Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Sacrament of Penance · Book IV: On Satisfaction
Chapter 1: The State of the Controversy Is Explained
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. III, De Sacramento Poenitentiae, Book IV, the fourth general controversy on the sacraments. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
There remains Satisfaction, which is the third part of Penance, of which we shall discourse briefly, both because this disputation pertains almost wholly to the place on justification, which we reserve for volume 4, and because the adversaries, instructed or convicted by the disputations of Catholics, now concede much as regards Satisfaction, about which they fought most fiercely before. Further, this whole disputation is contained in three parts. For first the state of the controversy must be explained. Then, since when the state of the controversy has been explained five questions will arise, these will have to be treated one by one separately. Lastly, the arguments which are brought by the adversaries will have to be dissolved.
Chapter I. The state of the controversy is explained
That the controversy on Satisfaction may be understood, then, it is to be observed that Satisfaction is nothing else than the action by which he who has wronged another does as much as is enough to compensate the injury, or as much as he who has been wronged justly exacts. From which it follows that restitution is not the same as Satisfaction. For to restore is to cease from an injury, not to repair an injury done; for he who keeps another’s property against the owner’s will does injury so long as he does not give that property back. Besides, restitution regards the damage actually inflicted; Satisfaction the person affected by the injury, even if he has received no damage. Wherefore nothing can be restored to God, since he suffers no damage; yet satisfaction can be made to him, since injury is done him by us. So restitution is concerned with things, Satisfaction with actions; and restitution restores justice as to the equality of things, as when those things which were taken by theft are given back; Satisfaction restores justice as to the equality of actions, as when he who had treated another with contumely asks pardon of him. But as justice, which is concerned with actions, is twofold, so Satisfaction also is twofold. One justice is that which consists in absolute and perfect equality, as when one bestows on another as much honour as his dignity absolutely exacts. Another is the justice which does not consist in perfect and absolute equality, but in an imperfect equality, which depends in part on the donation or acceptance of the other; as when someone pays to a prince the honour which he has commanded by law to be paid him, although that honour is inferior to the dignity of the prince. So Satisfaction is sometimes made to absolute and perfect equality, as when a contumelious action between two equal men is compensated by a contrary one, having as much of honour as the other had of contumely. But sometimes it is made to an imperfect equality, as when he who has borne the loss of ten thousand gold pieces suffers satisfaction to be made him by the cession of all goods, although those goods do not reach the sum of so many thousands. Now, then, it is agreed among all that between God and men there cannot be that perfect and absolute justice, and therefore not Satisfaction either. For whatever we are, we are God’s; whatever we have, we have from God; when we sin against him we wrong an infinite good which is in us; but whatever we have and are is slight and finite. Wherefore unless some acceptance or donation intervenes, no one can make satisfaction to him for sins committed against him; nor can there be any controversy about this, since even the heathen philosophers understood and wrote that equal returns cannot be made to God by men. The whole controversy, then, is whether at least that imperfect Satisfaction, which rests on his acceptance and donation, has place in the sacrament of Penance.
