Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Members of the Church · On the Laity or Secular Persons (Book III)
Chapter 15: How Many, and Which, Are the Conditions of a Just War
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. III, De Laicis sive Saecularibus (De Membris Ecclesiae, Book III), On the Laity or Secular Persons (On the Members of the Church, Book III). The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Those who treat of these matters are wont to number four conditions of a just war: lawful authority, a just cause, a good intention, and a fitting manner. But of each we must speak separately.
The first condition, then, is lawful authority; for Saint Augustine says (Book XXII against Faustus, chapter 75): “That natural order accommodated to the peace of mortals demands this, that the authority and counsel of undertaking war be in the hands of the prince, but that soldiers owe the ministry of executing warlike commands to the common peace and safety.” And reason proves the same; for private men, and those who have a superior, if they receive injuries from anyone, can flee to their superior and ask judgment from him. But princes, if they suffer anything from other princes, have no common tribunal before which to accuse them; and therefore it is lawful for such a one to repel public injuries by war.
And this authority of declaring war resides, according to the common opinion, in all princes and peoples who in temporal matters have no superior — such as all kings; likewise the commonwealth of the Venetians and the like; likewise certain dukes and counts who are subject to none in temporal matters — but not dukes and counts who are subject to kings immediately; for those who are subject to others are not of themselves heads of the commonwealth, but rather members. Note, however, that this authority is not required for a defensive war, but only for an offensive one; for it is lawful for each one to defend himself, not only for a prince but even for a private person; but to declare war and invade an enemy belongs only to the supreme head.
The second condition is a just cause; for war cannot be declared without cause, nor even on account of any sin whatever, but only to repel an injury. So Blessed Augustine (question 10 on Joshua): “Just wars are wont to be defined as those which avenge injuries, if some nation or city which is to be attacked by war has either neglected to punish what was wickedly done by its own, or to restore what was taken away by injury.” And the reason of this is that a prince is a judge only of the men subject to him; therefore he cannot punish any sins whatever of other men, but only those which fall to the detriment of the people subject to him. For although he is not the ordinary judge of others, yet he is the defender of his own, and by reason of this necessity he becomes also in a manner the judge of those who have done injury to his own, so that he can punish them with the sword.
But it must be observed that the cause of war ought to be not light, nor doubtful, but great and certain, lest perhaps the war bring more disadvantage than is the utility hoped from it. But if it be doubtful, a distinction must be made between the prince and the soldiers; for the prince himself without doubt sins; for war is an act of punitive justice, and it is unjust to punish anyone whose cause is not yet proved. But the soldiers do not sin unless it be certainly established that the war is unlawful; for subjects ought to obey their superior, nor ought they to discuss his commands, but rather ought to presume that their prince has a good cause, unless they manifestly know the contrary — just as, when the guilt of some particular person is doubtful, the judge who condemns him sins, not the executioner who kills the condemned; for the executioner is not bound to discuss the sentence of the judge. So teaches Pope Boniface (in the Sext, On the Rules of Law, rule 25): “What one does by the command of a judge is not seen to be done by fraud, since he must needs obey.” And Blessed Augustine (Book XXII against Faustus, chapter 75): “It also comes about that a just man, if perchance he serves as a soldier under a sacrilegious king, can rightly fight at his command, keeping the order of civic peace — when what is commanded is either certainly not against God’s precept, or it is not certain whether it be so — so that perhaps the iniquity of commanding makes the king guilty, but the order of serving shows the soldier innocent.”
Note, however, that this is understood of soldiers who are obligated to the prince who wages the war, such as his subjects, and also those who have an ordinary pay from him even in time of peace — but not of others who come from elsewhere when there is fighting to be done. For those who are not obligated to serve cannot with a safe conscience go to war unless they know the war to be just; but those who think of nothing, but are ready to serve, whether the war be just or not, provided they have pay, these are in a state of damnation.
