Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Sacrament of Matrimony
Chapter 17: The Arguments of the Adversaries Are Solved (Objections One to Seven)
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. III, De Sacramento Matrimonii, the fifth general controversy on the sacraments. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
I shall set out and solve the arguments of Martin Chemnitz, both because he wrote after all the others and collected their arguments, and because no one has answered him; whereas John Eck, Ruard, Alphonsus de Castro and many others among the Catholics have answered Erasmus, Cajetan, Catharinus, Luther, Bucer, Brenz, Calvin and Philip.
The first objection of Chemnitz, page 1230: “The papist law, denying another marriage to the innocent spouse in the case of adultery, deprives the innocent of his right without his fault, against the rules of law.”
I answer: this law is not of the Roman pontiff alone, but also of Christ. And Chemnitz alleges the rule of law badly: for this is the rule in the Sext, on the rules of law, canon Sine culpa: “No one is to be punished without fault, unless there is a cause.” Where not only the fault but also the cause must be absent, for one to be in no way punishable: otherwise, how often are children deprived of their father's inheritance on account of the father's sins? How often are men lawfully tortured by judges on account of some signs, without any fault of their own? How often, on account of the incurable sickness of a spouse, is the other spouse deprived without his own fault of the conjugal debt, and (what is graver) of the fruit of marriage, that is, offspring? So, then, when the wife is separated by divorce, the husband is deprived of the use of marriage without fault, but not without cause: for there is a very great cause, because the bond of the first remains, and because Christ forbids it, and because injury would be done to the offspring, and so on.
The second objection, page 1231: “If it were not lawful for the innocent man to take a wife, the divorce granted by the Son of God in the case of fornication would be nothing else than a snare of conscience, and would cast men into burnings and fornication, into the wrath and judgement of God; for perhaps that innocent person will not have the gift of continence, and therefore will be in perpetual burning, which hinders the calling upon God, or will even be thrown headlong into fornications and adulteries. Wherefore Christ would have provided better for his Church if he had granted no divorce; for then the innocent person would be compelled to use the remedies ordained by God.”
I answer: either the innocent person can refrain from putting away the spouse, or at least after the putting away can be reconciled; or he is compelled to put away and cannot be reconciled. If the first is granted, which happens for the most part, then no snare of conscience is to be feared: for the innocent person has a remedy ready, if he cannot be continent, namely not to put away the spouse, or to be reconciled to the one put away; to which the Apostle exhorts, 1 Corinthians 7, and after the Apostle Ambrose on chapter 16 of Luke, and Augustine, book 2 On Adulterous Marriages, chapters 6, 7 and 9.
And that it ought not to seem hard to husbands to pardon the faults of their wives Augustine proves in many ways in the place noted. First, because if God through the sacrament of Penance cleanses the sin of adultery, and of an adulteress makes a holy woman, and reconciles her to himself, why should it be grievous to the husband to reconcile to himself a woman reconciled to God, no longer an adulteress but a just woman? For she had offended God by spiritual adultery no less than her husband by carnal adultery.
Second: Christ forgives husbands their spiritual adulteries as often as they will be reconciled to him; therefore husbands too ought to forgive wives their carnal adulteries, if they desire to be reconciled. For “with what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again,” Matthew 7 and Luke 6; and it is to be feared lest it be said to us, “Shouldst not thou then have had compassion also on thy fellow servant, even as I had compassion on thee?” Matthew 18.
Third: it often happens that the husband who has put away his wife for adultery is himself also an adulterer, if not in deed, certainly in will. And before God, and in the truth of the matter, “whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart,” Matthew 5. As, then, husbands desire not to be deserted by their wives even if they have not kept faith with them, so they ought not to desert them, or at least to bring them back if they have put them away, although they have sometimes not kept faith with them; for although according to the laws of the world husband and wife seem unequal in the cause of adultery, yet according to the law of Christ they are equal.
But if it is not lawful, or not expedient, to keep the wife or to call her back after the crime committed, then too a remedy is not lacking in divine help, which is denied to no one who asks, according to that saying, “Ask, and you shall receive.”
And that it is not new that anyone should be compelled without his own fault to perpetual celibacy, Augustine shows, in the book On Adulterous Marriages, chapter 13 and following, by many examples. For if perhaps a wife from the beginning of the Matrimony falls into a sickness and remains in it until the death of her husband; or if she is led captive and, her husband knowing it, lives perpetually in prison or elsewhere among the enemy; or if for a just business the husband remains many years separated from his wife in a far region; what then will that husband do, if perhaps he begins to suffer burning, since he has no just cause of divorce and cannot use his wife? Will he not have to obtain from God by pious prayers help to be continent?
From these things it is seen how inconsiderately Chemnitz wrote that Christ would have provided better for the Church if he had granted no divorce. For if he had not granted it, he would have compelled men to undergo most open and greatest dangers in order to avoid lesser dangers, and ones which perhaps will never happen; which would have been the height of madness. For if perhaps one of the spouses becomes a heretic and constantly tries to draw the other to his heresy, who does not see that, if divorce were unlawful, that wretched spouse would be compelled by law to be in open danger of losing the faith?
The third objection, pages 1252 and 1253: “The Pharisees, asking Christ, Matthew 19, whether it was lawful to put away a wife, were speaking of putting away as to the bond, and not as to bed only; for they knew no other putting away than that which was permitted in the law. But that was such a putting away that it was lawful to take another, as is gathered from Deuteronomy 24, Leviticus 21, Jeremiah 3 and Ezekiel 44. Christ, therefore, answering them, speaks also of putting away as to the bond; for otherwise he would not have answered to the purpose. Whence the Lord always joins the putting away of one with the taking of another, saying, Whosoever shall put away his wife, and shall marry another, and so on, Matthew 19, Mark 10 and Luke 16. But Christ, speaking of this putting away as to the bond, Matthew 5 and 19, excepts the cause of fornication; therefore he willed that a wife could be put away as to the bond in the case of fornication.
“And the argument is confirmed from the contrary sense. For as Christ says, He who puts away his wife, excepting the cause of fornication, and marries another, commits adultery; therefore he who puts away his wife for the cause of fornication and marries another does not commit adultery. And these arguments from the contrary sense are the most manifest and firmest of all.
“It is confirmed, second, from this, that Augustine, who held the contrary, could not explain this place except by wretchedly twisting the text of the Gospel. For he says that this is the sense of the exception: that those indeed sin more gravely who make a divorce without the cause of fornication, but that those too are guilty of adultery who for the cause of fornication, the first wife being put away, marry another. But let the text be looked at, and it will be manifest that Christ does not say this.
