Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book II: That God Is Not the Author of Sin
Chapter 12: Objections from other testimonies of Scripture are solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book II. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
In the second place are objected those testimonies by which it is signified that God creates the impious that afterward, in their punishments, the divine justice may shine forth. For thus we read, Proverbs 16: The Lord hath made all things for himself: the wicked also for the evil day. And Romans 9: hath not the potter power… to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? Exodus 9: therefore have I raised thee, that I may shew my power in thee, and my name may be spoken of throughout all the earth — or, as the Apostle cites it, Romans 9: To this purpose have I raised thee, that I may shew my power in thee, etc.
I answer: God does not create the impious save materially, as the theologians speak in the schools — that is, he creates those whom he sees will be impious, that he may use their impiety, which he himself did not make but only foreknew, for manifesting his justice and power. So St. Augustine speaks in epistle 106 to Paulinus: “Although he made not the sins, yet the natures themselves — which of themselves without doubt are good, in which nevertheless, from the choice of the will, the vices of sins were to be, and in many such as that eternal punishment should be rendered them — who created, save God? Why, save because he willed? But why he willed — O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Doth the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Or hath not the potter of the clay power, of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honor, another unto dishonor?” Thus he. Likewise in the Enchiridion, chapter 27, after he had said that the whole of nature was infected with original sin, he speaks thus: “Yet the goodness of the Creator did not cease to form and quicken even the men born of the vitiated and condemned stock, and to order their members through the ages of times and the spaces of places, to quicken their senses, to give them nourishment. For he judged it better to make goods out of evils than to permit no evils to be.” When therefore we read in the Proverbs that God works all things for himself, the wicked also for the evil day, nothing else is to be understood than that God, who brought forth all things unto his glory, procreated nonetheless even those whom he saw would be impious if they were created — that, the punishment which they deserve being rendered them, he might lay open the glory of his justice. And so we deny that any are created by God unto everlasting destruction; but those who are foreseen as going toward evil, or destruction, we say are created for the glory of God. For this is what Solomon says: that God works all things for himself — the wicked also (going, namely) toward the evil day — for himself, that is, unto his glory. Now the whole question seems to be seated in this: whether the impious are created unto the glory of the divine justice, to be shown in their torments, on account of a decree of God which preceded all foreseeing of fault, as Calvin and Beza teach; or rather — what we believe — because God, on account of their foreseen sins, condemned them by his decree from eternity. And so far is Solomon from having said that God, before the foreseeing of sin, decreed to condemn some, that he seems rather to have signified the contrary, when he says that God works all things for himself — that is, that he may show the glory of his mercy or his justice. For to decree damnation on account of foreseen sins belongs to justice; but to decree damnation without the foreseeing of sins seems to belong to injustice. For thus speaks St. Augustine, book 3 against Julian, chapter 18: “God is good, God is just: he can deliver some without good merits, because he is good; he cannot condemn anyone without evil merits, because he is just.” And in epistle 106 to Paulinus: “If God be believed to condemn anyone undeserving, and liable to no sin, he is not believed foreign to iniquity.” God, then, could not, before the foreseeing of sin, decree anyone's damnation, that by that damnation he might show his justice.
