Bellarmine · De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus · On the Power of the Supreme Pontiff in Temporal Matters, against William Barclay
Chapter 5: On the Power over Temporal Things Which the Theologians Attribute Indirectly to the Supreme Pontiff
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. XII, De Potestate Summi Pontificis in Temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium, a treatise of 1610. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
In the fifth chapter Barclay, having exploded (as he himself says) the opinion of the canonists and of Bozio, sets about refuting the opinion of the theologians, who say that the Pope has power over temporal things indirectly. But before I come to refuting his arguments, I shall explain briefly what we understand by those words, directly and indirectly, and who is the author of those words. By the words directly and indirectly, then, we do not understand, as some say in jest, that the spiritual power is in the Pontiff directly, that is, justly and lawfully, but the temporal indirectly, that is, unjustly and by usurpation; but that the pontifical power is of itself and properly spiritual, and therefore regards directly, as its primary object, spiritual affairs; but indirectly, that is, through an order to spiritual things, by reduction, and by a necessary consequence, so to speak, regards temporal things as a secondary object, to which this spiritual power does not turn except in a given case, as Innocent III speaks in the chapter Per venerabilem, which children are legitimate: “In other regions,” he says, “on inspection of certain causes, we exercise temporal jurisdiction casually”; as Saint Bernard also speaks in book 1 on Consideration, chapter 5: “But,” he says, “it is one thing to run out incidentally into these (temporal affairs) when a cause indeed presses; another to lean upon them of one's own accord, as if they were great and worthy of such a man.” Further, as the author of these words we have Innocent IV, a most learned Pontiff. For he, explaining the chapter Novit, on judgments, in the paragraph on the fief, says that the Pontiff does not judge of fiefs directly, but otherwise indirectly, by reason of sin. The same distinction is used by John of Torquemada, Thomas Cajetan, Peter Paludanus, Durandus, Francis Vitoria, Dominic Soto, Martin Ledesma, James Simancas, Antonio of Cordoba, Martin Navarrus, Luis Molina and others.
I come now to Barclay's arguments. First he brings forward an argument which I had used against those who wanted the power of the Pontiff to be at once pontifical and royal, spiritual and temporal, and temporal kings to be not so much kings as executors of the pontifical power and will. My argument was this: the power of earthly kings is from God, as the Pontiffs themselves confess, Saint Leo, epistle 38 to Marcian; Saint Gelasius, in the epistle to Anastasius; Saint Gregory, book 2, epistle 61; Nicholas, in the epistle to Michael. Therefore either the Supreme Pontiff can take away the execution of administration from kings and emperors as being himself the supreme king and emperor, or he cannot; if he can, then he is a greater king than Christ, since he can take away what Christ gave; if he cannot, then he does not truly have royal power over kings and emperors themselves. This argument Barclay turns back thus against my opinion and that of the other theologians: “Either the Supreme Pontiff can in some way, that is, directly or indirectly, take from kings and emperors their kingdoms and empires and confer them on others, or he cannot. If he can, then he is in some way greater than God, because what God gave he takes away; for a lesser or an equal cannot take away what was granted by a greater or an equal, nor even the vicar of him who granted it, without the express command of the Lord (lest anyone reply to us that the Pope does this as the Vicar of Christ, since he is found to have received no command on this matter, either express or tacit); if he cannot, then it is false what they say, that he has supreme power of disposing indirectly of all the temporal things of Christians, and of deposing kings and emperors from the throne, and putting others in their place.” So Barclay.