“Moreover the particles parektos and ei me do not admit that twisting of Augustine: for in the Scriptures they are everywhere taken exceptively, as is plain from 1 Kings 20, ‘The boy knew not this, only David and Jonathan’; 1 Kings 21, ‘There is no other sword here but this’; 3 Kings 3, ‘No one was present but we two’; Acts 26, ‘I would that all were made such as I am, except these bands.’ For in these sentences an interpretation of more and less would be most foolish, since they are simply exclusive exceptions, as is also the particle ‘except’ which is used in Matthew 19.”
I answer: to this argument a twofold solution can be used, according to what we said in the chapter above. For those words of Matthew, “except it be for fornication,” can be taken exceptively or negatively, as we said there; and if they are taken exceptively, then it must be answered that Christ does not speak of putting away as to the bond, but only as to bed, when he grants putting away in the case of fornication.
But the Pharisees had asked about putting away as to the bond; therefore the Lord too answered about the same thing. I grant that the Pharisees asked about putting away as to the bond, but I deny that the Lord answered about the same. Then, says the adversary, the Lord did not satisfy the question proposed. The consequence is to be denied. For since in a perfect putting away, which is as to the bond, two things are contained, the putting away of one and the power of taking another, the Lord separated these two, and granted the one, namely the putting away, with a restriction to the cause of fornication, but took away the other altogether. And this is the cause why the Lord almost always set those two things distinctly, “Whosoever shall put away,” and so on, and “shall marry another”: namely to explain the repudiation permitted in the law, and partly approve it, partly disapprove it.
To that argument from the contrary sense I answer that it concludes nothing. For if we expound the words of the Lord, as we said in the chapter above, in this way: Whosoever shall put away his wife, except for fornication, and shall marry another, commits adultery, that is, commits adultery by putting her away, because he makes her commit adultery, and commits adultery by marrying another, because he properly commits adultery, and so commits adultery twice: then from the contrary sense it must be inferred, Therefore he who puts away his wife for fornication and marries another does not commit adultery twice, but only once, that is, he does not commit adultery by putting away, but only by taking another; and this is most true. So too if we take the other exposition, which was this: Whosoever shall put away his wife, except for fornication, that is, which is not lawful except for fornication, and shall marry another, commits adultery; from the contrary sense nothing can be inferred but this: Therefore he who puts away his wife for fornication and marries another does not sin by putting away, but only commits adultery by taking another. And so much for the first solution.
But if with St. Augustine we take those words, “except it be for fornication,” not exceptively but negatively, then to the principal argument we admit that Christ speaks of putting away as to the bond, as Chemnitz contends; but we deny that this putting away is granted in the case of fornication, because that “except for fornication” is not an exception but a negation: for the Lord denies that such a putting away is lawful without the cause of fornication, but he does not say that it is lawful if the cause of fornication is present.
To the first confirmation I answer: an argument from the contrary sense does not conclude unless the contraries are rightly taken. Now in the proposition, when we say negatively, “Whosoever, without the cause of fornication, puts away his wife and marries another, commits adultery,” it is not rightly inferred, “Therefore he who, for fornication, puts away his wife and marries another, does not commit adultery”; but it can only be inferred, “Therefore he commits adultery less gravely.” For he who without the cause of fornication puts away his wife and marries another does not commit adultery for this reason, that he marries another without such a cause, but because he marries another. But that that cause is absent does not make him commit adultery, but makes him commit adultery with injury to the first spouse; and therefore he who for fornication, the first being put away, marries another, commits adultery indeed, but less gravely, because without injury to the first spouse.
Augustine gives an example, book 1 On Adulterous Marriages, chapter 9, from the letter of James, chapter 4: “To him who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is sin.” For from the contrary sense it ought not to be inferred, Therefore to him who does not know good and does not do it, it is not sin; for there are also sins of ignorance; but it ought to be inferred, Therefore to him who does not know good and does not do it, it is less sin than if he had sinned knowingly. Just as, if someone said, He who steals except from want sins, it could not be inferred from this, Therefore he who steals from want does not sin; but, Therefore he who steals from want sins less; unless perhaps it be extreme necessity, because then it would be called not only not a sin but not even a theft.
To the second confirmation I answer: Chemnitz is always like himself, that is, fraudulent and lying. For St. Augustine nowhere wrote that the sense of that exception, “except it be for fornication,” is that those sin more gravely who make a divorce without the cause of fornication, as if the question proposed had been which of unlawful divorces was the graver. Nothing such, I say, does Augustine ever write; but only that Christ in the Gospel of blessed Matthew expressed one species of adultery, and that the gravest, others being passed over, because the place and time of that disputation held with the Pharisees required it, as we set out in the chapter above.
To what Chemnitz lastly objected about the exceptive particle, I answer: it cannot be denied that those particles, parektos and ei me, are often taken exceptively, as the places brought by Chemnitz show; but yet they can also be taken otherwise. For in Apocalypse 9, where we read, “And it was commanded them that they should not hurt the grass of the earth, nor any green thing, nor any tree: but only the men who have not the sign of God on their foreheads,” that “but only,” in Greek ei me, cannot be taken exceptively, but adversatively, unless one will number men among the trees. And in chapter 21, where we read, “There shall not enter into it any thing defiled… but they that are written in the book of life,” the particle ei me, in Greek, cannot be taken exceptively; for the sense would be that some defiled persons will enter the kingdom of heaven.
Then, even if in the testimony of Matthew 19 the word “except” is taken exceptively, yet it can be a negative exception, and that suffices for the opinion of St. Augustine. For when it is said, “Whosoever shall put away his wife, excepting the cause of fornication, and shall marry another, commits adultery,” the cause of fornication can be excepted either because, when that cause is present, it is not adultery to marry another, and this is an affirmative exception; or because nothing is determined at present about that cause, whether it suffices to excuse adultery or not; and this is the negative, which St. Augustine rightly embraced. And why the Lord determined nothing in that place about that cause we showed in the chapter above.
The fourth objection, pages 1259 and 1260: “When the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 7, I command, not I, but the Lord, that the wife depart not from her husband; and if she depart, that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband, he means that the woman ought to remain unmarried if she departed outside the cause of her husband's fornication, namely for her own fault; therefore, if the cause of fornication is present, she will not be bound to remain unmarried.
“He proves the antecedent. First, because in that word, I command not to depart, the exception laid down by the Lord concerning the cause of fornication is understood; therefore in the following word also, And if she depart, that she remain unmarried, the same exception ought to be understood; otherwise there will be an equivocation within a few lines in the word depart. Second, he proves it from that word to be reconciled, which belongs properly to the guilty: for he who has hurt ought to be reconciled, he who was hurt to be appeased. Wherefore Paul speaks of the woman departing unjustly without the cause of a lawful divorce. Third, a little after the same Apostle grants to a believer deserted by an unbeliever the liberty of marrying; therefore he shows that that former sentence, Not to depart, and, If she depart, and so on, is not to be taken without exception. Fourth, Chrysostom, Theophylact, Oecumenius and Ambrose, expounding this place, except the cause of fornication.”
