Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book II: That God Is Not the Author of Sin
Chapter 3: The judgment of Zwingli, Calvin, and Beza is brought forward in their own words
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book II. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
As touching the first, then, the judgment of Zwingli, Calvin, and Beza concerning the cause of sin on the side of God can be comprised in five propositions. The first is: God not only permits, but also wills to be done, whatever sins are done by men. The second: God not only wills them to be done, but also from eternity decreed that whatever sins are done by men should be done — and that without any foreseen determination of the human will; for God does not decree anything because he foreknows it will be, but foreknows things future because he himself decreed that they should be. The third: God not only decreed from eternity that whatever sins are done by men should be done, but also commands Satan and wicked men to conceive misdeeds, and inclines, impels, and even compels them thereto. The fourth: God not only commands Satan, or inclines and impels him, to lead men to sin, but he himself also works in the minds of impious men, and through them, as through his instruments, he himself, as the first cause, does all those things which with respect to men are called, and truly are, sins. The fifth: although those things which with respect to men are called, and truly are, sins are done with God willing, defining, commanding, and working, yet with respect to God they cannot be called, nor are they, sins, but good and just works — because men do all those things with an evil intention, but God with a good counsel; hence God neither himself sins, nor is the author and cause of sin. That this is the judgment of Zwingli, Calvin, and Beza we shall demonstrate with easy labor from their own books and confession.
First, then, Zwingli, in the sermon on providence which he wrote to Philip, prince of Hesse, in the year 1530, has these most foul and plainly Tartarean blasphemies. For in chapter 5 he speaks thus: “Further, since the deity could by no means show us injustice in itself — being on every side by nature true, good, holy — it produced through the creature an example of injustice: not as though the creature produced it by its own force, which neither is, nor lives, nor works without the deity, but because the deity itself is the author of that which to us is injustice, but to it is by no means so.” And below: “When therefore it makes the Angel a transgressor, and man, yet it is not itself constituted a transgressor.” And chapter 6: “What God works through man is turned to man's fault, not also to God's.” And below: “One and the same crime, therefore — say adultery, or murder — insofar as it is of God the author, mover, and impeller, is a work, is not a crime; but insofar as it is of man, it is a crime and wickedness.” And below: “When he moves to some work which is a fraud to the instrument accomplishing it, yet to himself it is not; for he moves freely, nor does he do injury to the instrument, since all things are more his than any craftsman's own instruments are his — to which he does no injury if now he turn the file into a hammer, and contrariwise the hammer into a file. He moves the robber, therefore, to kill the innocent man, even one unprepared for death.” Thus he.
But now let us hear Calvin. He first, in book 1 of the Institutes, chapter 17, §11, speaks thus: “But when they recall to memory that the devil and the whole cohort of the wicked are so restrained on all sides by the hand of God as by a bridle that they can neither conceive any mischief against us, nor set about it when conceived, nor move a finger to perpetrate it, however much they set about it, save so far as he shall have permitted — nay, save so far as he shall have commanded; and that they are not only held bound by his fetters, but even compelled by the bridle to render services: they have whence to console themselves abundantly. For as it belongs to the Lord to arm their fury, and to turn and direct it whither he pleases, so also to set the measure and the end, that they may not exult licentiously at their own lust.” Thus he. In which words we have the third proposition which we noted a little before in explaining Calvin's judgment: for here Calvin in express words says that God not only permits, but even “commands,” that Satan and the wicked conceive misdeeds and set about them against the good; and that their fury is armed and directed by God whither he wills; and finally that Satan and the impious are compelled as by a bridle to render services — that is, that according to God's command they conceive and set about misdeeds. Again, in the same book, chapter 18, §1: “It seems absurd,” says he, “that man should be blinded by the will and command of God, who is presently to pay the penalties of his blindness. They therefore escape by the evasion that this is done only by God's permission, not also by his will; but he, openly pronouncing that he himself does it, repudiates that evasion. That, however, men effect nothing save by the secret nod of God, and deliberate on nothing but what he has already decreed with himself and determines by his secret direction, is proved by innumerable and clear testimonies.” And §2: “And certainly, unless he worked inwardly in the minds of men, it would not have been rightly said that he takes away the lip from the truthful and prudence from the elders.” And a little after: “But nothing clearer can be desired than when he so often pronounces that he blinds the minds of men and smites them with dizziness, makes them drunk with the spirit of slumber, casts in madness, hardens hearts. These things also many throw back upon permission — as though, by deserting the reprobate, he suffered them to be blinded by Satan; but since the Spirit expressly declares that blindness and madness are inflicted by the just judgment of God, the solution is too frigid.” And a little after, concerning the crimes of the Assyrians: “It appears that they were impelled by the sure appointment of God.” And below: “The same Satan also is said to blind the minds of unbelievers; but whence this, save that the efficacy of error flows from God himself, that they may believe lies who refuse to obey the truth?” And §[4]: “Man, by the just impulse of God, does what is not lawful for him.” From these things we have the four former propositions: for we hear that God, not by permission and desertion only, but by will, decree, impulse, precept, inward operation, brings it about that men think, deliberate, and do what is not lawful for them. The same author, book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 4, §2: “Satan, for his part, instigates the depraved minds of the Chaldeans with his poisoned goads to perpetrate that outrage; they rush furiously to injustice, and bind and contaminate all their members with wickedness. Satan therefore is properly said to act in the reprobate, in whom he exercises his kingdom — that is, of wickedness. God also is said to act in his own manner: in that Satan himself, since he is the instrument of his wrath, bends himself hither and thither at his nod and command, to execute his just judgments. I omit here the universal motion of God, whence all creatures, as they are sustained, so draw their