Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Sacraments in General · Book II: On the Effect, Number, and Ceremonies of the Sacraments
Chapter 11: The objections drawn from reason are solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. III, De Sacramentis in Genere, Book II: On the Effect, Number, and Ceremonies of the Sacraments. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The first reason is Luther's, in the Babylon chapter On Baptism, and Philip's in the Apology article 13, and others'. In every Sacrament a word of promise is required; where there is a promise, there faith is necessarily exacted, which may receive the promise; therefore it is faith which immediately works and justifies. Luther confirms it, because many are saved by faith without the Sacrament, as those who have no one by whom to be baptized; and on the contrary, those who have the Sacrament without faith are damned. Therefore in the Sacrament it is faith which justifies, not the Sacrament. I answer that this argument sins in three ways, though it is most common among the adversaries. For, first, the word of promise is required indeed in the institution of the Sacrament, but is not required in the very use of the Sacrament; which is plain. For those who baptize do not say, He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, which is a promise; but they say, I baptize thee in the name of the Father, etc. And those who consecrate the Eucharist do not say, He that eateth this bread shall live for ever; but, This is my body. And those who absolve do not say, Whose sins you shall forgive; but, I absolve thee. Now here we treat of the use of the Sacrament, not of the institution; for we treat of the effect of the Sacrament, and the Sacrament works while we use it. Wherefore the argument is not to the purpose, and assumes what is false. Second, even if in the use a promise, and consequently faith, were always required, it could not thence be concluded that it is faith which immediately justifies; for we would say that it is required as a condition, and as that which applies the Sacrament to the man. But as, when a physician offers a medicine, we do not say that the sick man does everything and the medicine effects nothing, but that both are necessary and one without the other does not suffice; so here.
To the confirmation I answer that faith and the Sacrament can seem equal in this matter. For as in the article of necessity someone can be saved without the Sacrament in reality, provided he have the desire of it, and faith, and penance, so on the contrary little ones are saved without actual faith by the Sacrament alone. And as in adults he who has the Sacrament and will not believe is damned, so he who has faith and will not receive the Sacrament is damned. From which we understand that each is required, when it can be had, and each justifies, but in a diverse manner. For the Sacrament justifies actively, as an instrument of God; faith and penance justify as dispositions, and according to some as meritorious causes of congruity. Nor is it the same grace (as we said above) which is given by the force of the Sacrament, and which is given without the Sacrament on account of the disposition, or the merit of congruity of faith and penance.
The second reason is Zwingli's, in the book On true and false religion, chapter On the Sacraments. God alone knows the hearts of men; therefore he alone can cleanse them; the Sacraments, then, do not justify. It is confirmed, because if the Sacraments justified ex opere operato, God would be bound to the Sacraments, since he could not but justify him who receives the Sacrament. I answer: the argument proves that the Sacraments are not principal causes, but not that they are not instrumental. For it is not necessary that the Sacrament know the heart or the conscience, but it is enough if God know it, who works through the Sacrament. To the confirmation I say that God is not bound to the Sacraments, but on the contrary the Sacraments are bound to God; for God can justify without the Sacraments, the Sacraments cannot without God. But that God cannot but justify him who faithfully receives the Sacraments is not because he is bound to the Sacraments, but because he is bound (if it be lawful so to speak) to his own truth; for he cannot but be faithful in his promises. Add that all these arguments, if they concluded anything, would conclude also that men cannot be justified by the blood of Christ or by faith in Christ. For the blood of Christ does not search the hearts, nor penetrate to the soul more than the Sacraments; and as it seems absurd to the adversaries that God be bound in any way to the Sacraments, so it ought to seem absurd that he be bound to the blood of Christ or to our faith. And yet the adversaries teach nothing more often than that we are justified by the blood of Christ and by faith in him.
The third reason is Calvin's, book 4 of the Institutes chapter 14 section 14: those who say the Sacraments justify draw men away from God, and make them rest in the spectacle of a corporeal thing, not in God himself. I answer, first: if the argument availed anything, it would prove that God ought not in the Old Testament to have set forth the brazen serpent, which those who looked upon were healed; nay, that God ought not to have become incarnate, lest men should rest in the spectacle of a corporeal thing. Second I answer that the contrary follows from our doctrine. For since we say that the Sacraments have not virtue of themselves, but that it is God who works through them, by this very thing we draw men to God; in the way that those who were cured by Christ, whether by the touch of the hem or even by the spittle and clay, did not rest in the hem, and the spittle and clay, but acknowledged and praised the virtue of Christ.
The fourth reason is Kemnitz's, in the place cited in the second part of the Examen, chapter On the efficacy of the Sacrament: the word of God and the Sacraments justify in the same manner; but the word justifies only by exciting faith; therefore the Sacraments too justify only by exciting faith. He proves the major proposition, first, because Scripture, as it says the Sacraments justify, so also says the word justifies, Romans 1: The Gospel is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth. Second he proves it because in justification through the Sacraments two hands, as it were, concur: one is God's, offering grace; the other is man's, receiving it; the hand of God is the word and the Sacrament; the hand of man is faith. Therefore neither the word nor the Sacrament profits anything unless it be received by faith; and if it profit anything, it profits because it is received by faith. Hebrews 4: The word which they heard did not profit them, not being mixed with faith. I answer: it is false that the word and the Sacrament justify in the same manner; nay, as we said above, they justify in so diverse a manner that one, that is, the word, precedes faith, the other, that is, the Sacrament, follows faith. To the first proof I answer, first, that by “Gospel” in that place can be understood not a sermon, but the very mysteries of the Gospel, as the Incarnation, the Passion, the Sacraments, etc. Second, if the Gospel be taken for a sermon, I say that it is there explained how the Gospel saves; for the Apostle subjoins: For the justice of God is revealed therein, from faith unto faith. But nowhere did Scripture so explain the manner of the Sacraments' saving. Third I say that Scripture attributes the power of justifying both to the word and to the Sacrament, but nowhere says that they justify in the same manner; nor is it lawful, from this that we read that the word and the Sacrament justify, straightway to gather, Therefore they justify in the same manner; otherwise it would also be lawful to conclude that the word justifies in the same manner in which God, or faith, or the Passion of Christ justifies; for all these are said in the Scriptures to justify; and yet Kemnitz would not admit that these justify in the same manner. To the second I answer that the word and the Sacraments can be called the hand of God, through which grace and justice come to us; but not in the same manner. For a hand can have many offices; for it both holds something out and also works. Now the word can be called a hand, because it offers salvation, but not because it really works or applies; but on the contrary the Sacrament is called a hand, because it really applies the merit of Christ, works grace. An evident sign of this difference is that the word is not preached except to those who understand, nor profits unless it be understood and believed; but the Sacrament is exhibited, and profits, even to those who do not understand, as to infants and the insane. In like manner faith can be called our hand, not, as Kemnitz will have it, because it apprehends the promise, and by itself alone in this manner justifies, but because it removes obstacles and disposes the soul, where such a disposition is necessary. Otherwise not only would Baptism not profit infants and the insane, but neither adults and the sane, if at the very moment of Baptism they were a little distracted in mind; for then faith does not apprehend the promises.
