Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book II: That God Is Not the Author of Sin
Chapter 9: It is proved by the testimonies of the Fathers that God is not the author of sin
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book II. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
To the testimonies of the Scriptures we shall add the ecclesiastical tradition. St. Dionysius the Areopagite, then, in the book On the Divine Names, chapter 4: “God, therefore, is not the author of evil.” And a little after he demonstrates that Angels and souls become evil when they fall away from the goods of God. St. Justin, in the Dialogue with Trypho, near the end: “That too I taught before: that God is not the cause why they whose sins were known beforehand — whether Angels or men — become wicked; but each is such by his own fault.” St. Irenaeus wrote an entire work against this heresy, Eusebius being witness, book 5 of the History, chapter 20. For when a certain Florinus taught that God is the author of evil, St. Irenaeus reprehended him in these words, which thou wilt find in Eusebius in the place cited: “These dogmas, Florinus — to deal with thee the more gently — are not of sound doctrine and judgment. These dogmas are repugnant to the Church, seeing that they cast those who obey them into the greatest impiety. These dogmas not even the heretics who were driven out of the Church ever dared to affirm. These dogmas the presbyters who were before us, and who were disciples of the Apostles, by no means handed down to thee.” Clement of Alexandria, book 1 of the Stromata, about the middle, shows that the cause of sin cannot be referred to God, since God does not hinder free choice from choosing what it will: “He who did not forbid the free election of the soul judges justly; so that most of all, indeed, God is not to us the cause of vice.” And book 1 of the Pedagogue, chapter 8: “The fault is his who chooses; but fault cannot be laid upon God.” Origen, book 4 against Celsus, after the middle: “After these things,” says he, “Celsus proceeds: it is difficult for those who do not philosophize to know the nature of evils, and it is enough for the crowd to be taught that evils are not from God, but that matter is engaged about evils.” And below: “It is indeed true that evils are not from God. For our Jeremias also manifestly teaches that from the mouth of the Lord evils shall not go forth together with goods. But that matter, which is engaged about mortal things, is the cause of evils, is false. For each man's own reason is the cause of the malice existing in him — which indeed is the evil — and of the evil actions too which proceed from it.” Eusebius of Caesarea, book 6 of the Preparation of the Gospel, chapter 6: “He assuredly will be judged impious — nay rather, worst of all men — who thinks that by the creator of the universe some are impelled to adulteries, others to rapines, others to other vices. Whence it follows either that these are not sins, or that the cause of sinning is referred to the creator.” And below: “Wherefore not the man by right, but his creator, will be the sinner — than which dogma nothing more wicked can be thought.” St. Athanasius, in the oration against the Idols, not far from the beginning, demonstrates that God cannot be the author of evil: “That would be at once absurd and impossible. For evil is not from good, nor is it in him, nor through him; otherwise he could not be held for good, since he would either have a mixed and contrary nature, or would stand as cause and author of evils.” The same Athanasius attributes the same judgment to St. Antony, in describing his life. St. Basil, homily 2 on the work of the six days: “But it is not pious to say that evil flowed forth from God.” The same wrote an entire oration on this — that God is not the author of evils. St. Gregory of Nyssa, book 7 of the Philosophy, chapter 1: “For it is not right to ascribe to God base and unjust actions.” St. Gregory Nazianzen, oration 1 against Julian, before the middle, discoursing of the counsels of divine providence: “By which counsels he indeed was not stirred to evil (for God is in no way the cause of evil, being good by nature; and the vice is his