Again it is to be observed that by Satisfaction an inequality is to be compensated which is contrary not only to justice but also to friendship, as Saint Thomas rightly teaches in book 4, distinction 15, question 1, article 3. For as he who wrongs another violates justice and friendship at once, so he who makes satisfaction ought to restore and reintegrate both justice and friendship. And although by one action satisfaction can sometimes be made to justice and friendship at once, yet it often happens that by one action only justice or only friendship is restored. If someone seized by a judge is compelled against his will to undergo as much punishment as he himself inflicted injury on another, he will without doubt satisfy justice by that punishment, yet friendship will not be repaired between them, which cannot exist between the unwilling. On the contrary, if someone has so gravely wronged another that he cannot compensate the injury except after a long time, he indeed will be able by humble entreaty straightway to ask pardon and return into the favour of him whom he had wronged; yet he will be bound in his time to make entire satisfaction for the injury. Now then, when men sin against God, they violate friendship and justice at once, as is well known. And for reforming friendship indeed a man cannot make satisfaction to God; for, as we said above, the Satisfaction of a man towards God necessarily needs the acceptance of God himself; but acceptance presupposes friendship. And besides, that Satisfaction be in some way to equality, it is needful that, as the offence had a certain infinity on the part of the object, so the satisfaction should have some infinity on the part of the principle of the one satisfying; therefore it is required that satisfactory works be done by the Spirit of God dwelling in the man, or by the man himself as a member of Christ and now made a son of God through grace and charity. It cannot therefore come about that men make satisfaction for restoring friendship with God; and this is what the theologians commonly teach, that Satisfaction is not offered to God, nor exacted of men, for the guilt; for God freely justifies us from guilt, freely restores his friendship to us. But if the ancient Fathers sometimes seem to attribute to human actions that they render God a friend from an enemy, and so make satisfaction for expiating guilt, they are to be interpreted of Satisfaction from congruity, not from condignity, as we said in the preceding book of the power and merit of contrition. Ruard Tapper indeed, a notable theologian, teaches in the explication of article 6 of the Louvain articles that a man can make satisfaction to God for guilt and eternal punishment through certain acts which in the order of nature follow the infusion of sanctifying grace and precede the remission of sins; and for the same opinion he cites Saint Thomas in book 4, distinction 15, question 1, article 2; but it is neither necessary now to dispute of these subtleties, nor is it certainly settled whether Saint Thomas meant that; it is enough for us in this place that all the doctors agree in this, that no one can make satisfaction to God before sanctifying grace has been obtained; in which not even the heretics are against us. And that Andrew Vega, book 13 on the Council of Trent, chapter 10, contends that satisfaction is made for guilt, is not repugnant to what we have said. For he does not mean that satisfaction can be made for guilt so far as it brings in enmity with God, but only so far as the guilt of punishment follows it; wherefore the question is only about the name.
There remains, then, the controversy only about the satisfaction by which the equality of justice is restored, friendship having been restored through the gratuitous mercy of God, and through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus. God could indeed forgive the whole debt of punishment, as it is certain that he does when he first receives us as sons through Baptism, or when we undergo martyrdom for his name; but he can also will this, that when we sin after Baptism, friendship indeed be freely restored to those repenting and confessing their sins, but that the debt of paying punishment nevertheless remain, by which justice may be satisfied. The question, then, is whether God wills that for those sinning after Baptism, the guilt being remitted, the debt of paying punishment remain, or not; and this is the first thing in which Catholics differ from the heretics. But if it shall have been proved, as a little later, with the good help of the Lord, it will be, that when the guilt is remitted the debt of punishment is not always remitted, there will arise another question, whether that debt of punishment remaining after the remission of guilt can be redeemed by good works. For (as Cardinal Cajetan rightly explains in the treatise On Contrition, question 4) that punishment which remains to be paid after the remission of guilt is that very punishment of sense which the sinner ought to have suffered in hell, eternity only being removed. For the punishment of hell embraces three things: the punishment of loss, the punishment of sense, and the eternity of both punishments; of which the first corresponds to the turning away from God; the second, to the disordered turning to creatures; the third, to enmity with the everlasting and infinite king. Of these three evils which are in hell, those who return to the friendship of God and his grace are straightway freed from the first and the third; there remains only that second evil, namely the debt of the punishment of sense, to be paid for a time. And since God could will that that punishment be necessarily paid after this life, he could also admit the redemption of that punishment through the laborious works of this life; and what God in fact wills, we do not agree with the adversaries; therefore the second question is born, whether men can make satisfaction for expiating the guilt of that punishment which sometimes remains after the remission of guilt. But after it shall have been demonstrated that that temporal punishment of the future life, which is properly due to sin, can be redeemed by the laborious works of this life, the third question will be born, whether the laborious works by which the punishment of sin is redeemed are both to be undertaken of one’s own accord and also to be enjoined by priests in the sacrament of Penance; for in this article also we differ not a little from the adversaries. Then the fourth will follow, by what works chiefly satisfaction is made to the Lord for the guilt of punishment. And at last the fifth and final, whether those works are to be called properly satisfactory, so that we may be said truly and properly to make satisfaction to the Lord.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
pars, (lc qua brcviler disscremus, lum quod liaec conlinctur. Pn»m?/i, enim o.\plicandus esl cunlro-
dispulalio fcre pcrlincal ad locum dc iuslificalio- vcrsiae slalus. DemfiCjquoniam slalu conlroversiae
ne, queni lomo 4. rescrvamus. lum quod advcrsa- cxplicalo , quiiiquc cxislcril (luacsliones. Iraclaii-
rii calholicorum dispulalionibus crudili , aul con- dac crunl singulac scorsum. Puslreiiio, dissol-
viclijnulla jam conccdanl, quod allinclad Salisla- venda erunl argumcnla, quac ab adversariis adlc-
clioncm, dc quibus acerrimc anloa dimicabant. runlur.
