Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book II: That God Is Not the Author of Sin
Chapter 5: That from the judgment of Zwingli, Calvin, and Beza it follows that God truly and properly sins
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book II. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
It follows now that we prove that God, by the judgment of the adversaries, is not only the author of sin, but truly and properly sins — which is a horrible blasphemy, and one which not even the Libertines themselves dare freely to utter. It must be known, then, that for this — that someone truly and properly sin — it is not required that he will the sin under the notion of sin, that is, choose the very baseness and malice of the sin; but that he be the cause of the evil action insofar as from that action that malice follows. For there is no one who wills evil under the notion of evil, since evil is outside the object of the will, and has nothing whereby it can be desired or chosen. And so all criminals, in their sins, look not to the baseness itself of the sin, but to some good, as gain or pleasure; but they are said truly and properly to sin because they seek the gain or the pleasure through an action to which baseness is annexed, and they are themselves the cause of that action — not in any way whatever, but in such wise that from that action the baseness necessarily follows; for hence it comes that the baseness of the sin is by right and desert attributed to them.
Further, three things are required that baseness follow upon some action, and thereby three things are required that someone can be said truly and properly to sin. The first is that the action be repugnant to a law — whether positive or natural, temporal or eternal. For, as we taught in the book above from Scripture and the Fathers, sin is nothing else than the transgression of the law; and it is beyond controversy that an action is not evil which is repugnant to no law; hence it ought also to be beyond controversy, what we placed first: that it is required, in an action upon which baseness follows, that it be repugnant to some law. The second is that that action be effected by a free cause. For this is the sole reason why brute animals, boys, fools, sleepers do not sin, though they do things which otherwise fight most openly with the rule of right reason — as if they kill a man, or utter something blasphemous (for parrots and crows are at times trained to speak), or basely defile sacred things, or perpetrate something else of the same kind. The third thing which is demanded for the true notion of sin is that he who does the action fighting with the law not only do it freely, but also do it as a particular cause — so that the action is such in species because it proceeds from such a cause. For since the universal cause is limited and determined by the particular cause, and is of itself indifferent to this action and to that, it cannot rightly be said that this action is such in species because it is from the universal cause, but only because it is from such a particular cause. And since that deformity which is discerned in sin follows the action as it is such in species, therefore that deformity cannot properly be referred to the universal cause, but only to the particular. Certainly, when monsters arise, whether among men or among brute animals, no one says that the cause of the monstrosity — which is a certain sin of nature — is to be referred to the heaven, or another universal cause, but only to the proximate causes; for the heaven by its influence would no more produce a man than a horse or a plant — and, if a man, no more this one than that — unless it were determined by a particular cause. Hence the cause of the monstrosity which is discerned in a man is the other man who begot that man, not the heaven, which furnished an influence of such a kind that with it a perfect man could have been begotten, had there not been an impediment in the proximate cause.
Now then, if God concur with man to that action which is sin only as a universal cause, it will easily be able to be understood how he is both the cause of that action and not the cause of the sin. For he will truly be the cause of the action, because he will truly concur to producing the substance, or entity (so to speak), of that action; and yet he will not be the cause of the sin, because he will concur by a certain universal influence, indifferent to this action and to its contrary; and thereby the action will not be such in species because it comes forth from God, but because from man; and the whole fault will be the man's, who willed to abuse the concourse of God for this action, when he could have used it well for another. For which reason also God is not called the cause of the sin which is committed by the free will of man, though he himself gave man the free will and preserves it — because, namely, man can use the free will well if he will, and God gave it to him for this, that he might use it well, not that he might abuse it to his own destruction and the injury of the giver. But if God concur to those actions which are evil not only as a universal cause, but also, as a particular