I answer: when we said, from the opinion of the Pontiffs, that the power of earthly kings is from God, we do not understand that it is from God immediately, in the way that the power of the Supreme Pontiff is from God; but that it is from God because God willed that there be a political government in the human race, and therefore gave men a certain natural instinct to choose for themselves magistrates by whom they may be ruled; and besides, God willed the political government to be distinct from the ecclesiastical, as Pope Nicholas expressly taught in the epistle to Michael, and after him Innocent in the chapter Solitae, on majority and obedience, and before both Gelasius in the epistle to Anastasius. From these things it is clear that my argument is solid and Barclay's argument wholly weak; for if in the Supreme Pontiff there were spiritual and temporal power directly, and the Pontiff were king of the world as he is Pontiff of the universal Church, and the other kings were mere executors of temporal jurisdiction, certainly the Pontiff could at his pleasure deprive any kings whatever of the administration and execution of temporal jurisdiction; and in this way he could take away the political government, or confound it with the ecclesiastical; and he would be greater than Christ, since he could take away or confound the powers which Christ willed to be, and to be distinct. But if in the Supreme Pontiff there is set only spiritual power directly, and temporal indirectly, that is, only in order to spiritual things, it does not follow that the Pontiff can take away or confound the political government, but only that the Pontiff can, through his spiritual and Apostolic most eminent power, direct and correct the political power, and, if it is needed for the spiritual end, take it from one prince and confer it on another. And to answer the argument in form: when he says, either the Supreme Pontiff can in some way, that is, directly or indirectly, take from kings and emperors their kingdoms and empires and confer them on others, or he cannot; I answer, he can. When he gathers, if he can, then he is in some way greater than God, because what God gave he takes away; I deny the consequence, for God did not immediately give a kingdom to this man or that; but the power of kings is said to be from God because God willed there to be among men a political power, and that distinct from the ecclesiastical. Therefore when the Supreme Pontiff transfers a kingdom from one to another, he does not take away what God gave, but orders and directs it; and as God gives kingdoms to men by the mediation of the consent and counsel of men, and can and is wont to change and transfer them from nation to nation by the mediation of the counsel and consent of the same men, so he can with greater reason change and transfer them for the spiritual end through his general Vicar, whom he set over his whole household. But, says Barclay, that Vicar has no command of the Lord, either express or tacit. Nay, he has an express one, but in general; for by the very fact that he was made Shepherd of the whole flock, and set over the whole household, and head in Christ's stead of the whole body of the Church, he is understood to have a command to rule and direct and correct all the sheep of the whole flock, all the fellow servants who are in the household, and all the members which are in the body; nor are emperors and kings excepted, unless they wish to be excepted from the number of the sheep of Christ, and the servants of Christ, and the members of the body of Christ.
Barclay then brings forward another argument, which I proposed against the opinion of those who attribute to the Supreme Pontiff temporal power directly over all the kingdoms of the world; and he tries to turn it back against my opinion and that of the other theologians on the temporal power indirectly, that is, in order to spiritual things. He speaks thus: “But another, by far the most effective, which we related above from the same book and chapter of Bellarmine, we shall in this place with the best right adapt to our purpose in this manner. If it is true that the Pope has power indirectly of disposing of the temporal things of all Christians, either he has it by divine law or by human law. If by divine law, it ought to be established from the Scriptures, or certainly from the tradition of the Apostles. From the Scriptures we have nothing except that the keys of the kingdom of heaven were given to the Pontiff; of the keys of the kingdom of the earth no mention is made; of a tradition of the Apostles the adversaries bring forward none.” I answer: the Supreme Pontiff has by divine law the power of disposing of the temporal things of Christians in order to the spiritual end. And this is established from the Scriptures; for in the keys of the kingdom of heaven delivered to the Apostle Peter, for himself and his successors, Matthew 16, the keys of the kingdom of the earth are not indeed understood, of which no mention was made in the Gospel, because it was not necessary that the supreme Prince of the Church should at the same time be the temporal monarch of this world; but there is understood the power of disposing of temporal things so far as they help toward opening the kingdom of heaven to the faithful, or hinder and stand in the way lest the kingdom of heaven be opened to the faithful.
“But,” Barclay objects, “if they should say that there is no need of the express word of God or of the tradition of the Apostles for the confirmation of this power, since it belongs to the Pontiff only indirectly and by a certain consequence, as a certain inseparable accession and appendage of that spiritual power with which the supreme Shepherd of souls is endowed over all the sheep of the Christian flock; we shall in turn ask of them some testimony of this accession and conjunction from the Scriptures or the tradition of the Apostles.” I answer: I have already said that the power of which we speak is found expressly in the Scriptures, but in general, not in particular; namely in that chapter 16 of Matthew, I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and John 21, Feed my sheep; and that from these same divine testimonies is gathered that particular accession and conjunction of the power of disposing of temporal things in order to spiritual, as has been explained more than once. Nor is it true what Barclay adds, that so great a power was passed over in deep silence in the Church for so many centuries, both by Christ and by the Apostles and their successors. For by Christ it was signified plainly enough in the places cited; and by the Apostle also indicated, 1 Corinthians 6, when he says: Know you not that we shall judge angels? how much more things of this world? and by the successors of the Apostles Peter and Paul, namely the Roman Pontiffs, it was shown in deed in the deposition of kings and emperors, from the year of the Lord seven hundred onward; for before that time either the necessity or the opportunity was lacking.