who chooses); yet he was not held back from his onset and the purpose of his mind.” St. John Chrysostom, homily 23 on the Acts of the Apostles: “Let no one say: God is to us the author of evils.” And below: “It were better to be buried six hundred times than that God should hear such things through us.” And homily 3 on Genesis: “For this cause he brought forth all this creation, and formed us: not that we should perish, nor that he should torment us with punishments, but that he might save us.” And in the homily on the forbidding of the tree to Adam, which is had after the homilies on Genesis, he says: “It is manifest that God willed not that Adam should sin, who willed to fortify him beforehand against the offense. Adam could have obeyed God; but he would not, who preferred to consent to the devil.” Which two places fight openly with the judgment of Calvin and Beza, who say that men were created by God that he might destroy them, and that God willed Adam to sin, and by his sin to infect all his posterity, that a door might be opened to God himself for showing his justice and mercy. St. Epiphanius, heresy 66, which is Manichaeus's, not far from the beginning: “It is absurd to attribute malice to God; and the character of the divine and ecclesiastical Scripture confesses this: that God is utterly foreign to, and unmixed with, evil. For God made nothing evil, but all things very good — as one who is good by nature, incomprehensible in essence, containing all things and himself contained by none. Neither, then, was evil always, nor was evil made by God.” And below: “According to the permission of free choice he grants to all to use their own will, that each may do what he will — so that he himself is not the cause of evils,” etc. Theodoret, in the Epitome of the divine decrees, chapter on Antichrist: “God is not the cause of evils, as even the outside philosophers will have it. For neither did he make Cain a murderer.” The same author, discourse 5 [al. 6] to the Greeks, shows this copiously, the testimonies of Plato and others being adduced. St. Cyril of Alexandria, book 3 against Julian, about the middle: “Good, therefore, and well-working — nay, goodness itself — is the divine and ineffable nature; yet it was not ignorant of evil, but knew it — not practically, as we know it, who come into every evil.” Thus he; where he teaches that God knows good and evil: but the good theoretically and practically, because he always works well; the evil theoretically, not practically, because he never works ill. St. John Damascene, book 4 On the Faith, chapter 20 [al. 19], teaches nothing else than that God is not the author of evil, and explains the testimonies of Scripture which seem to stand otherwise. And these indeed are the testimonies of the Greeks. We shall now add also those of the Latins.
Tertullian, in the book against Hermogenes: “Now therefore evil is from him who, if not the author of evil, because not its effecter, is certainly its permitter, because its ruler.” And in the book On the Trinity [Novatian]: “For it cannot be that he be the initiator or artificer of any evil work, who claims for himself the name of the perfect one, and of parent, and of judge.” St. Ambrose, book On Paradise, chapter 8 [al. 15]: “God works what is good, not what is evil.” The same, in book 1 of the Hexaemeron, chapter 8: “Did God create malice? Nay, it arose from us, not founded by God the creator, and is generated by the levity of our morals.” And below: “God wills this to be rooted out of the minds of each. How should he himself generate it, when the Prophet cries: Cease from your malices; and above all holy David: Decline from evil, and do good? How then do we give it its beginning from the Lord? But this is the deadly opinion of those who thought the Church was to be thrown into confusion.” St. Jerome, in the commentary on the first chapter to the Ephesians, explaining that, “who worketh all things according to the counsel of his will”: “Not that all things which are done in the world are carried through by the will and counsel of God — otherwise evils too could be imputed to God — but that all things which he does, he does with counsel and will.” And in the commentary on chapter 