Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book II: That God Is Not the Author of Sin
Chapter 10: The same truth is established by reasons
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book II. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
To these testimonies reasons can be added. Let the first reason be that which St. Anselm uses in the book On Free Choice, chapter 8. The just will of man is that only which wills what God wills it to will; and the unjust, contrariwise, is that which wills what God wills not that it will. Therefore, if God willed man to sin, as the adversaries say, he would will man to will that which he would not will him to will — which is a manifest contradiction. Wherefore not only does God not will man to sin, but he cannot by any means will it. From which it also follows that God is not the author of sin — neither by exhorting, nor by commanding, nor by impelling, nor in any other way. For he would do it either unwilling or willing: assuredly not unwilling; therefore willing. But if willing, there follows, as we have said, a most open contradiction.
The second reason can be that which is found in St. Fulgentius, book 1 to Monimus, chapters 21, 22, and 23. In the works of God nothing can be that is not full of wisdom and reason; but no reason could be devised why God should will, or make, men to sin; therefore he neither wills nor does it. The minor is demonstrated in this way: in every work of God either justice or mercy is discerned — for all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth, Psalm 24. And indeed why God makes a man just from unjust, a reason can be given: because in that work the divine mercy is wondrously declared. But why he should will to make a man unjust from just, no reason can be given, since in this work neither mercy nor justice, but rather iniquity and cruelty, have place. Someone will perhaps say that, even if in this work by which one is made unjust no mercy or justice can be discerned, yet this work can be ordered to an end in which mercy or justice shines; hence a reason will be able to be given why God wills to make some unjust — namely, that he may have those on whom he may have mercy, and those whom he may punish. For this is the reasoning of Theodore Beza, as we saw above, who taught that God decreed the fall of the first man, and of all his sons, that he might lay open the way for manifesting his mercy and justice. But (as St. Fulgentius rightly says, in the place cited, book 1 to Monimus, chapter 22) justice will not be just if it be said not to have found, but to have made, the guilty man it punishes; nay rather, the injustice will be the greater, if God allot punishment to him fallen whom, while he stood, he is said to have predestinated to ruin. Further, that mercy would be cruel and unmerciful which should make a man impious in order afterward to free him from impiety — unless perchance he seem praiseworthy for clemency who strips a man that he may clothe him, wounds him that he may heal him, throws him into a well that he may draw him out thence. Beautifully does St. Augustine, book 3 of the Confessions, chapter 2, say that it would be altogether a malevolent benevolence (which cannot be) if one should will someone to be wretched, that he might pity him. Add that very many ways of manifesting his glory could not be wanting to God, even if men had not sinned; for Ecclesiasticus rightly wrote, chapter 15, that impious men are not necessary to God.
The third reason is St. Augustine's, in the book of Eighty-three Questions, question 3: By no wise man as author does a man become worse; for that fault is no small one — nay, it is so great that it cannot fall upon any wise man whatever; but God is more excellent than every wise man; much less, therefore, does a man become worse with God as author. Likewise, question 21: Whoever is the author of all things that are, and to whose goodness this only pertains — that everything that is, be — to him non-being can in no way pertain. Now everything that fails, fails from that which is to be, and tends toward non-being; but to be, and to fail in nothing, is good; and to fail is evil. But he to whom non-being does not pertain is not the cause of failing — that is, of tending toward non-being — because, so to speak, he is the cause of being. He is therefore the cause of good only, and for that reason is himself the highest good. Wherefore he is not the author of evil who is the author of all things that are; because, insofar as they are, so far they are good. Thus he. A like reason nearly all the Fathers cited above use, and above all Athanasius, Basil, Nazianzen, Epiphanius, who from this — that God is by nature good, and the highest and pure good — gather that it cannot be that from him is the origin of evil, since like is produced by like, not by its contrary.
The fourth reason is St. Ambrose's, book 1 of the Hexaemeron, chapter 8. God desires malice to be rooted out, and therefore forbids and punishes sins; and the Son of God himself came to take away the sins of the world, to dissolve the works of the devil, to destroy the body of sin. By what reasoning, then, can it come to pass that God wills men to sin, and therefore not only permits sins, but even incites and impels men to sin, and — as the adversaries blaspheme — himself through men, as through his instruments, efficaciously carries through all those things which are wickedly done by them?