The last argument of Zwingli is: It cannot be that the Sacraments, which are gross and material things, penetrate to the soul; therefore they do not purge the filth of sin, which resides in the soul. This argument can be confirmed. First, because if in any way the Sacraments could work upon the soul, it would have to be done through the action which they have upon bodies, as Augustine says of the water, which touches the body and washes the heart; but often the Sacraments do not even touch the body itself. For when one is absolved, it is not necessary that the sound of the words, or the hand of the priest, reach the penitent. In like manner Matrimony can be made by nods alone, or between absent parties. Finally, it is not necessary that the words of consecration really touch the bread to be consecrated; for those words can be said so softly, and at so great a distance, that the moved air does not reach the bread. Finally the same can be proved of Baptism itself; for the virtue must be in the words. Second, justification is a nobler and more difficult work than the creation of the world, as Augustine teaches tract 72 on John. And it is plain, because in justification is found the creation of grace, which is a certain divine and supernatural thing; but no creature can be the instrument of creation, as St. Thomas teaches, part 1 question 45 article 5. Third, justification is done in a moment; the Sacraments cannot work in a moment; therefore they cannot justify. The minor is proved. For a cause cannot work except when it is; but the sacramental action, since it is successive, cannot be in an instant. I explain: successive things have no being except while they are being made, for they consist in a certain flux. Wherefore no instant can be assigned in which a successive thing is, or even any part of it, but only an instant can be assigned in which there is something indivisible continuing the successive thing, which continuing thing indeed is not the successive thing, nor a part of it; for successive things essentially require a certain extension. Therefore it cannot be understood that a successive thing acts except successively, and accordingly in time, since it itself is in no instant, and that which is not, or when it is not, cannot act.
Fourth: Either there is in the Sacraments some virtue divinely superadded, or not. If there is not, then they cannot attain a supernatural effect; for it is unintelligible that a thing should remain altogether as it was before, and receive nothing, and yet be able to do what before it could not. If there is, it is either a corporeal virtue or a spiritual one. If corporeal, it cannot effect a spiritual thing, nor act upon a spiritual thing, and accordingly will profit nothing; for a superadded virtue is required precisely because the Sacrament cannot act upon the soul, which is a spirit, nor produce grace, which is spiritual. But if it is a spiritual virtue, then it cannot be in a corporeal Sacrament. For a spiritual and indivisible accident cannot be received in a corporeal and extended subject; for everything that is received is received according to the manner of the receiver. Besides, fifth: This virtue would be either whole in each part of the Sacrament, or part of it in one part of the Sacrament and part in another. Not the first, because then it would follow that it does not depend on the subject for its being, nor properly inhere, and so would be a substance, not an accident; likewise also, any word being uttered, the effect would straightway be produced, which no one grants. Nor the second, because then it would be corporeal, and besides, the first word being uttered, part of the virtue would perish, the second uttered, another part would perish; and so that virtue, either wholly or for the most part, would perish before the effect began to be produced; wherefore that virtue in the parts of the Sacrament preceding the effect was superfluous. Sixth: Either this virtue is in the words only, or in the element only, or in both. If in the words only, how does the Eucharist received justify? If in the elements only, how do the words of consecration of the Eucharist work? If in both, either it will be the same virtue — and this cannot be, since one accident cannot be in two subjects — or there will be two virtues, and then there will be in one Sacrament two virtues, which seems absurd. If you say, There will be two partial ones: on the contrary, because then they would have to concur together to the work; but it sometimes happens that one part of the Sacrament is applied a long time after the other, as when one confesses today and is absolved tomorrow. Finally it is unintelligible (as Kemnitz says) what this virtue is, when it comes, when it ceases to be, etc.
To these arguments answer can be made in three ways. First, one could, if he wished, confess ignorance about knots of this kind, and yet satisfy the heretics, nay even stop their mouths. For we are bound indeed to give a reason of the hope which is in us, 1 Peter 3; but this we are bound to do from the principles of faith, not from Metaphysics. For St. Augustine, book 3 On the merits and remission of sins chapter 4, speaking of arguments against the manner of the transmission of original sin, says: “I, even though I be not able to solve the arguments of these men, yet see that we must adhere to the divine letters,” etc. And in epistle 29 to Jerome he says that, when he is asked how the sin of Adam is propagated to posterity, he is wont to answer: “This, like many other things, I confess that I am ignorant of.” And yet he did not on that account fail in the defense of the faith; nay, he most keenly defended it, showing that it must be believed that original sin is propagated to posterity, though we be ignorant of the manner, because Scripture teaches it, and tradition, and the use of the Church.
Second, one could answer that the Sacraments are true causes of justification, but Moral, not Physical; in the way that he is the true cause of a homicide who bids it be done, though he himself does not touch the man who is killed. But although this answer can be defended with the faith safe — which of the more recent Ledesma defends, in book 4 distinction 1 question 3 article 1, and Cano in the Relection on the Sacraments; and many of the ancient Scholastics seem to have thought the same, as Bonaventure, Scotus, Durandus, Richard, Ockham, Marsilius, Gabriel, in book 4 distinction 1 or 2, who teach that the Sacraments truly justify, and yet will have God alone produce grace at the presence of the Sacraments, so that the Sacraments are not physical causes, except as those without which the effect would not be made — yet I think far more probable and safer the opinion which gives the Sacraments a true efficiency; because the Fathers everywhere teach that the Sacraments do not act unless they first receive from God virtue, or blessing, or sanctification; and they refer the effect of the Sacrament to the omnipotence of God, and compare them with true efficient causes, as we saw above. Second, because there would be no difference between the manner of acting of the Sacraments and of magical signs. Third, because then a man would not be a minister of God in the very sacramental action, but the man would present the sign by his action, and God by another action, having seen that sign, would infuse grace; as when one shows a bond to a merchant, and he gives the money. But the Scriptures teach that it is God who baptizes through man, as we showed above.
Third, then, it can be answered, with St. Thomas part 3 question 62 article 4, that the Sacraments are efficient causes, even Physical, but instrumental; and that the virtue divinely imparted is not some new inhering quality, spiritual or corporeal, but is only the motion, or use, of God. For by this, that God uses this sacramental action to produce grace, he elevates it and makes it attain a supernatural effect, which it could not attain if it were moved by any other. For the understanding of which four things are to be noted.