efficacy of doing anything; I speak only of that special action which appears in each single crime. We see therefore that it is not absurd that the same crime be assigned to God, to Satan, and to man.” Again, §3, after Calvin had said that God can be said to blind men by deserting, he adjoins another account in these words: “The second account, which comes much nearer to the propriety of the words, is that, for executing his judgments through Satan, the minister of his wrath, he directs their counsels whither he pleases, and stirs their wills, and strengthens their endeavors.” And §4: “Afterward he says that he himself weighed down Pharao's heart and hardened it. Did he harden by not softening? That indeed is true; but he did something more: that he handed over his breast to Satan to be confirmed in obstinacy.” In these places the third proposition is most openly contained: for we hear that that special action which is discerned in the crime is to be attributed to God as author, because he himself, through the ministry of Satan, stirs the wills of the impious to evil, and hardens their hearts, that they obey not, etc.
The same author, in book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 23, §4, thus objects to himself: “Had they not,” says he, “been predestinated beforehand, by the ordination of God, to that corruption which is now pretended as the cause of damnation? When therefore they perish in their corruption, they do nothing else than pay the penalties of that calamity into which, by his predestination, Adam fell and dragged his posterity headlong with him. Is he not therefore unjust, who so cruelly mocks his creatures?” To this objection he answers thus: “I confess indeed that all the sons of Adam fell, by the will of God, into this misery of condition in which they are now bound; and this is what I said at the beginning — that we must at last always return to the sole choice of the divine will, whose cause is hidden in himself.” And §7: “They deny that it stands in express words that it was decreed by God that Adam should perish by his own defection — as though, forsooth, that same God, whom Scripture proclaims to do whatsoever he wills, founded the noblest of his creatures with an ambiguous end.” And a little after: “A horrible decree, I confess; yet no one can deny that God foreknew what end man was to have before he founded him, and therefore foreknew it because he had so ordained by his decree.” And §8: “Although not even that is probable — that man drew destruction on himself by the mere permission of God, without any ordination.” And a little after: “Man therefore falls, the providence of God so ordaining.” And §9: “They will have the reprobate held excusable in sinning, because they cannot escape the necessity of sinning — above all since such necessity is cast upon them by the ordination of God. But we deny that they are thereby duly excused, since to the ordination of God, by which they complain that they were destined to destruction, its own equity stands firm — unknown indeed to us, but most certain to him.” From these places the first and second propositions of the Calvinian error are gathered plainly enough: for Calvin in express words more than once repeated that the first man fell not only by God's permission, but by his will, ordination, predestination; that God had willed and ordained it, and therefore also foreknew it; and that not only the first man, but all his posterity, by God's predestination, fell into the necessity of sinning.
Further, all these things he repeats again, and treats even more copiously, in the book on the eternal predestination of God. And because his book is very long, and has no division of chapters or other sections, I shall cite the number of the pages, according to the Geneva edition of the opuscula of the year 1552, in folio. Thus, then, he speaks, page 903: “Let our faith adore from afar, with what sobriety befits, the secret counsel of God by which the fall of man was preordained.” And page 906: “For the just damnation of man it was enough that, when he had been placed in the way of salvation, he fell thence of his own accord. But it could not have been done otherwise. What then? Is the fault thereby set free, which resides wholly in his will?” Thou seest, reader, in this place, that Calvin concedes that man could not not fall, because by the eternal decree of God his fall had already been preordained. Again, page 916: “Not without God's knowing, and so ordaining, did Adam fall, and destroy himself and his posterity.” And page 917: “But how it was fixed by the foreknowledge and decree of God what was to become of man, and yet God is not to be drawn into the fellowship of the fault, as though he were either author or approver of the transgression — it is plain that this secret is far deeper than the perspicacity of the human mind, so that we need not be ashamed to confess our ignorance; nay, let no one of the faithful be loath not to know what the Lord swallows up in the brightness of his inaccessible light.” Here truly Calvin said that it is inexplicable, or rather unintelligible, how God is not the author of sin, if by his decree the first man sinned. For, as we shall a little later demonstrate, it is most openly false that God is not the author of sin, if by his decree men sin; and what is false, it is no wonder if it cannot be explained and understood. Again, page 944: “Hence it is certainly now easy to gather how empty and fleeting is that defense of the divine justice, that the things which are evil are done not by his will, but by his permission only. So far indeed as they are evils which men perpetrate with an evil mind, as I shall presently expound more plainly, I confess they by no means please God; but that they feign him idly to permit those things which Scripture pronounces to be done not only with him willing, but with him as author, is too frivolous an escape.” And page 946: “Therefore, since the misdeeds which are wickedly perpetrated by men proceed from the Lord for a just cause, though unknown to us, even if his will is the first cause of things, yet I deny that he is the author of sin. Nor indeed is that diversity of causes which I have set down to be buried in oblivion — that one is the proximate, another the remote cause — that we may know how great a distance there is between the even providence of God and the turbulent onsets of men.” Thus he. From which we have the first, the second, and the fifth proposition of John Calvin. But the same fifth proposition the same Calvin explains more fully and openly in the Instruction against the Libertines, chapter 14, where, after he had said that in every work, good as well as evil, men are the instruments of God, he subjoins these words: “Great is the difference between the work of God and the work of the impious man, when God uses him in place of an instrument. For the impious man is incited to his crime by his own avarice, or ambition, or envy, or cruelty, nor does he look to any other end; therefore from that root — that is, from the affection of the mind, and the end which he looks to — the work takes its quality, and is deservedly judged evil. But God has a regard altogether contrary — namely, that he may exercise his justice,” etc. And below he says that God is like the sun, which by its rays generates corruption in a carcass, and yet draws no impurity to itself.