CAPUT PUIMUM
Slatus conlroversiae explicalur.
Ul igilur conlroversia dc Salisraclione intclliga- liam contrariam. lantum habcntcm lionoris, quan-
lur, animadvcrlcndum est, Salisfactionem nihil es- lum aiia habucral conlumcliac. Aliquando aulcm
se aliud, nisi actioncm. qua is qui allerum laesit, fit ad aequalilalcm impcrfcctanr,ut cum is, qui pcr-
lanlum facil, quantum salis cst ad injuriam com- lulil jacluram deccm millium anreorum. salisficri
pensandam: sive quantum is qai lacsus cst, juste sibi palitur ccssionc omninm bonornni.licct ea bo-
cxigit. na ad summam lot millium non pcrvcnianl.
Kx quo scquilur, ul non sit idcm rcstitutio.quod Jam igilur inter omncs convenit, inler Denm cl
Salislaclio.Rcsliluere cnim, est ccssarc ab injuria, homincs non posse cssc justiliam illam pcrfectam
non injuriam factam rcsarcirc: nam qui rcm alie- et absolulam:proindc ncc Satisfactioncm.Quidquid
iiam iriviio Doinino rctinel, landiu facit injuriam, enim sumus, Dei sumus: quidquid liabcmus.a I)eo
doncc rcm illam non rcddit. Adhacc rcslilulio re- habcmus:cum in cum pcccamus.infinitum bonum,
spicil damnum rcipsa illatum:Salisfactio pcrsonam quod in iiol)iscsl.lacdimiis,quid(piid aulcm nos ha-
injuriam ancctam, eliamsi ilia (l;;mnum nullum ac- bcmus ct sumus, cxiguum est ac linilum. Quare
cepcrit. Quocirca Dco nihil rcslilui polcsl,cum ip- nisi aliqua acccptalio aut donatio intcrcedal, ncmo
sc damfiuin nullum paliatur: potcsl lamcn eidcm polcst illi pro pcccalis in cum admissis salisfacc-
salisficri, curn injuria a nobis anicitur. Ilaque re- rc. ncquc dc hac rc ulla conlroversia cssc polcsl,
sliliilio in rcbus. Salisfaclio in aclionibus vcrsntur: cnin eliam clhiiici pliilosnphi inlcllcxcrint cl scri-
cl rcslaural juslitiam rcslitutio quoad aequalilatcm pscrint, Deo non possc ab hominibus paria reddi.
rcrum. ul cum ca, (]uac hirlo ablata sunt, reddun- Tola ifjitur conlrovcrsia csl: Uiruiii saltcm impcr-
lur: rcslaural Satisfaclio jusliliam quoad acqualila- fecla illa Satisfaclio . quac acccplationc ct dona-
lcm actionum, ut cum is qui alium conlumclia al- tionc ejus nililur,locum habcal in sacramcnlo Poc-
fcccrat. ab co veniam pclil. nitcnliac.
QuiMTiadmodum autcm juslitia. (puic in aclioni- lliirsiis animadvcrtcndiim csl:Salisfactionc com-
bus vcrsalur, duplcx csl; il;i (iiiplcx cliam csl Sa- p(Misaii(lain cssc inacquiililalcm, quac noii solum
lisf;iclio. Alia justitia esl, qu;ic vcrsalur in absolu- jnslitiae. sed etiam ainicitiac contniria csl. ut s.
la cl pcrfcclJi acqu;ililalc: ut ciiin taiiiiim honoris Tliomiis rcctc (loc(;l in i. dist. 1.'». (pi;icsl. 1. arl.