The third condition is a good intention. For since the end of war is peace and public tranquillity, it is not lawful to undertake war for another end. Whence both kings and soldiers gravely sin who undertake war either to harm someone, or to extend their dominion, or to exercise warlike valor, or for any other cause than for the common good, even if lawful authority and a just cause be not lacking. So Blessed Augustine (in the letter to Boniface the count, which is 207, elsewhere 5): “The will ought to have peace, war only necessity, that God may free from necessity and preserve in peace. For peace is not sought that war may be waged, but war is waged that peace may be acquired. Be therefore peaceful even in warring, that by conquering you may lead those whom you fight to the profit of peace.” And (Book XXII against Faustus, chapter 74): “The desire of harming, the cruelty of avenging, an unappeased and implacable mind, the fierceness of rebelling, the lust of dominating, and if there be any like things — these are what are rightly blamed in war.”
But two things are to be noted. First, since war is a certain means to peace, but a very grave and dangerous one, therefore war is not to be waged at once when a cause exists, but peace is first to be procured by other, easier means — namely, by peaceably asking from the enemy the due satisfaction. Deuteronomy 20: “If at any time thou come to fight against a city, thou shalt first offer it peace,” and so on. And Blessed Augustine (letter 207 to Boniface): “The will ought to have peace, war only necessity.”
But someone will ask, what if the enemy will not make satisfaction at the beginning, but a little after, the war having already begun, asks peace and offers satisfaction — whether the other will be bound to cease from war. Cajetan (under the word “War”) says that he is not bound to cease when the war has already begun, although he would have been bound, before it was begun, to accept the satisfaction. But (saving a better judgment) it seems to be said that, in justice, he who has a just cause is never bound to accept satisfaction, neither before the war is begun nor after; yet in charity he is bound at either time, unless by accident something else be expedient. The reason of the former is that a prince having a just cause of war bears the person of a judge in respect of the other prince who did the injury; and a judge is not bound in justice to remit death to a guilty man, even if he offers satisfaction, although he can remit it out of mercy, if he be a supreme judge — for example, a king is not bound to grant life to a thief, even if he restore, though he can out of mercy. The reason of the latter is that war is a most grave punishment, by which not only he who sinned is punished, but also by accident many innocent are involved; therefore Christian charity always seems to require that there be a cessation from war when he who did harm offers the due satisfaction, unless perhaps by accident something else be expedient — that is, unless the enemy against whom one fights be such that it is expedient for the common good either that he be subjected to another, or perish utterly, such as were the Amorrhites, whom God ordered to be wholly destroyed (Deuteronomy 20).
Secondly it is to be noted that this third condition differs from the first two in this: that if those be lacking, they make the war unjust; but this, if it be lacking, makes the war evil, but not properly unjust. For he who moves war without authority or without a just cause sins not only against charity but also against justice, and is not so much a soldier as a robber; but he who has authority and a just cause, and yet fights out of love of vengeance, or of extending dominion, or for another evil end, does not act against justice, but only against charity, and is not a robber but a bad soldier.
From which it is deduced that when only this third condition is lacking, neither soldiers nor kings are bound to any restitution, but only to penance; but when the first or second is lacking, all are bound to restitution of the damage inflicted, unless they be excused by invincible ignorance. For crass and culpable ignorance, as it does not excuse from sin, so neither from restitution, as we have in the final chapter On Injuries and Damage Done. But he who labors under invincible ignorance is not bound to restore while he labors under that ignorance; but when he has known the war to have been unjust, he is bound to restore — not the damage inflicted at the time of the war, but whatever he has of another’s from that war. And if he has nothing in kind, but yet by the sale of things has become richer, he is bound to restore as much as he has become richer; for another’s property cannot be retained, even if acquired without sin through ignorance, but must be rendered either to the owner if he is known, or to the poor.
The fourth condition is the due manner, which consists chiefly in this, that no harm be done to the innocent, which John the Baptist explained (Luke 3): “Do violence to no man, calumniate no one, be content with your pay.” By which words he forbids the injuries which soldiers are wont to inflict on the innocent, whether by force or by fraud, either in their persons or in their goods. When he says, “Do violence to no man,” he forbids the injury which is inflicted on the person by open violence, as when they beat peasants unless they obey at a nod. When he says, “Calumniate no one,” he forbids the injury inflicted by frauds and calumny, as when they say someone is a traitor or an enemy, even though they know the contrary to be true, and under that name either themselves despoil or kill him, or bring him to the commander or officers. And when he adds, “Be content with your pay,” he forbids the injury inflicted on someone not in his person but in his goods, as when they steal and plunder wherever they can, or even exact and extort from those from whom they ought not.
