Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Members of the Church · On Monks (Book II)
Chapter 29: The First Objection of the Adversaries Answered
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. II, De Monachis (De Membris Ecclesiae, Book II), On Monks (On the Members of the Church, Book II). The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
It now remains that we solve the objections of the adversaries. The first objection is common to all, and is taken from those Scriptures which teach that good works are to be done not from necessity, which nevertheless vows bring with them, but voluntarily and freely; for that is better and more laudable, and more acceptable to God, which is more voluntary and free, and accordingly less necessary. Psalm 53: I will freely sacrifice to thee. 1 Corinthians 7: Not that I may cast a snare upon you — that is, I exhort to continence, but not to a vow. 2 Corinthians 9: Every one as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity; for God loveth a cheerful giver. And to Philemon: That thy good deed might not be as it were of necessity, but voluntary. Saint Jerome (Book 1 against Jovinian, before the middle): “And therefore Christ loves virgins the more, because they of their own accord give what had not been commanded them; and it is of greater grace to offer what you owe not, than to render what you are required.” And Saint Prosper (Book 2 On the Contemplative Life, last chapter): “So ought we to abstain, or to fast, that we do not subject ourselves to the necessity of fasting, lest, now not devout but unwilling, we do a voluntary thing.”
I answer that there is a threefold liberty, and likewise a threefold necessity. One on the part of debt, whether the debt arise from a precept, or from a vow, or otherwise. For we are said to do freely that which we are not bound to do, but necessarily that which we are bound. Another on the part of the natural determination of the will. For we are said to do freely those things in which we have not a will determined to one; and this liberty is that which is properly called free will. A third on the part of coercion, whether it be absolute coercion, as when one is dragged by force whither he wills not to go, or a certain moral and as it were conditioned coercion, as when one would be unwilling to do something, and does not willingly do it, but does it nevertheless, compelled by some human or servile fear.
Of these, the first liberty is not necessary to the doing of a laudable work, or one pleasing to God; nor does the contrary necessity fight with the praise and merit of a good work, because rather, on the contrary, as we have shown, that necessity increases the praise of a good work. For always, unless there be an impediment from elsewhere, a work is better by precept than not by precept, by vow than not by vow. That second liberty is necessary to the praise of a good work, but it is equally found in a work which is by precept or vow, and in a work in every way undue; for even if one vow something a thousand times, he can yet by the liberty of choice not render the vow, and sin. The third liberty is likewise necessary to the praise of a good work, but neither does it fight with a precept, and much less with a vow. For it can happen that one execute commanded works with as great alacrity and promptitude as another the works not commanded. Whence David said (Psalm 118): I have been delighted in the way of thy testimonies, as in all riches. And: How sweet are thy words to my palate, more than honey to my mouth.
By like reasoning it can happen, nay ordinarily happens, that what is done by vow is done more willingly and promptly than what is done without a vow. For a vow of itself begets gladness, since it proceeds from great charity, according to that (1 Paralipomenon, last chapter): The people rejoiced when they promised their vows freely, because they offered them to the Lord with their whole heart. But if some render with sadness what they vowed, that happens from the vice of men, not from the nature of a vow; nor yet even then is that which is done without a vow better than by vow; for, as Saint Thomas teaches (in opusculum 18, which is On Perfection, chapter 12), one can be disposed in three ways in fulfilling a vow.
In one way, that he willingly do that to which he is bound by vow, both because the thing itself pleases him and because the vow pleases him; and then without doubt he merits more than another who as willingly does the same thing without a vow.
In another way, that he do unwillingly the thing which he vowed, yet willingly fulfill the vow; as if he who vowed a fast begin not to love the fast, and accordingly fast with difficulty and sadness, so that if he were of his own right he would not vow the fast; yet because he has now vowed, and it pleases him greatly to keep faith given to God, therefore with a prompt and alacritous mind he overcomes that difficulty, that he may fulfill the vow. And here too he merits more than another who without a vow willingly fasts; for as religion is more excellent than temperance, so it is better to fulfill a vow willingly, which is of religion, than willingly to fast, which is of temperance.
In the third way it can happen that one so grieve that he vowed that he no longer wishes to keep the vow; but because this is simply evil, it cannot be compared with a good.
