Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Members of the Church · On the Laity or Secular Persons (Book III)
Chapter 7: The Same Asserted from Antiquity
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. III, De Laicis sive Saecularibus (De Membris Ecclesiae, Book III), On the Laity or Secular Persons (On the Members of the Church, Book III). The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The fifth argument is taken from the origin. For although servile subjection began after the sin of Adam, yet the political principate would have existed even in the state of innocence. And it is proved, first, because even then man would have been naturally a civil and social animal, and accordingly would have had need of a ruler.
Secondly, from the very creation; for God therefore made the woman from the man, and did not create many men at once, but one only, from whom all the others should be born, that He might indicate the order and rule which He willed to be among men, as Chrysostom observes (homily 34 on 1 Corinthians).
Thirdly, because in that state there would have been a disparity of sexes, of conditions, of talents, of wisdom, and of probity; therefore also rule and subjection; for in human society there had to be order. And right order requires that the inferior be ruled by the superior, the woman by the man, the younger by the elder, the less wise by the wiser, the less good by the better. And that these diversities would have had place even then can be shown thus.
In that state there would have been generation, as is plain (Genesis 1): “Increase and multiply”; therefore also a disparity of sex, which necessarily precedes generation, and a disparity of ages, which necessarily follows generation, and a disparity of wisdom and probity, which follows the disparity of ages. For men would not have been born perfect in that state, but would have had to learn and advance gradually. All indeed would have been born in the grace of God, and with greater knowledge than now, as Augustine teaches (Book I On the Baptism of Infants, chapter 38); but without doubt they would not have been as perfect as adults; and among the adults themselves, some through free choice could apply themselves more, others less, to learning.
Finally, the variety of talents arises from the variety of bodies; and there would then have been bodies varied in size, form, strength, and the like, as is plain, because those bodies were not exempt from the laws of nature, and needed food, the breathing of air, the influences of the heavens; therefore there would then also have been a diversity of talents. See Blessed Thomas (Part 1, questions 96 and 105).
Fourthly, among the angels there is rule and subjection; why then would there not have been among men in the state of innocence? Certainly Beelzebub is called the prince of the demons (Matthew 12); who surely did not acquire that principate by sinning, but retained what he had before over those angels who followed him. And in Revelation 12 it is said, “Michael and his angels.” Finally Dionysius (chapter 9 of the Celestial Hierarchy) says that the first hierarchy of angels presides over and commands the second, and the second the third. And Blessed Gregory (homily 34 on the Gospel) says that the names of Principalities and Dominations among the angels openly signify that some preside over others.
From these things it is answered to the fifth argument that the liberty in which we were created does not conflict with political subjection, but only with despotic subjection, that is, with true and proper servitude. And political subjection differs from servile in this: that one subject in a servile way is and works for the sake of another; one subject politically is and works for his own sake. A slave is ruled not for his own advantage, but for that of his master; a citizen is ruled for his own advantage, not for the advantage of the magistrate; just as, on the contrary, a political prince, in ruling the people, seeks not his own but the people’s good, whereas a tyrant and a master seeks not the people’s but his own, as Aristotle teaches (Book VIII Ethics, chapter 10). And so in truth, if there is any servitude in the political principate, he who presides ought more properly to be called a servant than he who is subject, as Augustine teaches (Book XIX On the City of God, chapter 14). And this is what the Lord’s word signifies to the letter (Matthew 20): “Whoever wishes to become first among you shall be the servant of all” — in which way bishops name themselves servants of their peoples, and the supreme Pontiff names himself the servant of the servants of God.
To the first passage from Genesis 1 I say that there it treats of despotic rule; for thus man had to have dominion over the fishes of the sea, the birds of the air, and the other animals.
To the second I say that the woman, both before sin and after, is a companion and subject to the man — a companion in generation, subject in government. But that word, “Thou shalt be under the power of thy husband,” does not signify any subjection whatever, but an involuntary one, with sadness and fear, such as married women for the most part experience. So teaches Blessed Augustine (Book XI On Genesis, chapter 37): “For neither is it fitting to believe that before sin the woman was made otherwise than that the man should have dominion over her, and that she should turn to him by serving; but this servitude may rightly be understood as signified, which is of a certain condition rather than of choice.”
To the third I confess that Cain first built a material city, but it does not therefore follow that political government began there; for even without a material city there can be a commonwealth and a principate; nor can it be denied that his sons and grandsons were subject to Adam.