And it is to be observed that there are three kinds of persons to whom soldiers cannot inflict damage, according to the rule of John the Baptist. The first is of all those who do not pertain to the commonwealth of the enemy. Whence soldiers cannot be excused who inflict damage on friendly citizens or peasants, among whom they lodge, or through whose places they pass. Nor are they excused if they say their pay is not paid them; for the goods of private citizens are not on that account bound to them, nor ought a citizen or peasant to pay the penalty if the king or commander sins by not paying the soldiers — unless perhaps, for a just cause, the men of some place have been condemned to this penalty, of maintaining the soldiers, which yet more rarely happens.
The second is of certain persons who, although in some way they pertain to the commonwealth of the enemy, yet are excepted in the chapter Innovamus (On Truce and Peace), where it is thus said: “We renew, that priests, monks, lay brothers, pilgrims, merchants, peasants going or returning or engaged in agriculture, and the animals with which they plow and carry seeds to the field, may enjoy fitting security.” Where by the name of merchants do not seem to be understood those who reside in the city of the enemy and are a certain part of the city, but only those who pass through, or come to the fairs, who are not part of the city.
The third kind is of men unfit for war, such as children, the aged, women; for such, although they can be captured and despoiled, because they are part of the city, yet cannot justly be killed, unless perhaps they be killed by chance and by accident — as when a soldier hurls a missile into a wedge of the enemy and by chance kills a child, or a woman, or even a priest, he does not sin; but then he sins when he kills of set intention, and could, if he would, not kill. For both natural reason teaches this, and God too commanded this to the Hebrews (Deuteronomy 20), namely that they should spare the little ones and the women; and Theodosius was gravely reprehended by Ambrose, because, when he wished to punish the Thessalonians, he ordered whoever was met to be slain without distinction, as Theodoret relates (Book V of the history, chapters 17 and 18). But if Moses sometimes ordered even women and little ones to be killed, as is plain (Deuteronomy 2 and 3, and elsewhere), it is not therefore lawful for our soldiers too; for he by God’s revelation clearly knew that God so willed, to whom no one can say, why doest thou so?
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XV. Quot sint, et quee justi belli conditiones. Belli justi conditiones quatuor numerare solent, qui haec tractant. Auctoritatem legi¬ timam, causam justam, intentionem bonam, et modum convenientem. Sed de singulis seorsim dicendum est. Prima igitur conditio est auctoritas legi¬ tima, dicit enim S. Augustinus lib. XXII. contra Faustum, cap. 75 : « Ordo ille natu¬ ralis mortalium paci accommodatus hoc po¬ scit, ut suscipiendi belli auctoritas, atque consilium penes principem sit , exequendi autem jussa bellica ministerium milites de¬ beant paci, salutique communi. » Et ratio idem probat; nam privati homines, et qui superiorem habent, si ab aliquo injurias ac¬ cipiant, possunt ad superiorem confugere, atque ab eo judicium petere. At principes si ab aliis principibus aliquid patiantur , non habent commune aliquod tribunal, ad quod illos accusent, et ideo licet ei bello injurias publicas propulsare. Residet autem haec auctoritas indicendi belli, secundum communem sententiam, in omnibus, principibus, et populis, qui in tem¬ poralibus superiorem non habent, quales sunt Reges omnes ; item Respub. Venetorum