From these it is easy to answer the testimonies which we brought forward on the contrary. To that of Psalm 53, I will freely sacrifice, I answer that that, freely, is opposed to sadness and coercion, but not to the necessity which arises from a vow or precept.
To that of 1 Corinthians 7, Not that I may cast a snare upon you — by which words Peter Martyr thinks it most openly demonstrated that vows are forbidden — I answer that a snare is the necessity which detains one unwilling, but not any necessity whatever. And accordingly vows are snares to those who have vowed rashly, or who have been compelled by others to vow, when they themselves desired nothing of the kind. Just as marriage too can be called a snare to those who rashly take a wife, and in that way bind themselves to one with whom they cannot live, and thence take occasion of fornicating with others. The sense of the Apostle, then, is: I exhort you to continence, but yet so that I do not compel the unwilling, nor persuade to take and vow it rashly, and that it be a snare of souls; but that I show that which is of itself honorable and most useful, so that those to whom the Lord has inspired a desire of this thing may take and vow it.
And that a snare in this passage is not called a vow, or necessity absolutely, but, as we said, a vow undertaken unwillingly or rashly, Saint Augustine testifies (in the book On the Good of Widowhood, chapter 5), who thus expounds: “Not that I may cast a snare upon you — that is, not that I may compel you”; and Saint Jerome (Book 1 against Jovinian): “The Apostle does not impose,” he says, “a snare on us, nor compel us to be what we will not.” Similarly expound the commentaries on this passage of Theodoret, Theophylact, Anselm, and others.
There comes in the very metaphor of a snare; for a snare is called not a rope binding and holding a man lest he perchance fall, but a rope forcibly detaining, and set out both to capture and to destroy. Finally, the Wise Man (Proverbs 20) expounded this very thing in express words: It is a ruin to a man to devour holy ones, and after vows to retract. Where, for that which Jerome renders “ruin,” in the Hebrew is a word which properly signifies a snare; whence the Seventy interpreters rendered pagis, that is, a snare; nor did Jerome ill render “ruin,” because the proper end of a snare is a fall and ruin. Therefore, according to Solomon, it is a snare and ruin, not to vow absolutely, but after a vow to retract, which happens to those who vow rashly or unwilling. For these are held by the vow, as by a certain snare, compelled, and take occasion of offending more grievously.
To that of 1 Corinthians 9, Not with sadness, or of necessity, I answer that in this passage necessity is called not a law or a vow, but the human necessity which compels men to do what they would not. For he speaks of those who give alms unwilling, because, namely, they blush not to do what others do, lest they be judged avaricious; or they dare not deny one asking, some great man, such as Paul himself was, for the needy. That Blessed Paul speaks of this necessity the following words testify: For God loveth a cheerful giver. For the necessity which is born of human fear is opposed to cheerfulness, but not the necessity of a vow, which arises from charity. The same is to be answered to the other passage from the epistle to Philemon.
But to the testimony of Saint Jerome (Book 1 against Jovinian), where he says that it is of greater grace to offer what you owe not than to render what you are required, I answer that Saint Jerome speaks of that work which is required by reason of a precept, not of that which is required by reason of a vow. For there is much difference between a law and a vow, as pertains to the present matter; for he who does a work not commanded by any law, although he does not do a more laudable work inasmuch as he does a work not commanded — nay, as we said above, other things being equal, it is better to do a commanded work than one not commanded — yet for three causes, for the most part, he does a more laudable work.
First, because things not commanded are generally nobler in themselves than things commanded; for God commanded lesser things, counseled greater. But this has no place in vows; for not lesser things are done by vow, and greater without a vow, but the contrary; for the most perfect works can be and are wont to be vowed.
Secondly, because always he who does works not commanded, out of charity, as he ought, does also all commanded works; and so gives more than he who does only commanded works; for the precepts are included in the counsels, not the contrary. But neither has this place in vows; for he who does something without a vow does not straightway fulfill also all vows.
Thirdly, because for the most part greater promptitude is required to undertake a work not commanded than a commanded work, as is known; and therefore, by reason of the greater promptitude, a work not commanded is of greater grace, as Jerome says, than a commanded work. But of a vow this cannot be said; for although greater promptitude perhaps be required to undertake a new work, to which we are in no way bound, than to do ordinary works, to which we are bound by vow, yet that greater promptitude is surpassed by another still greater, which was necessary to make the vow itself. For since a vow is offered of one’s own accord, and is an arduous and difficult thing, much greater promptitude is required to make a vow than to do something without a vow.