cause, intend them as they are such in species, and command them, or impel man to them, or through men, as through instruments, effect those actions in species, it will in no way be able to be understood how God himself does not sin. For men are said to sin — and truly and properly, in very fact, by the consensus of all, do sin — for no other cause than that they are free and particular causes of those actions which fight with reason and the eternal law; for that deformity and malice in which the notion of sin properly consists necessarily follows upon such actions, as was demonstrated above. And now, Calvin and Zwingli do not deny that God concurs to certain actions which fight with the eternal law and are from their object evil; nor do they deny this either — that God works all things freely, and (as the Apostle speaks) according to the counsel of his will. In which two things we do not dissent from them; but about that third head, which we said is required for sinning, is the whole controversy. For we say that God concurs to those actions only as a universal cause, by a certain influence indifferent as much to them as to their contraries; and moreover, if the question be not of the physical but of the moral cause, we say that those actions in species are not intended by God, nor commanded, but contrariwise disapproved, forbidden, condemned; and that therefore their malice and baseness can in no way be referred to God. But the adversaries in more than one place teach that God not only concurs to those actions as a universal cause, but also wills and commands them as they are such in species, and properly effects them through his instruments, and thereby is the particular cause, both moral and physical — which certainly is nothing else than truly and properly to sin. Hear Calvin, book 2 of the Institutes, chapter 4, §2: “I omit here,” says he, “the universal motion of God, whence all creatures, as they are sustained, so draw their efficacy of doing anything. I speak only of that special action which appears in each single crime. We see therefore that it is not absurd that the same crime be assigned to God, to Satan, to man.” Thus he. Where thou seest how Calvin will have the very crime which is perpetrated by Satan or by man to be assigned also to God, whose instruments Satan and man are — because God cooperates with Satan or with man not by a general influence only, but himself also intends that special action which is discerned in the crime, and bends to it the will of man and of Satan, and finally himself properly does it. The same also, book 1 of the Institutes, chapter 18, §2, where he explains how the Scriptures teach that men are blinded and deceived, says that God not only suffers Satan to deceive men, but that God himself works within in their minds, and that from God himself flows the efficacy of error. For these are his words: “Certainly, unless he worked within in the minds of men, it would not have been rightly said that he takes away the lip from the truthful.” And below: “The same Satan also is said to blind the minds of unbelievers; but whence this, save that from God himself flows the efficacy of error?” Thus he. And so, as the holy Fathers — Augustine, tractate 26 on John, and book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 8, and Gregory, book 11 of the Morals, chapter 5 [al. 9], and others — teach that preachers exhort outwardly in vain unless God work within, and that therefore the conversion of the sinner is the work of God: so Calvin teaches that Satan strives in vain to blind and deceive unless God work within, and that therefore the efficacy of error flows from God himself; and that, as in the conversion of the sinner it is God who properly illuminates and converts, so in the perversion of the just it is God who properly seduces and perverts. But to illuminate and convert is a good work, and congruent with right reason; and contrariwise to seduce and pervert is an evil work, and abhorrent from right reason; therefore, as God does well by illuminating and converting, so he does ill, and sins, by seducing and perverting. Zwingli, in the sermon on providence, chapter 5, says that injustice was necessary, that justice might be able to be known; and in chapter 6 he says that a lie was necessary, that truth might be known, and that therefore God impelled the Angel and man to the lie and to injustice. Therefore, by Zwingli's judgment, God willed, and properly intended in particular, the action of the lie and of injustice; and thereby his will was evil, and he manifestly sinned. Further, Beza, in aphorism 22, teaches that God not only stirs and impels the instruments to those actions which are evil, and sins with respect to the instruments, but even creates the instruments themselves — that is, men — to this end, that they accomplish those actions intended and decreed by him from all eternity. From which doctrine of Beza it is manifest that the evil actions, as they are such in species, are intended by God, and are to be attributed to him as the true and proper and principal cause; from which it follows (as is evident from what has now been said) that God, by Beza's judgment, truly and properly sins.
