Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book II: That God Is Not the Author of Sin
Chapter 4: That from the judgment of Zwingli, Calvin, and Beza God is rightly made the author of sin
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book II. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
The judgment of Zwingli, Calvin, and Beza on the cause of sin on the side of God being set forth, it follows that we prove that from that judgment it is rightly gathered that God is the author of sin — although they themselves, lest they incur the odium of so horrible a blasphemy, neither dare affirm it openly, and not rarely deny it in express words. And that the disputation may be clearer, and the impiety of the adversaries shine out more, I shall demonstrate that four absurd and blasphemous things follow from the judgment of the adversaries. The first will be that God is truly and properly the author of the sins which are done by men. The second, that God properly and truly sins. The third, that God alone truly sins. The fourth, that if these be denied, the judgment of the Libertines will be true, which holds that nothing is sin but a false opinion. From which it will be understood that the most absurd dogma of the Libertines, which was refuted by Calvin himself, sprouted from the doctrine of the same Calvin as a shoot from its root.
Let us come to the first. God (by the judgment of the adversaries) impels men to sin, and even compels them to sin. For thus Zwingli writes, in the sermon on providence, chapter 6: “Nor let anyone say, The robber therefore is innocent, for he acted with God as impeller. For he sinned against the law. But, thou wilt say, he was compelled to sin. I allow, say I, that he was compelled — but to this end, that the one might be translated, and the other fastened to the cross.” Where Zwingli confesses that the robber is compelled by God to the murder, but to this end: that the man slain by the robber be translated to heaven, and the robber himself, by the sentence of the judge, be fastened on the cross — for so he expounds himself. Calvin speaks thus, book 1 of the Institutes, chapter 18, §4: “Man, by the just impulse of God, does what is not lawful for him.” And above, chapter 17, §11, he had said that the impious are compelled by God as by a bridle to conceive and set about misdeeds. But he who impels and compels another to do any work whatever is the primary author of that work, and is so called among all nations; nor does the natural light implanted in our intelligence in any way suffer this to be denied: therefore God, by the judgment of the adversaries, is the primary author of the sins which are perpetrated by men. Again, God, by the judgment of the adversaries, commands Satan and the impious to conceive and set about misdeeds, as in the place just cited the same Calvin writes. But any work, by the common consensus of all nations, pertains more to him who commands than to him who executes: therefore the misdeeds of Satan and of the impious pertain more to God, as author, than to the impious themselves and Satan. Moreover, the impious, while they sin, are the instruments of God, as everywhere in the places cited Calvin and Beza witness; but he who uses an instrument is the primary author of that work which he himself does through the instrument: therefore God, by the judgment of Calvin and Beza, is the primary author of all sins. Finally, God from eternity willed and decreed that the first man should fall into sin — not upon a foreseen determination of the human will, but from his mere and absolute good pleasure, as Calvin teaches, book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 23, and in the book on predestination, which places we cited fully above. But if God had permitted the first man to stand or fall at his own choice, and had not rather efficaciously procured that he should fall, that decree could easily have been frustrated; therefore it was necessary that God efficaciously procure the fall of the first man, and so cast upon the first man the necessity of sinning — which very thing Calvin gladly admits in the places cited. But he who procures, and that efficaciously, that someone sin, must be called the truest author of that sin, unless we would fight with the very light of nature: therefore God, by Calvin's judgment, can and ought to be held the truest author of the sin which the first man committed.