I answer: I have already shown sufficiently in the chapter above that Paul cannot be expounded except of a departing for a just cause, when he says, “And if she depart,” and so on; because otherwise he would fight both with the Gospel and with himself, if he gave the spouse the choice of returning to the spouse or not returning, even if she had withdrawn from him unjustly.
To the first proof I answer: there is no equivocation in the words of Paul, but an ellipsis, most frequent in Paul himself; for the sense is: I command not to depart, namely without a just cause; and if she depart, namely a cause being found, and so on.
To the second I answered above: the word “to be reconciled” is common both to him who has hurt and to him who has been hurt; for according to the Scriptures both we are reconciled to God and God is reconciled to us.
To the third I answer: the argument is not to the point. For when Paul permits the liberty of marrying to a believer deserted by an unbeliever, he speaks of a marriage contracted between unbelievers, of which the Lord had commanded nothing; whence he says, “To the rest I speak, not the Lord,” and so on. But when he commands that the wife depart not from her husband, and if she depart, that she remain unmarried, he speaks of a Matrimony contracted between the faithful, which Christ pronounced insoluble.
But someone will press: if spiritual fornication, namely unbelief, looses the bond of marriage, why not much more bodily fornication?
Some answer that spiritual fornication is a greater sin than bodily, and therefore it does not follow that, if the bond of marriage is loosed for a greater sin, it is loosed for a lesser. But this is not a solid solution. For although spiritual fornication is a greater sin absolutely, yet bodily fornication is more opposed to marriage than spiritual; and therefore, if spiritual fornication loosed the bond, bodily would loose it too.
The true solution, then, is that the bond is not loosed on account of spiritual fornication absolutely, because then it would be loosed also when one of Catholic spouses became an unbeliever; but that yet the bond of a marriage contracted between unbelievers is loosed when one is converted to the faith, because that marriage was not a sacrament, as we said above.
To the fourth I answer: those Fathers do not place the exception in that sentence, “If she depart,” but in that one, “I command not to depart,” in which we too place the same exception. Further, the same Fathers in that sentence, “If she depart,” and so on, place an inclusion, so to speak, rather than an exception of fornication; which is manifestly against the adversary. For Chrysostom and Theophylact say that divorces are made from desire of continence, or for other causes, but that when they are made, the spouses must not pass to other marriages; and who forbids us to number among those causes the fornication of the other spouse?
And the commentary of Ambrose, or whoever was the author, says (as Chemnitz cites) that the Apostle speaks of a woman who withdraws on account of the evil conduct of her husband. But by evil conduct nothing can more fitly be understood than if the husband does not keep faith with his wife, or solicits her to sin, which are causes of a most just divorce. And that he spoke of these causes that author shows a little after: for he says that the woman ought to remain unmarried after divorce for this reason, that it is not lawful for her to marry another if she has withdrawn from him on account of the fornication or apostasy of her husband. The words alleged by Chemnitz, then, fight most of all against Chemnitz himself, who contends that Paul speaks of the woman who withdraws from her husband without a just cause.
The fifth objection, page 1263: “Origen, tract 7 on Matthew, although he says that the bishop who permits a woman second marriages after a divorce made for the cause of adultery has permitted it against Scripture, yet in the same place says that he did not permit it without cause; and he compares this permission with that which is extant in 1 Corinthians 7, It is good for a man not to touch a woman, but for fear of fornication, and so on. He does not, then, understand the permission of a mortal crime laying waste the conscience and pouring out grace.”
I answer: the heretic, after his manner, perverts the writings of the Fathers. For Origen in the place noted, when he says that those bishops did not permit it without cause, signifies that they permitted an evil and unlawful thing, that of two evils they might choose the lesser; for so he says: “In comparison with worse things they permitted things that are evil.” Nor does Origen compare this permission with that of Paul, “It is good for a man not to touch a woman. But for fear of fornication, let every man have his own wife,” except in this, that each is a certain permission granted on account of the weakness of men. For if all Christians would be perfect, they would follow what the Apostle calls simply good, when he says, “It is good not to touch a woman”; yet because not all take this word, wives are granted. But yet Origen does not say that this permission of Paul is against Scripture, or is of an evil thing, as he speaks of the permission of a second marriage after divorce.
And what Chemnitz adds, that by the opinion of Origen that second marriage is not a deadly crime, is false. For how is that not a deadly crime which, by Origen's testimony, is expressly against that Scripture of Paul, Romans 7, “Whilst her husband liveth, she shall be called an adulteress, if she be with another man”? Or is adultery perhaps not a deadly crime? But let us pass to the rest.
The sixth objection, page 1264: “The Council of Neocaesarea, canon 7, enjoins some penance on those who contract second marriages after divorce, but does not break the Matrimony contracted. The ancients therefore judged that such marriages are not to be altogether condemned, although they would have wished them not to be made.”
I answer: the council does not treat of marriages after divorce, nor is there any mention of divorce in that whole council; but of second marriages which are contracted when the first wife is dead, which the ancients knew indeed to be lawful, but yet marked with some penance as a sign of incontinence, as is seen more clearly in the Council of Laodicea, canon 1.
The seventh objection, in the same place: “Jerome, in the letter to Oceanus, relates the public penance of Fabiola, who married another man while the first lived, after a divorce made for the cause of fornication; but he adds that she did not commit this as a mortal sin, nor followed only the laws of Papinian, but did it according to the sayings of Paul, It is better to marry than to be burnt, and, I will that the younger widows marry. Nor does the public penance of Fabiola make the sin simply mortal: for a penance of two or three years was then imposed on those also who kept an adulterous wife without divorce, cause 32, question 1, canon Si quis.”
I answer: Augustine said rightly that the forehead of heretics is no forehead, book 4 against Julian, chapter 8. For who would believe that a man held by any shame could have lied so impudently? For those words of Chemnitz, “Jerome adds that she did not commit this as a mortal sin,” signify either that it was not a mortal sin in the opinion of Fabiola, or that it was not in the opinion of Jerome. If he means the first, he does not speak to the point; for what do we care what opinion Fabiola had? We are disputing about the opinion of Jerome, not of Fabiola. If he means the second, as he must, he openly lies. For nowhere in that whole letter does St. Jerome write that Fabiola did not sin mortally in that second marriage; nor could he write it, unless he wished to fight with himself.