Which will become still more manifest from the explication of the second testimony. For when God is said to have made certain vessels unto dishonor, it is not so to be taken as though he himself, from a noble or indifferent matter, made vessels unto dishonor; but that from a condemned and dishonored matter he made vessels such as the matter itself demanded — while yet from the same matter he made certain others unto honor, according to his own will, not according to the condition of the matter; as if a potter should make from clay certain earthen vessels and depute them, as the matter itself requires, to the vilest services, but should adorn certain others, made from the same clay, above the condition of the matter, with gold and gems, and apply them to the noblest uses. From which it follows that the vessels made unto dishonor have it from God that they are vessels, but from the matter that they are unto dishonor; while the vessels made unto honor have both from God — both that they are vessels, and that they are unto honor. So St. Augustine expounds, in epistle 105 to Sixtus: “Or hath not the potter of the clay power, of the same lump — assuredly deservedly and rightly condemned — to make one vessel unto honor unowed, for the grace of mercy, another unto dishonor owed, for the justice of wrath?” And again in the same place: “Although, then, God makes vessels of wrath unto perdition, that he may show his wrath and demonstrate his power, by which he uses well even the evil, and that he may make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he made unto honor — not owed to the condemnable lump, but given by the largess of his grace — yet in those same vessels of wrath, made unto the dishonor owed for the desert of the lump — that is, in men created for the good of nature, but destined to torment for their vices — the iniquity which the most right truth disapproves he himself knows how to condemn, not to do.” And in epistle 106 to Paulinus: “This lump, if it were so neutral that, as it deserved nothing of good, so neither anything of evil, it would not without reason seem iniquity that from it should be made vessels unto dishonor. But since through the free choice of the first man the whole flowed down into condemnation, beyond doubt that from it vessels are made unto honor is to be reckoned not to its own justice, which in no way preceded grace, but to the mercy of God; but that vessels are made unto dishonor is to be reckoned not to the iniquity of God — far be it that there be iniquity with God — but to his judgment.”
But Theodore Beza, observing that this place, so explicated, favors nothing that error of his for whose establishing he had adduced it, confidently rejects St. Augustine's judgment, and contends that by the lump from which are made vessels unto honor and unto dishonor is to be understood the human race not created and corrupted by the vice of the first sin, but to-be-created — or that clay from which God formed Adam, and in him all men. For thus he speaks in the response to the acts of the Colloquy of Montbéliard, former part, page 155: “But Dr. Andreae demands something more express. Since therefore the same Apostle witnesses that God, like a potter, made from the same lump certain vessels for honor, certain for disgrace, how will that saying be able to be explained truly and fitly, unless we go up even to the very fashioning of Adam? For the name of lump befits the human race not as founded, but as to-be-founded — much less so that by the appellation of lump the corrupted human race be understood. For if it were so, the Apostle would by no means have said that God makes from that lump vessels of wrath, but that he leaves in that wretched lump those which were already vessels of wrath; nor would the Apostle have had to labor in vindicating the justice of God in the destruction of the reprobate. God, then, is there compared with a potter; and if it be conceded to a potter to found at his pleasure vessels both for honorable and for base uses, nor is injury on that account thought to be done to the clay, is it not much more lawful for God so to dispose that clay from which he was to found the human race in one man, that thence he might bring forth some in whom he might exercise his just wrath, others whom through his signal goodness he might bless? And how did he found them? Certainly in Adam, to whose creation also without doubt the Apostle looked back, when he made mention of the potter and the clay.” And page 164: “Nor am I ignorant that Augustine himself often by the lump of clay understands the human race, not only as already founded, but also as vitiated by the sin of origin, whence are born those on whom he may have mercy, and those whom he may justly harden. But if that hold, the cause of the destining unto wrath would be as well known as that of the destining unto mercy; and why then would the Apostle, if it were so, exclaim, O the depth of the riches?”