These arguments, which are woven partly from the pronouncements of the adversaries, partly from the most certain light of nature and the consensus and confession of all nations, Zwingli and Calvin think to elude without difficulty by a single distinction. For they say that God impels and compels the impious to conceive and set about crimes, but that these are not crimes insofar as they are done with God impelling and compelling, but insofar as they proceed from the evil will of the impious; and that therefore not God, but the impious themselves, are the authors of their own crimes. By like reasoning they say that God commands the impious to conceive crimes; likewise that the impious are the instruments of God; and finally that God efficaciously procures that men fall; but that the works of the impious cannot be called, nor are, sins in that part in which they proceed from the command, providence, or motion of God, but only in that part in which they are the works of the instruments themselves — that is, of impious men. And why the will of the man who chooses the outrage is evil, while the will of God, who willed that same outrage to be chosen, is not evil — or why, in the same work, the will of God is good, the will of man evil — they give three causes. One is, that human nature by the vice of the first man is wholly corrupted. But that reason (which we shall refute more copiously in another place) does not solve the question: for the first sin of the first man — as also the first sin of Satan — drew its origin from no preexisting corruption of nature, as the adversaries confess. By which also is refuted another reason which could be brought why God is not the author of sin — namely, that he wills the sin not as fault, but as the punishment of another sin; for that reason can have no place in the first sin of the first man and of the angel, which, since it was the first, could be the punishment of no preceding sin. We ask, then, why in the same work the will of the first man was evil — before the depravation of human nature, and before any other fall — while the will of God was not evil.
That first reason, then, being dropped, they apply a second, which they also repeat in many places even to nausea. For they write that the will of God is good while he impels to outrages, or commands them, or procures them, or accomplishes them through the impious as through certain instruments of his own, because God has a good end in view: for he wills that men sin, that he may have those whom he may justly condemn, and those on whom he may liberally have mercy, that in that way he may manifest the glory of his justice and of his mercy; but that the will of the impious is evil, because in that very work which they do at God's commanding, impelling, and moving they look to an evil end — namely, that they may sate their own lust, not that they may serve the glory of God. This reason Zwingli gives, in the sermon on providence, chapter 6: “What God does, he does freely, foreign to every hurtful affection, and therefore also without sin; so that the adultery of David, insofar as it pertains to God its author, is no more a sin to God than when a bull mounts and fills the whole herd,” etc. The same reason Calvin gives, book 1 of the Institutes, chapter 17, §5, and in the book on the eternal predestination of God, page 946, and in the Instruction against the Libertines, chapter 14; and Beza in the response to Sebastian Castellio, in the refutation of the second calumny, and in the aphorisms, as we cited above. But this their doctrine, which is the foundation of the whole error, we can with no trouble most solidly refute. For first, it is Apostolic doctrine that evils are not to be done that goods may come, Romans 3; a good intention, then, and a good end conceived in the mind cannot bring it about that it be licit to do those things which of themselves, intrinsically and from their object, are evil. Otherwise he should not be reprehended who committed theft for the sake of almsgiving; nor he who on private authority killed a man, lest that man by his example or deed harm others; nor he who committed adultery for the sake of getting offspring — for all these would be looking to a good end. But if the thefts, murders, adulteries of men are true sins, and men, the authors of those crimes, are most justly punished, even though they be said — and in truth be — done with a good intention, why shall God, the author of those same works, have to be excused on account of a good intention alone? The adversary is deceived, then; and because an evil intention vitiates a work otherwise good, he wrongly gathers that evil works are justified by a good intention. For a good work is born of an entire cause, but an evil one can arise from any defect whatever — which no one is ignorant of who has learned even the first rudiments of moral philosophy. Next, I shall ask of the adversary whether the evil intention of the man is from God or not. For if God is the author of the evil intention, it altogether follows that God is the author of the sin: for how is he not the author of the sin who is the author not only of the evil action, but even of the evil intention itself, whence the action has it — Calvin and Beza being the teachers — that it is evil and is properly named sin? Further, that God is the author of the evil intention the adversaries cannot deny, unless they would manifestly fight with themselves. For if God, as they will have it, impels men to sin, and sin is not without an evil intention, certainly he impels also to the evil intention. And if from eternity he decreed, for the showing of his mercy and justice, that man should sin; and sin is not sin unless it be done with an evil intention, nor can it be truly remitted from mercy, or truly punished from justice, unless it be truly sin — that is, unless it be done with an evil intention: it manifestly follows that God from eternity willed and determined that man should work with an evil intention, and in that manner fall. And because the decree of God ought not to be uncertain, nor depend on the choice of the creature, it behooved God himself efficaciously to procure that man work with an evil intention, and to be no less the author of the evil intention than of the work itself.