Barclay objects again: “If each power can be separated from the other, the spiritual namely from the temporal and the reverse, there will be room for the sentence which lays down that what is not permitted to be done directly is not to be done indirectly either. For so the prudent have defined: whenever something is forbidden to be done directly, it cannot be done even indirectly or by consequence, unless that which is forbidden follows necessarily upon something else permitted by right, so that the permitted cannot proceed without the forbidden, and unless (to speak with the jurist, law 5, paragraph generally, on gifts between husband and wife) the cause of both is so mixed that it cannot be separated. Whence it is concluded that he who alone cannot alienate a thing cannot even give credit in a suit brought over it, according to Panormitanus on the chapter Dudum 54, on election, and the chapter Cum pridem, on pacts, because namely he would in this way obliquely and indirectly alienate the thing. If therefore the Pope, as Pope, has no temporal jurisdiction directly over Christians, which they grant, it seems to follow from the foregoing sentence of the law that he cannot have it even indirectly. Wherefore, to persuade men of their opinion, they ought to bring forward testimony from the Scriptures or the traditions of the Apostles, or at least to show that the temporal power of which they speak is so joined with the spiritual that it cannot be torn and separated from it, so that, I say, the spiritual can in no way stand without it; which since they have not been able to do, they have followed nothing but uncertain opinions, and reasons which do not seem to conclude sufficiently what they assume.”
I answer: on the conjunction and separation of the ecclesiastical and the political power there can be a twofold question. One: whether the ecclesiastical power can exist without the political, so that there is no political prince in the Church; and conversely, whether the political power can be found in some nation where there is no ecclesiastical prelate; and in this way we grant that these powers can be found wholly separated; for in the first times of the Church there was on earth a Church without any Christian temporal prince, and there were at the same time, and there are even now, some kingdoms of unbelievers where there are no ecclesiastical prelates. The other question can be: whether there can be a supreme ecclesiastical or spiritual power which does not have annexed in some way the power of disposing of temporal things in order to spiritual; and in this way we deny that there can be a supreme ecclesiastical or spiritual power which does not have annexed a temporal power in some way, that is, in order to spiritual things. For even at that time when there were no temporal princes in the Church, the ecclesiastical Prince could command the faithful to support the ministers of the sacraments from their temporal goods; likewise, that the faithful should settle civil suits among themselves, and not go to the tribunals of unbelievers for these matters; both of which the Apostle teaches in the first epistle to the Corinthians, chapters 6 and 9. The Church could also refuse to tolerate over herself an unbelieving prince, if he tried to turn the faithful from the worship of the true God, as Saint Thomas teaches in 2-2, question 10, article 10. Lastly, at that time the use of this power over princes was lacking, because there were none; but the power itself was not lacking; for power is one thing, the use of power another. So Barclay's foundation on the separation of these powers wholly collapses, and with its fall falls the whole building of his arguments. For what he brings from the civil and canon law is not to the point, because we do not admit that the spiritual power can be wholly separated from the temporal, and we hold the contrary for certain, and that from the testimony of Scripture and the practice of the