Nor does he say that Fabiola followed the law of Papinian and of Paul; nay, rather he says that she acted against the law of Papinian. For Papinian loosens the reins of lust for men, not for women; and Fabiola was a woman, not a man. “The laws of the Caesars,” says Jerome, “are one thing, those of Christ another; Papinian commands one thing, our Paul another,” and so on. And that Jerome brings in some excuse for Fabiola the words of Paul, “It is better to marry than to be burnt,” and “I will that the younger should marry,” tends to this, to show that she sinned partly from weakness, partly from ignorance. For she had thought that those sentences belonged to her, both because she did not know the rigor of the Gospel and because she deceived herself with the heat of concupiscence.
But that nevertheless, by the testimony of Jerome and her own conscience, she sinned mortally can easily be proved. First, because Jerome writes that that deed of Fabiola was against the precept of Christ: “The Lord commanded,” he says, “that a wife ought not to be put away, excepting the cause of fornication, and if she has been put away, that she remain unmarried. Whatever is commanded to men redounds in consequence to women.” So he; where he most openly shows the deed of Fabiola to have been against the express law of Christ, and in consequence a mortal sin of its kind.
Second, it is proved from these words of the same Jerome: “Therefore, because Fabiola had persuaded herself, and thought that her husband had been lawfully put away by her, and did not know the rigor of the Gospel, in which every pretext of marrying is cut off from women while their husbands live, while she avoids many wounds of the devil, she incautiously received one wound.”
Third, it is proved from these: “But why do I linger over things abolished and old, seeking to excuse a fault whose penance she herself confessed?” And what the penance was he explains in these words: “In the sight of the whole city of Rome, before the day of Easter, in the basilica of him who was once Lateranus, who was cut down by Caesar's sword, she stood in the rank of penitents, the bishop, the presbyters and the whole people weeping with her; with hair loosed, face livid, hands unwashed, she bowed her soiled neck.” And below: “She uncovered her wound to all, and Rome weeping beheld the discolored scar on her body; she had her sides unlaced, her head bare, her mouth closed; she did not enter the church of the Lord, but sat apart outside the camp with Mary the sister of Moses, that the priest who had cast her out might himself call her back.” So he. And who ever heard of such a public penance asked for, or granted, not to say imposed and enjoined in the Church, for a venial fault? Whom did a bishop ever expel from the Church for a venial offence, as Jerome writes that Fabiola was cast out?
Further, that canon which Chemnitz cites, by which a penance of three years is enjoined on him who keeps an adulteress, must be understood of him who consented to his wife's adultery, as the doctors expound; which certainly no one can doubt to be a mortal crime. For otherwise that an adulteress can be tolerated, and most of all that one desiring to amend must be kept, Augustine teaches at length, book 2 On Adulterous Marriages.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XVII, Solvimlur argumenta adversariorum. Proponam et solvam argumenta Marlini Remni- tii, tuin quia ipse posl alios omnes scripsil, et eo- rum argumenta collegit.tum quia nemo ei respon- dil; cuni Erasmo, Cajclano, Calharino, Luthero, Bucero, Brenlio, Calvino et Philippo responderint Joann.Eckius,Ruardus,AIphonsus de Castro.el alii ex calholicis multi. Prima objeclio Kemnitii pag. 1230. Lexponlifi- cia negans conjugi innoce^iH in caiissa adnlterii aliud conjugium.prival innocenlem jurc suo abs- que ejus culpa, conlra regulas juris. Respondeo: Lex isla non est pontificis romani solius, sed etiam Christi. El male Kemnilius regu- lam juris allegal: haec enim esl regula in Sexto de regul. juris can. Sine culpa.Sine culpa,nisi sub- sil caussa, non est aliquis puniendus. Ubi non solum culpam, sed eliam caussam abesse oportet; ut qui nullo modo puniri possil: alioqui,quam sae- pe filii privanlur haereditate paterna oh peccala patris? quam saepe ob indicia aliqua jure lorquen- tur homines a judicibus, sine ulla propria culpa? quam saepe ob incurabilem conjugis morbum sine culpa sua privatur aller conjux debilo conjugali, et (quod est gravius) fruclu nupliarum, idcst, pro- le? Sic igitur uxore per divortium scparata, priva- tur vir usu conjugii sine culpa,sed non sine caus- sa: caussa enim subest ma\ima, quia vinculum prioris rnanel, et quia Christus prohibet,cl quia fi- crelinjuria proli etc. Secunda objectio pag. 1231. Si non licerel u- xorem ducere liomini innocenli, divortium a Fi- lio Dei concessiwi in caussa fornicalionis, niliil essel aiiud, nisi laqucus conscientiae, ct conji- ciens homincs in usliones et 1'ornicalioncm, in iram etjudicium Dei: nam forte persona illa in- nocensnon habcbit domum coniinentiae, etideo in perpelua ustione versabilur, quac impcdit in- vocationem Dei; aul cliam in fornicntioncs et a- dultcria praecipilabilur. Qwire mclius Ecclesiae suac Christus consuluisscl, si divorlium nullum conccssissel,tunc cnim persona innocens cogere- lur uti remcdiis a Dco ordinalis. Respondco:Aut persona innocens polest non di- miltere coiijugom, vel certc posl dimissioiiem po- losl rcconciliari; aut cogitur dimillerc, noc polesl i'jcynciliiiri. Si dotuv rriuiuin,<|uud accidil ut plu- 8IG DE SACUAMKNTO MATRIMOMI rimum. liim luilliis conscienliae laqueus meluen- dus esl: liubel enim persona innocens remedium paralum, si fonlinore non polest, niunrum ul con- jui^em non dimillal, aul dimissae reconciliclur, ad quod Apostolus horlalur, 1. Corinlh. 