I shall now add also the testimonies of Theodore Beza, that it may be exactly understood what Calvin and his followers hold on this matter. He, then, in the response to Sebastian Castellio on the eternal predestination of God, in the refutation of the second calumny, speaks thus of the fall of Adam: “God, being about to found man for declaring the glory both of his mercy and of his severity, founded Adam to his own image — that is, holy and innocent. And why so? Because, since he is good, nothing vicious can be created by him; but they must needs be vicious, both those of whom he has appointed to have mercy, and those also whom he has justly decreed, for his glory's sake, to condemn. Therefore it behooved Adam to be founded holy and innocent — but such as, of his own accord, and without any fault of God, being made vicious, should lay open the way for the eternal counsels of God, that is, for declaring both his mercy and his severity. It behooved God, therefore, also to open to himself this only way — that is, to ordain the fall of Adam; but to that end which I have said; and since he is most just and most holy, it follows that his ordination too is just.” And a little after: “The origin of the vice,” says he, “is to be sought in the spontaneous motion of the instruments; whereby it comes to pass that God justly decreed what they unjustly did. But, thou wilt say, they could not resist the will — that is, the decree — of God. I confess it; but as they could not, so also they would not. But they could not will otherwise. I confess it, as to the event and the energeia; but the will of Adam was nevertheless not coacted.” The same Beza, a little after, explains Calvin's judgment and his own in thirty-eight aphorisms; and in the first seventeen he teaches nothing else than that God is the first cause of all things which are done, and determined all things from eternity before all foreseeing of the determination of the second causes; and that the second causes, whether they be devoid of reason or endowed with reason, are in every work of theirs the instruments of God — where (to show that God is not the cause of sin) he delivers many things about the variety of instruments. And at length he subjoins five aphorisms, the 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd, in which the sum of the whole matter consists; which it has pleased us to set down here in the same words. Aphorism 18: “Now therefore let us accommodate these things to God himself, whose efficacity we have before proved to intervene in all things which are done, without any exception; and that in such wise that through the things which he founded, as through instruments, he executes in his own time whatever he decreed from eternity.” Aphorism 19: “Whatever God does is good, since from the highest good nothing evil can proceed; but he effects all things; all things therefore are good insofar as they are effected by God; and that distinction of good and evil has place only in the instruments.” Aphorism 20: “For if these instruments are good, and look to the revealed will of God, they act well, and God also acts well through them; whereby it comes to pass that that work is in all ways good.” Aphorism 21: “But the evil instruments — evil, I say, not from creation, but from corruption — insofar indeed as they act, always act ill, and therefore justly run into the wrath of God; but insofar as God acts through them, they serve, whether unwilling or through ignorance, the good work of God. For God, through whatever instruments he acts, always acts well.” Aphorism 22: “And he so acts through those instruments that he not only suffers them to act, nor only moderates the event, but even stirs, impels, moves, rules — and moreover, what is greatest of all, even creates, that through them he may do what he has determined. All which things God does rightly, and without any injustice.” And these indeed would altogether suffice for understanding the judgment of Calvin and Beza. Yet I shall add one more aphorism, that from it we may learn how acutely Beza is wont to discourse on these matters. Thus, then, he speaks in aphorism 31: “(God) acts, with respect to his own work; but he permits, with respect to that work which the evil instruments themselves of their own accord accomplish — or insofar as they are active, not passive, instruments, to keep the words in use in the schools. Yet he justly permits that they act unjustly, since sins, insofar as they are permitted by God unwilling, are not sins, but the punishments of sins; for it is just before God to avenge sins even with sins. But those same actions, insofar as they proceed from Satan, and from the evil, solicited through Satan and through their own concupiscence, so far at last are sins, which the Lord in his own time justly avenges. For the Lord never permits sins insofar as they are sins — nay, he always forbids and vetoes them.”