7 of Ecclesiastes, explaining those words, God created man upright: “Lest he should seem to make God the author of evil, he shrewdly guarded against it, and says that we were created good by God; but because we are left to free choice, we slide down to worse things by our own vice.” See the same, at the end of book 12 [al. 5] on Isaias, and at the beginning of the first book against the Pelagians. St. Augustine wrote the three books On Free Choice chiefly for this cause: that he might show that God is not the cause of sin. The same Augustine, epistle 105 to Sixtus: “The iniquity which the most right truth disapproves, he himself knows how to condemn, not to do.” And book 13 On the Trinity, chapter 12: “The manner in which man was handed over into the power of the devil ought not so to be understood as though God did this, or commanded it to be done, but that he only permitted it.” And book 5 On the City of God, chapter 8: “From God are all powers, though from him are not the wills of all.” And chapter 9: “As he is the creator of all natures, so is he the giver of all powers, not of wills; for evil wills are not from him, since they are against nature, which is from him.” Book 12 of the Confessions, chapter 11: “This alone is not from thee, which is not; and the motion of the will from thee, who art, to that which less is — because such a motion is offense and sin.” The same, book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 31: “Nowhere do we read: There is no will save from God. And rightly is it not written, because it is not true; otherwise God is even the author of sins — which be far from us — if there is no will save from him; since an evil will is already by itself sin, even if the effect be wanting — that is, if it have not the power.” And book 2 On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 17: “Refer the cause of no human fault to God.” And chapter 18: “It is impious to say that an evil will is to be referred to God as its author.” Likewise: “If therefore the will is either good or evil, and assuredly we have not the evil one from God, it remains that we have the good will from God.” Book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10: “God is able to foreknow even the things which he himself does not do — as all sins whatever.” In which place St. Augustine demonstrates that predestination cannot be without foreknowledge, but that foreknowledge can be without predestination: for God predestinated the good things which he foreknew that he himself would do; but the evils he foreknew, yet did not predestinate; hence evils are not done (as Calvin says) from the decree of God. The same author, book 3 On Free Choice, chapter 16, thus concludes: “I altogether find not, nor can it be found, and I affirm outright that it is not, how our sins should be attributed to God our creator; since I find him praiseworthy even in them — not only in that he punishes them, but also in that they are done only when there is a departing from his truth.” Finally, in book 1 On Order, chapter 1: “It follows either that divine providence does not reach to these lowest things, or certainly that all evils are committed by the will of God. Both are impious — but more the latter.” What could be said more clearly against Calvin and Beza? Like things are found everywhere in Augustine. The author of the book Hypognosticon, which is had among the works of the same Augustine, book 6, about the middle, discoursing of the sin of Judas the betrayer: “Far be this from the highest good judge, God, author of all goods, but condemner of all evils; for the evils of Judas, as I have said before, he foreknew, he did not do.” St. Prosper, in the response to the chapters of the Gauls, chapter 12: “The will of God never wills anything but good things; but his foreknowledge knows both goods and evils: goods, which either he himself does, or commands that we do; evils, which he himself altogether does not do, nor has counseled or impelled to be done.” And chapter 14 [al. 15]: “The unbelief of those who believe not the Gospel is by no means generated from the predestination of God: for God is the author of gifts, not of evils.” See also the response to the Vincentian