7. cl posl A.- pt)slolum Ambrosius in cap. 10. Lucac, cl Au},'u- sliims lib. 2. de adullerinis conjug, cap. 0.7. el !). El non deberc duruni videri marilis, culpis uxo- rum ignoscere,probal Auguslinus loco nolalo nuil- lis modis. Primo. quia si Deus per sacramenlum Poenilenliac purgal peccalum adullcrii,cl cx adul- lcra facit sanctam, cleam sibi reconciliat, cur gra- ve debet esse viro, nuilierem Ueo reconcilialam , el non amplius aduUerain, sed juslam existenlem sibi reconciliarc? nam non minus illa Dcum oiren- derat adullerio spiriluali, quani virum adullcrio carnali. Secundo: Christus rDmitlit viris, quolics ipsi rc- conciliari volunt, adulteria spirituaIia;ergo debent ctinni viri rcmiitere uKoribiis adulteria carnalia, si rcconciliari illae cupianl. Nam cadem mensura , qua mensi fuerimus, remelietur nobis, Matth. 7.et Luc. 0. el metuendum est. ne dicatur nobis: D'on- ne oporluil lc miscreri conservi lui, sicut ego lui miscrlus sum? 3Ialth. 18. Terlio: Saepe accidit,ut vir qui uxorem ob adul- terium dimisil, sil eliam ipse aduller,si non opere, certe voluntatc. Coram Deo autem , et in rei veri- tale: Qui vidcril mulicrem ad concupiscendum eam, jam moechalus est eam in corde swo, Mattli. 5. Sicut ergo viri cupiunt non dcseri ab uxoribus, etiamsi lidcm eis non servaverint; ita debenl eas non desererc, aul ccrte rcducere si dimiserint , licel ipsis aliquando fidem non servavcrint: licet e- nim secundum leges mundi impares videanlur vir cl uxor in caussa aduUerii,tamen secundQra legem Christi pares sunt. Quod si non liceat, aul non expediat uxorem relincre, aut revocare posl crimen admissum:lunc ctiam rcraedium non decsl in divino auxilio, quod ncmini petenli negalur, juxla illud : Petilc elac- cipieds, Matth. 7. Et non esse hoc novum,ut quis cogalur sinc sua culpa ad pcrpeluum coelibalum, oslendit Augusti- nus libro de adullcrinis conjugiis, cap. H. el sc- quenlibus, mullis excmplis. Wam si forte uxor ab initio Matrimonii in raorbum incidat, ct in eo per- duret usque ad morlem viri; vel si capliva ducalur, et viro sciente, in carcere, vel alibi apud hostes perpeluo vivat, vel jusli negotii caussa multos an- nos in longinqua regione vir ab uxore disjunctus raaneat, quid tunc faciel vir ille, si forte ustionem pati incipial;cum neque ullam divorlii justam caus- sam habeat, neque uxore sua uli possil? nonne o- porlebit a Deo auxilium ad continendum piis pre- cibus impetrare? Ex his perspicilur quam inconsiderate Kemni- tius scripseril, melius Christum Ecclesiae consul- turum fuisse, si divortium nullum concessisset. iVam si id non concessisset, coegisset homines ad pericula aperlissima el maxima subeunda , ut vita- rcnlur pericula minora et quae forlc numquam ac- «•idenl: quod extremae demenliao fuissel. IVara si forle altcr conjugum fiat haerelicus el pcrpetuo al- leram ad haercsim suam nilafur allralicrc , quis non vidcl, si illicitum sit divortium, in aperto dis- criminc amiltcndao lidei miseram illaiii conjugcra lego cogoiile essc hiUiiam ? TerUa objectio, pag. 1252. cl 1253. Pharisaci Chrislum inlerroganles, Matth. 19. an liceret uxo- rem dinUllerc, loqucbanlur de dimissione quoad vinculum, et non quoad Ihorum tanlum ; neque c- nim illi aliam dimissioncm noveranl, nisi quae in lcgc pcrmillobalur. Illa autem talis dimissio crat, ul licerel aliam duccre, utcolligitur cx Deutcron. 2i. Lcvil. 21. Jcrcra. 3. ct Ezechicl. U. Christus igilur eis rcspondcns.loquitur cliam de dimissione quoad vinculum: nam alioqui non respondissct ad proposilum. Unde seraper Dominus conjungil di- missionom unius cum acccptionc altcrius, diccns : Qaicumquc dimiscrit uxorem suam.et aliam du- xerit clc. Jlallh. 19. Marci 10. et Lucae 10. Sed Chrislus de ista dimissione quoad vinculura lo- quens, Matlh. I"». et 19. excipit caussara fornicatio- nis; crgo voluit posse dimitli uxorem quoad vincu- lum in caussa fornicationis. Elconfirmatur argumenlura a contrario sensu. Nam sicut Christus dicit: Qui dimitlit uxorem ex- cepta caussa lornicationis, et aliam ducit, moc- chatur, ergo qui propler caussara fornicalionis di- millil uxorcm, et aliam ducit, non raoechalur:Sunt autem haec argumenta a contrario sensu omniuni ct manifcstissima et firmissima. Secundo confirmatur ex eo, quod AugusUnus , qui conlrarium sensil, non potuit explicare islura locum, nisi misere lorquendo textura evangelii. Dicit cnira hunc esse sensum exceptionis quod illl gravius quidem peccant , qui sine caussa fornica- tionis divortium faciunt, sed tamen , el illos adul- tcrii reos esse, qui propter caussam fornicationis , dimissa priore uxore aliara ducunt. At inspiciatur lextus, el raanifestura erit, Christum hoc non di- cere. Praelcrea parliculac, rapEXXo? , et ziii.Yi illam Augustini conlorsionem non adraittunt : nam ia Scripturis passira accipiunlur cxceptivcutpatet 1. Bc^^. 20. Puer hocnonsciebat, nisi lantum Da- vid etJonathas,l.^cg.2\. Non est hic alius gladius, praeler hunc, 3. Rcg. 3. Ncmo adfuit , nisi 710S duae, Aclor. 20. Optarim omncs fieri ta- les, qualis ego sum, exceptis his vinculis. In his cnim senteniiis inepUssima essel interprelaUo do magis ct minus, cura sirapliciter sint exclusivae excepUones, sicut et parlicula Nisi, quae Matth. 