But it is easy to refute this judgment of Beza, and to answer his objections. For — to omit that by the lump the human race corrupted by sin is understood, besides Augustine, by Ambrose, Haymo, Primasius, Bede, Anselm, Thomas, and others on this place — the Apostle himself indicates that very thing when he says: What if God, willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, That he might shew the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he hath prepared unto glory? By which words it is signified that God indeed greatly hated those vessels of dishonor, and willed at the first opportunity to show his wrath and his power in their breaking; yet endured those vessels with much patience, because that was useful to the vessels of mercy, which had been prepared unto glory. But certainly, if God had made the vessels of dishonor by his own proper will, and not with the condition of the matter demanding it, he would not have hated them, nor would he by right have willed to break them; for God hates nothing of the things which he has made. And why, I pray, should God have to endure those vessels with much patience, if he himself had made them of his own accord, and had willed them to be such? Certainly a potter, if from clay he make earthen vessels and depute them to the vilest services, does not on that account hate them, nor is angry with them, nor desires to see them broken. Next, although Beza repudiate the authority of St. Augustine, yet his reason he must, will he nill he, admit. For this is an insoluble argument: if some lump were so neutral that it deserved nothing either of good or of evil (as Beza judges), there would not without reason seem to be iniquity with God, if he made from it vessels unto dishonor; but there is not, nor can be, iniquity with God; therefore the lump from which vessels are made unto dishonor was before corrupted through sin, and deserves the wrath of God, and dishonor. And what Beza says — that the vessels are not made unto dishonor save with the fall of Adam intervening — avails little for demonstrating the justice of God. For, as he himself in the same place (in the response to the acts of the Colloquy of Montbéliard, pages 155 and 164) says: “the decree of God concerning the making from the same lump of some vessels unto honor, others unto dishonor, precedes all foreseeing of fault, and absolutely every cause; but because God could not open a way to the execution of this decree unless man sinned, therefore he ordained the fall of Adam, that he might have those on whom he might have mercy, and those whom he might justly punish.” And so that intervening of the first man's fall pertains not to the divine decree concerning the destroying of the reprobate forever, but to the execution of the decree — which certainly does not take away the injustice of God, but increases it. For as it is unjust, in the execution, to condemn a man deserving nothing, so it is unjust to decree to condemn a man of whom no evil desert exists, not even in foreseeing, when the decree is made. For since justice demands that the punishment answer to the fault, as the execution of damnation is unjust when fault does not precede, so also the decree of damnation is unjust unless it be made on account of fault, at least foreseen. And I said that the injustice is not only not taken away, but even increased, because a new kind of injustice is added, when it is said that God decreed and ordained the fall of the first man that he might have those whom he might justly punish; nay rather, it is more unjust that God should will and ordain that man sin, that he may have those whom he may punish, than that he should simply punish without fault: for fault is a greater evil than punishment, and therefore it is a greater injustice to be to someone, deserving nothing of evil, the author of fault than of punishment.
But let us answer the arguments by which Beza proves that the lump in the Apostle is not the human race already depraved by the vice of origin. The first argument: “If it be so,” says he, “the Apostle would not say that God makes from that lump vessels of wrath, but that he leaves in that wretched lump those which were already vessels of wrath.” I answer: the Apostle rightly said that vessels are made by God from the lump, and not left in the lump; because men not yet born are not in the lump, nor are they vessels, save in potency; but when they are actually born, then they begin to be actually vessels — and vessels formed from the corrupted lump, that is, propagated from the human race infected with the original vice. The second argument: if the Apostle were speaking of the lump already corrupted, he would not labor in asserting the justice of God in the destruction of the reprobate; for the cause of the destining unto wrath would be as well known as that of the destining unto mercy; and why then, if it were so, would he exclaim, O the depth of the riches? I answer: the Apostle does not labor in asserting the justice of God in the destruction of the reprobate, but in this — that in an equal cause God has mercy on the one, has not mercy on the other; that he loves Jacob, hates Esau, before they had done anything of good or evil, though each by nature is a child of wrath; that, in fine, from the same lump — corrupted, namely, and vitiated — he makes some vessels, as the lump itself deserves, unto dishonor, and makes others, beyond all desert, unto honor. For of this distinction no cause can be assigned but the will of God — as also of that by which the potter from the same lump deputes one vessel for foods, another for receiving filth, and adorns the one with gold and painting, and leaves the other earthen, as it is. And to this distinction St. Augustine perpetually refers that exclamation of the Apostle, O the depth of the riches — and above all in epistle 105 to Sixtus, where, treating that “O the depth”: “Nor let them dare to judge concerning his inscrutable judgments, why in one and the same cause upon one comes his mercy, upon another remains his wrath. For who are these, that they should answer God?” And in the same place: “But why he delivers this man rather than that, or delivers him not — let him who can search so great a depth of his judgments; but nevertheless let him beware the precipice.” The third argument: the Apostle without doubt looked back to the creation of the first man when he made mention of the potter and the clay. I answer: that is neither necessary nor likely, since there exists a most open place in Isaias, chapter 45, to which the Apostle — Calvin also and Peter Martyr being witnesses, whom Beza acknowledges as teachers — alluded: Shall the clay say to him that fashioneth it: What art thou making…? where the Prophet does not treat of the first forming of man, but says that God can dispose of men at his pleasure no less than the potter of his vessels. Moreover, if we would speak properly, from the clay whence God formed the first man not many vessels were made, but one only — and that unto honor; for the other men God does not fashion from clay, but daily propagates from other men through carnal generation. Hence the lump from which are made some vessels unto honor, others unto dishonor, is not that clay from which the first man alone, and in a certain extraordinary manner, was formed, but is men themselves, from whom, through the natural way of generation, other men are procreated.
