Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book II: That God Is Not the Author of Sin
Chapter 6: That from the doctrine of Calvin, Zwingli, Beza, and the like it is gathered that God alone truly sins
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book II. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
We have shown thus far that from the doctrine of Zwingli, Calvin, and Beza it follows that God is the author of all the sins which are perpetrated by men, and that God himself also truly sins. Now it is to be demonstrated that God alone (by the judgment of the same men) so sins that men ought to be judged immune from sin. And I shall use this reasoning: no one sins in that which he cannot avoid; our first parents in the state of innocence could not avoid the evil actions; therefore our first parents did not sin in the evil actions. And if the first parents, at the time when they were endowed with the grace of God and free choice, could not avoid sin, and thereby did not sin even though they acted ill, certainly much less can men after Adam's sin avoid evil actions — since, by the judgment of the adversaries, they lack the grace of God and free choice; and hence they do not sin, even though they slide down into every kind of crimes and outrages.
That major — no one sins in that which he cannot avoid — is most certain. For as St. Augustine says, book On True Religion, chapter 14: “It is so manifest that that is not sin which is not voluntary, that from this no fewness of the learned, no crowd of the unlearned, dissents.” Nor indeed ought the voluntary in that place to be distinguished against coaction, but against necessity. For a little below, the same Augustine, explaining what it is to do well or ill by the will: “God judged,” says he, “that his servants would be better if they served him freely — which could in no way be, if they served not by will, but by necessity.” And at the end of the chapter: “And as to what man is said to have been persuaded to by the perverse angel, to this too, assuredly, he consented by will. For if he had done it by necessity, he would be held by no crime of sin.” Thus he. Where thou seest that the first man could not have been held by crime if he had sinned by necessity — that is, could not have avoided the sin. Which the same St. Augustine also affirms in the book On Rebuke and Grace — a book which he wrote as an old man, the Pelagian heresy having already arisen (lest perchance Calvin think the book On True Religion to be contemned, because it was written by Augustine as a young man). In the book On Rebuke and Grace, then, chapter 11, St. Augustine speaks thus of Adam: “Then, therefore, God had given man a good will; for in it he had made him, who had made him upright. He had given the help without which he could not remain in it though he willed; but that he should will, he had left in his free choice. He could therefore remain if he would, because he had given the help through which he could, and without which he could not, perseveringly hold the good which he willed. But because he would not remain, assuredly the fault is his — whose the merit would have been, if he had willed to remain.” And presently: “But if this help had been wanting, whether to the Angel or to man, as soon as they were made — since their nature had not been made such that it could remain, if it willed, without the divine help — they would assuredly not have fallen by their own fault; for the help would have been wanting without which they could not remain.” Thus he. And so, by St. Augustine's judgment, the Angel and the first man did not fall by their own fault, if they could not avoid the fall. Nor can that be answered (which Calvin and Beza are wont to answer) — namely, that they who cannot avoid sin nevertheless truly sin, because they will to sin. For they who cannot avoid sin cannot not will to sin; because, if they could not will, they could also not sin, since sin is in the will; but they who cannot not will to sin have not the help by which they could remain in a good will; and of these St. Augustine pronounces that they fall not by their own fault, to whom such help was denied.