19. usurpatur. Respondeo: Ad hoc argumentum Duplex solulio adhiberi potest, juxla ea, quae diximus capite su- periore. Nam verba illa Mallhaei: Nisi oh fornica- tionem, possunt accipi exceplive vel negalivo, ut ibi diximus, et si quidem accipianlur cxcepUve , lum respondendum est, Christura non loqui de dimissione quoad vinculum, sed solum quoad Iho- rum, quando concedit dimissionem in caussa for- nicationis. At Phnrisaei inlerrogaverant de dimissione quoad vinculum, ergo el Dominus de cadem re- apomlit. Conccdo Pharisaeos de remissione quoad vinculum inlerrogasse, sed nego Dominuni de ea- LIHEU PRIMUS 817 dem respondissc: Ergo, inqull advcrsarius, ?io?i salisfecil Doviinus proposilae quaesHuni, negan- da est conscquenlia. Nam cum in dimissione per- l'ecla,quae est,quoad vinculum,duo conlineanlur,di- missio unius, el poleslas ducendi aliani: Dominus haec duo separavit, ac unum quidcm concessil,di- missionem vidclicct, cum reslrictione ad caussam fornicationis, allerum vcro omnino sustulil.Et hacc est caussa, cur fcrc semper Dominus illa duo di- slincte posucn[:Qaicumqiie dimiseril clc.c\,Aliam duxerit, ul nimirum explicarcl repudium in lcge permissum.etporliraapprobarct.partimimprobaret. Ad argumentum illud a contrario scnsu rcspon- deo, nihil illud concludere. Nam si exponamus , ut cap. superiore diximus, verha Doraini, hoc mo- do: Quicumque dimiseriluxoremsuani, ?mi ob fornicalionem . ct aliam duxerit , moechalur , idest, moechatur illam dirailtendo , quia facil eam moechari, ct moeclialur aliam duccndo, quia pro- prie adulleriura commillit, alquc ita bis moccha- lur: lunc a conlrario sensu inferendum esl : Ergo qui propler fornicationcm dimiltit uxorem,et aliam ducit, non moechatur bis,sed tanlum scmel,idest, non moechatur dimitlendo, sed solum aliam acci- piendo, el hoc est verissimum. Sic eliam si acci- piamus alleram exposilioncm, quae talis erat:()iu- cumque dimiserit uxorem suam,nisi ob fornica- tionem, idest,quod non liccl nisi ob fornicationem: et aliam duxeril, moechatur, a conlrario serisu non polcst inferri; nisi hoc, Ergo qui propter for- nicationem dimittil uxorem el aliam ducit, non peccat dimillendo,sed solum mocchatur aham du- cendo. Atque haec dc prima solulionc. Si vero cum s. Augustino accipiamus illa verba: IMsi ob fornicalionevi, non cxceptive, scd negali- ve: lunc ad argumenlura principalc admiltimus, Chrislum loqui de dimissione quoad vineulum, ut Keranilius contcndil: sed negamus, concedi istam dimissionem in caussa fornicalionis, quia illud: ISisi ob fornicalionem,, non esl exceptio, scd ne- galio; ncgat enim Dominus licilam esse talem di- missionem sine caussa fornicalionis, scd non di- cil esse licitam si adsit caussa fornicationis. Ad Primam conlirmationem llespondco: Argu- menlum a conlrario scnsu non concludcre,nisi re- cle accipianlur contraria.Jam in proposilio cum di- cimus negativc; Quicumque sinc caussa fornicatio- nis diraissa uxorc aliam ducit, n)occhalur; non re- cte infertur; Ergo qui proptcr fornicationem uxorc dimissa aliam ducit, non mocchatur: sed tantum inferri potest;Ergo miniis graviter mocchatur. Nam qui sinc caussii furni(%'ilionis uxorc dimissa aliam ducit, rion ideo moechatur, quia sine lali caussa a- liam diicit; scd quia aliam ducit. Qiiod aulcm ca caussa absit,non lacit eam muecl)ari,sed faciteum mocchari cum injuria prioris conjugis; cl idcirco qui propter fornicalioncm priore dimissa aliara du- cit, moechatur quidem, scd minus graviter, (juia sine injuria prioris conjugis. Ponit exemplum Auguslinus lib. l. de adullcri- nis conjugiis, cap. 9. cpisl. .lacob. cap. i. Scienti bonum et non facienli, peccalum est ilii. Neque enim a conlrario sensu dcbcl infcrri; Ergo, igno- ranli bonum cl non facicnli, pcccalum non csl il- li; nam sunl eliam pcccala ignorantiae: scd inferri debel; Ergo ignoranli bonum et non facicnti, mi- nus peccalum est.quam si scicns peccassel.Quem- admodum si quis diccret ; Qui, nisi ob inopiam furatur, peccal, non possct inde infcrrc; Ergo qui ob inopiam fuiatur, non peccat: Sed, Ergo qui ob inopiam furatur, minus peccat; nisi forte sit exlrc- ma ncccssilas,quia tunc non modo non pcccatum, sed nec furtum appellandura csset. Ad Secundam confirmationcm Rcspondco: Kem- nilium semper sui esse similem, idcst, fraudulen- tem ct mendacem: ncquc enim s. Augustinus us- quam scripsit, exceplionis illius: ISisi ob fornica- tionem, scnsum csse, quod illi gravius peccenl, qui sine caussa fornicalionis divortium faciunt, quasi quaeslio proposita fuisset, ex illicitis divor- tiis quodnam essel gravius. Nihil, inquam,lale un- quam scribit Auguslinus, scd solum Christum in evangelio b. Mallliaci, cxprcssisse unam spcciem adullerii, eamque gravissimam,aliis praelcrmissis, quia id requircbat locus et tempus illius disputa- lionis habilae cum Pharisaeis, ut nos supra capilc superiore exposuimus. Ad illud quod ultimo Kemniliusdc parlicula ex- ceptiva objecit, Respondco: Ncgari non posse,illas parliculas, Tiapex-o?, et sljjiy] saepe accipi exce- plive,ut loca a Kcmnitio allata dcmonstranl:scd la- mcn posse eliam aliler accipi. Nam Apoc. 0. ubi legimus: Et praeceptum estillis,nelaederentfoe- num terrae, neque omne viride, neque omnem arborem, nisi tantum homines, qui non habent signum Dei in frontibus suis. Illud Nisi, graece, ei/xvj , non potest accipi exceptive, sed advcrsa- tive, nisi quis velil homines inter arborcs connu- merare. Et cap. 21. ubi lcgimus: Non intrabit in eam aliquid coinquinalum, nisi qui scripti sunt in libro vitae, non polcsl accipi parlicula l\isi £i;jLyj graecc, cxceptive: nam sensus cssel, aliquos coinquinalos intraluros cssc in rcgnum coclorum. Deinde etiarasi in teslimonio Matthaci 11). vox nisi, accipiatur exccptivc. tamcn polcrit csse ex- ccptio ncgativa, cl id sufficit sententia s. Augusti- ni. Cum cnim dicitur: Quicumquc dimiscnt uxo~ rem, excepta caussa fornicalionis, ct aliam du- xerit, moechatur, polcst cxcipi caussa fornicatio- nis, vel quia cum ea caussa adcsl, non esl adulte- rium aliam ducere;ct hacc est cxcoptio anirmativa: vcl quia de ca caussa nihil in pracscntia dclcrmi- natur, an sufTiciat excusare adullerium, nec ne; et haec est negaliva, quain s. Augustinus reclc am- plcxus esl. Cur aulcm Domiuus nihil delcrmina- vcrit co loco de isla caussa, ostcndimus capile su- periore. Quarta objcctio pag. 12.