To the testimony of Saint Prosper (from Book 2 On the Contemplative Life, last chapter), where he says that we ought so to abstain that we do not subject ourselves to necessity, I answer that the necessity of which Saint Prosper speaks is not the necessity of a law or vow, but the necessity of human fear, which begets sadness; for therefore the same author subjoins: “Lest, now not devout but unwilling, we do a voluntary thing.”
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XXIX. Solvitur objectio prima adversariorum. Restat nunc, ut objectiones adversariorum solvamus. Prima objectio communis est om¬ nibus et sumitur ab illis Scripturis, quae do¬ cent, opera bona non ex necessitate, quam tamen secum adferunt vota, sed voluntarie, ac libere esse facienda : Id enim est melius, et laudabilius, et Deo etiam acceptius, quod est magis voluntarium , et liberum , ac proinde minus necessarium. Psalm. LIII : Vo¬ luntarie sacrificabo tibi. I. Corinth. YII : Non ut laqueum vobis injiciam , id est, hortor ad continentiam, sed non ad votum;II. Corinth. IX : Unusquisque prout destinavit in corde suo , non ex tristitia , aut ex necessitate , hilarem enim datorem diligit Deus. Et ad Philemo¬ nem : Ne veluti ex necessitate bonum tuum sit , sed voluntarium. (1) S. Hieronymus lib. I. in Jovinianuin, ante medium : « Et ideo plus amat virgines Christus quia sponte tribuunt, quod sibi non fuerat imperatum : majoris- que gratiae est offerre quod non debeas, quam reddere quod exigaris. » Et S. Pros¬ per lib. II de vita contemplativa cap. ult. <i Sic abstinere, vel jejunare debemus, ut non nos necessitati jejunandi subdamus, ne jam non devoti, sed inviti, rem voluntariam faciamus. » Respondeo, triplicem esse libertatem, ac triplicem item necessitatem. Unam ex parte debiti, sive debitum oriatur ex praecepto, sive ex voto, sive aliunde. Id enim discimur libere facere, quod non tenemur facere, id vero necessario, quod tenemur. Alteram ex parte naturalis determinationis voluntatis. Illa enim dicimur libere facere, in quibus non habemus voluntatem deterrmnatam ad unum : atque haec libertas est, quae proprie dicitflr liberum arbitrium. Tertiam ex parte coactionis, sive ea sit absoluta coactio, ut cum quis trahitur vi, quo ire non vult, sive sit moralis quaedam, et quasi conditionata coactio, ut cum quis nollet aliquid facere, et non libenter facit, facit tamen coactus ti¬ more aliquo humano, aut servili. Ex his prima libertas non est necessaria ad opus laudabile, aut Deo gratum facien¬ dum : Neque contraria necessitas pugnat cum laude et merito operis boni, quia potius contra, ut ostendimus, ista necessitas auget laudem operis boni. Semperenim nisi aliun¬ de sit impedimentum, melius est opus ex praecepto, quam non ex praecepto, ex voto quam non ex voto. Altera illa libertas ne¬ cessaria est ad laudem boni operis, sed ea aeque reperitur in opere, quod sit ex prae¬ cepto aut voto, et in opere omnibus modis indebito : Nam etiamsi quis millies voverit aliquid, poterit tamen ex arbitrii libertate votum non reddere, et peccare. Tertia li¬ bertas est item necessaria ad laudem boni operis, sed neque ipsa repugnat praecepto, et multo minus voto. Potest enim fieri, ut quis tanta alacritate, et promptitudine exe- quatur opera praecepta, quanta alius opera non praecepta. Unde David dicebat Psal. CXVIII : In via testimoniorum tuorum delecta¬ tus sum , sicut in omnibus divitiis. Et : Quam dulcia faucibus meis eloquia tua , super mei ori meo. (2) Pari ratione fieri potest, imo ordinarie fit, ut quod sit ex voto, fiat libentius, et promptius, quam quod fit sine voto. Yotum enim ex se laetitiam gignit, cum ex magna charitate pfcfcedat, juxta illud. I. Paral. ult: Laetatus est populus, cum vota sponte promitte¬ ret , quia corde toto offerebant ea Domino. Quod si aliqui cum tristitia solvunt, quod vo¬ verunt, id accidit ex vitio hominum, non ex natura voti ; nec tamen etiam tunc melius est quod fit sine voto, quam ex voto : Nam, (1) Psal. LXIII, 8; I. Cor. VII, 35; II. Cor. IX, 7; Philem. 