There remains the last place, from chapter 9 of Exodus and chapter 9 to the Romans: To this very purpose have I set thee up, or raised thee, that I may show my power in thee, etc. For from these words it seems to be gathered that Pharao was created by God for this — that he might sin, and, punished for his sins, might demonstrate the power of God. But it is easy, from what has been said before, to explain this place. For whether that “I have set thee up,” or “raised thee,” signify “I created thee,” or “I advanced thee to the kingdom,” or “I preserved thee, when thou oughtest long since to have died” (for the Hebrew word, which to the letter sounds “I made thee stand,” suffers all these), always there is to be understood the foreseen sin, which God does not make, but orders unto good. And so the sense is: since I foresaw that thou wouldst be contrary to me, and with an obstinate mind wouldst resist my precepts; and since I could have hindered thee from being born, or from ascending to the kingdom, or even have taken thee straightway out of the way when first thou begannest to sin: yet I gave thee life and the kingdom, and that for no brief time, that I might use thy malice for the exercising of my people, and might demonstrate my justice and power in thy punishment. St. Augustine, question 32 [al. 18] on Exodus, thus expounds this place: “And for this very cause hast thou been preserved, that I may show my power in thee, and that my name may be declared in all the earth. These words of Scripture the Apostle also set down, when he was engaged in the same most difficult place. And there he says this too: But if God, willing to show his wrath and demonstrate his power, endured with much patience the vessels of wrath — sparing, assuredly, those whom he had foreknown would be evil — which vessels he calls perfected unto perdition.” And below: “God therefore knows how to use the evil — in whom nevertheless he creates the human nature not unto malice, but bears them patiently, so long as he knows it behooves; not idly, but using them for the admonition or the exercising of the good. For behold, that the name of God should be declared in all the earth assuredly profits the vessels of mercy. For their profit, therefore, was Pharao preserved — as both the Scripture witnesses and the outcome teaches.” Further, Rupert of Deutz, explaining this same place, speaks thus: “For God rather raised up Pharao — understand, to the kingdom — and conferred on him the highest power for this reason, that he was a vessel of wrath, and because he was long since fitted for destruction; therefore he was set over the sons of mercy, to be chastised, that he might be the rod of fury and the staff in the hand of the Lord over those whom, through tribulation, he had prepared to carry over into glory. When therefore he says, Therefore have I raised thee up, there is to be understood: to the kingdom — by permitting, namely, not by acting, that thou shouldst ascend to the highest empire, that thou mightest have power, according to the wickedness or hardness of thy heart, to rage against my people.” Thus he. Calvin and Peter Martyr, in the commentary on chapter 9 to the Romans, refer that “I have raised thee” to the disobedience of Pharao, so that the sense is: To this very purpose have I incited thee, that thou shouldst afflict my people and resist me, whereby my power may be demonstrated in thee. And if indeed they meant that Pharao was raised up so that God might use his foreseen disobedience for the just chastisement of the people and the