The first is that there is a great difference between the instruments which God uses and those which men use. And there are five differences. The first is that man needs a twofold application: one, by which he applies himself to the instrument, as by taking the axe in his hand; the other, by which he applies the instrument to the work; the former motion is in the man himself, the latter in the instrument. But God does not need the former application; for he is immutable and most present to all things, and accordingly also applied. Wherefore that motion by which God moves the Sacraments is only the application of the Sacrament to the work, and is in the Sacrament itself, not in God. The second is that man needs an instrument naturally apt for that work; for a man could not cut wood with a saw unless it were of iron and sharp. But God does not need this aptitude of the instrument; for he himself is not helped by the instrument, since he can do all things by himself alone, but uses an instrument because it pleases him either to honor the creature, or to show his power in it; as if one should purposely wish to write with a pen little fit. Whence it follows that it is not necessary to place in the Sacraments any inhering quality which formally perfects it, but it is enough if God will to use the Sacrament; for he himself does not need an apt instrument. The third is that when a man uses an instrument, it is necessary that, besides the motion of the man himself by which the instrument is moved, the instrument itself also concur by its natural virtue and work what is proper to it. For example, when the workman uses an axe to make a chair, it is not enough that the axe be moved skillfully, but it is necessary also that the axe cut; and when nature uses heat for nutrition, it is required that the heat warm, which is proper to it; for by means of that action nature uses heat to convert food into flesh. But when God uses some instrument, it is not necessary that the instrument by its natural virtue work anything upon the subject; and if perhaps it work, that operation is not the cause of the divine effect, as such an operation, but only as a thing which God willed to apply to do this. Hence we see in the use of many Sacraments that no proper and natural action of theirs is found, as is plain of Absolution, of Matrimony, of the consecration of the Eucharist. In others a proper action is found, as washing or anointing, but, as I said, that, inasmuch as it is a natural action, is not the cause, but as a certain thing. Whence it follows that the motion, or use, of God in the Sacraments is not only the virtue of the agent impressed on the instrument, but is the whole virtue and reason by which they act. For that which in the axe is the edge, and the force of the agent impressed on it, all that in the Sacraments is the motion of God alone. The fourth difference follows from these two, that a man cannot use any thing whatsoever for the instrument of his work; but God can, and in fact uses most diverse things to produce the same thing. The fifth difference follows also from the preceding, that a man cannot use an instrument except one that touches the thing in which the effect is to be produced; because the instrument must work about the subject its own proper and corporeal action, but a corporeal action is not made without contact. But God can, even through that which is in one place, act upon another thing most remote from that place, since he does not need the proper operation of that thing.
Second, it is to be noted that all concede that God can use any instruments whatsoever, however inept, provided he first make those instruments apt. But certainly this is not necessary, but God can with an inept instrument, it remaining inept, effect whatever he will; in the way that a most excellent scribe can use an inept pen so dexterously that by it letters are most rightly formed. We have an example John 5, where, an Angel descending and moving the water, through that water so moved all diseases were cured. And that this was a figure of Baptism we taught above. Wherefore the Fathers, imitating this manner of speaking, often say that the Sacraments do not work unless the Holy Spirit first descend into them. See Tertullian in the book On Baptism, Ambrose book 1 On the Holy Spirit chapter 7, and Chrysostom on chapter 5 of John, and there Theophylact, and Theophilus of Alexandria book 1 Paschal. In like manner, when God willed to convert the world through the preaching of the Gospel, he could have chosen eloquent men, or certainly straightway rendered rude men most eloquent; but he would not use this manner, but chose rude men, and such as would speak simply, unpolished and unadorned, and through them converted the world.
Third, it is to be noted that the sacramental virtue is sometimes in the element, sometimes in the word, sometimes in both. For the sacramental action is properly the action of the minister giving the Sacrament, not the action of the receiver; for reception is our work, but the Sacrament is not our work, but God's. And so the action of the minister is that which God uses as an instrument to justify. When, therefore, the minister uses things and words, as in Baptism, Confirmation, and Extreme Unction, then God too uses things and words, and accordingly the virtue of God is in both; and it is needful that those two concur together, otherwise nothing would be done. But when the minister uses only words, and the matter of the Sacrament is on the part of the receiver, or is at least not applied by the minister to act, then the virtue is only in the words. So it is in the Sacrament of Absolution, and of Matrimony, and in the consecration of the Eucharist; for the minister does not apply the sins of the penitent to absolve him, nor the bread to consecrate anything, but the words to consecrate the bread. And hence it is that it is not repugnant to the Sacrament of Penance that the sins be said on one day and the penitent be absolved on another; for the operative virtue is not in the sins, but in the absolution alone. In the consecration of the Eucharist, however, the presence of the bread is required, not because there is in the bread an operative virtue, but because unless the bread were present, there would be no matter in which the Sacrament might act; for in Absolution, even though the Confession be not present, because it is already past, yet there is the man upon whom the Absolution falls. Finally sometimes the minister uses the element alone, as when he offers the Eucharist, and then the virtue is in the element alone.
Fourth, it is to be noted that justifying grace is not properly created, nor yet educed from the natural potency of the soul, but educed from the obediential potency, or natural capacity; and accordingly that St. Thomas does not fight with himself when he says that a creature cannot instrumentally concur to creation, and yet that the Sacraments concur to the production of grace in the soul. I explain: that is said properly to be created which is made independently of a subject; that on the contrary is said to be educed which depends on a subject, in its becoming, being, and working. And so the rational soul is truly created, though it be made in the body, because it does not necessarily depend on the body, as some think, since it can exist and work separated, and is by nature first subsisting in itself before it is infused into the body. But grace is a certain spiritual quality which depends in all ways on the subject, as is plain; wherefore it is educed. But it is not educed from the natural potency, because there is no such potency in man; otherwise grace would be a natural thing; for where there is a natural potency, there is a natural act. Nor does it stand in the way that grace cannot be made except by God; for the soul too cannot be created except by God, and yet it is a natural thing, because the matter is in natural potency to the soul. And so grace does not give a natural being to man, but a supernatural one. Yet there is in man a natural capacity for grace; for it naturally belongs to man that he be able to receive grace, as Augustine teaches On the predestination of the Saints chapter 5; and this capacity can also be called an obediential potency, because, although it is not such that it can naturally concur even passively to the production of grace (for then it would be a natural potency), yet it is such that from it can be made whatever God shall will; and this is called an obediential potency. Nor is this eduction of grace from the obediential potency repugnant to what the Theologians, and the Council of Trent itself session 6 chapter 7, say, that grace is infused; for infusion is opposed to acquisition, not to eduction. For so infused and acquired knowledge is distinguished, not because both are not educed from the potency of the intellect, but because one is acquired by one's own labor, the other given by God alone without labor. And if the knowledge of natural things which God gave to Adam and Solomon without their labor is rightly called infused, though it was educed from the natural potency, how much more rightly will grace be said to be infused, which is given by God alone, and to which no natural potency corresponds?