The third reason is proper to Zwingli, who delivers that the will of man in an evil work is evil, and God's not evil, for this cause: that no law is laid upon God, but upon man a law is laid; hence in the same work the will of man transgresses the law and is evil; the will of God does not transgress, and is not evil. For thus he speaks in the same sermon on providence, chapter 6: “What God does is not sin, because it is not against the law; for on him no law is laid, as being just — for on the just no law is laid, according to Paul's sentence. One and the same crime, therefore — say adultery or murder — insofar as it is of God the author, mover, and impeller, is a work, is not a crime; but insofar as it is of man, it is a crime and wickedness: for the former is not held by the law, but the latter is even condemned by the law.” And above, chapter 5: “When God makes the Angel, or man, a transgressor, yet he himself does not transgress, since he goes not against a law. What God did, therefore, is not sin to him, but it is to man and to the Angel; for the law presses and accuses them. To God it is lawful to deal freely with his creatures, no less than to the father of a family with his goods, or to the potter with the clay. Howsoever therefore he impel the creature hither, or drive it thither, so far is he from sinning that he does these things not without signal good — while meanwhile the man, on whom the law has been fixed, even when he is impelled, sins; for he works against the law.” Thus he. But this doctrine of Zwingli is repugnant to itself, and is most evidently refuted. First: if God impels a man to adultery (as he himself says) as a craftsman impels an instrument to the work, he wills, then, that the man obey him in perpetrating the adultery, as the craftsman wills that the instrument obey him in doing the work; hence that impulse of God is a precept and a law, which the man is bound to fulfill, as the instrument is bound to comply with the craftsman by whom it is moved. Therefore the man, impelled by God, committing adultery, both transgresses and does not transgress the law of God; sins, and does not sin; and God, impelling him, wills him both to keep and not to keep the law, to sin and not to sin. Next, although no law is laid upon God by some superior lawgiver, yet his own wisdom is to him a law; and (as Zwingli himself in the same place teaches) what to us is law, to God is his character and nature. God, then, is no less bound not to be repugnant to his own character, wisdom, and nature than men are bound not to be repugnant to the law of God. Wherefore, if God impelled men to those things which are contrary to the eternal law — and hence to the character and wisdom of God — such as adultery is, his will would be evil, seeing that it would be repugnant to the right rule of the divine wisdom, and God would deny himself — which can in no way be, as the Apostle says. Third: no law is laid upon God, by Zwingli's judgment, in the manner in which no law is laid upon the just man. But no law is laid upon the just man — law which would terrify — because of his own accord he keeps the law; not because he would not sin if perchance he did something against the law: for in Ezechiel 18 the Lord witnesses that the just man will plainly sin, and be condemned, if he do the things which are forbidden by the law. Therefore in the same way no law is laid upon God, because of his own accord — nay, from his very nature — his will is always conformed to his own wisdom; not because it would be lawful for God to deny himself by impelling men to the things which are