14. - (2) Psal. CXVIII, 14 et 103; 576 LIBER II. ut S. Thomas docet in opuscul. XVIII. quod est de perfectione cap. 12. potesttribus mo¬ dis quis se habere in solvendo voto. Uno modo, ut libenter faciat' id, ad quod tenetur ex voto, et quia res ipsa placet, et quia votum placet ; Et tunc sine dubio ma¬ gis meretur, quam alius, qui seque libenter illud idem operatur sine voto. Altero nfodo, ut invitus faciat rem illam, quam vovit, tamen libenter impleat votum ; ut si is, qui vovit jejunium, incipiat*non amare jejunium, et proinde cum difficultate, et tristitia jejunet, adeo ut si esset sui juris, non voveret jejunium : tamen quia jam vo¬ vit, et placet ei vehementer servare Deo fi¬ dem datam, propterea prompto et alacri animo superet eam difficultatem, ut impleat votum. Atque hic etiam magis meretur quam alius, qui sine voto libenter jejunet; ut enim excellentior est religio, quam tem¬ perantia, ita melius est implere votum liben¬ ter, quod est religionis, quam libenter jeju¬ nare, quod est temperantiae. Tertio modo potest fieri, ut quis adeo do- leat se vovisse, ut non velit amplius servare votum; sed quia hoc est simpliciter malum, non potest conferri cum bono. Ex his ad ea testimonia, quse contra pro¬ tulimus, facile est respondere. Ad illud Psalm. LIII : Voluntarie sacrificabo. Respon¬ deo, illud, voluntarie , opponi tristitiae, et coactioni, non autem necessitati, quae ori¬ tur ex voto, aut praecepto. Ad illudi. Cor. VII: Non ut laqueum vobis in¬ jiciam', quibus verbis apertissime demonstrari existimat Petrus Martyr prohibita esse vota, respondeo, laqueum , appellari necessitatem, quae detinet invitum, non autem quamlibet necessitatem. Proinde vota esse laqueos il¬ lis, qui temere voverunt, vel qui coacti sunt ab aliis vovere, cum ipsi nihil tale cuperent. Quemadmodum etiam nuptiae laquei dici possunt iis, qui temere ducunt uxorem ; et eo modo alligant se alicui, cum qua vivere non possunt, et inde occasionem accipiunt cum aliis fornicandi. Est igitur sensus Apos¬ toli : Exhortor vos ad continentiam, sed ita tamen, ut non cogam invitos, nec suadeam temere eam accipere, et vovere, et quod es¬ se laqueus animarum, sed ut ostendam id, quod est per se honestum, et utilissimum ; ut quibus Dominus hujus rei desiderium ins¬ piraverit, illi accipiant, et voveant. Quod autem laqueus hoc loco non dicatur votum, aut necessitas absolute, sed, ut dixi¬ mus, votum ab invito, aut temere suscep¬ tum, testatur S. Augustinus lib. de bono vi¬ duitatis cap. 5. qui sic exponit : « Non ut laqueum vobis injiciam, id est, non ut vos cogam, » et S. Hieronymus lib. I. in Jovi- nianum: « Non imponit, inquit, nobis Apos¬ tolus laqueum, nec cogit esse, quod nolu¬ mus. )> Similiter exponunt commentaria in hunc locum Theodoreti, Theopliylacti, An- selmi et aliorum. Accedit ipsa laquei metaphora;- non enim laqueus dicitur funis ligans, et tenens homi¬ nem, ne forte cadat; sed funis vi detinens, et ad capiendum, et ad perdendum exposi¬ tus. Denique Sapiens Prov. XX. id ipsum di¬ sertis verbis exposuit : Ruina , inquit , est homini devotare Sanctos , et post vota re¬ tractare. » Ubi pro eo, quod Hieronymus vertit, ruina in Hebraeo