Church. But Barclay assumes as certain and granted that we are destitute of the testimony of Scripture, and that those powers are in no way joined; which none of us grants; indeed we contend that it is even false. It is added besides that when there are temporal princes in the Church, as after the first two or three hundred years there always have been, then the ecclesiastical and political power are joined by a still closer bond, since the political prince is subject to the spiritual prince as a son to a father and a member to the head. For the political and the spiritual commonwealth make one Church, not two; and the head of that one Church is the Vicar of Christ and successor of Peter. Wherefore if Barclay's arguments were worth anything for princes who never received the faith of Christ, which nevertheless we do not admit, certainly for Christian princes, or those who were once Christians, they are worth nothing at all. But on this matter more must be said in its place.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT V. De potestate in temporalia, quam indirecte theologi summo Pontifici tribuunt. In quinto capite Barclaius explosa (ut ipse dicit) Canonistarum, et Bozii sententia, ag¬ greditur refutare sententiam Theologorum, qui dicunt Papam habere potestatem in temporalia indirecte. Sed antequam ad ejus argumenta refellenda accedam, explicabo, breviter quid intelligamusper voces illas di¬ recte et indirecte ; et quis sit auctor earum vocum. Igitur per voces directe, et indire¬ cte, non intelligimus, ut aliqui per jocum di¬ cunt, potestatem spiritualem esse in Ponti¬ fice directe, id est, juste, et legitime; tem¬ poralem autem indirecte, id est, injuste, et usurpative ; sed potestatem Pontificiam per se, et proprie spiritualem esse, et ideo dire¬ cte respicere, ut objectum suum primarium, spiritualia negotia ; sed indirecte, id est, per ordinem ad spiritualia, reductive, et per necessariam consequentiam, ut sic lo¬ quamur, respicere temporalia, ut objectum secundarium, ad quod non convertitur haec spiritualis potestas, nisi in casu, ut loquitur Innocentius tertius, in cap. Per venerabilem, Qui filii sunt legitimi : « In aliis, inquit, re¬ gionibus, certis causis inspectis, tempora¬ lem jurisdictionem casualiter exercemus » : quomodo etiam loquitur sanctus Bernardus, in lib. i. de Consideratione, cap. 5. « Sed, inquit, aliud est incidenter excurrere in ista (temporalia negotia) causa quidem urgente; aliud vero ultro incumbere istis, tamquam magnis dignisque tali. » Porro auctorem harum vocum habemus Innocentium IV. Pontificem doctissimum. Is enim explicans, cap. Novit, de Judiciis, Paragr., de feudo, dicit, Pontificem directe non judicare de feudis, secus autem indirecte ratione pecca¬ ti. Eadem distinctione utitur Joannes de Turrecremata, Thomas Cajetanus, Petrus de Palude, Durandus, Franciscus Victoria, Dominicus a Soto, Martinus Ledesmius, Ja- cobus Simanca, Antonius Cordubensis, Mar¬ tinus Navarrus, Ludovicus Molina, et alii. Venio nunc ad argumenta Barclaii. Pri¬ mum adfert argumentum, quo ego fueram usus adversus eos, qui potestatem Pontificis, simul pontificiam, et regiam, spiritualem, et temporalem esse volebant, reges autem temporales, non tam esse reges, quam exe- cutores pontificiae potestatis, et voluntatis. Argumentum meum hoc fuit: Potestas regum terrenorum est a Deo, ut confitentur ipsimet Pontifices : S. Leo, epist. 38. ad Martianum ; sanctus Gelasius, in epist. ad Anastasium ; sanctus Gregorius, lib.n. epist. 61. Nicolaus, in epist. ad Michaelem : ergo vel potest summus Pontifex tollere exeeutionem ad- ministrationis a regibus, et imperatoribus tamquam summus ipse rex, et imperator, vel non potest ; si potest ergo est major rex IN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS 27 Christo, cum possit auferre, quod Christus dedit; si non potest, ergo non habet vere potestatem regiam in ipsos reges, et impe¬ ratores. Hoc argumentum ita retorquet Bar- claius adversus meam, et Theologorum cse- terorum sententiam. 