity. Omitting, therefore, the three first, of which there is no question, let us begin to examine the fourth. But although there are not wanting those who teach that the liberty of choice is not necessary for meriting — for that Robert Holcot so held, John Pico witnesses in the Apology, question 8 — yet the common opinion of the theologians holds the contrary, as is plain from St. Thomas, 1a 2ae, question 114, article 1, and from the Doctors everywhere on book 1 of the Sentences, distinction 17, and on book 2, distinction 27, and on book 3, distinction 18. And this true and common opinion can be proved, first, from the divine letters of both Testaments. For Ecclesiasticus 31, when it had been said, Who might have transgressed and hath not transgressed, and might have done evil and hath not done it, straightway is added the merit: Therefore are his goods established, and all the church of the saints shall declare his alms. And the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 9: If I do this willingly, I have a reward; but if against my will, a dispensation is committed to me. And 2 Corinthians 9: Every one as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity; for God loveth a cheerful giver.
Second, the same is proved from the Fathers, whose testimonies, very many, we brought in the fifth book On Grace and Free Choice. Of which we shall set down a very few which more properly make for the present matter. St. Justin, in the first Apology, about the middle: “For none of these things would be worthy of praise, unless they (men, namely) could turn themselves, and, as it were, bend, to either part.” St. Irenaeus, book 4, chapter 71: “They who work good shall receive glory and honor, because they have worked good when they were able not to work it.” Clement of Alexandria, book 1 of the Stromata, about the middle: “But neither praises, nor dispraises, nor honors, nor punishments are just, if the soul have not the free power both of desiring and of undertaking.” St. Basil, in the oration that God is not the author of evils: “To God that is not pleasing which is forced, but that which is rightly done from virtue. But virtue comes from will, and not from necessity. And will depends on those things which are in us. But in us is free choice.” St. John Chrysostom, homily 22 on Genesis: “Is it not manifest that each one by his own will chooses either malice or virtue? For unless it were so, and a power were implanted in our nature, neither ought those to be punished, nor these to receive the rewards of virtues. But because the whole (after the grace of God) is left in our will, therefore both to sinners are punishments set forth, and to those who work well, wages and rewards.” St. Cyril, book 2 on John, chapter 54: “He shows the free choice of man by these words, who can proceed to either part according to the judgment of his own mind. For so we justly find praise if we do well, and the contrary if we commit evils.” Tertullian, book 2 against Marcion, before the middle: “Otherwise, neither the reward of good nor of evil could justly be weighed to him who had been carried into good or evil by necessity, not by will.” St. Hilary, on the second Psalm: “What of honor and reward would the necessity of goodness merit, when a certain implanted force would not suffer men to be evil? To the will, therefore, was goodness promised, that the will might acquire for itself the reward of goodness.” St. Jerome, book 2 against Jovinian: “God made us of free choice; we are drawn neither to virtues nor to vices by necessity. Otherwise, where there is necessity, there is neither crown nor damnation.” St. Augustine, book 2 On Free Choice, chapter 1: “Then, that good by which justice itself is commended, in condemning sins and honoring right deeds — how would it be, if man had not a free will? For neither would it be a right deed, or a sin, which was not done by will; and thereby both the punishment would be unjust, and the reward, if man had not a free will.” St. Paulinus, in epistle 2 to Severus: “What grace is it to us, if we be faithful only in another’s, unless we serve of our own — that is, of the free choice of the will?” St. Bernard, sermon 81 on the Canticles: “Where there is no liberty, there is no merit. Therefore the animals lacking reason merit nothing, because, as they lack deliberation, so also they lack liberty.” Third, the same is proved by reasons. For first, many things, as the sun, the moon, the fields, the vineyards, the gardens, the beasts of burden, the flocks, afford us the greatest advantages, and yet are not properly said to merit well of us, because they act not freely, nor can do otherwise than they do. Then, to merit a reward is owed; but a debt arises not save from this, that one gives to another what was his own. For if he gave a thing not his own, but another’s, nothing would be owed him. But nothing is properly ours save what we can do or omit at will. For these are in our power, and of these we are properly said to have dominion. Finally, evil works, unless they be done freely, merit no punishment; therefore neither will good works merit a reward, unless they be done freely.