chapters, chapters 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13. St. Leo the Pontiff is the author of the sentences which were defined in the [aforesaid Council]; in the twenty-fifth of which, which is the last, we read thus: “That some are predestinated to evil by the divine power, not only do we not believe, but even, if there are any who will to believe so great an evil, with all detestation we say anathema to them.” Which sentence the Synod of Valence, which was celebrated in Gaul in the time of the Emperor Lothair, again confirmed, and as it were made its own, chapter 3. The same St. Leo, sermon 16 on the Passion of the Lord: “Did the iniquity of Christ's persecutors arise from God's counsel? and did the hand of the divine preparation arm that which is greater than every crime? Plainly this is not to be thought of the highest justice.” St. Fulgentius, in the whole of book 1 to Monimus, disputes this question: whether sins are done from the predestination of God — which is the very question which we now treat against the Calvinists. For (as the same Fulgentius witnesses, in the same book 1 to Monimus, last chapter) a little after the death of St. Augustine there were not wanting some who, from the book of blessed Augustine On the Predestination of the Saints, ill understood, gathered that God predestinated the impious to evil works, and that hence evil works are done from the decree and impulse of God. Which error was most copiously refuted, first by St. Prosper, then by St. Leo and the Council above cited, then by St. Fulgentius, and the authors who followed them, as Leo IX and others. But it will be worth the labor to adduce something hither from the book of St. Fulgentius. Thus, then, he himself speaks, book 1 to Monimus, chapter 13: “He could, as he willed, predestinate some to glory, some to punishment. But those whom he predestinated to glory, he predestinated to justice; those, however, whom he predestinated to punishment, he did not predestinate to fault. For some sin could be from the predestination of God, if any man could sin justly; but no man sins justly, though God justly permit him to sin.” And below: “In the Saints God crowns the justice which he himself gratuitously bestowed on them, gratuitously preserved, and gratuitously perfected; but the unjust he will condemn for the impiety or injustice which he himself did not work in them. For in the former he glorifies his own works; in the latter he condemns works not his own.” And chapter 21: “For if, when man was being made by God, he was so good in the present work of God as to be evil in his predestination, beyond doubt he was going to be evil by the work of God, by whom he was being predestinated to sin. Whereupon straightway that absurdity will follow, that it be said that God — of whom the Prophet says, Who made the things that are to come — had in himself, which be far from him, the origin of iniquity, if he himself had predestinated the man made by him to be a sinner. For his predestination is the preparation of his works; and as it befits the good God to be the cause of the whole good work, so it is incongruous that he be reckoned the cause of any evil work whatever.” St. Gregory, book 29 of the Morals, chapter 21 [al. 30]: “The Lord is the author of nature, not of fault.” And homily 9 on Ezekiel, at the beginning: “But it must be known that our evils are ours only; but our goods are both almighty God's and ours.” Leo IX, Pontiff, in the epistle to Peter of Antioch, delivering the confession of the Catholic faith: “I believe that God predestinated only goods, but foreknew goods and evils.” Hugh of St. Victor, book 1 On the Sacraments, part 4 [al. 5], chapter 27: “To the evil God grants power alone, not will; for though it be from his permission that they can do evil, yet it is not from his inspiration that they will evil. For God is the orderer of evil wills, not their creator.” To these we can add also the testimonies of gentiles who beyond the rest are wont to be held most wise. One is of Mercurius Trismegistus, in the Poimandres, last chapter, where we read: “From God the maker nothing base, nothing evil comes forth.” Another is of Plato, in the second dialogue On the