4. « Aut potest summus Pontifex aliquo modo, hoc est, directe, vel indirecte auferre regibus, et imperatoribus regna, atque im¬ peria, aliisque conferre ; aut non potest : si potest, ergo est aliquo modo major Deo, quia quod Deus dedit, ipse aufert : minor enim vel par auferre non potest, quod a ma¬ jore, vel sequali concessum est , ac ne Vica¬ rius quidem ejus, qui concessit sine expres¬ so Domini mandato (ne quis nobis reponat, Papam tamquam Christi Vicarium id facere, cum ipse nullum de ea re mandatum neque expressum, neque tacitum accepisse invenia¬ tur) ; si non potest, ergo falsum est, quod di¬ cunt, eum habere summam potestatem indi¬ recte disponendi de omnibus rebus tempora¬ libus Christianorum, et deponendi de solio reges, et imperatores, aliosque in eorum lo¬ cum sufficiendi. » Haec Barclaius. Respondeo : Cum diximus ex Pontificum sententia regum terrenorum potestatem esse a Deo, non intelligimus, esse a Deo imme¬ diate, quomodo est a Deo potestas summi Pontificis ; sed esse a Deo, quia Deus voluit esse in genere humano politicum regimen ; et ideo instinctum quemdam naturalem dedit hominibus, ut elegant sibi Magistratus a quibus regantur : et praeterea voluit Deus regimen politicum esse distinctum ab Eccle¬ siastico, ut expresse docuit Nicolaus Papa, inepist. ad Michaelem; et post eum Inno¬ centius, in cap. Solitae, de majorit. et obe- dient. et ante utrumque Gelasius, in epist. ad Anastasium. Ex his perspicuum est albu¬ mentum meum solidum esse, et argumen¬ tum Barclaii omnino infirmum : nam si in summo Pontifice esset potestas spiritualis, et temporalis directe, et esset Pontifex rex mundi, ut est Pontifex Ecclesiae universae, et reges caeteri essent meri exeeutores tempo¬ ralis jurisdictionis ; certe posset Pontifex pro arbitrio suo privare quoslibet reges admi- nistratione, et exeeutione jurisdictionis tem¬ poralis; et hoc modo posset tollere regi¬ men politicum, vel confundere cum Eccle¬ siastico : et esset major Christo, cum posset tollere, vel confundere potestates, quas ille voluit esse, et esse distinctas. At si in sum¬ mo Pontifice ponatur potestas spiritualis tantum directe, et temporalis indirecte, id est, in ordine solum ad spiritualia ; non se¬ quitur, posse Pontificem tollere, vel confun¬ dere politicum regimen, sed solum sequitur, posse Pontificem per spiritualem, atque Apostolicam eminentissimam suam potesta¬ tem dirigere et corrigere potestatem politi¬ cam, eamque, si opus sit ad finem spiritua¬ lem, uni Principi adimere, et alteri conferre. Atque ut respondeamus in forma ad argu¬ mentum, cum ille dicit : Aut potest summus Pontifex aliquo modo, hoc est, directe, vel indirecte auferre regibus, et imperatoribus regna, atque imperia aliisque conferre, aut non potest ; respondeo, potest; cum ille col¬ ligit, si potest, ergo est aliquo modo major Deo, quia quod Deus dedit, ipse aufert : ne¬ go consecutionem, nam Deus non dedit im¬ mediate regnum huic aut illi ; sed dicitur potestas regum esse a Deo, quia Deus voluit esse inter homines potestatem politicam, eamque distinctam ab Ecclesiastica : proin¬ de cum Summus Pontifex transfert regnum ab uno ad alium, non tollit quod Deus de¬ dit, sed ordinat, et dirigit : et quemadmo¬ dum Deus dat regna hominibus mediante consensu, et consilio hominum; et potest, ac solet ea mutare et transferre de gente in gentem, mediante consilio et consensu eo- rumdem hominum : ita potest majore ratio¬ ne ea mutare, et transferre propter finem spiritualem per Vicarium suum generalem, quem constituit super totam familiam suam. At, inquit Barclaius, iste Vicarius non habet mandatum Domini, neque expressum, neque tacitum. Immo habet expressum, sed in ge¬ nere : eo siquidem ipso quod factus est Pa¬ stor gregis totius, et praepositus toti fami¬ liae, et caput vice Christi totius corporis Ec¬ clesiae, intelligitur habere mandatum regen¬ di, et dirigendi, et corrigendi omnes oves totius gregis ; omnes conservos, qui sunt in familia ; et omnia membra, quae sunt in cor¬ pore : neque excipiuntur imperatores, et reges, nisi velint excipi a numero ovium Christi, et servorum Christi, et membrorum corporis Christi. 