But besides this argument, the same is gathered from what we said in the chapter above. For if we rightly gather, from the judgment of the adversaries, that God is truly and properly the author of the sins which are done by us, certainly we can also rightly gather that God truly and properly sins. For he who is to another the author that he sin, straightway himself also sins. For it is no more repugnant to the eternal law to will to lie, or fornicate, or punish the innocent, than to will to bring it about that another lie, or fornicate, or punish the innocent. And so in every commonwealth he is wont to be punished no less who did the murder than he who commanded that it be done; but none is punished save he who sins; therefore, by the consensus of all, he who commands a sin himself also sins. Nor does that similitude of the sun and the carcass satisfy, which Calvin is wont to adduce to show that God does not sin, though he is the cause why others sin — which similitude he judged so apt and fitted for illustrating the matter that he repeated it in many places, as book 1 of the Institutes, chapter 17, §5, in the Instruction against the Libertines, chapter 14, and in the epistle against a certain Franciscan Libertine. And this is the similitude, which I shall report in his words from book 1 of the Institutes: “And whence, I pray, the stench in a carcass which has been both putrefied and laid open by the heat of the sun? All see that it is stirred up by the rays of the sun; yet no one on that account says that the rays stink. So, since the matter and fault of the evil resides in the evil man, what reason is there that God should be thought to contract any defilement, if he uses his ministry at his own pleasure?” Thus he. But this similitude sins in three things. First, that before the action of the sun there is posited a carcass — that is, a body already corrupted; for from a sound body the rays of the sun could not have stirred up a stench. But God is affirmed by the adversaries to have stirred up sin in the will of the first man while it was still whole, and altogether sound and innocent. Next, the sun is a universal cause, and intends not corruption but heating; which heating is of itself indifferent to producing various effects, and is limited by particular causes and determined to effecting this rather than that. And so, why from a carcass heated a stench is stirred up, while from an apple or a spice likewise heated a fragrance arises, the cause is to be referred not to the sun, but to the particular causes. But God, as we taught above, concurs to the evil actions which are done by men not only as a universal cause, but also, by the doctrine of Calvin and Beza, as a particular one: for God intends them in particular, commands them, and accomplishes them through human wills as through his instruments. Finally, the sun, even if it were a particular cause, would yet not be corrupted by corrupting other things, because it does not act by free will, nor through any immanent action, but through an action passing over into another, and necessary. But he who by free will makes another sin, himself also straightway sins; nor can he putrefy another with the corruption of sin unless at the same time he himself also putrefy. For that will by which he wills another to sin is in himself, not in the other; and since it is evil — seeing that it is freely borne toward an object not congruent with right reason — it follows that he himself also is evil, and sins.