Commonwealth, who speaks thus: “God alone indeed is to be called the cause of goods; but of evils it befits us to seek any other cause whatever besides God.” And below: “That God, since he is good, is the cause of evil to anyone, is altogether to be refuted; nor is it to be permitted that anyone say this in his city, if the city is to be furnished with good laws; nor moreover that anyone hear it — whether he be younger or older, whether these things be woven into songs or narrated in prose — as things which are neither holy to say, nor useful to others, nor consonant among themselves.” The third is of Maximus of Tyre, who in discourse 25, where he discourses of the cause of evil, speaks thus of the moral evil which properly is called sin: “Its name is improbity, and it gets its cause from the choice of him who chooses — God standing always outside every cause.”
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CAPUT IX. Probatur testimoniis Pati am, Deum non esse peccati auctorem. Ad Scripturarum testimonia addemus tra¬ ditionem Ecclesiasticam. Igitur S. Dionysius Areopagita in lib. de divinis nominibus cap. ■i : « Non igitur, inquit, Deus auctor est ma¬ li. » Et paulo post demonstrat, Angelos, et animas fieri malas, cum a Dei bonis defi¬ ciunt. S. Justinus in Dialogo cumTriphone, pro- pre extremo : « Illud quoque, inquit, ante docui, Deum non esse causam, cur ii, quo¬ rum peccata ante cognita sunt, sive Angeli, sive homines improbi efficiantur, sed sua quisque culpa tales gunt. » S. Irenaeus integrum opus adversus hanc haeresim scripsit, teste Euscbio lib v. hist. cap. 19. Cum enim Florinus quidam doceret, Deum esse auctorem mali, reprehendit eum S. Irenams his verbis, qua? apud Eusebium loc. cit. reperies : « Ista dogmata, Florine, ut tecum agam humanius, sanae doctrinae, et sententiae non sunt. Ista dogmata sunt Eccle¬ siae repugnantia, utpote quae eos, qui illis obsequuntur, in maximam impietatem deji¬ ciunt. Ista dogmata ne haeretici quidem, qui erant ab Ecclesia exturbati, unquam afiir- mare audebant. Ista dogmata presbyteri, qui ante nos fuerunt, quique erant Apostolorum discipuli, minime tibi tradiderunt. » Clemens Alexandrinus lib. i. Stromatum circa medium, ostendit causam peccati non posse referri in Deum, cum Deus non impe¬ diat, quominus liberum arbitrium eligat quod voluerit : « Qui, inquit, non prohibuit liberam animae electionem, juste judicat, ut vel maxime quidem Deus nobis non sit causa vitii. » Et lib. i. Paedagogi cap. 8 : « Culpa, inquit, est ejus qui eligit ; in Deum autem culpa conferri nequit. » Origenes lib. iv. contra Celsum post me¬ dium : « Post haec, inquit, pergit Celsus, na¬ turam malorum cognoscere difficile est non philosophantibus, et satis est vulgus doceri, mala non esse a Deo, sed materiam versari circa mala. » Et infra : « Est quidem verum, inquit, mala non esse ex Deo. Nam et noster Hieremias, manifeste docet, quod ex ore Do¬ mini non egredientur mala cum bonis, caetc- rum materiam, quae versetur circa mortalia, causam esse madorum, falsum est. Nam sua cuique ratio causa est existentis in ipso mali¬ tiae, quae quidem malum est, malae quoque actiones, quae ex ea proveniunt. » Eusebius Caesariensis lib. vi. de praepara¬ tione Evangelica cap. 5 : « Impius, inquit, profecto judicabitur, imo vero pessimus om¬ nium, qui a creatore universi alios ad adul¬ teria, adios ad rapinas, alios ad alia vitia impelli arbitretur. Unde sequitur, aut haec peccata non esse, aut peccandi causam in creatorem refex-ri. » Et infra : « Quare non jure homo, sed creator ejus peccator erit, quo dogmate nihil scelestius cogitari pot¬ est. D S. Athanasius in orat, contra Idola, non procul ab initio, demonstrat, Deum auctorem mali esse non posse : « Id, inquit, absurdum simul et impossibile fuerit. Non enim ex bo¬ no malum, neque in eo est, neque per eum. Alioqui pro bono haberi non posset, cum aut miscellaneam, contraiuamque natui’am habei'et, aut causa, auctorque malorum exi- steret. » Idem Athanasius, eamdem senten¬ tiam tribuit S. Antonio, ejus vitam descri¬ bens. S. Basilius hom. 2. de opere sex dierum : «At, inquit, a Deo malum profluxisse pium non est dicere. » Idem integram orationem scripsit de eo, quod Deus non sit auctor ma¬ lorum. S. Gi’egorius