The fifth reason can be such. If God were the author of sin, he himself also would sin. But to sin is no less repugnant to God than not to be God; therefore it cannot be that God be the author of sin. The major is most certain: for if God were the author of sin, certainly he would will men to sin; for men to sin is an evil; therefore God would will evil; and thereby his will would be evil; but where there is an evil will, there is sin. The minor of the first argument is proved from the very nature of God, which is plainly taken away and destroyed if sin be placed in it. For to sin is to fail; but God, if he can fail, is not the highest and infinite being, and hence is not God. Likewise, he cannot sin who errs in nothing; for the will cannot desire evil save under the notion of good — whence is that of the Wise Man: They err that work evil, Proverbs 14; and that of the Philosopher: “Every evil man is ignorant,” book 3 of the Ethics, chapter 1. But God, if he can err, is not the highest and infinite wisdom, and hence is not God. Again, to sin is to depart from the rule of the eternal law, which is the divine wisdom itself; but God cannot depart from the divine wisdom without departing from himself, since he is the divine wisdom itself. Finally, to sin is to be turned away from the last end and highest good, which is nothing but God; therefore, as it is a contradiction that God be turned away from himself, so it is a contradiction that God sin.
Let the last reason come from this: that all in common execrate Marcion, Manichaeus, and the other old heretics, who in some manner made God the author of sins. But far more to be execrated are the Libertines and Calvinists. For those ancients, since they dared not refer the cause of evil to the good God, feigned two Gods — one good, the author of goods; and the other evil, the author of evils. But the Libertines and Calvinists make one and the same God the author of all the crimes and outrages which are perpetrated by men. But of these things thus far.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT X. Eadem veritas rationibus comprobatur. Ad ha;c testimonia rationes addi possunt. Prima ratio sit ea, qua utitur S. Anselmus in lib. de libero arbitrio cap. 8. Justa volun¬ tas hominis est ea tantum, qua; vult id, quod Deus vult eam velle; injusta vero contrario est ea , quse vult id , quod Deus non vult eam velle : ergo si Deus vellet hominem peccare, quod adversarii dicunt, vellet ho¬ minem velle id, quod non vellet, eum velle, qua; est manifesta contradictio. Quare non solum non vult Deus hominem peccare, sed nec potest ulla ratione id velle. Ex quo etiam sequitur, ut non sit Deus auctor peccati, nec hortando, nec imperando, nec impellendo, nec ullo alio modo. Vel enim id faceret no¬ lens, aut volens ; non utique nolens, ergo volens. Quod si volens sequitur ut diximus, apertissima contradictio. Secunda ratio esse potest ea, qua; est apud S. Fulgentium lib. i. ad Monimum, cap. 21. 22. et 23. In Dei operibus nihil esse potest non plenum sapientia;, et rationis ; nulla au¬ tem posset excogitari ratio cur Deus velit, aut faciat homines peccare; non igitur id vult, nec facit. Assumptio demonstratur hoc modo : In omni opere Dei, aut justitia, aut misericordia cernitur. Nam omnes viae ejus misericordia, et veritas, Psalm. xxiv. Et quidem cur Deus hominem ex injusto faciat justum, ratio reddi potest, quia in eo opere misericordia divina mirifice declaratur. At cur ex justo facere velit injustum, non po¬ test reddi ratio, cum in hoc opere nec mi¬ sericordia, nec justitia, sed iniquitas potius, et crudelitas locum habeant. Dicet fortassis aliquis, etiamsi in hoc ope¬ re, quo quis efficitur injustus, nulla cerni possit misericordia, vel justitia ; tamen pot- 270 LIBER II. est, hoc opus ordinari ad finem, in quo mi¬ sericordia, vel justitia luceat. Proinde pote¬ rit reddi ratio cur Deus velit aliquos injustos facere nimirum, ut habeat, quorum mise¬ reatur, et quos puniat, Ilaec enim est ratio Theodori Bezae, ut supra vidimus, qui do¬ cuit, Deum decrevisse lapsum primi homi¬ nis , et omnium filiorum ejus, ut viam pate¬ faceret misericordia), et justitiae sua) mani¬ festanda). At (ut recte dicit S. Fulgentius loco citato, lib. i. ad Monimum, cap. 22.) Justitia justa non erit, si puniendum reum non invenisse, sed fecisse dicatur; quin po¬ tius major erit injustitia, si lapso Deus tri¬ buat poenam, quem stantem