Now from this elegant aphorism there follow three things most worthy of note. First it follows that the things which are done by evil instruments are, under the same aspect, both permitted and not permitted. For the things done by evil instruments, insofar as those instruments are active, are not done by God, but permitted, as the beginning of this 31st aphorism has it; and those same things, under the same aspect — that is, as they are done by evil instruments insofar as those instruments are active — are not permitted by God: for God does not permit sins, but forbids them, as the end of the same aphorism has it; and sins are the things done by evil instruments insofar as they are active, as aphorism 21 has it. Therefore the same works, under the same aspect, are permitted and not permitted. Second it follows that those same works, under the same aspect, both are sins and are not sins. For the things done by evil instruments, insofar as they are active, are evil — that is, sins — as aphorism 21 teaches; but again those same things, under the same aspect, are not sins: for God does not permit sins, but forbids them, as aphorism 31 teaches; yet he permits the works done by evil instruments insofar as they are active, as the same aphorism teaches; therefore the same works, under the same aspect, are sins and are not sins. Third it follows that the evil instruments, insofar as they are active, work with God either unwilling or ignorant. For either God knows what they do, or he is ignorant. If he is ignorant, then with God ignorant the instruments of God accomplish their works. If he knows, he either consents, or resists, or permits; nor can a fourth member be feigned, for he who permits stands midway between one consenting and one resisting. Wherefore St. Augustine, in the Enchiridion, chapter 95, writes that nothing at all can be done unless God either do it or permit it; for that with him resisting nothing can be done, he believed to be beyond controversy. But by Beza's aphorism, the things done by evil instruments, insofar as they are active, are done with God neither acting nor permitting — because they are sins, and God neither does nor permits sins. Therefore they are done with God either ignorant or resisting.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT III. ' Sententia Zwinglii , Calvini , et Bezse ex verbis ipsorum in medium adducitur. Quod igitur ad primum attinet, sententia Zwinglii, Calvini, et Bezae de causa peccati ex parte Dei quinque propositionibus com¬ prehendi potest. Prima est : Deus non solum permittit, sed etiam vult fieri quacumque fiunt ab homini¬ bus peccata. Secunda : Deus non solum vult fieri, sed etiam ab aeternitate decrevit ut fierent , quacumque fiunt ab hominibus peccata , idque non praevisa determina¬ tione voluntatis humana : Deus enim non decernit quidquam quia prascit futurum, sed prascit futura, quia ipse decrevit ut fi¬ erent. Tertia : Deus non solum ab aternitate decrevit ut fierent, quacumque fiunt ab ho¬ minibus peccata, sed etiam imperat Satana, et improbis hominibus ut concipiant male¬ ficia, eosque ad hoc inclinat, impellit, et etiam cogit. Quarta, Deus non solum impe¬ rat Satana, vel eum inclinat et impellit, ut homines ad peccandum inducat, sed etiam ipse operatur in mentibus hominum impi¬ orum, et per eos, ut per sua instrumenta, ipse tamquam prima causa facit ea omnia, qua respectu hominum dicuntur, et sunt vere peccata. Quinta : Tametsi ea, qua re¬ spectus hominum dicuntur, et sunt vere pec¬ cata, fiant Deo volente, definiente, imperan¬ te, et operante, tamen respectu Dei non possunt dici, nec sunt peccata, sed opera bona et justa, quia homines mala intentione, Deus autem bono consilio illa omnia fa¬ cit. Proinde Deus neque ipse peccat, neque est auctor, et causa peccati. Hanc esse Zwin¬ glii, Calvini, et Beza sententiam, ex ipsorum libris et confessione facili negotio demon¬ strabimus. Primum igitur Zwinglius in serm. de pro¬ videntia, quem scripsit ad principem Catto¬ rum Philippum anno 1530. has teterrimas, ac plane tartareas blasphemias habet. Nam cap. 5. loquitur : « Porro injustitiam in sese nobis ostendere numen cum nulla ratione posset, ut quod undique verum, bonum, sanctum natura sit, per creaturam injustitiae exemplum produxit, non quasi creatura il¬ lam suo marte produxit, quae nec est, nec vivit, nec operatur sine numine, sed quod numen ipsum auctor