>0. et 1260. Cum Apo- slolus dicit i. Corinlh. 7. Praecipio non ego, scd Dominus, uxorem a viro non discedere: quodsi discesserit, manere innuplam, aut viro suo ra- conciliari; inlelligitmulicrem dcberc innujjlum manere, si discesserit excepla caussa fornicatiu- nis viri^ob culpam nimirum sieam; Ergo si caus- sa fornicationis adsit, non lcncbitur manerc in- nupta. Anlcccdens probal. Primo, quiii in vcrbo illo. Praecipio non disccdcrc, intcllii;ilur cxccplio u S|S L»K SACUARIENIO ^l ATniMOM Domino posila dc canssa fornicalionis; ergo cliaiii in vorl)0 scquenli:(}jtO(i si di^cessvrit viancre in- vuplatn, dcl)el inlelligi cadeni exrcplio: alioqni o- ril iicquivocalio inlra paucas lineas, in verbo, Di- sccdo. Secundo, probat ex verbo illo Ueconciliari, quod propric ad reos pcrlinel: qui eniin hicsit, de- bet rcconciliari, qui luit laesus, placari. Quare lo- quilur l*aulus dc niulicrc discedcntc injuste sine caussa licili divortii. Tcrlio.paulo posl idcui Apo- stolus eoncedit lidcli deserlo ab infidcli, nubendi liberlaltMn, crgo osleiulil prioreui illa scnlcnliani: A'o?i discedere, \c\:Sidisccsscril ctc. non esse ac- cipiendani sine exccplionc. Qiiarlo.Clirysosloinus, Tlieopliylaclus, Oecuineniiis et Ainbrosius, liunc locum c.vponcnlcs.cxcipiunl caussam fornicalionis. I\i'spoudco: Jam salis ostendi capite superiorc, rauluiu non posse c.xponi nisi dc disccssione ob juslam caussam, cum aii; Quod si discesserlt etc. quia alioqui, el cum evangelio, el secum ipse pu- gnarel, si daret oplionera conjugi.ut ad conjugem rediret, vel non redircl, eliamsi injusle ab illo rc- cessisset. Ad Primam probationem Uespondco: Non esse acquivocationem in verbis Pauli.sed eclypsim ipsi Paulo rrequenlissimam, est enim sensus: Praeci- pio non discedere, scilicel sine jusla caussa:gwo(Z ii discesseril, videlicet caussa invcnla elc. AdSecundamsuprarespondi.verbumReconcilia- ri, esse commune, et ei qui laesit, et ei qui laesus esl: nam secundum Scripturas, et nos reconcilia- mur Deo, el Deus reconcilialur nobis. Ad Terliara Respondeo: Argumentum non esse ad rem. Nam quando Paulus permittit liberlatem iiubendi fideli deserlo ab infideli, loquitur de con- jiigio conlracto inler infideles, de quo Dominus ni- liil pracceperat: unde ail: Caelcris ego dico, non Dominum elc. Al quando jubel, u\orem a viro non discedere. et si discesserit, manere innuptam, lo- quilur de Malrimonio contracto inter fideles, quod Clirislus insolubile essc pronunciavit. Sed inslabil aIiquis:Si fornicatio spirilualis,nem- pe infidelitas solvit vinculum conjugii.cur non ma- gis fornicalio corporalis? Respondent nonnulli:Fornicalionem spiritualem esse mnjus peccalura, quam corporalem, et ideo non esse consequens,ut si ob rnajus peccalum sol- vilur vinculura conjugii, solvatur ob minus pecca- tum. Sed non esl solida solutio. Nam eliamsi for- nicalio spiritualis sit majus peccatum absolute, ta- nicn magis repugnat conjugio fornicalio corpora- lis.quam spiritualis:et ideo si fornicatio spiritualis: solveret vinculum, solveret etiam corporalis. A'era igitur solulio est,vinculum non solvi ob for- nicalionera spiritualem absoIutc,quia tunc solvere- tiir cliam quando aller catholicorum conjugum fie- rel inOdelis: sed solvi tamen vinculum conjugii in- ter infideles conlracti, quando alter converlilur ad fidem.quia conjugium illud sacramentum non erat, ul supra dixlmus. •Ad Quarlam Respondeo: Piitres illos non pone- re exceplionem in illa sentenlia: Sbdiscesserit;sed in illa: Praecipio,non discedere',\n qua nos etiam eandem exceptionem ponimus. Porroiidem Palres in illdsenlenliaj Si diocesscrUelc. ponunl inclusi- onem,ulsic loquar ,polius quam exccptionem for- nicalionis, quod esl manirestc contra adversarium. Clirysoslonms ciiini ct Tlicopliylaclus dicunt ob conlincntiae dcsiderium, vcl ob alias caussas ficri divortia,sed cum fiunl,oporlere conjugcs non Irans- irc ad alia conjugia : inler illas autem caussas quis proliibcl loruicalioncm altcrius conjugis nu- merare? Commentarins autem Ambrosii, sivc quicumque fuerit auctor, dicit(ut Remnitius citat) Apostolum loqui dc mulicre.quae reccditob malam conversa- lionem viri.Per malani autem conversalionem nihil convcnientius inlelligi polesl, quam si vir uxori fi- dem non servcl, aul eam ad peccandum sollicitel, quae sunt caussae juslissimi divortii.Etde hiscaus- sis seloquutum auctor ille paulo posl oslendit: di- cit enim, ideo debere innuptam mulierem manere post divortium, quia non licet ei alteri nubere, si ob fornicationera,aul apostasiam viri ab illo disces- seril.Verba igitur a Remnilio aIIegata,conlra ipsum Remnilium maxime pugnant, quippe qui conlcndit Paulum de ea rauliere loqui,quae sine jusla caussa a viro recedit. Objeclio Quinta, pag. 1263. Oi'igenes tracl. 7. in Matlh. eiiamsi dicat, episcopuni, quipermit- tit mulieri secundas nuptias, post divortium caussa aduUerii factuni, id j^s^^/^inisisse contra Scripturani: tamen ibidem dicit eum non sine caussa permisisse; et comparat hanc permissio- neni: cum illa,quae exstat 1. Corinlh. 