showing of his power, they would say the same which we, with St. Augustine, said a little before. But if they will — as assuredly they seem to will — that God, before all foreseeing of Pharao's sin, absolutely incited Pharao to resist him, they most openly make God the author of sin, and are repugnant to St. Augustine, because in the place cited a little before he said that God does not create men unto malice, but uses well those whom he knows will be evil. Nor from the words of Moses or of Paul can anything else be gathered than that Pharao was created by God, or preserved, or advanced to the kingdom — though he knew he would be disobedient and obstinate — that he might manifest his justice and his power.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XII. Solvuntur objectiones ec aliis testimoniis Scriptura \ Secundo loco objiciuntur ea testimonia, quibus significatur, Deum creare impios, ut postea in eorum poenis justitia divina relu¬ ceat. Sic enim legimus Proverb. xvi: Omnia propter semet ipsum operatus est Dominus, im¬ pium quoque ad diem malum. Et Rom. ix: .4« non habet polestanem figulus facere aliud vas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam? Exod. ix: Idcirco autem posui te, ut ostendam in te for¬ titudinem meam, et narretur nomen meum in omni terra. Vel ut Apostolus citat Rom. ix : In hoc ipsum excitavi te, ut ostendam in (e virtutem meam, etc. (2). Respondeo, Deum non creare impios nisi materialiter, ut in scholis Theologi loquun¬ tur, id est, creare eos, quos videt futuros impios, ut eorum impietate, quam ipse non fecit, sed tantum praescivit, utatur ad justi¬ tiam, et pbtentiam suam manifestandam. Sic S. Augustinus loquitur in epist. 106. ad Paulinum: « Quamvis peccata non fecerit, naturas tamen ipsas, quae per se ipsas sine dubio bona; sunt, quibus tamen ex arbitrio voluntatis futura essent vitia peccatorum, et in multis talia, quibus esset aeterna p<ena reddenda, quis'1 nisi Deus creavit? Quare, nisi quia voluit? quare autem voluerit, 0 homo, tu quis es, qui respondeas Deo? num- quid dicit figmentum ei, qui se finxit, quare sic me fecisti? an non habet potestatem figu¬ lus luti ex eadem conspersione facere, aliud quidem vas in honorem, aliud in contume¬ liam ? » Haec ille. Item in Enchirid. cap. 27. posteaquam dixerat, totam naturam infectam esse pec¬ cato originali, sic ait : « Non sane creatoris desistente bonitate, et hominum, quamvis» de propagine vitiata damnataque nascen¬ tium, formare fcemina, et animare, et ordi¬ nare membra per temporum aetates, per lo¬ corum spatia, vegetare sensus, alimenta do¬ nare. Melius enim judicavit de malis bona facere, quam mala nulla esse permittere. » In Proverbiis igitur cum legimus, Deum om¬ nia propter semetipsum operari, impium (1) Gen. L, 19. - (2) Prov. XVI, 4; Rom. IX, 21; Exod. IX; Rom. IX, 1". CAPUT XII. 273 quoquo ad diem malum; nihil aliud intelli- gendum est, nisi Deum, qui omnia produxit in gloriam suam, eos etiam, quos vidit im¬ pios fore, §i crearentur, nihilominus pro¬ creasse, ut reddita eis poena, quam meren¬ tur, justitia? sua} gloriam patefaciat. Itaque negamus aliquos a Deo creari ad interitum sempiternum, sed eos, qui ad ma¬ lum, sive interitum pra}videntur ituri, dici¬ mus creari propter gloriam Dei. Hoc enim dicit Salomon, Deum omnia propter scmet- ipsum operari, impium quoque ad diem malum (videlicet iturum) propter semetip- sum, id est, ad gloriam suam operari. Tota autem qua}stioin eo sitaesse videtur, an impii creentur ad gloriam divinae justitia}, in eorum suppliciis demonstrandam, ob de¬ cretum Dei, quod