est ejus, quod nobis est injustitia, illi vero nullatenus est. » Et infra : « Cum igitur Angelum transgressorem facit, et hominem, ipse tamen transgressor non constituitur. » Et cap. 6 : « Quod Deus ope¬ ratur per hominem, homini vitio vertitur, non etiam Deo. » Et infra : « Unum igitur, atque idem facinus, puta adulterium, aut ho¬ micidium, quantum Dei est auctoris, motorist impulsoris, opus est, crimen non est : quan¬ tum autem hominis est, crimen ac scelus est. » Et infra : « Cum movet ab opus ali¬ quod, quod perficienti instrumento fraudi est sibi tamen non est ; ipse enim libere movet, neque instrumento facit injuriam, cum omnia sint magis sua, quam cujusque artificis sua instrumenta, quibus non facit injuriam, si nunc limam in malleum, et contra malleum in limam convertat. Movet ergo latronem ad occidendum innocentem, etiam ac impara¬ tum ad mortem. » Haec ille. Sed jam Calvinum audiamus. Is primum in lib. i. Instit. cap. 17. §. 11. sic loquitur : « Verum ubi in memoriam revocant diabo¬ lum, totamque improborum cohortem sic omnibus partibus manu Dei tamquam fraeno cohiberi, ut nec concipere ullum adversus nos maleficium, nec conceptum moliri, nec ad perpetrandum, si maxime moliantur, di¬ gitum movere queant, nisi quantum ille per¬ miserit, imo nisi quantum ille mandarit, nec compedibus tantum ejus teneri ligatos, sed etiam ad obsequia praestanda fraeno cogi, habent unde se prolixe consolentur. Nam ut domini est, eorum furorem armare, et con¬ vertere, destinareque quo libuerit, ita et modum, finemque statuere, ne pro sua libi¬ dine licentiose exultent. » Haec ille. In qui¬ bus verbis habemus tertiam propositionem, quam paulo ante notavimus in explicanda Calvini sententia. Hic enim disertis verbis Calvinus dicit, Deum non solum permittere, sed etiam « mandare », ut Satan et improbi concipiant maleficia, et ea moliantur adver¬ sus probos, et furorem ipsorum armari, et destinari a Deo, quo ipse voluerit, et tandem cogi quasi fraeno Satanam et impios ad obse¬ quia praestanda, id est, ut juxta Dei mauda- tum maleficia concipiant, et moliantur. Rursus in eodem lih. cap. 18. §. 1 : « Ab¬ surdum, inquit, videtur, volente ac jubente Deo excaecari hominem, qui mox caecitatis suae pcenas daturus est, tergiversando itaque effugiunt, Dei tantum permissu, non etiam voluntate hoc fieri, ipse vero palam se facere pronuntians, effugium illud repudiat. (Juod autem nihil efficiant homines, nisi arcano Dei nutu, nec quidquam deliberando agitent nisi quod ipse jam apud se decreverit, et ar¬ cana sua directione constituat, innumeris, et claris testimoniis probatur. » Et §. 2 : « Et certe, inquit, nisi intus operaretur in men¬ tibus hominum, non recte dictum esset, au¬ ferre labium a veracibus, et a senibus pru¬ dentiam. » Et paulo post : « Sed nihil, in¬ quit, clarius potest desiderari, quam ubi to¬ ties pronuntiat se excaecare hominum mentes ac vertigine percutere, spiritu soporis inebri¬ are, incutere amentiam, obdurare corda. Haec etiam ad permissionem multi rejiciunt, ac si deserendo reprobos, a Satana excsecari sineret. Sed cum diserte exprimat spiritus, justo Dei judicio infligi caecitatem, et amen¬ tiam, nimis frigida est solutio. » Et paulo post, de sceleribus Assyriorum: « Apparet, inquit, certa destinatione Dei fuisse impulsos. » Et infra : « Dicitur etiam idem Satan excaecare infidelium mentes: sed unde hoc, nisi quod a Deo ipso manat effi¬ cacia erroris, ut mendaciis credant, qui re¬ nuunt parere veritati. » Et §. 2 : « Homo, in¬ quit, justo Dei impulsu agit quod sibi non li¬ cet. » Ex his habemus quator priores propo¬ sitiones : audimus enim Deum non solum permissione, et desertione , sed voluntate, decreto, impulsu, praecepto, interna opera¬ tione efficere, ut hominescogitent, deliberent agant qua) sibi non licent. Idem auctor lib. ii. Instit. cap. 4. §. 2 : « Satan, inquit, alioqui pravos Chaldaeorum animos venenatis suis aculeis ad perpetran¬ dum id flagitium instigat : illi ad injustitiam furiose ruunt, omniaque inemhra scelere ob¬ stringunt , ac contaminant. Proprie ergo agere dicitur Satan in reprobis, in quibusreg- num suum, hoc est, nequitiae, exercet. Di¬ citur et Deus suo modo agere quod Satan ipse, instrumentum cum sit ira) ejus, pro ejus nutu, ac imperio, huc atque illuc se in¬ flecti ad exequenda ejus justa judicia. Omitto hic universalem Dei motionem, unde creatu¬ ra) omnes ut sustinentur, ita efficaciam quid¬ vis agendi ducunt; de illa speciali actione tantum loquor, qua) in unoquoque facinore apparet. Idem ergo facinus Deo, Satanae, ho¬ mini assignari, videmus non esse absurdum. » Rursus §. 