To the fourth I say that Augustine speaks of servitude properly so called, as is plain from that whole chapter, where among other things he says: “The condition of servitude is rightly understood as imposed on the sinner,” and so on. Nor does it stand in the way that Augustine says in the same place that the first just men were established as shepherds of flocks rather than as kings of men, that thereby too God might intimate what the order of creatures required and what the desert of sins exacts; for in this place he looks to the abuse of the royal name, which is sometimes taken for despotic rule. For, as the same Augustine says (Book V On the City of God, chapter 12), a king is so called from ruling and counseling, not from reigning and lording it; and in this way Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob could have been called kings. Yet because human haughtiness thinks a king is so called from reigning and lording it — whence is that word of the Lord (Luke 22): “The kings of the Gentiles lord it over them” — therefore the first just men were called shepherds of flocks rather than kings of men.
To the fifth I say that Gregory does not speak of the political principate simply, but with fear, sadness, and dread annexed, which were brought in by sin. And when he says that all men are by nature equal, and become unequal through sin, and therefore one ought to be ruled by another, he does not mean that men are by nature equal in wisdom or grace, but equal in essence and in the human species; from which equality it is rightly gathered that one ought not to lord it over another, as man lords it over the beasts, but only that one ought to be ruled by another politically. Whence in the same place he adds: “For to be proud against nature is to wish to be feared by equals.” But because sinners through sin become like the beasts and degenerate from that integrity of nature in which they had been created, therefore Gregory in the same place rightly says that after sin one began to lord it over another — with terror, by threatening and punishing, which in the state of innocence would not have been.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT VII. Idem asseritur ex antiquitate. Quinta ratio sumitur ab origine; Nam etsi subjectio servilis coepit postpeccatum Adae, tamen politicus principatus fuisset etiam in statu innocentiae ; et probatur primo, quia etiam tunc homo fuisset naturaliter animal civile, et sociale, ac proinde rectore opus habuisset. Secundo, ex ipsa creatione ; Nam ideo Deus fecit mulierem ex viro, et non creavit simul multos viros, sed unum tantum, ex quo omnes alii nascerentur; ut indicaret or¬ dinem et praefecturam, quam inter homines esse volebat, ut Ghrysostom. observat ho- mil. 34. in. I. ad Corinth. Tertio, quia in illo statu fuisset disparitas sexuum, statuum, ingeniorum, sapientiae et probitatis : ergo et praefectura ac subjectio; nam in humana societate debuit esse ordo. Rectus autem ordo postulat, ut inferiore a superiore regatur, foemina a viro, junior a seniore, minus sapiensasapentiore, et minus bonus a meliore : quod autem hae diversita¬ tes tunc etiam locum habuissent, sic ostendi potest. In illo statu fuisset generatio, ut patet Ge¬ nes. I. Crescite, et multiplicamini (6) : ergo et (1) Isai X, 5 et seq. — '(2) Isai XLV, 1 et seq. — (3) Jerem. XXVII. 6 et seq. — (4) Ezech. XXIX, 18. — (5) Matth. XXII, 21. — (6) Gen. I, 28. CAPUT VII. 13 sexus disparitas, quae necessario praecedit generationem, et disparitas aetatum, quae necessario sequitur generationem, et dispa¬ ritas sapientiae et probitatis, quae sequitur aetatum disparitatem; non enim fuissent nati homines perfecti in illo statu, sed debuissent paulatim discere, et proficere. Fuissent qui¬ dem omnes nati in gratia Dei, et cum ma¬ jori cognitione, quam nunc, ut Augustinus docet lib. I. de Baptismo parvulorum, c. 38. at sine dubio non fuissent tam perfecti, quam adulti : et inter ipsos adultos poterant per li¬ berum arbitrium aliimagis, alii minus appli¬ cari ad discendum. Denique ingeniorum varietas oritur ex va¬ rietate corporum ; fuissent autem tunc cor¬ pora varia magnitudine, forma, robore, et si¬ milibus, ut patet, quia illa corpora non erant exempta a legibus naturae, et egebant cibo, aeris inspiratione, coelorum influxibus : fuis¬ set igitur etiam tunc ingeniorum diversitas. Vide B.Thomam I. par. qusest. XCYI etCV. Quarto, inter Angelos est praefectura, et subjectio, cur ergo inter homines non fuisset in statu innocentiae? Certe Beelzebub dicitur princeps Daemoniorum, Matth. XII : qui sane principatum non acquisivit peccando, sed retinuit, quem ante habebat in eos An¬ gelos, qui eum secuti sunt. Et Apocalvps. cap. XII. dicitur :,Michael, et Angeli ejus ( 1). Denique Dionysius cap. 9. coelestis Hierar- chiae, dicit primam Hierarchiam Angelorum praeesse, et imperare secundae, et secundam tertiae. Et. B. Gregor, homil. 