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CAPUT V. Ex Zivinrjlii, Calvini, et Bezse sententia sequi , Deum vere, ac proprie peccare. Sequitur nunc, ut probemus, Deum ex sententia adversariorum, non solum esse pec¬ cati auctorem, sed vere, ac proprie peccare ; quae est blasphemia horribilis, et quam ne ipsi quidem Libertini libere proferre audent. Sciendum est igitur, ad hoc, ut aliquis vere, ac proprie peccet, non id requiri, ut is velit peccatum sub ratione peccati, id est, eligat ipsam peccati turpitudinem, atque malitiam, sed ut sit causa actionis malae, quatenus ex ipsa actione consequitur ea malitia. Nullus enim est, qui velit malum sub ratione mali, cum malum sit extra objectum voluntatis, et nihil habeat unde appeti, eligive possit. Ita¬ que facinorosi omnes in peccatis, non ipsam peccati turpitudinem, sed bonum aliquod, ut lucrum, aut voluptatem spectant : sed ideo vere ac proprie peccare dicuntur, quia lu¬ crum, aut voluptatem quaerunt per actionem, cui est annexa turpitudo, et ejus actionis ipsi causa sunt, non quocumque modo, sed ut ex illa actione necessario sequitur turpitudo. Hinc enim fit, ut peccati turpitudo ipsis jure, ac merito tribuatur. Porro tria requiruntur ut ad actionem ali¬ quam turpitudo sequatur, ac per hoc tria re¬ quiruntur, ut aliquis vere ac proprie peccare 'dici possit, trimum est, ut actio repugnet legi sive positivae, sive naturali, sive tempo¬ rali, sive aeternae. Nam ut libro superiore do¬ cuimus ex Scriptura, et Patribus, nihil est aliud peccatum, nisi praevaricatio legis. De¬ nique extra controversiam est, actionem non esse malam, quae nulli legi repugnet. Proinde extra controversiam etiam esse debet, quod primo loco posuimus, requiri in actione, ad quam sequitur turpitudo, ut alicui legi repug¬ net. Alterum est, ut ea actio a causa libera efficiatur. Haec enim sola ratio est, cur ani¬ mantia bruta, pueri, stulti, dormientes, non peccent quamvis ea faciant, quae alioqui cum regula rectae rationis apertissime pugnant, ut si hominem interimant, autblasphemum ali¬ quid proferant (nam psittaci, et corui inter¬ dum ad loquendum assuefiunt) aut res sacras turpiter foedent, aut aliquid aliud ejusdem generis perpetrent. CAPUT Y. 959 Tertium, quod ad veram peccati rationem exigitur est, ut, qui actionem cum lege pug¬ nantem facit, non solum libere faciat, sed etiam faciat ut causa particularis, ita ut actio talis sit in specie, quia a tali causa procedit ; quia enim causa universalis limitatur, ac determinatur a causa particulari, et ex se in¬ differens est ad hanc actionem, et ad illam, non potest recte dici hanc actionem esse talem in specie, quia est a causa universali, sed solum quia esse a tali causa particulari. Et quoniam deformitas illa, qua} cernitur in peccato, consequitur actionem, ut est talis in specie, ideo non potest ea deformitas in cau¬ sam universalem, sed solum in particularem proprie referri. Certe cum oriuntur monstra sive in hominibus, sive in animantibus bru¬ tis, nemo dicit causam monstrositatis, qua} est quoddam natur te peccatum, referendam esse in coelum, aut aliam causam univer¬ salem, sed solum in causas propinquas, coe¬ lum enim influxu suo non magis produceret hominem, quam equum, aut plantam, et si hominem non magis istum, quam illum, nisi a causa particulari determinaretur. Proinde monstrositatis, quse in homine cernitur, causa est alter homo, qui hominem illum genuit, non coelum, quod influxum praestitit ejus¬ modi, ut cum eo perfectus homo gigni po¬ tuisset, nisi in causa proxima impedimentum extitisset. Jam igitur, si Deus concurrat cum homine ad actionem illam, quse peccatum est, solum ut causa universalis, facile poterit intelligi quomodo et actionis illius causa sit, et causa peccati non sit. Erit enim vere causa actionis, quia vere concurret ad substantiam, sive en- titatem (ut sic loquamur) actionis illius pro¬ ducendam; et tamen causa peccati non erit, quia concurret influxu quodam universali, et indifferenti ad hanc actionem, et ad contra¬ riam ; ac per hoc non erit talis actio in spe¬ cie, quia a Deo, sed quia ab homine prodit : et tota culpa erit hominis, qui concursu Dei abuti voluit ad istam actionem, cum ad aliam bene uti potuisset. Qua ratione etiam non di¬ citur Deus causa peccati, quodlibera hominis voluntate committitur, licet liberam volun¬ tatem homini ipse dederit, eamque conservet; quia videlicet, libera voluntate potest homo bene uti si velit, et eam illi Deus ideo dedit, ut ea bene uteretur, non ut illa in suam perniciem et donatoris injuriam abutere¬ tur. Quod si Deus non solum, ut causa univer¬ salis ad eas actiones, quae malae sunt, con¬ currat, sed etiam