And now the minor of the first argument — namely, that our first parents in the state of innocence could not avoid sin — is affirmed by the adversaries in express words. For, as we cited above in the fourth chapter, these are Zwingli's words, chapter 6 on providence: “But, thou wilt say, man was compelled to sin. I allow, say I, that he was compelled.” Thus he. And, as we recited in the third chapter, these are Calvin's words, book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 23, §7: “A horrible decree indeed, I confess; yet no one can deny that God foreknew what end man was to have before he founded him, and therefore foreknew it because he had so ordained by his decree.” Where Calvin teaches that God, from his sole will, before he foresaw the determination of the first man's free choice, decreed the fall of man; and since no one can resist the will of God, it follows that the first man could not escape that fall. Which same Calvin acknowledges when he subjoins, §9: “They will have the reprobate held excusable in sinning, because they cannot escape the necessity of sinning — above all since such necessity is cast upon them by the ordination of God. But we deny that they are thereby duly excused, since to the ordination of God, by which they complain that they were destined to destruction, its own equity stands firm — unknown indeed to us, but most certain to him.” Where Calvin does not deny that man necessarily sins, but says he is inexcusable, because God has his own reason why he cast upon man the necessity of sinning. But we in this place strive to prove nothing else than that the first man — as also all the rest, by Calvin's judgment — could not avoid sin; and since he concedes this, we desire nothing further. Further, the same Calvin, in the book on the eternal predestination of God, page 906, speaks thus of the same matter: “For the just damnation of man it was enough that, when he had been placed in the way of salvation, he fell thence of his own accord. But it could not have been done otherwise. What then? Is the fault thereby set free, which resides wholly in his will?” In which place he again confesses that the first man could not avoid the sin, but will have him inexcusable because the fault resides in his will — that is, because he willed to sin, and sinned of his own accord, though he could not not will to sin. Which Beza also teaches, in the response to Castellio on the eternal predestination of God, when he says: “The origin of the vice is to be sought in the spontaneous motion of the instruments; whereby it comes to pass that God justly decreed what they unjustly did. But, thou wilt say, they could not resist the will of God. I confess it; but as they could not, so also they would not. But they could not will otherwise. I confess it, as to the event and the energeia; but the will of Adam was nevertheless not coacted.” By which words both Calvin and Beza most openly confess that Adam could not not will to sin, and therefore necessarily sinned — though he willed and sinned not coactedly, but of his own accord. Which confession of theirs, though it abstain from the word coaction, from which Zwingli did not abstain, is yet enough for us to prove the minor of the argument which we proposed at the beginning; for we assumed only this: that our first parents could not avoid the sin.
And what Calvin and Beza say — that the first man sinned necessarily indeed, yet of his own accord — helps them nothing. For we have already taught from Augustine that the first parents, if they sinned by necessity, are held by no crime of fault; and that, if they had not the help by which they could remain in a good will — that is, by which they could not will to sin — they fell not by their own fault. Otherwise, if it sufficed for sinning to will something of one's own accord, and it were not required not to will necessarily, there would be no reason why boys, and the mad, and the very beasts too, should not sin when they wound a man or destroy something of great price: for they do all these things of their own accord, and of their own accord, not coactedly, desire the things which they cannot not do, or not desire. We have, then, what we proposed at the beginning: that from the doctrine of Zwingli, Calvin, and Beza it is rightly gathered that God is the author of sin; that he himself also sins; and that he alone properly and truly sins. Though of this — that man is not guilty of fault if he sins necessarily — we shall discourse more copiously in the treatise on free choice.