repugnant to the eternal law, which is the very infinite reason and wisdom of God. Fourth: it can in no way come to pass that a man, God impelling, do what is forbidden by the law of God, and yet God impelling be not the author of the crime, but of the work. For what else is a crime than the committing of a work forbidden by the law of God? How then is God not the author of the crime, if he is the author of a work forbidden by the divine law? And how does Zwingli say that man, and the Angel, were made transgressors of the law by God, if God is not the author of the transgression, but only of the work? I pass over here how great an impiety it is to teach that men are punished by God because they do the things which God himself compels them to do. We have it, then, that from the judgment of Zwingli, Calvin, and Beza it is most rightly gathered that God is truly and properly the author of sin, though they themselves in word deny it.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT IV. Ex sententia Zivinglii, Calvini,' et Bezse recte colligi , Deum esse auctorem peccatorum , quse a nobis fiunt. Exposita sententia Zwinglii, Calvini et Bezae de causa peccati ex parte Dei, sequitur ut probemus ex ea sententia recte colligi, Deum esse auctorem peccati, quamvis id ipsi, ne invidiam tam horribilis blasphemiae subeant, nec palam affirmare audeant, et non raro disertis verbis inficientur. Ac ut sit clarior disputatio, et impietas adversariorum magis elucescat, quatuor absurda, et blasphema ex sententia adversariorum sequi demonstrabo. Primum enim erit, Deum vere et proprie esse auctorem peccatorum quse fiunt ab ho¬ minibus. Secundum, proprie, et vere Deum peccare. Tertium, Deum solum vere pecca¬ re. Quartum, si hsec negentur, veram fore Libertinorum sententiam, quse habet, nihil esse peccatum nisi falsam opinionem. Ex qui¬ bus intelligetur absurdissimum dogma Liber¬ tinorum, quod ab ipso Calvino refutatum est, ab ejusdem Calvini doctrina, tamquam a radice surculum germinasse. Veniamus ad primum. Deus (ex sententia adversariorum) impellit homines ad peccan¬ dum, atque adeo cogit eos peccare. Sic enim Zwinglius scribit in serm. de providentia, cap. 6: « Nec dicet quisquam, Innocens igi- !ur est latro ; Deo enim impulsore egit. Nam contra legem peccavit. At, inquies, coactus est ad peccandum. Permitto, inquam, coa¬ ctum esse, sed in hoc ut et alter transferetur, et alter cruci adfigeretur. » Ubi fatetur Zwin¬ glius, cogi latronem a Deo ad homicidium, sed ad eum finem, ut occisus a latrone trans¬ feratur ad coelum, et ipse latro ex sententia judicis affigatur in cruce. Sic enim se ipse exponit. Calvinus sic loquitur lib. I. Instit. cap. 18. § 4 : « Homo justo Dei impulsu agit quod sibi non licet. » Et supra cap. 17. §. 11. dixe¬ rat, impios a Deo cogi quasi fraeno ut male¬ ficia concipiant, et moliantur. At qui impel¬ lit, et cogit alium ad opus quodeumque fa¬ ciendum, ejusdem operis auctor primarius est, et dicitur apud omnes gentes ; neque sinit ullo modo naturale lumen intelligentiae nostrae insitum hoc negari : igitur Deus ex sententia adversariorum, auctor primarius 236 LIBEM II. est, eorum peccatorum, qua; ab hominibus perpetrantur. ltursus Deus ex sententia adversariorum jubet Satana;, et impiis, ut maleficia conci¬ piant, et moliantur, ut in loco proxime cita¬ to, idem Calvinus scribit. At opus quodcum- que, ex communi consensu omnium gentium, magis pertinet ad imperantem, quam ad exequentem : igitur Satana;, et impiorum maleficia magis pertinent ad Deum , ut auctorem, quam ad ipsos impios, et Sata- nam. Ad ha;c, impii dum peccant, instrumenta Dei sunt, ut passim in