3. posteaquam dixerat Calvinus Deum posse dici excajcare homines dese¬ rendo, adjungit aliam rationem his verbis : « Secunda ratio, quae multo propius accedit ad verborum proprietatem, quod exequenda sua judicia per ministrum ira) suae Satanam, et consilia eorum destinat, quo visum est, et voluntates excitat, et conatus firmat. » Et §. 4 : « Postea, inquit, dicit se aggravasse cor iilius et indurasse, an induraverit non emol¬ liendo ? id quidem verum est : sed plus ali¬ quid fecit, quod obstinatione pectus ejus ob- firmandum Satanae mandavit. » In his locis tertia propositio apertissime continetur. Au¬ dimus enim specialem illam actionem, qua) in facinore cernitur Deo auctori tribuendam esse, quia ipse per ministerium^Satanae vo¬ luntates impiorum excitet ad malum, et cor¬ da eorum obduret, ne obediant etc. Idem auctor in m. lib. Instit. cap. 23. §. 4. Ita sibi ipse objicit : « Nonne, inquit, ad eam, quae nunc pro damnationis causa ob¬ tenditur, correptionem, Dei ordinatione prac- destinati ante fuerant ? cum ergo in sua cor¬ ruptione pereunt, nihil aliud, quam poenas luunt ejus calamitatis, in quam ipsius prae¬ destinatione lapsus est Adam, ac posteros praecipites secum traxit, an non itaque inju¬ stus, qui creaturis suis tam crudeliter illu¬ dit ? » Huic objectioni ita respondet : « Fa¬ teor sane, in hanc, qua nunc illigati sunt, conditionis miseriam, Dei voluntate deci- CAPUT III. disse omnes filios Adam, atque id est, quod principio dicebam, redeundum tandem sem- per esse ad solum divinae voluntatis arbi¬ trium, cujus causa sit in ipso abscondita. » Et §. 7 : « Disertis, inquit, verbis hoc ex¬ stare negant, decretum fuisse a Deo, ut sua defectione periret Adam, quasi vero idem ille Deus quem Scriptura praedicat, facere quacumque vult, ambiguo fine condiderit nobilissimam ex suis creaturis. » Et paulo post : « Decretum quidem, in¬ quit, horribile fateor : inficiari tamen nemo potest, quin praesciverit Deus quem exitum esset habiturus homo, antequam ipsum con¬ deret, et ideo praesciverit, quia decreto suo sic ordinaverat. » Et§. 8 : « Quamquam, in¬ quit, nec ipsum, quem probabile est, sola Dei permissione, nulla ordinatione hominem sibi accersisse interitum. » Et paulo post : « Cadit igitur homo, Dei providentia sic or¬ dinante. » Et §. 9 : « Excusabiles, inquit, peccando haberi volunt reprobi, quia eva¬ dere nequeunt peccandi necessitatem : prae¬ sertim cum Dei ordinatione sibi injiciatur hujusmodi necessitas. Nos vero inde nega¬ mus rite excusari, quandoquidem Dei ordi¬ nationi, qua se exitio destinatos conquerun¬ tur, sua constet aequitas nobis quidem incog¬ nita, sed illi certissima. » Ex his locis satis aperte colliguntur prima et secunda propositio Calviniani erroris. Di¬ sertis enim verbis non semel Calvinus re¬ petiit, non solum Dei permissione, sed vo¬ luntate, ordinatione, praedestinatione pri¬ mum hominem lapsum esse, quia Deus id voluerat, et ordinaverat; ideo etiam praesci¬ visse, nec solum primum hominem, sed om¬ nes ejus posteros ex Dei praedestinatione in¬ cidisse in peccandi necessitatem. Porro haec omnia iterum repetit, et copio¬ sius etiam tractat in lib. de aeterna Dei prae¬ destinatione. Quia vero liber ejus valde pro¬ lixus est, neque distinctionem ullam habet capitum, aut sectionum aliarum, citabo nu¬ merum paginarum, juxta editionem opuscu¬ lorum Genuensem anni 1552. in fol. Sic igitur loquitur pag. 903 : « Arcanum Dei consilium, quo praeordinatus fuerat hominis lapsus, qua decet sobrietate, procul adoret fides nostra. » Et pag. 906 : « Ad justam hominis damnationem satis erat in via sa¬ lutis cum esset collocatus, inde sponte exci¬ disse. At fieri aliter non potuit. Quid tum ? an ideo culpa liberatur, quae tota in ejus vo¬ luntate residet ? » Vides, lefctor hoc loco , 233 Calvinum concedere, non potuisse hominem non cadere, quia aeterno Dei decreto fuerat jam ejus casus praeordinatus. Rursus pag. 916 : « Non nisi sciente, at¬ que ita ordinante Deo cecidit Adam, seque et posteros perdidit. » Et pag. 917 : « Quo¬ modo autem Dei praescientia, et decreto sta¬ tutum fuerit, quid de homine futurum erat : neque tamen in culpae societatem trahendus sit Deus, quasi transgressionis vel auctor sit, vel approbator, cum