ut causa particularis eas, ut tales sunt in specie, intendat, easque im¬ peret, vel ad eas hominem impellat, vel per homines, ut per instrumenta, actiones illas in specie efficiat, nullo modo intelligi po¬ terit quemadmodum Deus ipse non peccet. Non enim homines alia de causa peccare di¬ cuntur, et vere, ac proprie re ipsa omnium consensu peccant, nisi quia sunt causae libe¬ rae, et particulares earum actionum, quae cum ratione, atque aeterna lege pugnant. Defor¬ mitas enim illa, et malitia, in qua peccati ratio proprie consistit, necessario sequitur ad ejusmodi actiones, ut supra demonstratum est. Jam vero Calvinus, et Zwinglius non negant Deum concurrere ad actiones quasdam, quae cum aeterna lege pugnant, et ex objecto sunt malae : neque illud etiam negant, Deum li¬ bere, ac (ut Apostolus loquitur) secundum concilium voluntatis suae omnia operari. In quibus duobus ab eis non dissentimus : sed de tertio illo capite, quod ad peccandum requiri diximus, tota controversia est. Nos enim Deum dicimus concurrere ad eas actiones solum ut causam universalem, per influxum quemdam indifferentem tam ad eas, quam ad contrarias ; et praeterea' si non de physica, sed de morali causa agatur, dicimus actiones illas in specie a Deo non intendi, nec imperari, sed e contrario, improbari, prohi¬ beri, damnari; atque ideo non posse ullo modo in Deum referri earum malitiam, ac turpitudinem. At adversarii non uno in loco docent, Deum non solum ut causam universalem ad actiones illas concurrere, sed etiam eas, ut tales sunt in specie, velle, et imperare, ac per instru¬ menta sua proprie efficere, ac per hoc esse causam particularem, tum moralem, tum physicam. Quod certe nihil est aliud, nisi vere, et proprie peccare. Audi Calvinum lib. ii. Institut. cap. 4. §. 2 : « Omitto, inquit, hic universalem Dei motionem, unde crea¬ tura} omnes, ut sustinentur, ita efficaciam quidvis agendi ducunt. De illa speciali actione tantum loquor, qua} in unoquoque facinore apparet : idem ergo facinus Deo, Satanae, homini, assignari, videmus non esse absur¬ dum. » Hsec ille. Ubi vides, quemadmodum Calvinus velit ipsum facinus, quod a Satana, vel ab homine perpetratur, assignari debere etiam Deo , cujus Satan, et homo instrumenta sunt, quia 200 LIBER II. Deus non influxu tantum generali cum Sa¬ tana, vel homine cooperatur, sed etiam spe¬ cialem illam actionem, qua} cernitur in faci¬ nore, ipse intendit, et ad eam inflectit ho¬ minis, et Satanae voluntatem, ac denique illam proprie ipse facit. Idem etiam lib. i. Instit, cap. 18. §. 2. ubi explicat, quemadmodum homines excaecari, ac decipi Scripturae doceant, dicit, Deum non tantum sinere, ut Satan homines deci¬ piat, sed ipsum Deum intus in mentibus ope¬ rari, atque ab ipso Deo, manare efficaciam erroris. Haec enim sunt verba ejus : « Certe, inquit, nisi operaretur intus in mentibus ho¬ minum, non recte dictum esset, auferre la¬ bium a veracibus.» Et infra: « Dicitur etiam idem Satan excaecare infidelium mentes, sed unde hoc, nisi quod a Deo ipso manat effi¬ cacia erroris? » Haec ille. Itaque quemadmodum sancti Patres, Au¬ gustinus tract. 26. in Joan. et lib. de praede¬ stinatione Sanctorum cap. 8. et Gregorius lib. xi Moral. cap. 5. et alii docent, frustra concionatores exterius exhortari, nisi Deus intus operetur, et ideo conversionem pecca¬ toris esse opus Dei. Ita Calvinus docet fru¬ stra Satanam conari ad excreandos, et deci¬ piendos nisi Deus operetur intus, et ideo efficaciam erroris ab ipso Deo manare : et sicut in conversione peccatoris Deus est, qui proprie illuminat, et convertit : ita in per¬ versione justi, Deum esse, qui proprie sedu¬ cit, et pervertit. At illuminare, et convertere opus est bonum, et recta} rationi congruens ; et contra seducere, et pervertere, opus est malum, et a recta ratione abhorrens ; igitur sicut Deus bene facit illuminando, et conver¬ tendo, ita male facit et peccat seducendo, et pervertendo. Zwinglius in serm. de providentia cap. 5. dicit, fuisse necessariam injustitiam, ut ju¬ stitia cognosci posset. Et cap. 6. dicit, fuisse necessarium mendacium, ut veritas