2. Adfert deinde Barclaius alterum argu¬ mentum, quod ego proposui adversus eorum sententiam, qui tribuunt Summo Pontifici po testatem temporalem directe in omnia regna mundi : illudque retorquere conatur adver¬ sus meam, et aliorum Theologorum senten¬ tiam de potestate temporali indirecte, id est, in ordine ad spiritualia, sic autem loquitur : 28 DE POTESTATE PAPA2 « Sed aliud longe efficacissimum, quod ex eodem Bellarmini libro, et capite supra retu¬ limus, hoc loco ad institutum nostrum optimo jure in hunc modum adaptabimus. Si verum est, Papam habere potestatem indirecte dis¬ ponendi de rebus temporalibus omnium Christianorum, aut eam habet jure divino, aut jure humano; si jure divino, deberet id constare ex Scripturis, aut certe ex Aposto¬ lorum traditione : ex Scripturis nihil habe¬ mus, nisi datas Pontifici claves regni coelo¬ rum : de clavibus regni terrarum nulla mentio fit : traditionem Apostolorum nullam adversarii proferunt. » Respondeo : Habet Summus Pontifex jure divino potestatem disponendi de rebus tem¬ poralibus Christianorum in ordine ad finem spiritualem. Id vero constat ex Scripturis ; nam in clavibus regni coelorum Apostolo Petro, pro se, et successoribus traditis, Mat- th. xvi. non intelliguntur quidem claves re¬ gni terrarum, de quibus nulla mentio facta est in Evangelio, quia non erat necessarium, ut Summus Princeps Ecclesiae simul esset monarcha temporalis hujus mundi : sed in- telligitur potestas disponendi de temporali¬ bus, quatenus ea juvant ad aperiendum fide¬ libus regnum coelorum, vel impediunt atque obstant, ne fidelibus aperiatur regnum ccelo- rum. 3. « At, objicit Barlaius, Quod si dixerint neque expresso Dei verbo, neque traditione Apostolorum ad hujus potestatis confirma¬ tionem opus esse ; cum indirecte tantum, et ex quadam sequela Pontifici competat, tam¬ quam inseparabilis quaedam accessio, et ap¬ pendix potestatis illius spiritualis, qua su¬ premus animarum Pastor in omnes Christiani gregis oves praeditus est. Nos rursus ab eis petemus aliquod ejus accessionis, et conjun¬ ctionis testimonium ex Scripturis, vel tradi¬ tione Apostolorum ». Respondeo : Jam dixi, potestatem, de qua loquimur, haberi expresse in Scripturis, sed generatim,nonin particulari; in illo videlicet cap. xvi. Matth. Tibi dabo claves Regni coelo¬ rum, et Joau. xxi. Pasce oves meas ( 1) : atque ex iisdem istis testimoniis divinis colligi par¬ ticularem illam accessionem, et conjunctio¬ nem potestatis disponendi de temporalibus in ordine ad spiritualia, ut non semel expli¬ catum est. Neque verum est quod Barclaius subjungit, hanc tantam potestatem tum a Christo, tum ab Apostolis eorum successori¬ bus alto silentio in Ecclesia tot saeculis fuisse praetermissam. Nam a Christo satis aperte significata est in locis citatis : et ab Apostolo etiam indicata, I Corinth, vi, cum ait : Nescitis , quia et Angelos judicabimus ? quanto magis saecularia (2) ? et a successoribus Apostolorum Petri, et Pauli, Romanis vide¬ licet Pontificibus, re ipsa demonstrata est in‘ depositione regnum, et imperatorum, jam inde ab anno Domini septingentesimo nam ante illud tempus, vel defuit necessitas, vel opportunitas. 4. « Objicit rursus Barclaius : Si utraque potestas ab altera : spiritualis scilicet a tem¬ porali, et e contra, separari possit, locus erit sententiae, qua quod directe fieri non permit¬ titur, id nec indirecte fieri statuit : ita enim prudentes definierunt, quoties aliquid di¬ recte fieri prohibetur, id nec indirecte qui¬ dem, sive per consequentiam fieri posse ; nisi id quod prohibitum est, sequatur neces¬ sario ad aliud jure permissum, ita ut per¬ missum sine prohibito non possit procedere, et nisi (ut cum Jureconsulto dicam 1. 