omnem culpae praevisio- nem antecesserit, ut Calvinus et Beza docent; an potius, quod nos credimus, quia Deus ob eorum praevisa peccata, eos decreto suo ab aeternitate damnaverit. Tantum autem abest, ut Salomon dixerit, Deum ante peccati prai- visionem decrevisse aliquos damnare, ut po¬ tius contrarium significasse videatur, cum ait, Deum omnia operari propter semetip- sum, id est, ut gloriam misericordiae, justi- tiaeve suae demonstret. Nam damnationem decernere ob praevisa peccata, justitiae est. Sine praevisione autem peccatorum damna¬ tionem decernere, injustitiae esse videtur; sic enim loquitur S. Augustinus lib. iii. in Julianum, cap. 18: « Bonus est Deus, justus est Deus, potest aliquos sine bonis meritis liberare, quia bonus est; non potest quem¬ quam sine malis meritis damnare, quia ju¬ stus est. » Et in epist. 106. ad I)aulinum : « Quemquara immeritum, et nulli peccato obnoxium, si Deus damnare creditur, alienus ab iniquitate non creditur. » Non potuit igi¬ tur Deus ante praevisionem peccati decerne¬ re damnationem alicujus, ut justitiam suam ea damnatione mostraret. Quod etiam manifestius fiet ex testimonii secundi explicatione. Nam quod dicitur Deus fecisse vasa quantam in contumeliam, non sic accipiendum est, quasi ipse ex mate¬ ria nobili, aut indifferenti fecerit vasa in con¬ tumeliam, sed quod ex materia damnata, et contumeliosa fecerit vasa, qualia materia ipsa postulabat, cum tamen ex eadem mate¬ ria fecerit alia quaedam in honorem, pro vo¬ luntate sua, non pro conditione materiae quomodo si figulus ex luto vasa quaedam lutea faceret: eaque ut pia ter ia ipsa requirit. vilissimis ministeriis deputaret; quaedam au¬ tem ex eodem luto facta, supra materiae conditionem auro, et gemmis ornaret, et ad nobilissimos usus adhiberet. Ex quo sequi¬ tur, ut vasa facta in contumeliam, a Deo habeant, ut sint vasa ; a materia vero, ut sint in contumeliam; vasa vero facta in ho¬ norem, a Deo utrumque habeant, et quod vasa sint, et quod in honorem sint. Ita exponit S. Augustinus in epist. 105. ad Sixtum : « An non habet, inquit, potestatem figulus luti ex eadem massa, utique merito, recteque damnata, facere aliud vas in hono¬ rem indebitum, propter misericordia} gra¬ tiam, aliud in contumeliam debitam propter irae justitiam. >; Et rursus ibidem : « Quamvis itaque Deus faciat vasa irae in perditionem, ut ostendat iram, et demonstret potentiam suam, qua bene etiam utitur malis, et ut notas faciat divitias gloriae suae, in vasa mise¬ ricordiae, quae fecit in honorem, non damna¬ bili massae debitum, sed suae gratiae largitate donatum, tamen in eisdem irae vasis propter meritum massae in contumeliam debitam factis, id est, hominibus, propter naturae bo¬ num creatis, sed proptar vitia supplicio desti¬ natis, iniquitatem, quam rectissima veritas improbat, damnare novit ipse, non facere. » Et in epist. 106. ad Paulinum : « Ilaec massa, inquit, si esset ita media, ut quemadmodum nihil boni, ita nec mali aliquid mereretur, non frustra videretur iniquitas, ut ex ea fic rent vasa in contumeliam. Cum vero per liberum arbitrium primi hominis in condem¬ nationem universa destruxerit, procul dubio quod ex ea fiunt vasa in honorem, non ipsius justitiae, quae gratiam nulla praecessit, sed Dei misericordiae : quod vero in contume¬ liam, non iniquitati Dei, quae absit ut sit apud Deum, sed judicio deputandum est. » Sed Theodorus Beza animadvertens hunc locum ita explicatum errori suo , ad quem stabiliendum eum adduxerat, nihil favere, confidenter S. Augustini sententiam rejicit, et per massam, ex qua fiunt vasa in honorem, et