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT VI. Ex doctrina Calvini, Zivinglii, Bezse, et si¬ milium colligi, Deum solum vere peccare , non autem homines. Ostendimus hactenus, sequi ex doctrina Zwinglii, Calvini, etBezai, Deum esse aucto¬ rem omnium peccatorum, quse ab homini¬ bus perpetrantur, et ipsum etiam Deum vere peccare. Nuuc demonstrandum est, solum Deum (ex sententia eorumdem) ita peccare, ut homines a peccato immunes judicari de¬ beant. Utar autem hae ratiocinatione : Nemo peccat in eo quod vitare non potest : primi parentes nostri in statu innocentiae, actiones malas vitare non potuerunt : igitur primi parentes nostri in actionibus malis non pec¬ carunt. Quod si primi parentes quo tempore gratia Dei, et libero arbitrio praediti erant, peccatum vitare non poterant, ac per hoc non peccabant etiamsi male agerent ; certe multo minus possunt homines post Adee pec¬ catum malas actiones vitare ; cum gratia Dei, et libero arbitrio, ex adversariorum senten¬ tia carcant, ac proinde non peccant, etiamsi in omnia scelerum, et flagitiorum genera dilabantur. Propositio illa : Nemo peccat in eo, quod vitare non potest, certissima est. Nam ut S. Augustinus ait lib. de vera religione cap. 14 : « Ita manifestum est, peccatum non esse, quod non est voluntarium, ut nulla hinc Doctorum paucitas, nulla indoctorum turba dissentiat. » Neque vero debet eo loco voluntarium distingui contra coactionem , sed contra necessitatem. Nam paulo infra explicans idem Augustinus, quid sit volun¬ tate bene facere, aut male : « Tales, inquit, servos suos meliores esse Deus judicavit, si ei servirent liberaliter, quod nullo modo fie¬ ri posset, si non voluntate, sed necessitate servirent. » Et in fine capitis : « Quod au¬ tem, inquit, homini a perverso angelo per¬ suasum dicitur, etiam ad hoc utique volun¬ tate consensit. Nam si necessitate id fecisset nullo peccati crimine teneretur. » Hsec ille. Ubi vides, primum hominem non potuisse teneri crimine, si necessitate peccasset, id est, peccatum vitare non potuisset. Quod etiam affirmat idem S. Augustinus in libro de correptione et gratia, quem librum senex conscripsit exorta jam antea haeresi Pela- giana (ne forte Calvinus librum de vera reli¬ gione contemnendum censeat, quod ab Au¬ gustino juvene scriptus fuerit) in libro igitur de correptione et gratia, cap. 11, sic loqui¬ tur S. Augustinus de Adamo : « Tunc ergo dederat homini Deus bonam voluntatem : in illa quippe eum fecerat, qui fecerat rectum, dederat adjutorium, sine quo in ea non pos¬ set permanere, si vellet ; ut autem vellet, in ejus reliquerat libero arbitrio. Posset ergo permanere si vellet, quia dederat adjuto¬ rium, per quod posset, et sine quo non pos¬ set perseveranter bonum tenere, quod vel¬ let. Sed quia noluit permanere, profecto ejus culpa est, cujus meritum fuisset, si per¬ manere voluisset. » Et mox : « Si autem hoc adjutorium, vel Angelo, vel homini, quam primum facti sunt, defuisset, quoniam non talis natura facta erat, ut sine divino adjuto¬ rio posset manere si vellet, non utique sua culpa cecidissent. Adjutorium quippe defuis¬ set, sine quo manere non possent. » Ila3c ille. Itaque ex sententia S. Augustini, An¬ gelus, et primus homo non sua culpa ceci¬ derunt, si casum vitare non potuerunt. Neque id responderi potest (quod Calvi- 262 Liti EU II. nus et Bczn solent) videlicet, eos qui non possunt vitare peccatum, vere tamen pecca¬ re, quia volunt peccare. Nam qui non pos¬ sunt vitare peccatum, non possunt non velle peccare, quia si possent non velle; possent etiam non peccare, cum in voluntate pecca¬ tum sit : qui autem non possunt non velle peccare, non habent adjutorium, quo in bo¬ na voluntate manere possint. De his autem pronuntiat S. Augustinus, eos non sua cul¬ pa cadere, quibus tale adjutorium fuerit de¬ negatum. Jam vero Assumptio primi argumenti, vi¬ delicet, primos parentes nostros in statu in¬ nocentiae non potuisse vitare peccatum, di¬ sertis verbis ab adversariis affirmatur. Nam ut supra capite quarto citavimus, haec sunt verba Zwinglii cap. 6. de providentia : « At, inquies, coactus est homo ad peccandum, permitto, inquam, coactum esse. » Haec ille. Et ut in 3. cap. recitavimus, haec sunt verba Calvini lib. m. Instit. cap. 23. §. 