From these things, to the argument of Zwingli I answer by denying the consequence. For a corporeal and gross thing can act upon the soul, not from its own nature, but from the virtue of God. Augustine tract 80 on John did not fear to say: “The water touches the body and washes the heart.” And true and corporeal fire can hold and torment souls and demons; nay, we even experience that our minds, which yet are spirits, are wondrously affected by the affections of the body. And in what manner these very bodies of ours hold the souls as in a prison; for the soul cannot, when it will, depart from the body, and yet the body is a body, and the soul is a spirit. To the first confirmation it has already been answered that that which does not act by its own proper and natural action does not need contact. To the second I say, first, that the place of Augustine is not to the point. For Augustine, when he says that it is greater to justify the impious than to create heaven and earth, does not mean to say that it is more difficult to infuse the habit of grace into the soul than to create heaven, but means (as he himself there explains) that it is a work of greater mercy to justify the impious than to create heaven; and also a nobler work, because heaven and earth shall pass away, the salvation of the elect shall not pass away. Therefore he there says that the faithful cooperate with God in their justification, and accordingly that the faithful concur to a work greater than to create heaven and earth. Second, it is not improbable that a creature can concur, as a mere instrument of God, to a true creation. But St. Thomas in the place noted denies this of a creature which concurs by disposing the subject through its proper action. Third, I have already shown that grace is not properly created. To the third confirmation it could be said that no intrinsic last part is given in any way in successive things; and therefore that justification is done in the last sensible part, not in the last simply, which is none. Or it must be said that justification is done in that instant in which the sacramental action is ended. For although the action ceases negatively as to its parts — that is, by its first non-being — yet it ceases affirmatively — that is, by the last of its being — as to its term. For as in a line the last part cannot be assigned, yet the last point can be assigned by which the line is terminated, so in time and motion. But (they say) then the sacramental action is not. I answer that then most of all it is, in the manner in which a successive thing can be. For a successive thing never is through its parts existing in reality, but always has something indivisible, which is either the beginning, or the end, or the continuator of the successive thing; and through that it is said to be; and then it is perfectly said to be, when that indivisible terminates the action. This is plain in time; for one hour is not said to be except when it is ended. The same is plain in a discourse, which perfectly signifies when its term is uttered. To the fourth I have already said that that virtue is corporeal, because it is the motion of a corporeal thing, though it can be called spiritual by reason of its cause and effect. To the fifth I say that that virtue is partly in one part of the Sacrament, partly in another, and accordingly perishes little by little, as the parts of the Sacrament perish. Nor yet were they superfluous. For that little part works in the virtue of all the preceding; as also a discourse perfectly signifies when the last word is uttered, which yet would effect nothing unless the others had preceded; and the term of a motion is acquired by the last changed-being, which yet could do nothing unless the rest had preceded. To the sixth I have already answered that the virtue is now in the words, now in the element, now in both, etc. To the last I say that the matter seems difficult to them because they imagine that a spiritual quality must be constituted in a corporeal thing; but those who think that such a quality is not necessary suffer no straits in this matter.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XI. Solvuntur objectiones ex ratione depromptee . Prima ratio est Lutheri in Babyl. cap. de Baptismo, et Philippi in Apologia, art. 13. et aliorum. In omni Sacramento requiritur verbum promissionis : ubi est promissio, ibi necessario exigitur fides, qua: promissionem accipiat : ergo fides est, quee immediate ope¬ ratur, et justificat. Confirmat Lutherus, quia multi per fidem salvantur sine Sacramento, ut qui non habent a quo baptizentur : et contra, qui Sacramentum habent sine fide, damnantur. Igitur in Sacramento fides est, quae justificat, non Sacramentum. Respondeo : tribus modis peccare hoc ar¬ gumentum, quod tamen est communissimum apud adversarios. Primum enim, verbum promissionis requiritur quidem in institutio¬ ne Sacramenti, at non requiritur in ipso usu Sacramenti : id quod patet. Nam qui bap¬ tizant non dicunt : Qui crediderit, et bap¬ tizatus fuerit , salvus erit, qua: est promissio ; sed dicunt : Ego te baptizo in nomine Pa¬ tias etc. Et qui consecrant Eucharistiam, non dicunt : Qui manducat hunc panem, vivet in aeternum ; sed : Hoc est corpus meum. Et qui absolvunt, non dicunt : Quorum remise¬ ritis peccata ; sed : Ego absolvo te. Porro hic agimus de usu Sacramenti , non de institu¬ tione : agimus enim de effectu Sacramenti; 446 LIBER II. operatur autem Sacramentum , dum eo uti¬ mur. Quare argumentum non est ad propo¬ situm, et falsum assumit. Secundo, etiamsi in usu requireretur semper promissio, et con¬ sequenter fides, non inde posset concludi, fidem esse, qua; immediate justificat : dice¬ remus enim, lklem requiri ut conditionem, et ut quse applicaret homini Sacramentum. Sicut autem medico offerente pharmacum, et promittente sanitatem, requiritur in ajgro- to fides, quae accipiat serio illam promissio¬ nem, et medico assentia tur; non tamen est ea fides, qua; sanat aegrotum, sed pharma¬ cum licet sine fide pharmacum acceptum non fuisset : ita quoque etc. Tertio, etiamsi et promissio requiretur, et fides in Sacra¬ mento justificaret : non tamen inde concludi posset , quod illi concludunt, solam fidem agere, Sacramentum autem nihil efficere : sed concluderetur, utrumque esse neces¬ sarium , et unum sine altero non suffi¬ cere. Ad confirmationem Respondeo , fidem, et Sacramentum paria in hac re videri posse. Nam sicut in necessitatis articulo potest sal¬ vari