5. §. generaliter, de donatione inter vir. et uxor.) utriusque causa ita commixta sit, ut sepa¬ rari non possit. Unde eum, qui solus rem alienare non potest, ne credere quidem posse liti super ea motae concluditur, juxta Pa- norm. in cap. dudum. 54, de elect. et cap. cum pridem, de pact. quod nimirum obli¬ que, et indirecte hoc modo rem alienaret. Si igitur Papa, quatenus Papa nullam tem¬ poralem jurisdictionem directe habet in Christianos, quod illi concedunt, superiore juris sententia effici videtur, eum ne indi¬ recte quidem habere posse. Quapropter ut suam hominibus sententiam persuadeant, debent ex Scripturis, aut Apostolorum tra¬ ditionibus testimonium proferre, vel saltem docere, temporalem potestatem de qua lo¬ quuntur ita conjunctam esse cum spirituali, ut ab ea divelli, et separari, ut, inquam, spiritualis sine ea consistere nullo modo pos¬ sit : quod quoniam praestare nequiverunt, nihil nisi opiniones incertas sunt sequuti, et rationes quse non satis videntur concludere quod assumunt » . Respondeo : De conjunctione et separa¬ tione Ecclesiasticae potestatis, et politicae, duplex potest esse quaestio ; una : An possit Ecclesiastica potestas esse sine politica, ita (I) Matth. XVI, 19 : Joan. XXI, 19. — (2) l Corinth. VI, 5. IN REBUS TEMPORALIBUS 29 ut nullus in Ecclesia sit princeps politicus ; et contra : An possit potestas politica inve¬ niri in aliqua gente, ubi nullus sit Praelatus ecclesiasticus ; et hoc modo concedimus posse inveniri has potestates omnino separa¬ tas : primis enim temporibus Ecclesiae fuit in terris Ecclesia sine ullo principe temporali Christiano, et fuerunt eodem tempore, et sunt etiam nunc aliqua regna infidelium, ubi nulli sunt Praelati Ecclesiastici. Altera quae¬ stio esse potest : An possit dari summa po¬ testas Ecclesiastica, sive spiritualis, quae non habeat aliquo modo annexam potestatem disponendi de temporalibus in ordine ad spiritualia : et hoc modo negamus posse dari potestatem summam ecclesiasticam , sive spiritualem, quae non habeat annexam po¬ testatem temporalem aliquo modo, id est, in ordine ad spiritualia. Nam etiam illo tem¬ pore, quo nulli erant in Ecclesia Principes temporales, potuit Princeps Ecclesiasticus jubere fidelibus, ut de bonis temporalibus alerent ministros Sacramentorum : item, ut fideles dirimerent inter se lites civiles, et non adirent pro his rebus tribunalia infide¬ lium : quorum utrumque docet Apostolus in priore ad Corinth. cap. vi. et ix. Potuit quoque Ecclesia non tolerare super se Prin¬ cipem infidelem, si is avertere conaretur fi¬ deles a cultu veri Dei, ut S. Thomas docet in 2. 2. q. 10. art. 10. Denique illo tempore deerat usus potestatis hujus in principes, quia nulli erant : sed potestas ipsa non de¬ erat : aliud enim est potestas, aliud usus potestatis. Itaque fundamentum Barclaii de separatione harum potestatum omnino cor¬ ruit, et eo ruente ruit totum aedificium ar¬ gumentorum ipsius. Nam quod adducit ex jure civili, et canonico non facit ad rem, quia non admittimus separari posse omnino potestatem spiritualem a temporali ; et con¬ trarium pro comperto habemus ; idque ex testimonio Scripturae, et praxi Ecclesiae. Barclaius autem assumit tamquam certa, et concessa, nos destitui testimonio Scripturae, et potestates illas nullo modo esse conjun¬ ctas : quae nemo nostrum concedit ; imo etiam falsa esse contendimus. Accedit prae¬ terea, quod quando in Ecclesia sunt princi¬ pes temporales, ut post primos ducentos, vel trecentos annos semper fuerunt : tunc potestas ecclesiastica, et politica conjunctae sunt adhuc stictiore vinculo; quoniam prin¬ ceps politicus subjectus est principi spirituali ut filius patri, et membrum capiti. Siquidem respublica politica, et spiritualis unam Ec¬ clesiam faciunt, non duas : et illius unius Ecclesiae caput est Vicarius Christi, Petrique successor. Quare si quid valerent argumenta Barclaii pro principibus qui fidem Christi numquam susceperunt, quod tamen non ad¬ mittimus ; certe pro principibus Christianis, aut qui Christiani aliquando fuerunt, nihil prorsus valent. Sed de hac re plura suo loco dicenda sunt.