et similes etc. Item nonnulli Duces et Comi¬ tes, qui nulli subsunt in temporalibus : non autem Duces et Comites, qui subsunt regibus immediate; qui enim subsunt aliis, non sunt per se capita Reipub. sed potius membra. Nota tamen hanc auctoritatem non requiri ad bellum defensivum, sed solum ad ollen- p CAPUT XV. 29 sivum, nam defendere se unicuique licet, non solum principi, sed etiam privato , at indicere bellum, et invadere hostem, solius est supremi capitis. Secunda conditio est causa justa, non enim sine causa bellum indici potest, nec etiam propter quodcumque peccatum, sed tantum propter injuriam propulsandam. Ita B. Au- gustin. quaest. 10. in Josue : « Justa bella, inquit, definiri solent, quse ulciscuntur inju¬ rias, si qua gens vel civitas, quae bello pe¬ tenda est, vel vindicare neglexit, quod a suis improbe factum est, vel reddere, quod per injuriam ablatum est. » Ratio autem hujus est, quia princeps non est judex, nisi homi¬ num sibi subditorum, ergo non potest quse- cumque peccata aliorum hominum punire, sed solum ea, quae cadunt in detrimentum populi sibi subjecti ; nam etsi non est judex ordinarius aliorum, est tamen defensor suo¬ rum, et ratione hujus necessitatis efficitur etiam quodammodo judex eorum, qui suis injuriam fecerunt, ita ut possit eos gladio punire. Est vero observandum causam belli de¬ bere esse non levem, neque dubiam, sed magnam et certam, ne forte plus incommodi bellum afferat, quam sit utilitas, quae inde speratur. Si autem dubia sit, distinguendum est de principe, et militibus ; nam princeps ipse sine dubio peccat ; nam bellum est actus justitiae punitivae, injustum est autem punire aliquem causa nondum probata : milites au¬ tem non peccant nisi constaret certo bellum esse illicitum : debent enim subditi parere superiori, nec debent discutere imperia ejus, sed potius praesumere debent principem suum bonam causam habere, nisi manifeste contrarium noverint ; sicut etiam cum dubia est culpa alicujus particularis, peccat judex, qui eum damnat, non carnifex, qui damna¬ tum occidit ; non enim tenetur carnifex dis¬ cutere sententiam judicis, ita docet Bonifa- cius Papa in Sexto, de regulis juris, regula 25 : « Quod quis, inquit, mandato facit judi¬ cis, dolo facere non videtur, cum habeat pa¬ rere necesse. » Et B. Augustinus lib. XXII. contra Faustum, cap. 75 : « Hoc etiam, in¬ quit, fit ut vir justus, si forte sub rege sacri¬ lego militet, recte possit illo, jubente bellare, civicae pacis ordinem servans, cui quod ju¬ betur, vel non esse contra Dei praeceptum, certum est, vel utrum sit, certum non est, ita ut fortasse reum regem faciat iniquitas imperandi, innocentem autem militem os¬ tendat ordo serviendi. » * Nota tamen hoc intelligi de militibus, qui sunt obligati ei principi, qui bellum gerit, quales sunt subditi ejus, et etiam ii, qui or¬ dinarium ab eo stipendium habent etiam tempore pacis, non autem de aliis qui aliunde adveniunt cum est bellandum ; Qui enim non sunt obligati militare, non possunt tuta con¬ scientia ad bellum accedere, nisi sciant bel¬ lum esse justum ; Qui autem nihil cogitant, sed parati sunt militare, sive bellum sit jus¬ tum, sive non, modo stipendium habeant, ii in statu damnationis versantur. Tertia conditio est intentio bona. Nam cum finis belli sit pax et tranquillitas publica, non licet bellum suscipere propter alium finem. Unde graviter peccant tam reges, quam mi¬ lites, qui vel ut noceant alicui, vel ut impe¬ rium dilatent, vel ut exerceant fortitudinem bellicam, vel alia de causa bellum susci¬ piunt, quam propter commune bonum, etiam¬ si auctoritas legitima, et causa justa non de¬ sint, ita Beatus Augustinus inepist. adBoni- facium comitem, quse est 207. alias 