aliquis sine Sacramento in re, modo habeat votum ejus, et fidem, ac poeniten¬ tiam : ita e contrario salvantur parvuli sine fide actuali persolum Sacramentum. Et sicut in adultis, qui habet Sacramentum, etnonvult credere damnatur ; ita qui habet fidem et non vult Sacramentum percipere, damnatur. Ex quo intelligimus utrumque requiri, cum ha¬ beri potest, et utrumque justificare , sed di¬ verso modo. Nam Sacramentum active jus¬ tificat, ut instrumentum Dei : fides , et poe¬ nitentia justificant, ut dispositiones, et se¬ cundum aliquos, ut causm meritoriae decon- gruo. Neque est eadem gratia (ut supra di¬ ximus) quae datur vi Sacramenti, et qua; datur sine Sacramento ob dispositionem, vel meritum de congruo fidei , et poeniten¬ tiae. Secunda ratio estZwinglii in libro de vera et falsa religione, cap. de Sacramentis. So¬ lus Deus novit corda hominum ; igitur solus ipse potest ea mundare : non ergo Sacra¬ menta justificant. Confirmatur, quia si Sacra¬ menta ex opere operato justificarent, Deus esset obligatus Sacramentis, quippe qui non posset non justificare eum, qui Sacramentum percipit. Respondeo : argumentum probat , Sacra¬ menta non esse causas principales ; non au¬ tem non esse instrumentales. Non enim est necesse ut Sacramentum noverit cor, ve conscientiam, sed satis est, si Deus noverit, qui per Sacramentum operatur. Ad confirmationem dico , Deum non esse alligatum Sacramentis, sed contra Sacra¬ menta esse alligata Deo ; nam Deus potest sine Sacramentis justificare, Sacramenta sine Deo non possunt. Quod autem Deus non pos¬ sit non justificare eum , qui accipit fideliter Sacramenta, non ideo fit, quia sit alligatus Sacramentis, sed quia est alligatus (si sic loqui licet) veritati sum, non enim potest non esse fidelis in promissis suis. Adde, quod haec omnia argumenta, si quid concluderent, concluderent etiam Christi sanguine, vel fide in Christum, non posse homines justificari. Nam Christi sanguis non scrutatur corda, nec penetrat ad animam magis , quam Sa¬ cramenta : et sicut absurdum videtur adver¬ sariis Deum alligari aliquo modo Sacramen¬ tis, ita absurdum videri debet alligari Christi sanguini, aut nostra; fidei. Et tamen adver¬ sarii nihil saepius docent, quam nos Christi sanguine, et fide in ipsum justificari. Tertia ratio Calvini lib. IV Instit. cap. 14. §. 14. qui dicunt Sacramenta justificare, ab¬ strahunt homines a Deo, et faciunt ut in spectaculo rei corporeae acquiescant, non in ipso Deo. Respondeo Primo, si argumentum aliquid valeret, probaret non debuisse Deum in Testamento veteri proponere serpentem ameum, quem qui aspicerent sanarentur ; imo ne4c debuisse Deum incarnari, ne in spectaculo rei corporeae homines acquiesce¬ rent. Secundo respondeo, contrarium sequi ex nostra doctrina. Nam cum dicamus. Sacra¬ menta ex se non habere virtutem, sed Deum esse, qui per illa operatur, hoc ipso trahi¬ mus homines ad Deum; quomodo qui a Christo curabantur, vel per tactum fim¬ briae, vel etiam per sputum, et lutum non acquiescebant in fimbria, et sputo ac luto, sed agnoscebant, et laudabant Christi virtu¬ tem. Quarto ratio est Kemnitii loco citato in 2. parte Examinis, cap. de efficacia Sacramen¬ ti ; Eodem modo justificant verbum Dei, et Sacramenta; sed verbum justificat solum excitando fidem, igitur et Sacramenta solum justificant excitando fidem. Majorem propo¬ sitionem probat Primo, quia Scriptura, sicut dicit Sacramenta justificare , sic etiam dicit verbum justificare, Roman. I : Euangelium CAPUT XI. 447 virtus Dei est in salutem omni credenti (1). Se¬ cundo probat, quia iu justificatione per Sa¬ cramenta concurrunt duae quasi manus, una est Dei offerentis gratiam, altera est hominis illam accipientis ; manus Dei est verbum , et Sacramentum; manus hominis est fides. Ergo nec verbum , nec Sacramentum quid- quam prodest, nisi fide accipiatur, et si quid prodest, ideo prodest, quia fide accipitur. Heb. IV : Non proficit illis sermo auditus, non admixtus fidei (2). Respondeo : falsum esse, verbum et Sa¬ cramentum eodem modo justificare; imo, ut supra diximus, ita diverso modo justifi¬ cant, ut unum, id est, verbum praecedat fidem, alterum, id est, Sacramentum, se¬ quatur fidem. Ad primam probationem respondeo Pri¬ mo, per Evangelium eo loco intelligi posse non concionem, sed mysteria ipsa Evangelii, ut incarnationem, passionem, Sacramenta etc. Secundo, si accipiatur Evangelium pro concione, dico ibidem explicari, quomodo Evangelium salvet. Nam subjungit Aposto¬ lus : Justitia enim Dei revelatur in eo ex fide in fidem (3). At nusquam Scriptura ita expo¬ suit modum salvandi Sacramentorum. Ter¬ tio dico, Scripturam, et verbo, et Sacra¬ mento tribuere vim justificandi, sed nus¬ quam dicere eodem modo justificare ; neque licet ex eo quod legimus, verbum, et Sa¬ cramentum justificare, continuo colligere, ergo eodem modo justificant : Alioqui lice¬ ret etiam concludere, eodem modo justifi¬ care verbum, quo justificat Deus, vel fides, vel Christi passio ; haec enim omnia dicuntur in Scripturis justificare : et tamen non ad¬ mitteret Kemnitius, ista eodem modo jus¬ tificare. Ad Secundam respondeo, verbum et Sa¬ cramenta dici posse manum Dei, per quam ad nos venit gratia et justitia : sed non eodem modo. Manus enim mulla officia ha¬ bere potest; nam et porrigit aliquid, et etiam operatur. Porro verbum dici potest manus , quia offert salutem , non autem quia reipsa operatur, vel applicet; contra vero Sacramentum dicitur manus , quia applicat reipsa Christi meritum , opera¬ tur gratiam. Hujus differentiae signum evidens est , ''quod verbum non prae¬ dicatur, nisi intelligentibus, nec prodest, nisi intelligatur, et credatur : at Sacramen¬ tum exhibetur, et prodest etiam non intelli¬ gentibus, ut infantibus, et amentibus. Pari ratione fides dici potest manus nostra, non, ut vult Kemnitius, quia apprehendat pro¬ missionem, et ipsa sola hoc modo justificet ; sed quia removet obstacula, et disponit ani¬ mam, ubi est necessaria talis dispositio. Alioqui non solum non prodesset Baptismus infantibus, et amentibus, sed nec adultis, et sanis, si in ipso momento Baptismi paulu¬ lum distraherentur animo, tunc enim fides non apprehendit promissiones. Argumentum postremum Zwinglii est : Fieri non potest, ut Sacramenta, quae sunt res crassae et materiales, ad animam pene¬ trent, igitur non purgant sordes peccati, quae in anima resident. Confirmari potest hoc argumentum, Pri¬ mo ; quia si ullo modo Sacramenta possent operari in animam, id fieri deberet per ac¬ tionem, quam habent in corpora, ut Augus¬ tinus dicit de aqua, quae corpus tangit, et cor abluit : at saepe Sacramenta ne ipsum quidem corpus attingunt. Nam cum quis absolvitur, non est necesse, ut sonus ver¬ borum, aut manus sacerdotis pertingat ad poenitentem. Pari ratione Matrimonium potest Seri solis nutibus, vel inter absentes. Denique non est necesse, ut verba consecra¬ tionis realiter panem consecrandum attin¬ gant : possunt enim ea verba dici tam sub¬ misse, et in tanta distantia, ut aer motus non perveniat ad panem. Denique de ipso Baptismo idem probari potest; nam virtus debet esse in verbis. Secundo; Justificatio est opus nobilius, et difficilius, quam sit creatio mundi, ut Augustinus docet tract. 