longe altius humanae mentis perspicacia esse arcanum palam sit, ne ignorantiam nostram fateri pudeat. Imo ne quem ex fidelibus nescire pigeat quod Domi¬ nus lucis suae inaccessae fulgore absorbet. » Hoc vere Calvinus dixit, inexplicabile, vel potius inintelligibile esse, quomodo Deus non sit auctor peccati, si ejus decreto primus ho¬ mo peccavit. Nam, ut paulo post demonstra¬ bimus, apertissime falsum est, Deum non esse auctorem peccati, si ejus decreto homi¬ nes peccant, quod autem falsum est, mirum non est, si explicari, et intelligi nequeat. Rursus pag. 944 : « Hinc certe jam colli¬ gere promptum est quam inane et fluxum sit illud divinae justitiae patrocinium, quae mala sunt, non ejus voluntate, sed permissu dun- taxat fieri, equidem quatenus mala sunt, quae malo animo perpetrant homines, utsta- tim planius exponam, Deo minime placere fateor ; sed quod otiosum ea permittere fin¬ gunt, quae Scriptura non tantum eo volente, sed auctore fieri pronuntiat, nimis frivolum est effugium. » Et pag. 9-46 : « Ergo cum justa de causa licet nobis ignota a Domino procedant, quae scelerate ab hominibus ma¬ leficia perpetrantur, etiamsi rerum prima causa sit ejus voluntas, peccati tamen eum esse auctorem nego. Nec vero oblivione te¬ genda est illa, quam posui, causarum diver¬ sitas, quod alia est propinqua, alia autem re¬ mota causa : ut sciamus quam longa inter aequabilem Dei providentiam, et turbulentos hominum impetus, sit distantia : » Haec ille. Ex quibus habemus primam, secundam, et quintam Joannis Calvini propositionem. Sedeamdem quintam propositionem fusius et apertius explicat idem Calvinus in instru¬ ctione adversus Libertinos cap. 14. ubi po- steaquam dixerat, in omni opere tam bono, quam malo esse homines instrumenta Dei, subjungit haec verba : « Magna est differen¬ tia inter opus Dei, et opus impii, cum eo Deus vice instrumenti utitur. Impius enim sua avaritia, aut ambitione, aut invidia, aut 254 UBER II. crudelitate incitatur ad facinus suum, nec alium finem spectat, ideo ex radice illa, id est, ex animi affectione, et fine, quem spe¬ ctat, opus qualitatem sumit, et merito malum judicatur, sed Deus respectum omnino con¬ trarium habet, nempe ut justitiam suam ex¬ erceat etc. » Et infra, similem esse dicit Deum soli, qui radiis suis in cadavere cor¬ ruptionem generat, et tamen impuritatem nullam ad se trahit. Addam nunc etiam Theodori Bezae testi¬ monia, ut exacte intelligatur, quid Calvinus, et ejus sectatores de hac re sentiant. Is igitur in responsione ad Sebastianum Castilionem de aeterna Dei praedestinatione in refutatione secundae calumniae, ita loquitur de casuAda- mi : « Deus hominem conditurus ad gloriam tum misericordiae, tum severitatis suae decla¬ randam, Adamum condidit ad imaginem suam, id est, sanctum, ac innocentem. Cur nam id vero ? nempe quia bonus cum sit, non potest ab eo vitiosum quidquam creari : vitiosi autem sint oportet tum quorum con¬ stituit misereri, tum etiam quos juste decrevit gloriae suae causa condemnare. Ideo oportuit Adamum condi sanctum, et innocentem, sed qui sua sponte, et sine ulla Dei culpa vitiosus factus, viam patefaceret aeternis Dei consiliis, id est, tum misericordia?, tum severitati ip¬ sius declarandae. Oportuit ergo Deum quoque hanc unicam viam sibi aperire, id est, Adam lapsum ordinare, sed ad eum, quem dixi fi¬ nem, qui cum sit justissimus et sanctissimus, justam quoque ipsius ordinationem esse con¬ sequitur. » Et paulo post : « Quaerenda, inquit, est vitii origo in instrumentorum spontaneo motu, quo fit ut Deus juste decre¬ verit, quod illi juste fecerunt. At enim dices : Non potuerunt resistere Dei voluntati, id est, decreto, fateor, sed sicut non potuerunt, ita etiam noluerunt. Yerum non poterant aliter velle. Fateor quoad eventum, et evspYeiav. sed voluntas tamen Adami coacta non fuit. » Idem Bcza paulo post explicat sententiam Calvini, et suam triginta octo aphorismis, ac in primis septemdecim nihil aliud docet, nisi Deum esse causam primam omnium re¬ rum, quae fiunt, et determinasse omnia ab aeterno ante omnem praevisionem determi¬ nationis secundarum causarum. Secundas autem causas, sive eae sint rationis expertes, sive ratione praeditae, in omni opere suo esse instrumenta Dei. Ubi (ut ostendat Deum non esse causam peccati) multa tradit de instru¬ mentorum varietate. Ac tandem subjicit quin¬ que aphommos 18. 19. 20. 