Nissenus lib vil. Philoso¬ phia? cap. 1 : « Non enim, inquit, Deo fas est adseribere turpes actiones et injustas. » S. Gregorius Nazianzenus, orat 1. in Julia¬ num, ante medium, disserens de consiliis divina? providentia? : « A quibus, inquit, consiliis non ille quidem ad malum excifatus est (Deus enim nullo modo causa est mali, quippe natura bonus, vitiumque ejus est, qui eligit) haud tamen ab impetu suo, animique pi'oposito i-epressus est. » S. Joannes Chrysostomus hom. 23. iu Acta Apost. : « Nullus, inquit, dicat, Deus nobis auctor malorum est. » Et infia : « Sa¬ tius fuerit, sexcenties defodi, quam Deum audire talia per nos. » Et hom. 3. in Gen. : « Propter hoc, inquit, creaturam hanc om¬ nem produxit, et nos formavit, non ut per- CAPIT IX. eamus, neque ut suppliciis nos torqueat : sed ut salvet. » Et hom. de interdictione ar¬ boris ad Adam, qua; habetur post' homilias in Genesim, inquit : « Manifestum est, Deum noluisse Adam peccare, qui voluit eum ante delictum praestruere. Potuit Adam Deo pa¬ rere, quod noluit, qui consentire diabolo maluit. » Qua; (luo loca pugnant aperte cum sententia Calvini et Bezae, qui dicunt a Deo creatos homines, ut eos perderet, et Deum voluisse, ut Adam peccaret, et omnes poste¬ ros peccato suo inficeret, quo aditus ipsi Deo aperiretur ad justitiam, ct misericordiam os¬ tendendam ; S. Epiphanius haeres. G6. qua; est Mani¬ chaei, non procul ab initio : « Absurdum, inquit, est malitiam Deo tribuere ; et divinae, ac Ecclesiasticae Scriptura; character hoc confitetur, Deum penitus alienum, et imper¬ mixtum a malo esse : Deus enim nihil mali fecit, sed omnia valde bona : ut qui bonus sit natura, incomprehensibilis essentia, om¬ nia continens et ipse a nemine contentus. Neque igitur malum semper erat, neque ex Deo factum est malum. » Et infra : « Juxta permissionem liberi arbitrii omnibus propria voluntate uti concedit, ut quisque quod vo¬ luerit, faciat, quod ipse quidem malorum causa non sit etc. » Theodoretus in Epitome divinorum decre¬ torum, cap. de Anticbristo : « Deus, inquit, non est causa malorum, ut volunt etiam ex¬ terni philosophi. Nec enim ipse Cain effecit homicidam. » Idem auctor serm. 5. ad Grae- cos, copiose hoc ostendit, adductis testimo¬ niis Diatonis, et aliorum. S. Cyrillus Alexandrinus lib. m. in Julia¬ num circa medium : « Igitur bona quidem, et bene operans, imo ipsa bonitas est di¬ vina, et ineffabilis natura, non ignoravit au¬ tem malum, sed novit non practice id, quod nos sentimus, in omne venientes malum. » Haec ille, ubi docet, Deum scire bonum, et malum, sed bonum tbeorice, et pratice,quia semper bene operatur ; malum autem theo- rice, non practice, quia nunquam male ope¬ ratur. S. Joannes Damascenus lib. iv. de fide cap. 20. nihil aliud docet, nisi Deum non esse auctorem mali, ct explicat testimonia Scripturae, qua; secus habere videntur. At¬ que hsec quidem sunt Graecorum testimonia. Addemus nunc etiam Latinorum. Tertullianus in lib. adversus Hermoge¬ nem ; « Jam ergo, inquit, malum ab ipso. ■2()1 qui est mali si non auctor, quia non effector, certe permissor, quia dominator. » Et in lib. de Trinitate : « Nec enim potest fieri, ut sit initiator, aut artifex ullius mali operis, qui nomen sibi perfecti vendicat, et paren¬ tis, et judicis. » S. Ambrosius lib. de paradiso cap 15 « Deus, inquit, operatur quod bonum est, non quod malum. » Idem in lib. i. Exame- ron cap. 8 : « Numquid, inquit, malitiam Deus creavit? sed ea ex nobis orta, non a creatore Deo condita, morum levitate gene¬ ratur. )> Et infra : « Eradicari hanc Deus vult de animis singulorum. Quomodo ipse eam generaret, cum clamet Propheta : Desi¬ nite a malitiis vestris? et pra;cipue S. David : Desine, inquit, a malo, et fac bonum. Quo¬ modo ergo ei initium a Domino damus ? sed haec opinio feralis eorum, qui perturbandam Ecclesiam putaverunt. » S. Hieronymus in comment. 