locis citatis Calvinus, et Beza testantur: at qui utitur instrumento, auctor est primarius ejus operis, quod ipse per instrumentum facit ; igitur Deus ex sen¬ tentia Calvini, et Beza; auctor est primarius omnium peccatorum. Denique Deus ab Eeternitale .voluit, et de¬ crevit, ut primus homo caderet in peccatum non ante praevisa determinatione voluntatis humanae, sed ex mero, et absoluto benepla¬ cito suo, ut Calvinus docet lib. m. Institut. cap. 23. et in lib. de pra;destinatione, qua; loca supra fuse citavimus. At si Deus per¬ misisset primo homini, ut staret, vel cade¬ ret pro arbitrio suo, et non potius efficaciter procurasset ut caderet, facile decretum, illud frustrari potuisset; igitur necesse fuit, ut Deus primi hominis casum efficaciter procu¬ raret ; atque adeo primo homini peccandi necessitatem injiceret. Quod ipsum libenter Calvinus admittit in locis citatis. At qui pro¬ curat, et quidem efficaciter, ut aliquis pec¬ cet, is ejus peccati verissimus auctor dici de¬ bet, nisi cum ipso naturae lumine pugnare veli¬ mus : igitur Deus ex Calvini sententia, veris¬ simus auctor peccati , quod primus homo commisit, haberi potest, ac debet. Haec argumenta, quae partim ex adversa¬ riorum pronuntiatis, partim ex certissimo lumina; natura;, et consensu, confessioneque omnium gentium contexta sunt, non difficul¬ ter Zwinglius, et Calvinus unica distinctione sibi videntur eludere. Dicunt enim Deum im¬ pellere, et cogere impios ad scelera conci¬ pienda, et molienda, sed ea non esse scelera quatenus fiunt Deo impellente, et cogente , sed quatenus procedunt a mala impiorum voluntate, et ideo non Deum, sed ipsos im¬ pios esse auctores scelerum suorum. Pari ratione dicunt Deum jubere impiis, ut scele¬ ra concipiant ; item esse impios instrumenta Dei ; et denique Deum efficaciter procurare, ut homines cadant : sed opera impiorum non posse dici, neque esse peccata, qua parte a Dei mandato, providentia vel motione pro¬ cedunt : sed ea solum ex parte qua sunt ipso¬ rum instrumentorum, id est, hominum im¬ piorum opera. Cur autem mala sit voluntas hominis, quce flagitium eligit, non autem sit mala voluntas Dei, quce idem flagitium elegi voluit : sive cur in eodem opere, bona sit voluntas Dei, mala voluntas hominis, tres causas reddunt. Una est, quia natura humana vitio primi hominis tota corrupta est, sed ista ratio (quam alio loco copiosus refutabimus) non solvit qumstionem. Nam peccatum primum primi hominis, ut etiam peccatum primum Satanae, non ortum duxit ex aliqua praeex¬ istente natura; corruptione, ut adversarii confitentur. Ex quo etiam refellitur alia ra¬ tio, quae afferri posset, cur Deus non sit au¬ ctor peccati, quia videlicet non velit pecca¬ tum ut culpam, sed ut poenam alterius pec¬ cati. Nam ista ratio non potest habere locum in primo peccato primi hominis, et angeli, quod cum fuerit reimum, nullius praeceden¬ tis peccati poena esse potuit. Quaerimus igitur cur in eodem opere mala fuerit voluntas primi hominis ante natura; humanae depravationem, et ante alium la¬ psum, Dei autem voluntas non fuerit mala. Ergo prima illa ratione omissa secundam adhibent, quam etiam multis in locis usque ad nauseam repetunt. Scribunt enim Dei vo¬ luntatem esse bonam, dum ad flagitia impel¬ lit, vel ea jubet, aj*t procurat, aut per impios, tamquam per sua qusedam instrumenta per¬ ficit, quia bonum finem Deus propositum habet. Vult enim homines peccare, ut habeat quos juste damnet ct quorum liberaliter mi¬ sereatur, ut ea ratione justitiae, misericordias¬ que suse gloriam manifestet. Porro impiorum voluntatem esse malam, quia in illo ipso opere, quod imperante, im¬ pellente, et movente Deo faciunt, malum fi¬ nem spectant, videlicet ut libidinem suam expleant, non ut gloria; Dei serviant. Hanc rationem reddit Zwinglius in serm. de provi¬ dentia cap. G : « Quod, inquit, Deus facit, libere facit, alienus ab omni affectu noxio, igitur et absque peccato, ut adulterium Da- vid, quod ad auctorem Deum pertinet, non magis Deo sit peccatum, quam cum taurus totum armentum inscendit, et implet, etc. » Eamdem rationem reddit Calvinus lib. i. Institut. cap. 17. §. 