7 : « De¬ cretum quidem horribile, fateor, inficiari tamen nemo potest, quin praesciverit Deus, quem exitum esset habiturus homo, ante¬ quam ipsum conderet, et ideo praesciverit, quia decreto suo sic ordinaverat. » Ubi do¬ cet Calvinus Deum ex sua sola voluntate, antequam determinationem liberi arbitrii primi hominis praevideret, decrevisse homi¬ nis lapsum, et quia Dei voluntati nemo resi¬ stere potest, sequitur, non potuisse primum hominem effugere lapsum illum. Quod idem Calvinus agnoscit cum subjungit §. 9 : « Ex¬ cusabiles peccando haberi volunt reprobi, quia evadere nequeunt peccandi necessita¬ tem : praesertim cum ex Dei ordinatione sibi injiciatur ejusmodi necessitas: Nos vero inde negamus rite excusari, quandoquidem Dei ordinationi, qua se exitio destinatos conque¬ runtur, sua constet aequitas, nobis quidem incognita, sed illi certissima. » Ubi non ne¬ gat Calvinus, hominem necessario peccare, sed dicit esse inexcusabilem, quia Deo sua constat ratio, cur homini peccandi necessita¬ tem injecerit. Nos vero hoc loco nihil aliud probare con¬ tendimus, nisi primum hominem, ut etiam caeteros omnes ex Calvini sententia pecca¬ tum vitare non potuisse. Quod cum ille con¬ cedat, nihil desideramus amplius. Porro idem Calvinus in lib. de aeterna Dei praede¬ stinat. pag. 906. de re eadem sic loquitur : « Ad justam hominis damnationem satis erat in via salutis cum esset collocatus , inde sponte excidisse. At fieri aditer non potuit. Quid tum? an ideo culpa liberatur, quae tota in ejus voluntate residet? Quo loco rursum fatetur, primum hominem non potuisse vita¬ re peccatum, sed ideo vult, eum esse inex¬ cusabilem, quia culpa in ejus voluntate resi¬ deat, id est, quia peccare voluerit, et sponte peccaverit, tametsi non potuerit non velle peccare. Quod etiam docet Beza in responsioue ad Castilionem de aeterna Dei praedestinatione, cum ait : Quaerenda est vitii origo in instru¬ mentorum spontaneo motu. Quo fit ut Deus juste decreverit, quod illi injuste fecerunt. At enim dices, non potuerunt resistere Dei voluntati : fateor ; sed sicut non potuerunt, ita etiam noluerunt. Verum non poterant aliter velle, fateor quoad eventum, et ivi p- ysiav, sed voluntas tamen Adami coacta non fuit. » Quibus verbis tum Calvinus, tum Beza apertissime confitentur non potuisse Ada- mum non velle peccare, et ideo necessario peccasse; tametsi non coacte, sed sponte vo¬ luerit, et peccaverit. Qua3 ipsorum confes¬ sio, quamvis abstineat a vocabulo coactionis a quo Zwinglius non abstinuit, tamen satis nobis est ad probandam assumptionem argu¬ menti, quod initio proposuimus. Id enim so¬ lum assumpsimus, primos parentes nostros non potuisse vitare peccatum. Quod autem Calvinus, et Beza dicunt, pri¬ mum hominem necessario quidem, sed ta¬ men sponte peccasse, nihil eos juvat. Jam enim ex Augustino docuimus, primos pa¬ rentes, si necessitate peccarunt, nullo culpae crimine detineri, et si non habuerunt adju¬ torium, quo possent permanere in bona vo¬ luntate, id est, quo possent non velle peccare, non sua culpa cecidisse. Alioqui si sufficeret ad peccandum, sponte aliquid velle, et non requireretur, non necessario velle, nulla es¬ set ratio cur pueri, atque amentes, et ipsa; etiam bestiae non peccarent, cum hominem laedunt, aut aliquid magni pretii destruunt. Agunt enim ista omnia sponte, et sponte ap¬ petunt, non coacte, ea qua? non possunt non agere, vel r.on appetere. Habemus igitur quod initio proposuimus, ex doctrina Zwinglii, Calvini et Bezae, recte colligi Deum esse peccati auctorem, ipsum etiam peccare, et solum ipsum proprie, ac vere peccare. Quamquam de eo, quod homo non sit reus culpae, si necessario peccat, in tractatu de libero arbitrio copiosius dissere¬ mus. CAPUT VII. 203