72. in Joan. Et patet, quia in justificatione reperitur creatio gratiae, quae est res quadam divina, et su- pernatui’alis : at nulla creatura potest esse instrumentum creationis, ut S. Thomas do¬ cet, 1. par. quaest. XLY. art. 5. Tertio ; Justificatio fit in momento : Sacra¬ menta in momento operari non possunt; ergo non possunt justificare. Probatur Minor. Nam non potest operari aliqua causa, nisi quando est : actio autem Sacramentalis , cum sit successiva, in instanti esse non potest. Ex¬ plico : res successivae non habent esse, nisi dum fiunt, consistunt enim in quodam fluxu. Quare non est assignare ullum instans, in quo sit res successiva, vel etiam ulla pars (1) Rom. I, 16. — (2) Hebr. IV, 2. — (3) Rom. I, 17. 448 LIBER II, ejus, sed tantum est assignare instans in quo est quiddam indivisibile continuativum rei successivae, quod quidem continuativum non est res successiva, nec pars ejus : res enim successivae, essentialiter requirunt ex¬ tensionem quamdam. Igitur intelligi nequit rem successivam agere ; nisi successive, et proinde in tempore, cum ipsa in nullo ins¬ tanti sit, et non possit id quod non est, vel quando non est, agere. Quarto ; Yel est in Sacramentis aliqua virtus superaddita divinitus, vel non. Si non est, ergo non possunt attingere affectum su- pernaturalem : est enim inintelligibile, quod aliqua res maneat prorsus, sicut antea erat, et nihil accipiat, et tamen possit facere, quod antea non poterat. Si est, vel est virtus corporalis, vel spiritualis. Sicorporalis, non po¬ terit efficere rem spiritualem, neque agere in rem spiritualem, proinde nihil proderit ; nam ideo virtus superaddita requiritur, quia Sacramentum non potest agere in animam, quae est spiritus, nec potest producere gra¬ tiam, quae est spiritualis. Si autem virtus spiritualis est, non igitur poterit esse in Sacramento corporali. Non enim accidens spirituale, et indivisibile in subjecto corpo¬ rali, et extenso recipi potest ; omne enim, quod recipitur, per modum recipientis re¬ cipitur. Praeterea Quinto ; Ista virtus vel esset tota in qualibet parte Sacramenti, vel pars ejus in una parte Sacramenti, et pars in altera. Non primum, quia tunc sequeretur illam non pendere a subjecto in esse, nec proprie inhaerere ; quare esset substantia, non accidens. Item etiam prolato quovis verbo, statim produceretur effectus, quod nemo concedit. Non etiam secundum, quia tunc esset corporea, et praeterea prolato primo verbo periret pars virtutis, prolato secundo periret altera pars: et sic virtus illa, vel tota, vel maxima ex parte periret, an¬ tequam effectus inciperet produci. Quare supervacanea erat illa virtus in partibus Sa¬ cramenti praecedentibus effectum. Sexto ; Yel ista virtus est in verbis tan¬ tum, aut in elemento tantum, aut in utro¬ que. Si in verbis tantum, quomodo Eucha¬ ristia sumpta justificat? Si in elementis tantum, quomodo verba consecrationis Eu¬ charistiae operantur? Si in utroque, vel erit eadem virtus, et hoc non potest esse, cum non possit unum accidens esse in duobus subjectis : vel erunt duae virtutes, et tunc erunt in uno Sacramento duae virtutes, quod videtur absurdum. Si dicas : Erunt duae partiales. Contra, quia tunc deberent con¬ currere simul ad opus ; at aliquando ac¬ cidit, ut una pars Sacramenti longo tem¬ pore adhibeatur post aliam, ut cum unus hodie confitetur, ct crus absolvitur. Denique inintelligibile est (ut Kemnitius dicit) quid sit ista virtus, quando adveniaf, quando desinat esse etc. Ad haec argumenta posset tripliciter res¬ ponderi. Primo posset, si quis vellet confi¬ teri ignorantiam circa hujusmodi nodos ; et tamen satisfacere haereticis, imo etiam ora illorum obstruere. Nam tenemur quidem rationem reddere ejus, quae in nobis est spei, I. Pet. III. sed id facere tenemur ex principiis fidei, non ex Metaphysica. Nam S. Augustin. lib. III. de peccatorum meritis, et remiss. cap. 4. « Ego, inquit, loquens de argumentis contra modum traductionis pec¬ cati originalis, « etiamsi istorum argumenta solvere non valeam, video tamen inhaeren¬ dum esse divinis litteris etc. » Et in epist. 29. ad Hieronymum, dicit se, cum interrogatur quomodo peccatum Adaj propagelur in posteros, respondere solitum: « Hoc, ut alia multa, me ignorare confiteor, » Et tamen non propterea deerat defensioni fidei : imo acerrime eam propugnabat, ostendens cre¬ dendum esse, peccatum originale propagari in posteros, licet modum ignoremus, quia id Scriptura docet, et traditio, atque usus Ecclesiae. Secundo posset quis respondere, Sacra¬ menta esse veras causas justificationis, sed Morales , non Physicas : quomodo yera causa est homicidii, qui illud fieri jubet, licet ipse hominem, qui occiditur, non at¬ tingat. Sed quamquam luee responsio salva fide defendi potest, quam tuentur ex recen- tioribus Ledesmius in IV. dist. I. quaest. 3. art.l. et Canus in relectione de Sacramentis; et idem sensisse videntur antiqui Scholastici multi, ut Bonaventura, Scotus, Durandus, Richardus. Okam, Marsilius, Gabriel, in IV. dist. I. vel 2. qui docent, Sacramenta vere justificare, et tamen volunt solum Deum producere gratiam ad praesentiam Sacra¬ mentorum, ita ut non sint Sacramenta causae Physicae, nisi, sine quibus non fieret affectus : tamen puto longe probabiliorem, et tutiorem sententiam, quae dat Sacramen¬ tis veram efficientiam ; quia Patres passim docent, Sacramenta non agere, nisi prius a CAPUT XI. 449 Deo virtutem, seu benedictionem, seu sanc¬ tificationem accipiant; et referunt effectum Sacramenti ad omnipotentiam Dei ; et con¬ ferunt cum veris causis efficientibus, ut supra vidimus. Secundo, quia non esset dif¬ ferentia inter modum agendi Sacramento¬ rum, et signorum magicorum. Tertio, quia tunc non esset borrio Dei minister in ipsa actione Sacramentali, sed homo praeberet signum actione isua, et Deus alia actione, viso eo