3. et in lib. de eeterna CAPUT 1Y. 2.17 Dei praedestinatione pag. 946. et in instruet, adversus Libertinos cap. 14. et Beza in re¬ sponsione ad Sebastianum Castalionem,in re¬ futatione secundae calumniae, et in aphori- smis, ut supra citavimus. Sed hanc eorum doctrinam, quae totius erroris fundamentum est, nullo negotio solidissime possumus re¬ futare. Primum enim doctrina Apostolica est, non esse facienda mala, ut veniant bona, Rom. .3. non igitur bona intentio, et finis bonus animo conceptus id efficere potest, ut liceat ea facere, quae per se intrinsece, et ex ob¬ jecto mala sunt. Alioqui reprehendi non de¬ beret, qui causa eleemosynae furtum faceret : neque is, qui privata auctoritate hominem interficeret, ne is exemplo, aut facto suo aliis noceret : neque ille, qui suscipiendae prolis gratia committeret adulterium. Siqui¬ dem isti omnes bonum finem spectarent. Quod si hominum furta, homicidia, adulte¬ ria vere peccata sunt, et homines eorum scelerum auctores justissime puniuntur, ta¬ metsi bona intentione facta esse, re vera di¬ cantur, et sint : cur Deuseorumdem operum auctor ob solam intentionem bonam excu¬ sandus erit? fallitur igitur adversarius, et quia mala intentio vitiat opus alioqui bonum ; perperam ipse colligit opera mala ex inten¬ tione bona justificari. Nam opus bonum na¬ scitur ex integra causa, malum autem ex quo¬ vis defectu oriri potest. Id quod nemo igno¬ rat qui vel prima moralis philosophiae rudi¬ menta didicerit. Deinde quaeram ab ad versa ric^ utrum mala, hominis intentio sit a Deo, nec ne. Nam si malae intentionis est auctor Deus, sequitur omnino peccati auctorem esse Deum. Quo¬ modo enim non est auctor peccati, qui non solum actionis malae auctor est, sed etiam ipsius intentionis malae, unde habet actio, Calvino, et Beza doctoribus, ut sit mala, et peccatum proprie nominetur ? Porro Deum intentionis malae auctorem esse, negare non possunt adversarii, nisi secum ipsi manifeste pugnare velint. Nam si Deus, ut ipsi volunt, impellit homines ad peccatum, et peccatum non est sine mala intentione, certe impellit etiam ad malam intentionem. Et si ab aeter¬ nitate decrevit ad misericordiam, et justi¬ tiam suam ostendendam, ut homo peccaret, et peccatum non est peccatum, nisi mala intentione fiat, neque potest ex misericordia vere remitti, aut ex justitia vere puniri, nisi vere peccatum sit, hoc est, nisi mala inten¬ tione fiat, manifeste sequitur, Deum ab aeternitate voluisse, et statuisse, ut homo mala intentione operaretur, et eo modo ca¬ deret. Et quia decretum Dei non debet esse incertum, neque ab arbitrio creaturae pende¬ re, oportuit ipsum Deum efficaciter procu¬ rare, ut homo mala intentione operaretur, et non minus intentionis malae, quam ipsius operis auctorem esse. Tertia ratio propria est Zvinglio, qui ideo tradit malam esse hominis voluntatem in opere malo, Dei non malam, quia Deo non est posita lex, homini autem posita est, pro¬ inde in eodem opere voluntas hominis trans¬ greditur legem, et mala est, Dei voluntas non transgreditur, et mala non est. Sic enim loquitur in eodem sermone de providentia, cap. 6 : « Quod, inquit, Deus facit non est peccatum, quia