34. inEvangel. dicit, nomina Principatuum et Dominatio¬ num in Angelis, aperte significare, quod alii aliis praesint. Ex his ad argumentum quintum respon¬ detur, non pugnare libertatem, in qua creati sumus, cum politica subjectione, sed solum cum despotica, id est, cum vera et propria servitute. Differt autem politica subjectio a servili, quod subjectus serviliter est, etope- ratur'propter alium ; subjectus politice, est, et operatur propter se; servus regitur non in sui, sed in domini sui commodum ; civis regitur in commodum suum, non in commo¬ dum magistratus ; sicut e contrario Princeps politicus, dum regit populum, non suam, sed populi utilitatem quaerit, Tyrannus au¬ tem, et Dominus, non populi, sed suam quaeiut, ut Aristot. docet, lib. VIII. de morib. cap. 10. Itaque revera si ulla est servitus in politico principatu, magis proprie servus dici debet qui praeest, quam qui subjectus est, ut docet Augustinus lib. XIX. civitat. cap. 14. et hoc ad litteram significat illud Domini, Matth. XX : Qui voluerit inter vos primus fieri, erit omnium servus (2) ; quomo¬ do Episcopi servos se plebium suarum, et summus Pontifex servum servorum Dei se nominat. Ad primum locum ex cap. I. Genes, dico, ibi agi de principatu despotico ; sic enim dominari debuit homo piscibus maris, et volatilibus coeli, aliisque animantibus. Ad secundum dico, mulierem tam ante peccatum, quam post, sociam et subjectam esse viro, sociam in generatione, subjectam in gubernatione. Illud autem : Sub viri po¬ testate eris (3), non significat quamcumque subjectionem, sed involuntariam, et cum tristitia ac timore, qualem ut plurimum ex¬ periuntur mulieres conjugatae ; ita docet B. Augustinus lib. XI. Genes, cap. 37 ; «Ne¬ que enim, inquit, et ante peccatum aliter factam fuisse, decet credere, mulierem, nisi ut vir ei dominaretur, et ad eum ipsa ser¬ viendo converteretur, sed recte accipi potest hanc servitutem significatam, quae cujus- dam conditionis est potius, quam electio¬ nis. » Ad tertium fateor, Cain primum aedificasse materialem civitatem, sed non propterea sequitur ibi coepisse politicum regimen ; nam etiam sine civitate materiali potest esse Respublica et Principatus; neque negari po¬ test, quin Adamo subjecti fuerint filii et nepotes ejus. Ad quartum dico, Augustinum loqui de servitute proprie dicta, ut ex toto illo capite patet; ubi inter' alia sic ait : « Conditio ser¬ vitutis jure intelligilur imposita peccatori etc. » Neque obstat quod Augustinus ibidem dicit, quod primi justi, pastores, magis pe¬ corum, quam Reges hominum constituti sunt, ut hinc etiam insinuaret Deus, quid postularet ordo creaturarum, et quid exi¬ gat meritum peccatorum ; nam hoc loco respicit ad abusum nominis regii, quod in¬ terdum accipiatur pro despotico principatu; nam ut idem Augustinus ait lib. Y. de civit. Dei cap. 12, Rex dicitur a regendo, et con¬ sulendo, non a regnando atque dominando; et hoc modo Abraham, Isaac, et J acob Reges dici potuissent : tamen quia fastus humanus (1; Apoc. XII, 7. - (2) Matth. XX, 27. - (3) Gen. III, 16. LIBER III. 14 Regem dici putat a regnando et dominando, unde est illud Domini, Luc. XXII : Reges Gentium dominantur eorum (1), ideo primi justi, pastores pecorum potius, quam Reges hominum dicti sunt. Ad quintum dico, Cregorium non loqui de principatu politico simpliciter, sed adjuncto metu, et tristitia, et timore etc. quae per peccatum invecta sunt; et cum ait, omnes homines natura esse aequales, et per pecca¬ tum fieri inaequales, et ideo unum ab altero regi debere, non intelligit homines natura esse aequales sapientia vel gratia, sed aequa¬ les in essentia et specie humana; ex qua aequalitate recte colligitur, non debere unum alteri dominari, quomodo homo dominatur bestiis, sed solum debere unum ab altero regi politice. Unde ibidem subdit : « Nam contra naturam superbire, est ab aequalibus velle timeri; » Quia vero peccatores per peccatum similes fiunt bestiis, et degenerant ab ea naturae integritate, in qua creati fue¬ rant ; ideo ibidem Gregorius dicit recte post peccatum unum alteri dominari coepisse; cum terrore minando et puniendo, quod in statu innocentiae non fuisset.