in contumeliam, intelligendum esse con¬ tendit genus humanum non creatum, et vitio primi peccati corruptum, sed creandum, sive lutum illud, ex quo Deus Adamum, et in illo omnes homines finxit. Sic enim loquitur in responsione ad acta Colloquii Montisbel- gardensis, parte priore, pag. 155 : « Sed re¬ quirit, inquit, D. Andreas aliquid expressius. Cum igitur idem Apostolus Deum testatur instar figuli ex eadem massa quaedam vasa LIBEU ii. honori, quaedam dedecori fecisse, quomodo dictum istud explicari vere, et commode po¬ terit, quin ad ipsum usque Adami opificium ascendamus? nec enimmassa? nomen humano generi condito, sed condendo convenit, ne dum ut massa; appellatione corruptum hu¬ manum genus intelligatuc. Nam si ita esset, minime dixisset Apostolus, Deum ex illa massa facere vasa irae, sed quae jam essent ira; vasa, in illa misera massa relinquere, nec Apostolo laborandum fuisset in afferenda Dei justitia in reproborum exitio. Deus igitur illic confertur cum figulo, cui si conceditur vasa tum ad honestos, tum ad turpes usus arbitrio suo condere, neque luto propterea fieri pu¬ tatur injuria : an non multo magis Deo sic lutum illud, ex quo humanum genus in uno homine conderet, disponere licuit, ut inde alios educeret, in quibus justam iram suam exerceret, alios quos per insignem suam bo¬ nitatem bearet. Quomodo vero illa condidit? certe in Adamo, ad cujus etiam creationem procul dubio respexit Apostolus, cum figuli, et luti meminit. » Et pag. 164. « Nec etiam ignoro, inquit, ipsum Augustinum saepe per luti massam intelligere humanum genus, non solum ut jam conditum, sed etiam originis peccato vitiatum, unde nascantur, quorum misereatur, et quos juste induret. Sed si valet istud, tam nota esset causa destinationis ad viam, quam destinationis ad misericordiam. Cur autem Apostolus, si ita esset, exclamaret, 0 altitudo divitiarum. ,> Sed facile est, istam Bezae sententiam re¬ futare, et ejus objectionibus respondere. Nam ut omittam quod per massam, genus huma¬ num peccato corruptum, intelligunt praeter Augustinum, Ambrosius, Ilaymo, Primasius, Beda, Anselmus, Thomas, et alii in hunc locum, id ipsum indicat Apostolus cum ait : (i Si Deus volens ostendere iram, et notam facere potentiam suam sustinuit in multa patientia, vasa irae, apta in interitum, ut ostenderet divitias gloriae suae, in vasa mise¬ ricordiae, quae praeparavit in gloriam. » Qui¬ bus verbis significatur, Deum quidem valde odisse vasa illa contumeliae, et voluisse primo quoque tempore in eorum confractione ostendere iram, et potentiam suam : tamen sustinuisse vasa illa in multa partientia, quia id utile esset vasis misericordiae, quae praepa¬ rata erant in gloriam. At certe si Deus fecisset vasa contumeliae propria sua voluntate, non id exigente con¬ ditione materiae, non ea odisset, neque jure confringere vellet. Nihil enim Deus odit eorum, quae fecit. Et cur, quaeso, sustinere deberet Deus in multa patientia vasa illa, si ea sponte ipse fecisset, et talia esse voluisset? certe figulus si ex luto faciat vasa lutea, ea- que vilissimis ministeriis deputet, non pro¬ pterea illa odit, neque illis irascitur, neque confracta videre cupit. Deinde quamvis S. Augustini auctoritatem Beza repudiet, ejus tamen rationem, velit no¬ lit, admittere debet. Est enim illud insolubile argumentum, si massa aliqua ita esset media, ut nec boni, nec mali aliquid mereretur (ut Beza existimat) non frustra videretur iniquitas apud Deum, si is ex ea faceret vasa in contu¬ meliam : at non est, nec esse potest iniquitas apud Deum : igitur massa, ex qua fiunt vasa in