non est contra legem, illi enim non est lex posita, utpote justo, nain justis non ponitur lex, juxta Pauli sententiam. Unum igitur, atque idem facinus, puta adulterium, aut homicidium, quantum Dei est auctoris, motoris, ac impulsoris, opus est, crimen non est, quantum autem hominis est, crimen ac scelus est. Ille enim lege non tenetur, hic autem lege etiam damnatur. » Et supra cap. v : « Cum, inquit, Deus Angelum, vel homi¬ nem transgressorem facit, ipse tamen non transgreditur, ut qui contra legem non ve¬ niat. Non est igitur peccatum quod Deus fecit, sed homini, atque Angelo est, illos enim lex premit, atque accusat. Deo cum creaturis suis libere licet agere, non minus quam pa- trifamiliae cum rebus suis, quam figulo cum luto. Utcumque igitur creaturam huc im¬ pellat, aut illuc agat, tantum abest ut peccet, ut haec citra insigne bonum non faciat, cum interim homo, cui lex est prsefixa, etiam cum impellitur, peccet, adversus enim legem ope¬ ratur. » Haec ille. Sed hsec Zwinglii doctrina sibi ipsa repug¬ nat, et evidentissime refutatur. Primum, si Deus impellit hominem ad adulterium (ut ipse dicit) quemadmodum artifex instru¬ mentum ad opus; vult igitur ut homo sibi pareat in adulterio perpetrando, quemad¬ modum vult artifex ut sibi pareat instru¬ mentum in opere faciendo ; proinde ille im¬ pulsus Dei est prseceptum, et lex, quam homo implere tenetur, ut instrumentum te¬ netur obsequi artifici, a quo movetur. Ergo homo impulsus a Deo, adulterium committens praevaricatur, et non praevaricatur Dei legem; peccat, et non peccat. Et Deus illum impellens 258 LIBEM II. vult eum servare, et non servare legem, pec¬ care, et non peccare. Deinde, licet Deo non sit lex posita ab aliquo superiore legislatore, tamen sua sa¬ pientia ipsi est lex, et (ut ipse Zwinglius ibi¬ dem docet) quod nobis est lex, Deo est inge¬ nium, et natura. Non minus ergo tenetur Deus, non repugnare ingenio, sapientiae, et naturae suae, quam teneantur homines non repugnare legi Dei. Quare si Deus impelleret homines ad ea, quae sunt contraria legi aeternae, ac proinde ingenio, et sapientiae Dei, quale est adulterium, mala esset ejus volunlas, quippe quae repugnaret regulae rectae divinae sapientiae, et Deus seipsum negaret, quod nullo modo fieri potest, ut Apostolus ait. Tertio, Deo non est lex posita ex sententia Zwinglii, quomodo justo non est lex posita. At justo non est lex posita, quae cum terreat, quia sponte sua legem servat ; non autem quia non peccet, si forte contra legem aliquid faciat. Nam Ezech. xvm. Dominus testatur, justum plane peccaturum, et damnandum, si fecerit ea, quae sunt lege prohibita. Igitur eodem modo Deo non est lex posita, quia sponte sua, imo ex natura sua semper con¬ formis est voluntas ejus sapientiae ipsius ; non quod liceat Deo seipsum negare, ad ea ho¬ mines impellendo, quae repugnant aeternae legi, quae est ipsa Dei infinita ratio, et sa¬ pientia. Quarto, non potest ullo modo fieri , ut homo Deo impellente faciat quod lege Dei prohibitum est, et tamen Deus impellens non sit auctor criminis, sed operis. Nam quid aliud Ost crimen, nisi patratio operis, lege Dei prohibiti? Quomodo igitur Deus non est auctor criminis si est auctor operis lege di¬ vina prohibiti ? et quomodo Zwinglius dicit a Deo factum esse hominem, et Angelum trans¬ gressorem legis, si Deus non est auctor transgressionis, sed operis tantum ? Omitto hic quanta sit impietas docere, a Deo puniri homines, quia faciant ea, quae Deus ipse cogit ut faciant. Habemus igitur ex Zwinglii, Calvini, et Bezae sententia rectissime colligi, Deum vere ac proprie auctorem esse peccati, tametsi ipsi verbo id negent.