signo infunderet gratiam, ut cum unus ostendit syngrapham mercatori, et ille dat pecunias. At Scriptura; docent, Deum esse, qui baptizat per hominem, ut supra ostendimus. Tertio igitur responderi potest, cuin S. Tho- Thoma 3. qutest. LX1I. art. 4. quod Sacra¬ menta sint causa; efficientes, etiam Physica;, sed instrumantales, virtus autem divinitus indita non sit aliqua nova qualitas inhaerens spiritualis, vel corporalis , sed sit solum motus, sive usus Dei. Per hoc enim quod Deus utitur hac actione Sacramentali ad gratiam producendam, elevat eam, et facit eam attingere effectum supernaturalem, quam non posset attingere, si a quocumque alio moveretur. Ad cujus rei intelligcntiam notanda sunt quatuor. Primum est, multum interesse in¬ ter instrumenta quibus utitur Deus, et qui¬ bus utuntur homines. Sunt autem quinque differentiae. Prima est, quod homo eget du¬ plici applicatione : una, qua se applicet in¬ strumento, ut accipiendo securim in manu ; altera, qua applicet instrumentum operi ; prior motio est in ipso homine, posterior est in instrumento. Deus autem non eget priori applicatione ; est enim immutabilis, et prae- sentissimus omnibus rebus, proinde etiam applicatus. Quare motio illa, qua Deus mo¬ vet Sacramenta, est sola applicatio Sacra¬ menti ad opus, et est in ipso Sacramento, non in Deo. Secunda est, quod homo eget instrumento naturaliter apto ad illud opus; non enim posset homo secare lignum serra, nisi illa ferrea, et acuta esset. Deus autem non in¬ diget ista aptitudine instrumenti : non enim ipse juvatur instrumento, cum possit se solo omnia facere, sed utitur instrumento, quia placet illi, vel honorare creaturam, vel certe in eo potentiam suam ostendere; ut si quis de industria scribere vellet calamo pa¬ rum idoneo. Ex quo sequitur non esse ne¬ cessarium, ponere in Sacramentis aliquam Tom. III. inhaerentem qualitatem, quae illud formaliter perficiat, sed satis est, si Deus Sacramento uti velit; non enim ipse indiget instrumento apto. Tertia est, quod quando homo utitur ins- mento, necesse est, ut praeter motionem ipsius hominis, qua instrumentum movetur, ipsum etiam instrumentum per naturalem suam virtutem concurrat, et operetur id, quod sibi proprium est. Verbi gr. cum utitur faber securi ad faciendam cathedram, non satis est moveri securim artificiose, sed nccesse etiam est, ut securis scindat : et cum uritur natura calore ad nutritionem, requiritur ut calor calefaciat, quod est sibi proprium ; mediante enim illa actione, na¬ tura utitur calore ad convertendum cibum in carnem. At cum Deus utitur aliquo ins¬ trumento, non est necesse, ut instrumentum per naturalem suam virtutem aliquid opere¬ tur in subjecto; et si forte operatur, illa operatio non est causa effectus divini, ut talis operatio, sed solum ut res, quam Deuir ad hoc faciendum adhibere voluit. Hinc vi¬ demus in usu multorum Sacramentorum non reperiri ullam actionem propriam et naturalem eorum, ut patet de Absolutione, de Matrimonio, de consecratione Eucharis¬ tiae. In aliis reperitur actio propria, ut lotio, aut unctio, sedut dixi, illa quatenus natu¬ ralis actio, non est causa , sed , ut res quaedam. Ex quo sequitur, ut mo¬ tio , seu usus Dei in Sacramentis non solum sit virtus agentis instrumento im¬ pressa, sed sit tota virtus et ratio , per quam agunt. Id enim, quod est in securi acies, et vis agentis illi impressa, id totum est in Sacramentis sola motio Dei. Quarta differentia sequitur ex his duabus, quod homo non potest uti qualibet re pro instrumento sui operis : Deus autem potest, et revera utitur rebus diversissimis ad rem eamdem producendam. Quirita differentia sequitur etiam ex prte- cedentibus, quod homo non potest uti ins¬ trumento, nisi quod tangat rem, in qua est producendus effectus. Quia instrumentum debet operari circa subjectum suam propri¬ am et corporalem actionem : actio autem cor¬ poralis non fit sine contactu. Deus autem potest etiam per id, quod est in uno loco, agere in aliam rem ab eo loco remotissi¬ mam, quandoquidem non eget operatione propria illius rei. Secundo notandum est, omnes concedere 29 450 UDER II. posse Deum uti quibuslibet instrumentis, quamtumvis ineptis, modo tamen illa ins¬ trumenta prius ipse faciat apta. At certe id non est necesse, sed potest Deus instui- mento inept ), manente inepto, efficere quid¬ quid voluerit, quomodo potest optimus scriba calamo inepto ita dextre uti, ut per eum rectissime formenturlitterae. Exemplum habemus Joan. Y. ubi Angelo descendente, et movente aquam, per eam aquam ita motam curabantur omnes languores. Fuisse autem hanc figuram Baptismi, supra do¬ cuimus. Quare Patres imitati hunc modum loquendi, saepe dicunt , Sacramenta non operari, nisi prius in ea descendat Spiritus sanctus. Yide Tertullianum in lib. de Bap¬ tismo, Ambrosium lib. I. de Spiritu sancto, cap. 7. et Chrysostomum in cap. V. Joan- nis, et ibidem Theophylactum et Theophi- lum Alexandrinum lib. 1. Paschali. Pari ratione cum Deus voluit mundum conver¬ tere per Evangelii praedicationem, pote¬ rat eligere homines eloquentes, aut certo homines rudes, continuo eloquentissimos reddere : sed noluit hoc modo uti, sed elegit homines rudes, et qui simpliciter, impolite, et inornate loquerentur, et per eos mundum convertit. Tertio notandum est virtutem Sacramen- talem aliquando esse in elemento, aliquando in verbo, aliquando in utroque. Nam actio Sacramentalis proprie est actio ministri dan¬ tis Sacramentum, non actio suscipientis, susceptio enim est opus nostrum. Sacramen¬ tum autem non est opus nostrum, sed Dei. Itaque actio ministri est illa, qua Deus uti¬ tur tamquam instrumento ad justificandum. Quando ergo minister utitur rebus etverbis, ut in Baptismo, Gonlirmntione, et Unctione extrema, tunc etiam De :s utitur rebus et verbis, et proinde virtus Dei est in utrisque: et oportet illa duo simul concurrere, alioqui nihil fieret. At cum minister non utitur, nisi verbis, materia autem Sacramenti se tenet ex parte suscipientis, aut certe non adhibe¬ tur a ministro ad agendum ; tunc virtus non est nisi in verbis. Ita fit in Sacramento Ab¬ solutionis, ctMatrimonii, et in consecratione Eucharistiae ; non enim adhibet minister peccata poenitentis ad eum absolvendum, nec panem ad aliquid consecrandum, sed verba ad consecrandum panem. Et hinc est quod non repugnat Sacramento Poenitentise, ut uno die dicantur peccata, et alio die ab¬ solvatur pcenitens, virtus enim operativa non est in peccatis, sed in sola absolutione. In consecratione tamen Eucharistiae requiritur prtesentia