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT X. Ad meritum constituendum requiri Uberum voluntatis arbitrium. Sequitur altera pars disputationis de me¬ rito, in qua discutiendum est, « quae sint, et quot necessariae conditiones, ut aliquod opus dici possit vere ac proprie meritorium felicitatis aeternae ». De hoc enim potissi¬ mum quaerimus. Videntur autem septem omnino conditiones requiri , quarum tres conceduntur ab. omnibus, aliae quatuor in controversia sunt. Prima conditio est, ut sit opus bonum. Mala enim opera merentur quidem, sed poe¬ nam, non praemium. « Quae mala sunt, non coronat Deus », inquit Augustinus de gratia, et libero arbitrio cap. 6. Nos autem de bo¬ nis meritis hoc loco disserimus. Altera con¬ ditio est, ut opus illud bonum fiat in obse¬ quium Dei. Meritum enim relationem dicit ad mercedem ab alio accipiendam, proinde qui meretur, apud aliquem meretur. Tertia, ut qui meretur, sit viator. Nam in hac vita stadium est, et proelium, in tilia bravium, et corona. .Sed de hac conditione vide infra cap. 14. ubi agitur de conditione sexta. Quarta, ut opus sit non solum bonum, sed etiam liberum. Quinta, ut qui meretur, sit amicus et gratus Deo. Sexta, ut intercedat promissio. Septima, ut opus ex charitatis virtute procedat. Omissis igitur tribus prioribus, de quibus nulla quoestio est, examinare incipiamus quartam, sed quamvis non desint, qui do¬ ceant libertatem arbitrii ad merendum non esse necessariam; id enim sensisse Robertus Olchot, testatur Jo. Picus in Apologia quoest. 8. tamen communis Theologorum sententia contrarium habet, ut perspicuum est ex S. Thoma 1. 2. quoest. 114. art. 1. et ex Doctoribus enoteris in 1. sentent. dist. 17. et in 2. dist. 27. et in 3. dist. 18. Potest autem haec sententia vera, atque communis probari primo ex divinis litteris utriusque lastnmcnt-i. Nam Ecclesias!, xxxi. 364 LIBER V. cum dictum esset : Qui potuit transgredi, et non est transgressus, facere malum , et non fe¬ cit: continuo additur meritum, Ideo stabilita sunt bona illius, et eleemosynas illius enarra¬ bit omnis Ecclesia Sanctorum. Et Apostolus I ad Gorinth. ix. Si volens inquit, hoc ago, mercedem habeo, si autem invitus, dispensatio mihi crbdita est. Et II ad Gorinth. ix. Unus¬ quisque prout destinavit in corde suo ; non ex tristitia, aut ex necessitate. Hilarem enim da¬ torem diligit Deus (I). Secundo, idem probatur ex Patribus, quo¬ rum testimonia plurima attulimus in v. lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio. Ex quibus pau¬ cissima adscribemus, qua} magis proprie ad rem pratentem faciunt. Sanctus Justinus in Apologia prima circa medium : « Neque enim, inquit, quidquam horum laude dignum esset, nisi illi (homines videlicet) utramque in partem convertere, et quasi flectere se possent ». Sanctus Irenseus lib. iv. cap. 71. « Quiope* rantur, inquit, bonum, gloriam et honorem percipient, quoniam operati sunt bonum, cum possent non operari illud ». Clemens Alexandrinus lib. i. Strom. circa medium : « Sed, inquit, nec laudes, nec vi¬ tuperationes, nec honores, nec supplicia ju¬ sta sunt, si anima non habeat liberam pote¬ statem et appetendi et aggrediendi ». Sanctus Rasilius in orat, quod Deus non sit auctor malorum : « Deo, inquit, non est gratum, quod coactum, sed quod ex virtute recte geritur. Yirtus autem ex voluntate, et non ex necessitate fit. Voluntas autem ex his, qua} in nobis sunt, dependet. In nobis autem est liberum arbitrium ». Sanctus Joannes Chrysostomus hom. 22. in Genes. <t Nonne, inquit, manifestum est, sua quemque voluntate vel malitiam, vel virtutem eligere ? nam nisi ita esset, et na¬ tura! nostra! potestas insita esset, neque illos puniri, neque istos pra!mia virtutum acci¬ pere oportebat. Verum quia in nostra volun¬ tate totum (post gratiam Dei) relictum est, ideo et peccantibus supplicia proposita sunt, et bene operantibus mercedes et preemia ». Sanctus Cyrillus lib. ii. in Joan. cap. 54. « Liberum, inquit, arbitrium hominis his ver¬ bis ostendit, qui ad alterutrum secundum ani¬ mi sui judicium potest proficisci. Sic enim juste laudem, si bene agimus, et contraria, si mala committimus, invenimus » . Tertullianus lib. ii. in Marcionem, ante medium : « Gaderum, inquit, nec boni, nec mali merces jure pensaretur ei qui aut bo¬ nus, aut malus necessitate fuisset invectus non voluntate » . Sanctus Hilarius in Psalmum secundum : « Quid, inquit, honoris ac pramiii, bonitatis necessitas mereretur, cum malos nosse esse vis quredam inserta non sinei'et? voluntati ergo promissa bonitas est, ut pramiium sibi voluntas bonitatis acquireret ». Sanctus Hieixmymuslib.ii.in Jovinianum : « Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus, nec ad virtutes, nec ad vitia necessitate trahimur. Alioqui ubi necessitas, nec corona, nec dam¬ natio est ». S. Augustinus lib. n. de libero arbitrio, cap. 1. (i Deinde, inquit, illud bonum, quo commendatur ipsa justitia in damnandis pec¬ catis, recteque factis honorandis, quo modo esset, si homo voluntatem non haberet libe¬ ram ? non enim recte factum, aut peccatum esset, quod non fieret voluntate; ac per hoc et poena injusta esset, et prsemium, si homo voluntatem non haberet liberam n . S. Paulinusinepist. 2. ad Severum : « Quee nobis, inquit, est gratia, si in alieno tantum fideles fuerimus, nisi de proprio serviamus, id est, de libero voluntatis arbitrio » ? Sanctus Bernardus sermon. 81. in Canlic. « Ubi, inquit, non est libertas, nec meritum. Propterea qua! sutVt carentia ratione anima¬ lia, nihil merentur, quia sicut deliberatione, ita et libertate carent ». Tertio, idem probatur rationibus. Primum enim res multa}, ut sol, luna, campi, vineae, horti, jumenta, pecoi’a, maxima nobis com¬ moda praestant, et tamen non dicuntur pro¬ prie de nobis bene mereri, quia non libere agunt, nec possunt aliud facere, quam quod faciunt. Deinde, merito debetur merces, debitum autem non oritur, nisi ex eo, quod unus dat alteri quod suum erat. Nam si rem non suam, sed alienam daret, nihil ei deberetur : nihil autem proprie nostrum est, nisi quod pro arbitrio possumus facere, vel omittere. Ista enim in nostra potestate sunt, et horum dominium proprie habere dicimur. Denique mala opera, nisi libere fiant, poenam nullam merentur : igitur nec bona opera pra}miuin merebuntur, nisilibere facta fuerint. (I) Eccl. XXXI, 10: I Cor. IX, 17; II Cor. IX, 7. CAPUT XI.