est topia, quod pro¬ prie laqueum significat : Nam topi illaqueare est, to'p7 auceps dicitur, unde verterunt sep¬ tuaginta interpretes, 7r«7ts, id est laqueus; nec male Hieronymus vertit ruinam, quia finis proprius laquei casus et ruina est. Igi¬ tur juxta Salomonem laqueus, et ruina est, non absolute vovere, et post votum retrac¬ tare, quod accidit iis, qui temere aut inviti vovent. Isti enim voto, ut laqueo quodam tenentur coacti, et occasionem accipiunt gravius delinquendi. Ad illud I. Gorinth. IX : Non ex tristitia , aut ex necessitate , respondeo, hoc loco ap¬ pellari necessitatem, non legem, aut votum, sed humanam necessitatem, quas cogit ho¬ mines facere, quod non vellent. Loquitur enim de iis, qui eleemosynas faciunt inviti, quia videlicet erubescunt non facere, quod alii faciunt, ne judicentur avari; aut non au¬ dent negare petenti magno alicui viro, qua¬ lis erat ipse Paulus, pro egenis. De hac ne¬ cessitate loqui B. Paulum testantur verba sequentia : Hilarem enim datorem diligit Deus. Necessitas enim quae ex humano timo¬ re nascitur, hilaritati opponitur, non autem necessitas voti quae oritur ex charitate. Idem respondendum est ad alium locum ex epistola ad Philemonem. Ad testimonium autem S. Hieronymi lib. I. in Jovinianum, ubi dicit majoris gratiae esse offerre quod non debeas, quam reddere quod exigaris , respondeo : S. Hieronymum loqui de opere illo, quod exigitur ratione praecepti, non de eo, quod exigitur ratione voti. Nam multum interest inter legem et votum, quod ad rem praesentem pertinet ; V CAPUT XXX. 577 qui enim facit opus non imperatum ulla le¬ ge, etsi non facit opus laudabilius, quate¬ nus facit opus non imperatum, imo, ut su¬ pra diximus , cseteris paribus, melius sit opus imperatum, quam ifbn imperatum fa¬ cere, tamen tribus de causis, ut plurimum, facit opus laudabilius. Primo, quia res non imperatae sunt ple¬ rumque nobiliores secundum se, quam res imperatae; Deus enim minora imperavit, majora consuluit. At hoc non habet locum in votis ; non enim minora fiunt ex voto, majora sine voto, sed contrario ; perfectis¬ sima enim quaeque opera voveri possunt et solent. Secundo, quia semper, qui facit opera non imperata, ex charitate, sicut oportet, facit etiam omnia opera imperata : atque ita plus dat, quam ille, qui facit solum opera imperata; includuntur enim praecepta in consiliis, non contra. Sed neque hoc in votis locum habet; non enim qui. facit aliquid si¬ ne voto, continuo implet etiam omnia vota. Tertio, quia ut plurimum major prompti- tudo requiritur ad opus non imperatum ag¬ grediendum, quam ad opus imperatum, ut notum est ; ac propterea ratione majoris promptitudinis opus non imperatum majoris gratiae est, ut Hieronymus dicit, quam opus imperatum. At de voto hoc dici non potest ; nam etsi major promptitudo forte requi¬ ratur ad aggrediendum novum opus, ad quod non tenemur ullo modo, quam ad ope¬ ra ordinaria facienda, ad quae tenemur ex voto : tamen major illa promptitudo su¬ peratur ab alia quadam adhuc majore, quae necessaria fuit ad votum ipsum faciendum. Cum enim votum sponte offeratur, et sit res ardua, et difficilis, multo major promptitu¬ do requiritur ad votum faciendum, quam ad faciendum aliquid sine voto. Ad testimonium S. Prosperi ex lib. II. de vita contemplativa cap. ult. ubi dicit, sic esse abstinendum, ut non nos necessitati subdamus, respondeo, necessitatem, de qua S. Prosper loquitur, non esse necessitatem legis, aut voti, sed necessitatem timoris hu¬ mani, quse tristitiam gignit ; ideo enim sub¬ jungit idem auctor: « Ne non devoti, sed inviti rem voluntariam faciamus. »