panis, non quod in pane sit virtus operativa; sed quia nisi esset panis praesens, non esset materia, in qua ageret Sacramen¬ tum : in Absolutione enim etiamsi non sit Confessio, quia jam praeteri it, est tamen ho¬ mo, in quem cadit Absolutio. Denique ali¬ quando minister utitur solo elemento, ut cum porrigit Eucharistiam, et tunc virtus est in solo elemento. • Quarto notandum est, gratiam justifican¬ tem non proprie creari, nec tamen educi de potentia naturali animae, sed educi de po¬ tentia obedientiali, seu capacitate naturali : proinde S. Thomara non pugnare secum, cum dicit, non posse creaturam instrumen- taliter concurrere ad creationem, et tamen Sacramenta concurrere ad productionem gratiae in anima. Explico; illud dicitur pro¬ prie creari, quod fit independenter a sub¬ jecto : illud contra dicitur educi, quod de¬ pendet a subjecto, in fieri, in esse et ope¬ rari. Itaque anima rationalis vere creatur, licet fiat in corpore, quia non pendet a cor¬ pore necessario, ut putet, quia separata esse et operari potest, et prius natura est in se ipsa subsistens, quam corpori infundatur. At gratia est qualitas quuedam spiritualis, quae pendet omnibus modis a subjecto, ut patet; quare educitur. Sed non educitur de potentia naturali, quia non est in homine talis potentia ; alioqui gratia esset res natu¬ ralis : ubi enim est potentia naturalis, ibi est actus naturalis. Neque obstat, quod gratia non possit fieri, nisi a Deo ; nam etiam ani¬ ma non potest creari nisi a Deo, ei tamen est res naturalis, quia materia est in potentia naturali ad animam. Itaque gratia non dat esse naturale, sed supernaturale homini. Est tamen in homine capacitas naturalis ad gra¬ tiam : naturaliter enim convenit homini posse recipere gratiam, ut Augustinus docet de praedestinatione Sanctorum, cap. 5. et potest ea capacitas dici etiam potentia obe- dientialis, quia licet non sit talis, ut natura¬ liter possit concurrere etiam passive ad pro¬ ductionem gratiae, (tunc enim esset potentia naturalis) tamen est talis, ut ex ea possit fieri quidquid Deus voluerit, et haec dicitur potentia obeclientialis. Neque repugnat ha?c eductio gratiee de potentia obedientiali ei, quod dicunt Theo¬ logi, et ipsum Concilium Triclentinum sess. YI, cap. 7. gratiam infundi : infusio enim CAPUT XI. 451 opponitur acquisitioni, non eductioni. Sic enim distinguitur scientia infusa et acqui¬ sita, non quod non utraque educatur de po¬ tentia intellectus, sed quod una acquiratur proprio labore, altera a solo Deo sine labore donetur. Et si recte dicitur infusa scientia rerum naturalium, quam Deus donavit Ada¬ mo et Salomoni sine labore ipsorum, licet educta fuerit de potentia naturali : quanto rectius dicetur gratia infundi, quae a solo Deo datur, et non respondet ei potentia natu¬ ralis? Ex his ad argumentum Zwinglii Respon¬ deo, negando consequentiam. Nam res cor¬ porea et crassa potest agere in animam non ex natura sua, sed ex virtute Dei. Augusti¬ nus tract. 88. in Joan. non timuit dicere : (( Aqua corpus tangit, et cor abluit. » Et ig¬ nis verus et corporeus, animas et daemones tenere et cruciare potest : imo etiam expe¬ rimur corporis affectionibus, miro modo af¬ fici animos nofetros, qui tamen spiritus sunt. Et quomodo haec ipsa nostra corpora animas retinent tamquam in carcere; nec enim po¬ test anima, cum voluerit, a corpore rece¬ dere, et tamen corpus corpus est, et anima spiritus est. Ad primam confirmationem jam respon¬ sum est, non egere contactu id quod non agit per actionem suam propriam et natu¬ ralem. Ad secundam dico primo, locum Augus¬ tini non esse ad rem. Nam Augustinus cum dicit, majus esse justificare impium, quam creare coelum et terram, non vult dicere, esse difficilius infundere gratiae habitum in anima, quam crpare coelum', sed vult dicere (ut ipse ibidem se explicat) esse opus majo¬ ris misericordiae justificare impium, quam creare coelum; et etiam esse opus nobilius, quia coelum et terra transibunt, salus elec¬ torum non transibit. Idcirco ibidem dicit, fideles cooperari Deo in justificatione sua, proinde fideles concurrere ad opus majus, quam sit creare coelum et terram. Secundo, non est improbabile posse creaturam con¬ currere, ut merum instrumentum Dei, ad veram creationem. S. autem Thomas loco notato id negat de creatura, quaj concurrat disponendo subjectum per propriam actio¬ nem. Tertio, jam ostendi gratiam proprie non creari. Ad tertiam confirmationem posset dici non dari ultimum ullo modo intrinsecum in successivis : et ideo justificationem fieri in ultima parte sensibili, non in ultima simpli¬ citer, quae nulla est. Vel dicendum, justifi¬ cationem fieri in instanti illo, in quo finitur actio Sacramentalis. Tametsi enim acfio de¬ sinat negative quoad suas partes, id est, per primum non esse, tamen desinit affirmative, id est per ultimum sui esse, quantum ad ter¬ minum suum. Ut enim in linea non potest assignari ultima pars, potest tamen assignari ultimum punctum, quo terminatur linea : ita in tempore et motu. At (inquiunt) tunc non est actio Sacramentalis. Respondeo tunc maxime esse, eo modo, quo res successiva esse potest. Res enim successive numquam est per suas partes in re existentes. sed sem- per habet quiddam indivisibile, quod vel est initium, vel finis, vel eontinuativum rei suc¬ cessivae : et per illud dicitur esse ; et tunc perfecte dicitur esse, quando illud indivisi¬ bile terminat actionem. Id patet in tempore: non enim dicitur esse una hora, nisi quando finitur. Idem patet in oratione, quse perfecte significat cum profertur. ejus terminus. Ad quartam jam dixi, virtutem illam esse corporalem, quia est motus rei corporalis, licet dici possit spiritualis, ratione causae, et effectus. Ad quintam dico, virtutem illam esse par- tim in una parte Sacramenti, partim in alia: proinde paulatim perire, prout pereunt par¬ tes Sacramenti. Nec tamen supervacaneae fuerunt. Nam illa particula operatur in vir¬ tute omnium praecedentium. Sicut etiam oratio perfecta significat, cum profertur ul¬ tima vox ; qua*, tamen nihil efficeret, nisi aliae praecessissent : et terminus motus ac¬ quiritur per ultimum mulatum esse, quod tamen nihil posset, nisi cadera proecucums- sent. Ad sextam jam respondi, virtutem nunc esse in verbis, nunc in elemento, nunc in utroque etc. Ad ultimam dico, rem illis difficilem vi¬ deri, quia imaginantur spiritualem qualita¬ tem in re corporali debere constitui : sed qui seniiunt, non esse necessariam ejusmodi qualitatem, nullas in hac re patiuntur an¬ gustias. 452 LIBER II.