21. et 22. in qui¬ bus consistit totius rei summa; quos iisdem verbis huc referre placuit. Aphorismus XVIII . Jam igitur ista ad Deum ipsum accommodemus, cujus efficaci¬ tatem ante probavimus in omnibus, quae fiunt intervenire sine ulla exceptione : et ita quidem ut per ea, quae condidit tamquam per instru¬ menta, exequatur suo tempore quicquid ab aeterno decrevit. » Aphorismus XIX. «Quicquid agit Deus, bonum est, cum a summo bono nihil mali possit proficisci : omnia autem efficit, omnia igitur bona sunt quatenus a Deo efficiuntur: et discrimen illud boni, et mali in instrumen¬ tis duntaxat locum habet. » Aphorismus XX. « Nam si haec instrumen¬ ta bona sunt, et respiciunt patefactam Dei voluntatem, bene agunt, et Deus quoque bene agit per illa. Quo fit ut id opus omnibus mo¬ dis sit bonum. » Aphorismus XXI. Mala autem instrumen¬ ta, mala, inquam, non ex creatione, sed ex corruptione, quatenus quidem agunt, male semper agunt, ideoque juste incurrunt in iram Dei : quatenus autem Deus per illa agit, bono Dei operi, vel invita, vel per ignorantiam serviunt. Nam Deus, per quaecumque agaj, instrumenta, semper bene agit. » Aphorismus XXII. « Sic autem agit per illa instrumenta, ut non tantum sinat illa agere, nec tantum moderetur eventum, sed etiam excitet, impellat, moveat, regat, atque adeo, quod omnium est maximum, etiam creet, ut per illa agat quod constituit. Qua? omnia recte agit Deus, et sine ulla injusti¬ tia. » Atque haec quidem omnino sufficerent ad sententiam Calvini et Beza? intelligendam. Addam tamen adhuc unum aphoi'ismum, ut ex eo discamus quam acute Beza de his rebus disserere soleat. Sic igitur loquitur in apho- rismo 31 : « Agit (Deus) sui operis respectu: permittit vero ejus operis respectu, quod mala ipsa instrumenta sponte peragant; sive quatenus activa sunt, non passiva instrumen¬ ta, ut usitata in scholis verba retineamus. Juste tamen permittit, quod ista injuste agant, quoniam peccata, quatenus a Deo nolente permittuntur, peccata non sunt, sed pecca¬ torum poenae; justum enim est coram Deo peccata etiam peccatis ulcisci. Sed istae aedem actiones, quatenus a Satana, et a ma¬ lis per Satanam, et per propriam concupi¬ scentiam sollicitatis proficiscuntur, eatenus CAPUT IV. demum peccata sunt, quae Dominus juste suo tempore ulciscitur. Nunquam enim Dominus peccata quatenus peccata sunt, permittit, imo semper prohibet, ac vetat. » Sequuntur autem ex hoc eleganti aphori- smo tria qusedam notatu dignissima. Primo sequitur, ea quse fiunt ab instrumentis ma¬ lis sub eadem ratione permitti, et non per¬ mitti. Nam qua; fiunt ab instrumentis malis, quatenus ea instrumenta activa sunt, non fiunt a Deo, sed permittuntur, ut habet ini¬ tium apborismi hujus 31. et illa eadem, sub eadem ratione, id est , ut fiunt ab instrumentis malis, quatenus ea instrumenta activa sunt, non permittuntur a Deo. Deus enim peccata non permittit, sed prohibet, ut habet finis ejusdem aphorisrni, peccata au¬ tem sunt ea qua; fiunt ab instrumentis malis, quatenus activa sunt, ut habet aphorismus 21. Igitur eadem opera sub eadem ratione permittuntur, et non permittuntur. Secundo sequitur, et eadem illa opera sub eadem ratione esse peccata, et non esse pec¬ cata. Namque fiunt ab instrumentis malis, quatenus ea activa sunt, mala sunt, id est, peccata, ut docet aphorismus 21. Sed rursus illa eadem, sub eadem ratione, peccata non sunt, Deus enim peccata non permittit sed prohibet, ut docet aphorismus 31 . Permit¬ tit autem opera qua; fiunt ab instrumentis malis, quatenus activa sunt, ut docet idem aphorismus ; igitur eadem opera sub eadem ratione peccata sunt, et peccata non sunt. Tertio sequitur, instrumenta mala, quatenus activa sunt invito Deo, vel ignorante operari, Nam vel novit Deus quid illa agant, vel igno¬ rat. Si ignorat, igitur ignorante Deo instru¬ menta Dei opera sua perficiunt. Si novit aut consentit, aut repugnat, aut permittit ; ne¬ que fingi potest quartum membrum, nam qui permittit, medius est inter consentien¬ tem, et repugnantem. Quocirca S. Augusti¬ nus in Enchiridio cap. 93. scribit, nihil om¬ nino fieri posse , nisi Deo , vel faciente, vel permittente. Nam eo repugnante nihil fie¬ ri posse, extra controversiam esse credidit. At per aphorismum Bezse, quae fiunt ab in¬ strumentis malis, quatenus activa sunt, Deo nec agente, nec permittente fiunt, quia pec¬ cata sunt, et Deus peccata nec facit, nec permittit. Igitur ea Deo, vel ignorante, vel repugnante fiunt. 2ao