cogno¬ sceretur, et ideo Deum impulisse Angelum, et hominem ad mendacium, et injustitiam. Igitur ex sententia Zwinglii Deus voluit, et proprie intendit in particulari actionem mendacii, et injustitia}. Ac per hoc mala fuit ejus voluntas, ac manifeste peccavit. Porro Beza in aphorismo 22. docet, Deum non solum excitare, et impellere instrumenta ad actiones illas, quae mala} sunt, et peccata respectu instrumentorum, sed etiam creare ipsa instrumenta, id est, homines ad eum fi¬ nem, ut actiones illas ab ipso intentas, et de¬ cretas jam inde ab aeternitate, perficiant. Ex qua Bezae doctrina manifestum est, actiones malas ut tales sunt in specie a Deo esse in¬ tentas, et ipsi ut verae, et propriae, ac prin¬ cipali causae esse tribuendas, ex quo sequitur (ut ex jam dictis patet) Deum ex sententia Bezae, vere, ac proprie peccare. Sed praeter hoc argumentum, idem colli¬ gitur ex iis, quae diximus capite superiore. Nam si recte colligimus, ex adversariorum sententia, Deum esse vere, ac proprie aucto¬ rem peccatorum, quae a nobis fiunt, certe recte etiam colligere possumus, vere, ac proprie Deum peccare. Qui enim est alteri auctor, ut peccet, continuo ipse etiam peccat. Neque enim magis pugnat cum aeterna lege velle mentiri, aut fornicari, aut innoxium punire, quam velle efficere, ut alius mentiatur, aut fornicetur, aut innoxium puniat. Itaque in omni rcpublicanon minus puniri soletis, qui, homicidium fecit, quam is, qui, ut illud fieret, imperavit. Non autem punitur , nisi qui peccat; igitur consensu omnium, qui pec¬ catum imperat, ipse etiam peccat. Neque vero satisfacit similitudo illa de sole, et cadavere, quam Calvinus adducere solet, ut ostendat, Deum non peccare, licet sit causa, cur alii peccent. Quam quidem si¬ militudinem adeo propriam, et ad rem illu¬ strandam appositam existimavit , ut eam multis in locis repetierit, ut lib. i. Instit. cap. 17. §. 5. in Instructione contra Libertinos cap. 14. et in epist. contra Franciscarium quemdam Libertinum. Est autem hiec simili¬ tudo, quam verbis ejus referam ex lib. i. In¬ stitutionum : « Et unde qua}so, inquit, fcetor in cadavere, quod calore solis tum putrefa¬ ctum, tum reseratum fuerit? radiis solis ex¬ citari omnes vident, nemo tamen illos foetere ideo dicit. Ita cum in homine malo subsi- deat mali materia, et culpa : quid est quod inquinamentum aliquod contrahere putetur Deus, si ad suum arbitrium utatur ejus mi¬ nisterio. » Ha}c ille. At tribus in rebus peccat ha}C similitudo. Primum, quod ante actionem solis ponatur cadaver, id est, corpus jam corruptum. Ne¬ que enim ex corpore integro, soli* radii fce- torem excitare potuissent. At Deus ab ad¬ versariis affirmatur, peccatum excitasse in voluntate primi hominis, cum adhuc ea inte¬ gra, et omnino sana, et innocens esset. Deinde, sol est causa universalis, neque corruptionem, sed calefactionem intendit : qute calefactio ex se indifferens est ad efle- CAPUT VI. 261 ctus varios producendos, et a causis particu¬ laribus limitatur, et determinatur ad hoc potius, quam illud efficiendum. Itaque cur ex cadavere calefacto excitetur foetor, ex po¬ mo, aut aromate similiter calefacto existat odor, non in solem, sed in causas particula¬ res causa referenda est. Deus autem, ut su¬ pra docuimus, non solum ut causa universa¬ lis, sed etiam ut particularis ex doctrina Calvini, et Bezse, concurrit ad actiones ma¬ las, qui® ab hominibus fiunt. Eas enim in particulari Deus intendit, imperat, et per humanas voluntates, ut per sua instrumenta perficit. Denique, sol etiamsi esset causa particu¬ laris, non tamen corrumperetur corrumpen¬ do alia, quia non agit libera voluntate, ne¬ que per actionem ullam immanentem, sed per actionem in aliud transeuntem, et ne¬ cessariam. At qui libera voluntate facit a- lium peccare, is etiam continuo peccat, nec potest corruptione peccati alium putrefacere, nisi simul etiam ipse putrescat. Nam ea vo¬ luntas, qua vult alium peccare, in ipso est, non in alio, et cum ea sit mala, quippe qu<e libere fertur in objectum cum recta ratione non congruens ; sequitur ut ipse etiam sit malus, et peccet.