1. cap. ad Ephes. explicans illud : Qui universa opera¬ tur secundum consilium voluntatis sua; : « Non, inquit, quo omnia quae in mundo fiant, Dei voluntate, et consilio peragantur : alioquin et mala Deo poterunt imputari : sed quo universa, quse facit, consilio facit, et voluntate. » Et in commentario cap. 7. Ec- cles. explicans illa verba, Deus creavit ho¬ minem rectum ; « Ne videretur, inquit, De¬ um auctorem mali facere , argute praecavit, et ait bonos nos a Deo creatos, sed quia libero sumus arbitrio derelicti, vitio nostro ad pejora delabi. » Vide eumdem lib. xn. in Isaiam extremo ; et in principio primi libri contra Pelagianos. S. Augustinus tres libros de libero arbi¬ trio ea potissimum de causa scripsit, ut os¬ tenderet, Deum non esse causam peccati. Idem Augustinus epist. 105. ad Sixtum : « Iniquitatem, quam rectissima veritas im¬ probat, damnare novit ipse, non facere. » Et lib. xiii. de Trinit. cap. 12 : « Modus, inquit, quo traditus est homo in diaboli po¬ testatem, non ita debet intelligi, tanquam hoc Deus fecerit, aut fieri jusserit, sed quod tantum permiserit. » Et lib. v. de Civitate Dei cap. 8 : « A Deo sunt omnes potestates : quamvis ab illo non sint omnium volunta¬ tes. » Et cap. 9 : « Sicut omnium naturarum creatorem, ita omnium potestatum dator, non voluntatum. Mala; quippe voluntates ab illo non sunt, quoniam contra naturam sunt, quie ab illo est. » Lib. xil. Confess. cap. 11 : « Hoc solum a te non est, quod non est, mo- 268 LIBER II. tusque voluntatis a te qui es, ail id quod minus est, quia talis motus delictum, atque peccatum est. » Idem lib. de spir. et lit. c. 31 : « Nusquam, inquit, legimus, non est vo¬ luntas nisi a Deo, et recte non scriptum est, quia verum non est. Alioquin etiam peccato¬ rum, quod absit, auctor est Deus, si non est voluntas nisi ab illo, quoniam mala voluntas jam sola peccatum est, etiamsi desit effe¬ ctus, id est, si non habeat potestatem. » Et lib. H. de peccatorum meritis, et remissione cap, 17 : Nullius, inquit, culpa; humanae in Deum referas, causam. » Et cap. 18: « Ma¬ lam voluntatem ad auctorem Deum esse referendam nefas est dicere. » Item : « Si ergo voluntas aut bona est, aut mala ; et utique malam non habemus ex Deo, re¬ stat ut bonam habeamus ex Deo. » Lib. de praedest. sanet, cap. 10 : « Praescire, inquit, potens est Deus, etiam quae ipse non facit, sicut quaecumque peccata. » Quo loco demonstrat S. Augustinus, prae¬ destinationem sine praescientia esse non pos¬ se. Posse autem. esse sine praedestinatione praescientiam : praedestinavit enim Deus bona, quae se praesciebat esse facturum. Ma¬ la autem praescivit, sed non praedestinavit, proinde non fiunt mala (ut Calvinus dicit) ex decreto Dei. Idem auctor lib. m. de libero arbitrio cap. 16. ita concludit : « Omnino non invenio, nec inveniri posse, et prorsus non esse confirmo, quomodo tribuantur pec¬ cata nostra creatori nostro Deo ; quando et in ipsis eum laudabilem invenio, non solum quod ea punit, sed etiam quod tunc fiunt, cum ab ejus veritate receditur. » Denique in i. lib de ordine cap. i: « Sequitur, inquit, aut divinam providentiam non usque ad haec ima portendi, aut certe mala omnia Dei voluntate committi, utrumque impium, sed magis posterius. » Quid clarius contra Calvinum, et Bezam dici potuit? similia passim in Augustino reperiuntur. Auctor libri Hypognostici, qui habetur inter opera ejusdem Augustini lib. vi. circa medium, disserens de peccato Juda; prodi¬ toris : « Absit, inquit, hoc a summo bono judice, auctore omnium bonorum Deo, dam¬ natore vero cunctorum malorum : quia mala Juda; , ut praedixi , praescivit, non fe¬ cit. » S. Prosper in responsione ad capitula Cal¬ lorum, cap. 12 : « Voluntas Dei nunquam vult, nisi bona. Praescientia autem, et bona noscit, et mala : sed bona quae, aut ipse fa¬ ciat, aut etiam ut nos faciamus, imperat : mala autem, qua; omnino ipse non facit, nec fieri suasit, aut impulit. » Et cap. 14 : « In¬ fidelitas non credentium Evangelio, nequa¬ quam ex Dei prajdestinatione generatur. Donorum enim Deus auctor est, non malo¬ rum. » Vide etiam responsionem ad capi¬ tula Vicentiana cap. 3, 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. et 13. S. Leo Pontifex auctor est Sententiarum, quae in Concilio Arausicano II. definita; sunt, in quarum vigesima quinta, qua; est postrema, ita legimus : « Aliquos ad malum divina potestate praedestinatos esse, non so¬ lum non credimus, sed etiam si sunt, qui tantum malum credere velint, cum omni de¬ testatione il'is anathema dicimus. » Quam sententiam iterum confirmavit, et quasi su¬ am fecit Synodus Valentina, qua; tempore Lotharii