5 : «Pacem, inquit, habex-e debet voluntas, bellum neces¬ sitas, ut liberet Deus a necessitate, et con¬ servet in pace. Non enim pax quaeritur ut bellum geratur, sed bellum geidtur ut pax acquiratur. Esto ergo etiam bellando pacifi¬ cus, ut eos, quos expugnas, ad pacis unita¬ tem vincendo perducas. » EtliB. XXII. contra Faustum, cap. 74: « Nocendi cupiditas, ulcis¬ cendi crudelitas, impacatus, atque implaci- bilis animus, feritas rebellandi, libido domi¬ nandi, et si qua similia, haec sunt, quae in bello jui'e culpantur. » Sunt autem duo notanda. Primo, quoniam bellum est medium quoddam ad pacem, sed valde grave et periculosum, ideo non esse mox inferendum bellum, cum causa existit, sed esse prius procurandam pacem aliis ra¬ tionibus facilkmbus, nimirum pacifice peten¬ do ab hostibus debitam satisfactionem. Deu- teron XX. Si quando accesseris ad expugnan¬ dam civitatem , offeres ei primum pacem ete (1). Et B. Augustinus epist. 207. ad Bonifacium: « Pacem habere debet voluntas, bellum ne¬ cessitas. » Sed quaeretaliquis, quid si hostis nolit initio satisfacere, sed paulo post, bello jam inchoa¬ to, petat pacem, et satisfactionem offerat, an (1) Daut. XX, 10. 30 LIBER III. tenebitur alter a bello cessare. Cajetanus verbo Bellum, dicit, quod non tenetur ces^- sare, quando bellum jam est inchoatum, quamquam teneretur antea quam inchoare¬ tur, acceptare satisfactionem. Sed (meliori judicio salvo) dicendum videtur, quod ex justitia numquam tenetur, qui habet justam causam, acceptare satisfactionem nec ante bellum inchoatum, nec postea: tamen ex charitute utroque tempore tenetur; nisi per accidens aliud expediat. Prioris ratio est, quia princeps habens justam causam belli, gerit personam judicis respectu alterius principis, qui injuriam fecit, judex autem non tenetur ex justitia condonare mortem reo, etiamsi offerat satisfactionem, quam¬ quam possit condonare ex misericordia, si sit supremus judex, verbi gratia, Rex non tenetur donare vitam furi, etiamsi restituat, etsi ex misericordia potest. Ratio poterioris est, quia bellum est gravissimum supplicium, et quo non solum punitur qui peccavit, sed etiam per accidens multi innocentes invol¬ vuntur : ideo Christiana charitas semper id videtur exigere ut a bello cessetur, quando qui nocuit debitam satisfactionem offert, nisi forte per accidens aliud expediat, id est, nisi talis sit hostis contra quem pugnatur, ut bono communi expediat eum vel subjectum esse alteri, velle funditus interire, quales erant Amorrhaei, quos Deus jussit penitus deleri, Deuter. XX. Secundo notandum, differre hanc tertiam conditionem a duabus primis, quod illee si desint, faciunt bellum esse injustum, hoec vero si desit, facit bellum esse malum, sed non injustum proprie. Qui enim sine aucto¬ ritate vel sine justa causa bellum movet, non solum contra charitatem, sed etiam contra justitiam peccat, et non tam est miles, quam latro : qui vero auctoritatem, et causam jus¬ tam habet , et tamen amore vindictae vel augendi imperii, vel propter alium finem malum bellat, non agit contra justitiam, sed solum contra charitatem, nec est latro, sed malus miles. Ex quo deducitur, quod cum solum deest haec tertia conditio, non tenentur milites, nec reges ad ullam restitutionem, sed solum ad poenitentiam : cum autem deest prima vel secunda, tenentur omnes ad restitutio¬ nem damni illati, nisi excusentur ignorantia invincibili. Ignorantia enim crassa, et culpa¬ bilis sicut a peccato non excusat, ita nec a restitutione, ut habemus capite finali, de in¬ juriis et damno dato. Qui autem laborat ignorantia invincibili, non tenetur restituere donec ea ignorantia laborat; at cum cogno¬ verit bellum fuisse injustum, tenetur resti¬ tuere, non damnum tempore belli illatum, sed si quid habet alienum ex illo bello : et si nihil habet in specie, sed tamen rebus ven¬ ditis factus est ditior, tenetur restituere tan¬ tum, quantum est ditior factus; nam res alie¬ na retineri non potest, etiamsi propter igno¬ rantiam sine peccato acquisita sit, sed reddi debet vel domino si scitur, vel pauperi¬ bus. Quarta conditio est, modus debitus, qui in eo praecipue consistit, ut nulli innocenti no¬ ceatur, quod explicuit Joannes Baptista Luc. III : Neminem concutiatis, nulli calumniam fa¬ ciatis, contenti estote stipendiis vestris (I). Qui¬ bus verbis prohibet injurias, quas milites in¬ ferre solent innocentibus aut vi, aut fraude, vel in persona, vel in bonis. Cum dicit : Ne¬ minem concutiatis , prohibet injuriam, quae aperta violentia infertur personae, ut cum rusticos caedunt, nisi ad nutum obediant. Cum dicit : Nemini calumniam faciatis, prohi¬ bet injuriam, quae fraudibus, et calumnia infertur, ut cum dicunt aliquem esse prodito¬ rem vel hostem, etiamsi contrarium nove¬ rint esse verum, et eo nomine vel ipsi eum spoliant, aut occidunt, vel deferunt ad du¬ cem, vel praefectos. Cum vero addit : Contenti estote stipendiis vestris, prohibet injuriam, quae alicui non in persona, sed in bonis in¬ fertur, ut cum furantur, et rapiunt unde¬ cumque possunt, vel etiam exigunt, et extor¬ quent ab iis a quibus non debent. Est autem observandum, tria esse genera personarum, quibus milites damnum inferre non possunt secundum regulam Joannis Bap¬ tistae. Primum est eorum omnium, qui ad Rempub. hostium non pertinent. Ex quo ex¬ cusari non possunt milites, qui damnum in¬ ferunt civibus, aut rusticis amicis, apud quos hospitantur, vel per quorum loca tran¬ seunt. Neque excusantur si dicant, sibi sti¬ pendia non solvi;. nam non propterea illis obligata sunt bona privatorum civium, ne¬ que luere debet poenam civis, aut rusticus, si rex aut dux peccat non solvendo stipen¬ dia militibus, nisi forte justa de causa dam¬ nati sint homines alicujus loci ad hanc pce- (1) Luc * III. 14, CAPUT XVI. 31 nam, utmilites alant, quod tamen rarius ac¬ cidit. Secundum est quorumdam, qui etsi aliquo modo ad llempub. hostium pertinent, tamen excipiuntur capite Innovamus, de tregua, et pace, ubi sic dicitur : «Innovamus, ut Pres¬ byteri, Monachi, conversi, peregrini, merca¬ tores, rustici, euntes, vel redeuntes, vel in agricultura existCntes, et animalia, quibus arant, et semina portant ad agrum, congrua securitate laetentur. » Ubi nomine mercato¬ rum non videntur intelligi ii, qui in civitate hostium resident, et sunt pars quaedam civi¬ tatis, sed solum ii, qui transeunt, vel ad nun¬ dinas veniunt, qui non sunt pars civitatis. Tertium genus est hominum ineptorum ad bellum, quales sunt pueri, senes, mulieres : tales enim, etsi capi et spoliari possunt, quia sunt pars civitatis, tamen occidi juste non possunt, nisi forte casu et per accidens occi¬ dantur : ut cum miles jaculatur in cuneum hostium, et forte occidit puerum, aut mulie¬ rem, aut etiam sacerdotem non peccat, sed tunc peccat, cum ex intentione occidit, et po¬ test, si velit, non occidere. Nam et ratio na¬ turalis hoc docet, et etiam Deus hoc jube¬ bat Hebraeis Deuter. XX. nimirum ut parce¬ rent pax'vulis et mulieribus, et Theodosius graviter ab Ambrosio reprehensus fuit, quod cum punire vellet Thessalonicences, sine de¬ lectu obvios quosque necari jussit, ut refert Theodoretus lib. V. hist. cap. 17. et 18. Quod si Moses aliquando jussit etiam mulie¬ res, et parvulos occidi, ut patet Deuter. II. et III. et alibi, non propterea id etiam nostris militibus licet ; nam ille Dei revelatione clare cognoscebat Deum sic velle, cui nemo dicere potest, cur ita facis?