unus allcii Iribuit. (]uanlum cjiis dii^iriliis absolulc .'J. (picmadmndiim cniin (pii iillcrum lacdil, iiisli-
cxigil. Ali;i csl jiislilia. (|uac non consislil in pcr- liain siinul cl iimicili;im violat: ita (pii Siilisfacit cl
fccla ct absolula acqu;ililalc, sed in iieqnalitiilc iin- jusliliam ct amiciliiim rcslnurare ac rc(linlc}^r;ire
pcrfcctii. fpiiic i)\ p;ui(>.!uit douiilionc. vcl acccpla- (icbct. Kt ipiamvis un;i aiiioiK; possit aliiiiiiindo Ju-
lionc iillciius pciidcl: vcluti cum fpiis cuin hoiio- slitiac siiiiul cl amiciliiic salislicri; lamcn siicpc
rcm principi (lcfcrl,qucm is sibi dcfcrri lcj,'c maii- continjiil. ul una ;iclio solam jusliliam aulsolam a-
davil, liccl is lioiior infcrior sit piincipis di^Miilalc. miciliiiin rcsliiiini.
llii Siilislaclio alifpiiindo lit ;id ;ibsolul;im vA pcr- Sj (piis a jiidici' comprchcnsus. liiiiluiii pocmic
fccliim iiP(piiililiilcin;iil ciim iiclio contumcliosii in- siibirc c();;iilur invilus, (piiinluiii ipsc iojuriiic iii :i-
lcr duus homincs iicpnilcs rcconi{)ensatur pcr ii- liuiii inliilil.siiti.^licl sine dubio Aup[ilicio illo (usli-
-»li
uii i'oi:.MTi:.\ri.\
tiiio. iiec UiiiuMi inlcr cos ;iiniciliii icruninibiUir,
«|U!ie inlcr iiivilos esse non polcsl. Coiiliii nulciii.
M tiuis ila i;r;ivilcr ;ili(iuoiii lacstril. ut iioii possit,
nisi lont;o liMiiporc. iuiuriain coiiipciis;uc; is (|ui-
ticm pol^iMil iiuinili prece conlinuo vcniam polore,
al(|uc in tiraliam cjus rcdirc qucin laoscraiuioindo
l.imoii suo lcinporc pio injuria inlcgre salisraccrc
tciicbilur.
Jaiii itiilur cuin liominos poccanl in Doiim. ami-
( iti;im simul cljusliliam violanl, ul nolnm csl. Ac
pro amicilia quiilcm rclormanda. noii polcst lioino
1)00 satisracerc: nam, iit supra diximus. Salisla-
clioliominis ertja Doum.acccplalionc ipsius Dci iio-
ccssario iiulipet; ;icccptalio autcm ;iniiciti;ini prac-
supponit.Kt jiractcrca ut Satisraclio sil ;iliquo niodo
jul aequalilalcm, oportel ul sicut oflcnsio liabuil in-
fmilalcm quaiulam c\ p;irtc objccli: sic babeal sa-
tisraclio inlinitaiom aliquam c\ parlc principii Sa-
lisfacicntis^proindc rcquiritur.ul opcra satisractoria
lianl a Spirilu Dei bomiiicm iiiliabilanlo.sive ab ip-
so liominc ut nicmbro Cliristi. ac lllio Dci jam por
izratiam ct cbarilatcm cricclo. Kon ijiitur licri po-
icsl. ul pro instauranda amicitia cum Deo,bomines
satisracianl: ol lioc est quod lbeo!oi,M communilcr
(locont. S;ilisractioncm non oirerri Dco, neque cxi-
Iji ab bominibus pro culpa; ^ratis enim nos a cul-
pa justiGcal Deus, gralis amiciliam suam nobis re-
sliluit.
Quod si velercs Patres inlordum aclionibus bu-
nianis tribuere vidcnlur. ul Deum ex inimico ami-
nim reddanl, atque adeo pro cxpianda culpa sa-
lisracianl: inlcrprctandi sunl de Salisractione ex
congruo. non ex condigno, ut libro superiore di-
ximus, de vi et merito contrilionis.
Docet quidom Ruardus Tappcrus, insignis Ibeo-
logus in cxplicatioiic art. 6, Lovaniensium, posse
lioininem satisracerc Deo pro culpa et poena ae-
lerna. per actus quosdam, qui ordine naturae se-
qiianlur gratiae gralum lacienlis inrusionem , et
praeccdant remissionem pcccatorum:et in candein
^onlentiam citat s. Thomam in 4. dist. 15. quaest.