Imperatoris in Galliis celebrata est cap. 3. Idem S. Leo senu. 16. de pass. Do¬ mini : « Numquid, inquit, iniquitas perse¬ quentium Christum ex Dei est orta consilio ? et illud facimus, quod omni majus est cri¬ mine, manus divina; prae parationis arma¬ vit? non hoc plane de summa justitia sen¬ tiendum est. » S. Fulgentius lib. i. ad Monimum toto, disputat hanc quaestionem : Utrum peccata fiant ex praedestinatione Dei. Qua; est ipsa quaestio, quam nunc tractamus adversus Calvinistas. Nam (ut idem Fulgentius te¬ statur in eodem lib. i, ad Monimum cap. ult.) paulo post obitum S. Augustini non defuerunt aliqui, qui ex libro de praedesti¬ natione Sanctorum B. Augustini,- male in¬ tellecto, collegerunt, Deum praedestinasse impios ad opera mala, et proinde fieri opera mala ex decreto, et impulsu Dei. Quem er¬ rorem copiosissime refutavit, primo S. Pro¬ sper, deinde S. Leo, et Concilium Arausi- canum supra citatum. Tum S. Fulgentius, et auctores, qui eos secuti sunt, ut Leo IX. et alii. Sed operae pretium erit atiquid ex libro S. Fulgentii huc adducere. Sic igitur ipse lo¬ quitur lib. i. ad Monimum cap. 13 : «Potuit, inquit, sicut voluit, praedestinare quosdam ad gloriam, quosdam ad poenam. Sed quos praedestinavit ad gloriam, praedestinavit ad justitiam : quos autem praedestinavit ad pte- nam, non praedestinavit ad culpam. Posset enim peccatum aliquod ex praedestinatione Dei esse, si posset aliquis hominum juste peccare. Nullus autem hominum juste pec- CAPUT X. 2G9 cat, quamvis eum Deus juste peccare per¬ mittat. » Et infra : « In Sanctis coronat Deus justitiam, quam eis gratis ipse tribuit, gratis servavit, gratisque perfecit. Iniquos autem condemnabit pro impietate, vel inju¬ stitia, quam in cis ipse non fecit. In illis enim opera sua glorificat, in istis autem opera non sua condemnat. » Etcap. 21 : «Si enim cum a Deo fieret homo, sic erat in pra:senti opere Dei bonus, ut in praedestina¬ tione ejus esset malus, procul dubio Dei opere malus futurus erat, a quo ad peccan¬ dum praedestinatus fiebat. Ubi statim illa consequetur absurditas , ut dicatur, quia Deus, de quo Propheta dicit : Qui fecit quae futura sunt, in se habuit, quod absit, ini¬ quitatis originem, si hominem a se factum ipse praedestinaverat peccatorem. Praedesti¬ natio enim ejus praeparatio est operum ejus. Et sicut competit Deo bono, ut causa sit to¬ tius operis boni : sic incongruum est, ut im¬ putetur causa cujuslibet operis mali. » S. Gregorius lib. xxix. Moralium cap. 21 : « Dominus, inquit, auctor est naturae, non culpae, m Et hom. 9. in Ezechielem, in prin¬ cipio : « Sed sciendum, inquit, quia mala nostra solummodo nostra sunt, bona autem nostra et omnipotentis Dei sunt, et nostra. » Leo IX. Pontifex in epist. ad Petrum An¬ tiochenum, tradens fidei Catholicae confes¬ sionem : « Credo, inquit, Deum praedesti¬ nasse solum bona, praescivisse autem bona et mala. » Hugo de S. Victore lib. i. de Sacramentis parte 5. cap. 27 : « Malis inquit, Deus pote¬ statem tribuit solam, non voluntatem, quia licet ex ipsius permissione sit, quod malum possunt, ex inspiratione tamen ejus non est, quod malum volunt. Malarum enim volun¬ tatum Deus ordinator est, non creator. » His addere possumus quia gentilium te¬ stimonia, qui sapientissimi praeter caeteros haberi solent. Unum est Mercurii Trismegi¬ sti in Pimandro cap. ult. ubi legimus : « A Deo factore 'nihil turpe, nihil malum prodi¬ re. » Alterum est Platonis in secundo Dia- golo de Republica, qui sic ait : « Bonorum quidem solus Deus causa est dicendus, malo¬ rum autem quamlibet aliam, praeter Deum, causam quaerere decet. » Et infra : «Malorum alicui causam esse Deum, cum bonus sit, refellendum est omnino, nec permittendum hoc quemquam dicere in sua civitate, si bo¬ nis instrui legibus civitas debet. Nec insuper queraquanr audire, sive sit ille junior, sive senior, sive carminibus ha;c inserantur, sive soluta oratione narrentur, tamquam qua; neque dictu sancta sint, neque aliis utilia, nec inter se cosona. » Tertium est Maximi Tyrii, qui in serm. 25. ubi de causa mali disserit, ita loquitur de malo morali, quod proprie dicitur peccatum : « Ejus, inquit, nomen est improbitas, causamque ab eli¬ gentis arbitrio nanciscitur, Deo semper extra omnem causam constituto. »