praedestinasse dicitur ad ruinam. Porro misericordia illa crudelis, et immi¬ sericors esset, quae hominem impium faceret, ut eum ab impietate postea liberaret, nisi forte a clementia laudandus esse videatur, qui hominem spoliet ut vestiat ; vulneret, ut sanet; in puteum dejiciat, ut eum inde extrahat. Pulchre S. Augustinus, lib. ni. Confessionum, cap. 2. dicit, malevolam bene¬ volentiam (quod esss non potest) omnino fu¬ turam, si quis miserum aliquem esse velit, ut ei misereatur. Adde quod non poterant Deo deesse plurimae rationes gloriae suae ma¬ nifestandae, etiamsi homines non peccas- sent. Recte enim scripsit Ecclesiasticus cap. 15. non esse Deo necessarios homines im¬ pios. Tertia ratio est sancti Augustini lib. lxxxiii. quaestionum, quaest. 3. Nullo sa¬ piente homine auctore fit homo deterior. Non enim parva ista culpa est, imo tanta est, quae in sapientum quamvis hominem ca¬ dere nequeat. Est autem Deus omni homine sapiente praestantior. Multo minus igitur Deo auctore fit homo deterior. Item quaest. 21. Quisquis omnium, quae sunt, auctor est, et ad cujus bonitatem id tantum pertinet, ut sit omne quod est, non esse, ad eum perti¬ nere nullo pacto potest. Omne autem quod deficit, ab eo, quod est esse, deficit, et ten¬ dit in non esse. Esse autem, et in nullo de¬ ficere bonum est; et malum est deficere. At ille, ad quem non esse non pertinet, non est causa deficiendi, id est, tendendi ad non esse, quia, ut ita dicam, essendi causa est. Boni igitur tantummodo causa est, et pro- pterca ipse summum bonum est, quocirca mali auctor non est, qui omnium, qua? sunt, auctor est, quia in quantum sunt, in tantum bona sunt, lhcc ille. Simili ratione utuntur fere omnes Patres, supra citati, ac praesertim Athanasius, Basi¬ bus, Nazianzenus, Epiphanius, qui ex eo, quod Deus natura bonus est, et summum, purumque bonum, colligunt fieri non posse, ut ab ipso sitorigo mali; cum simile a simili, non a contrario producatur. Quarta ratio est sancti Ambrosili lib. i. Exa- meron cap. 8. Deus cupit eradicari malitiam, et ideo prohibet, ac punit peccata. Et ipse Dei filius venit, ut tollat peccata mundi, ut dissolvat opera diaboli, ut destruat corpus peccati: qua ratione igitur fieri potest, ut Deus velit homines peccare, et ideo non so¬ lum peccata permittat, sed etiam incitet, et impellat homines ad peccatum, et, ut adver¬ sarii blasphemant, ipse per homines, tam¬ quam per instrumenta sua, illa omnia effi¬ caciter peragat, quae scelerate fiunt ab illis? Quinta ratio talis esse potest. Si Deus es¬ set auctbr peccati, ipse quoque peccaret. At peccare non minus Deo repugnat, quam non esse Deum : igitur fieri nequit, ut Deus sit auctor peccati. Propositio certissima est. Nam si Deus esset auctor peccati, certe vel¬ let homines peccare. Homines peccare est malum; igitur Deus vellet malum ; ac per hoc voluntas ejus esset mala ; ubi autem est vo¬ luntas mala, ibi est peccatum. Assumptio primi argumenti probatur ex ipsa Dei natura, qua) plane tollitur, ac destruitur, si pecca¬ tum in ea ponatur. Nam peccare est deficere, Deus autem, si potest deficere, non est, summum et infinitum esse, proinde nec est Deus. Item, peccare non potest, qui non errat aliqua in re, neque enim voluntas po¬ test appetere malum, nisi sub ratione boni. Unde est illud Sapientis : Erant qui operan¬ tur malum , Proverb. xiv (1). Et illud Philo¬ sophi : k Omnis malus ignorans, » 3. Ethi¬ corum cap. I. Deus autem, potest errare, non est summa, et infinitasapientia, proinde nec est Deus. Rursus peccare est recedere a regula le¬ gis a)terna), qua) est ipsa divina sapientia; Deus autem a divina sapientia recedere non potest, quin a se ipse recedat, cum sit ipsa divina sapientia. Denique peccare est averti ab ultimo fine, et summo bono, quod nihil est nisi Deus: igitur sicut repugnat Deum a se averti, ita repugnat Deum peccare. (1) Prov. XIV, 22, CAPUT XI. 271 Accedat postrema ratio ex eo quod omnes communiter execrantur Marcionem, Mani- chaeum, et alios veteres haereticos, qui aliquo modo Deum faciebant auctorem peccatorum: at longe magis execrandi sunt Libertini et Calvinistae. Siquidem illi veteres, cum non auderent in Deum bonum referre causam mali, duos Deos finxerunt, unum bonum, bonorum auctorem; et alterum malum, au¬ ctorem malorum. Libertini vero, et Calvini¬ stae, unum, et eumdem Deum auctorem fa- ciuntomniumscelerum, et flagitiorum, quae ab hominibus perpetrantur. Sed de his hactenus.