1. art. 2. sed neque necesse est nunc de bis sub-
liiilatibus disputare.neque cerlo conslat an s. Tho-
mas id volucrit: satis nobis esl boc loco, doctores
oinnes in eo convenire, ul non possil ullus ante
praliam gratum lacienlem adeptam, Deo satisface-
re: in quo ne b;ieretici quidcm nobis adversantur.
Quod etiain .\ndreas Vega Iib.l3. in concilio Iri-
dcnt. cap. .10. conlendit satisfieri pro culpa; non
rcpu^jnat iis, quae diximus. Neque enim vult ille,
salisneri posse pro culpa, quatenus ea inducil ini-
micitiam cum Deo, sed solum qu;ilenus c;im sc-
qiiilur reatus poenae; quarc quaeslio solum est de
nomine.
Reslal igitur conlroversiasolum desatislaclione,
qua jiislitiiie restauretur ai;qiiHlit;is : restitula si-
quidtMU amicilia per graluilam Dei misericordiam,
'•l per rcdcmptionem, quae est in Clirislo Jesu.
Possel quidem Deus universum poenae dcbilum
condonare.ut cerlum est eum facere,cum primum
pcr Bnptis;num nos in filios recipit . vel cum mar-
lyrium pro nomine ejus subimus: sed potesl etiam
ifl velle, ut cum peccamus post Baplismum , ami-
citia quidem gialis poenilentibus ct confitcnlibus
peccata sua, rostilualur; sod m;incal tainen dcbi-
lum liiciidae poenae, qiio juslitiae satislial. Qiiae-
slio igilur csl, Aii volit Doii.s, ul peccantibiis post
r>;i|)tisinuin,rcmissa cuI|);i,riMnanciit debilum luen-
dae poenae, an non: atque boc est Primuiii,in (pio
c;illioli(M ;il) Inierotiois dissidcul.
Qiiod si probatum fuerit, ul p;iuIo post. Domino
bone jiivante fiel, remissa culp;i noii scmpiM- re-
milti dcbiliim poenae: exislet alia quaeslio.An de-
bilum iliiid poonae, post cul|);ii; r(Miiissionem ma-
nciis, possit per o|)cr;i boiui rcdimi. l\;im (ut recte
cxplicat card. C;ijotan. iii Iract. de Contrilionc
quii(>st. 4.) pocn;i ill;i qu;ie Iucii(l;i reslat |)ost cul-
pae remissioiicm, esl illa ipsa poena sensus,quain
in gebenna pati debuissel peccator, remola soluui
aeteriiilate. Tria enim complcctilur pocna geben-
nae: poenam damni, poonam sensus el utriusque
poonac aclernitatom: quorum Primum respondet
iiversioni a Deo. Secundum, conversioni inordina-
tac ad crealuras. Tertium, inimiciliae cum sempi-
tcrno el infinito rege. Ex bis autcin tribus malis
quae sunt in gelienna: a primo el tertio liberanlur
conlinuo, qui ad amicitiam Dei, ct cjus gratiain
redeunt: solum autem remanet malum illud secuii-
dam, debitum videlicet poenae sensus, ad teinpus
luendae.
El quoniam posset Deus velle , ut ea poena ne-
cessario lueretur post b;inc viliim, possel etiam
admitlere redemptionem ejuspoenae per opera la-
boriosa hujus vilae; et quid reipsa Deus velit, non
convenil nobis cum adversariis : propterea na-
scitur Secunda Quaeslio,An salisfacere possint bo-
mines, pro expiando reatu illius poenae,qui inler-
dum remanet post remissionem culpae.
Poslquam autem demonslraturn fuerit , posse
poenam illam temporalem futurae vitae,quae pro-
prie debelur peccalo, per opera laboriosa hujus
vitae redimi: nascetur quaeslio Tertia, An opera
laboriosa, quibus poena peccati redimitur, lum
sponle assumenda sint , tum etiam per sacerdotes
in sacramenlo Poenilentiac injungenda : nam in
hoc etiam articulo, non parum ab adversariis dis-
sidemus.
Tum succedet Quarta, Quibus potissimum ope-
ribus pro realu poenae Domino salisfiat.
Ac demum Quinla et postrema , Utrum ista ope-
ra sint dicenda proprie satisfactoria, ita ut nos di-
camur vcre ac proprie Domino satisracerc.