7. Bonum est homini mulierem non tangere, sed propter fornicationem etc. Non igilur intelligit permis- sionem criminis morlalis vastantis conscientiam et effundeniis graiiam. Respondeo: Pervertit morc suo haerclicus scri- pta Patrum.Origenes enim loco nolato, cura ait,il- los episcopos non sine caussa permisisse;signiQcal eos permisisse rem malam el illicitam. utex duo- bus raalis eligerit minus malum; sic enim ait: Pe- jorum comparatione quae mala sunt, permise- runt. Neque comparat Origenes hanc permissio- nem cum illa Pauli: Bonum csl homini mulierem non tangere-.propter fornicationem autem unus- quisque uxorem suam habeat; nisi in eo, quod utraque est perraissio quaedara concessa ob infir- raitatem hominura. Nara si oranes Chrisliani per- fecli essc vellent sequerenlur id, quod Aposlolus sempliciter bonum appellat, cura ait: Bonum est muliereni non tangere; tamen quia non omnes capiunt verbum hoc,conceduntur uxores. Sed la- men Origenes non dicit, hanc Pauli permissionem esse contra Scripturam, aul esse rei malae,sicut lo- quitur de permissione secundi conjugii post di- vorlium. Quod autera Kemnitius addit.ex sententia Orige- nis secundum illud conjugium non esse criraen le- lhale,falsum est.Quomodo enim nonest criraen le- thale.quod est Origene leste,expresse contra Scri- pturam iliara Pauli Roman. 7. Vivente viro, voca- bitur adultera, si fueril cum alio viro? an forte adulterium non cst crimen lelhale? Sed ad caetera transeamus. Objectio Sexla, pag. 1264. Concilium neocac- saricnse , canon, 7. conlrahenlibus secmidas LIBER PRIMUS 811) nuplias posl dlvorlium, injungil aliquam poe- nilentiam.scd non dirimil contraclum Matrimo- nium.Veteris igitur censebant ejusmodi conjugia non esse prorsus damnanda , licel optassent no7i fieri. Respondeo:[Von Iractatconcilium de nupliispost divortiam,neque ulla est ia toto illo conciiio divor- lii menlio,sed de secuiidis nupliis.quae contrahim- lur mortua priore uxore, quas licitas quidem esse sciebantveleres,sed tamen ob signum mcontinen- liae aliqua poenilenlia notabant,ul clarius perspici- tur in concilio Laodiceno, can. 7. Objectio Septima ibidem: Hieronyimus in epi- slola ad Oceanum,narrat publicam poenitenliam Fabiolae,quae nupserit aiteri viro, priore viven- te, post divortium factum caussa fornicationis; sed addit,illam hoc non utpeccatum mortale com- misisse,neque tantum Papiniani leges sequutam, s€d fecisse hoc juxta dicta Pauli; Melius esl nu- bere,quam uri; et, Volo juniores viduas nubere. Neque publicas poenilentia Fabiolae efficit, pec- catum esse simpliciter mortale: nam et illis qui adulleram sine divorlio retinebant, duorum aut trium annorum poenilentia tunc imponebatur 32. quaest. l. can. Siquis. Respondeo: Recte dixil Augustinus fronlem hae- reticorum non esse Ironlem, lib. 4. in Jui. cap. 8. quis enim crederet hominem, qui ullo pudorc te- nerelur, tam irapudenter potuisse menliri?!Nam illa verba Reranilii: Addit Hieronymus illam hoc non iU peccatum mortale commisisse, aut significant illud non fuisse peccatum morlale opinione Fabio- ]ae, aut non fuisse opinione Hieronymi, Si dical priraum, ad rem non ]oquilur:quid enim curamus, quam opinionem habueril Fabiola? de sententia enira Hieronymi , non Fabiolae disceptamus. Si dicat secundum,ut debel,aperte mentitur.Nusquam enim in lola illa epist.scribit s.Hieronymus Fabio- lam in secundo illo conjugio non peccasse raorta- liter; neque id scribere poterat, nisi secum ipse pugnare vellet. Neque dicit Fabiolam esse sequulam legem Pa- piniani et Pauli, immo potiusdicit illam conlra Pa- piniani legem fecisse. Papinianus enim viris frena libidinis laxat, non mulicribus: Fabiola aulem foe- mina erat, non vir: Aliac sunt, inquil Hieronymus, leges Caesarum, aliae Chrisli: aliud Papinianus, aliud Paulus noster praecipit elc. Quod aulem Hieronymus in excusationem aliquam Fabiolae ad- ducil verba Pauli: Melius est nubere, quamuri; ct, Volo adolescentiores nubere eo pertinet, ut os- tendat illam partim ex infirmitate,parlim cx igno- ranlia peccasse. Exislimaveral enim illa ad se per- linere illas scntentias, tum quia ignorabat vigorem evangclii, tum quia concupiscenliae ardore sc ipsa failebat. Sed quod nihilominus testc llieronymo , ct pro- pria Fabiolae conscienlia, raortaliter ipsa peccave- rit, facile probari polest. Primo, quia Hieronymus scribit factum illud Fabiolae fuissc conlra Christi praeceptum: Praccepit Dominus , inquit, uxorcm non dcbcre dimitti exccpta caussa fornicalionis, el si dimissa fuevit, manere innuptam.Quidquid viris jubetur, hoc consequcnler rcdundat in foc- vnmas.Haec ilie: ubi apertissime faclum Fabio- lae indicat contra expressam Christi legem , ct consequenler peccalum morlale cx gcncrc suo fuisse. Secundo: Probalur ex illis verbis ejusdem Hie- ronymi: Igiturjit Fabiola, quia pcrsuaseral sibi, clputabat a sc virumjure dimissum , 7iec cvan- gelii vigorem noveral, in quo nubcndi univcrsa caulio,vivenlibus viris foeminis amputatur: dum multa diaboli vilat vulnera, unum incauta vul- nus accepit. Terlio:Probalur ex illis: Sed quid cgo in aboli- tis el antiquis moror,quaerens excusare culpam cujus poenilenliam ipsa confessa esl? Qualis au- tem poenitentia fueril , his verbis explicat: Tota urbe speclante romana.anle diempaschae in ba- silica quondam Laterani, qui Caesariano iriin- calus est gladio, stelil in ordine poenitentiam, e- piscopo, presbyleris et omni populo collachry- mantibus: Sparsum cme?n, ora lurida etsqua^ lidasmanus, sordida colla submisit. Et infra: Aperuit cunctis vulnus suum, et decolorem in corpore cicatricem flens Roma conspexil: dissuta habuil latera, nudum caput, clausum os.non est ingressa in Ecclesiam Domini, sed extra caslra cum Maria sorore Moysi separata consedit, ut quam sacerdos ejccerat, ipse re-uocaref.Haec ille. Quis aulcm unquam audivit cjusmodi poenilen- tiam publicam pro veniali culpa postulatam, aut concessam, ne dicam impositam, et injunclam in Ecclesia? quem unquam episcopus expulit ex Ec- clesia ob veniale delictum , ut Fabiolam ejeclam scribit Hieronymus? Porro canon ille, quera citat Reranitius , quo poenitentia triura annorum injungitur ei, qui adul- leram retinel, intelligi debet de eo qui in adulte- rium uxoris consensit, ut doctores cxponunt, quod quidem mortale criraen esse nemo dubitare potest. Nam alioqui aduUeram tolerari posse , et maxime emendari cupicnlem esse relinendam , fuse docet Auguslinus lib. 2. de adulterinis conjugiis.