contumeliam, est ante corrupta per pecca¬ tum, et iram Dei contumeliamque meretur. Quod vero Beza dicit, non fieri vasa in con¬ tumeliam, nisi interveniente lapsu Adami, parum valetad Dei justitiam demonstrandam. Nam ut ipse ibidem (in responsione ad acta Colloquii Montisbelgardensis, pag. 155 et 104.) dicit : « Decretum Dei de faciendis ex eadem massa vasis aliis in honorem, aliis in contumeliam, antecedit omnem praevisionem culpa;, et omnem omnino causam ; sed quia non poterat Deus exeeutioni hujus decreti viam aperire, nisi homo peccaret, ideo ordi¬ navit lapsum Adami, ut haberet quorum misereretur, et quos juste puniret. » Itaque interventus ille lapsus primi hominis non ad decretum divinum de perdendis in aeternum reprobis, sed ad exeeutionem decreti per¬ tinet. Quod certe injustitiam Dei non tollit, sed auget. Sicut enim injustum est in exeeu- tione damnare hominem nihil merentem ; ita injustum est, decernere hominem damnare, cujus nullum extet malum meritum, ne in praevisione quidem, cum lit decretum. Cum enim justitia exigat, ut poena i'espondeat culpa;, sicut exeeutio damnationis injusta est, culpa non praecedente, ita etiam decretum damnationis injustum est, nisi ob culpam, saltem praevisam fiat. Dixi autem injustitiam non solum non tolli, sed etiam augeri, quia additur novum genus injustitiae, cum dicitur Deum decrevisse, et ordinasse primi hominis lapsum, ut haberet, quos juste puniret, quin etiam magis inju¬ stum est, ut Deus velit et ordinet, ut homo peccet, ut habeat quos puniat, quam ut simpliciter absque culpa puniat. Majus enim malum est culpa, quam poena, et ideo major CAPUT XII. injustitia est alicui nihil mali merito auctorem esse culpae, quam poena;. Sed respondeamus ad argumenta, quibus Reza probat, massam apud Apostolum non esse genus humanum, originis vitio jam de¬ pravatum. Primum argumentum : « Si ita est, inquit, non diceret Apostolus, Deum ex illa massa facere vasa irae, sed quae jam essent ira* vasa in illa misera massa relin¬ quere.» Respondeo, recte Apostolum dixisse, a Deo vasa fieri ex massa, non autem relinqui in massa ; quia homines nondum nati non sunt in massa, nec sunt vasa, nisi in potentia. Cum autem actu nascuntur, tunc incipiunt esse actu vasa, et quidem ex massa corrupta formata, id est, ex genere humano originali vitio infecto, propagata. Secundum argumentum, Si de massa jam corrupta loqueretur Apostolus, non labora¬ ret in asserenda Dei justitia in reproborum exitio. Tam enim nota esset causa destina¬ tionis ad iram, quam destinationis ad mise¬ ricordiam. Cur autem sitita esset, exclama¬ ret, o altitudo divitiarum ? Respondeo, non laborare Apostolum in asserenda Dei justitia in reproborum exitio, sed in eo, quod in pari causa Deus unius misereatur, alterius non misereatur. Quod Jacob diligat, Esau odio habeat, antequam quidquam boni, vel mali egerint, cum uterque natura sit filius ira*. Quod denique ex eadem massa, corrupta videlicet, et vitiata, alia vasa efficiat , ut massa ipsa meretur, in contumeliam, alia praeter omne meritum efficiat in honorem. Hujus enim discretionis nulla causa assignari potest, nisi Dei voluntas, quemadmodum etiam illius, qua figulus ex eadem massa aliud vas deputat cibis, aliud sordibus exci¬ piendis, et illud ornat auro, et pictura, hoc luteum, ut est, relinquit. Atque ad hanc dis¬ cretionem perpetuo refert S. Augustinus illam Apostoli exclamationem : O altitudo di¬ vitiarum. , ac praesertim in epist. 105. ad Six- tum, ubi tranctans illud, O altitudo : « Nec, inquit, de inscrutabilibus judiciis ejus audeant judicare, cur in una eademque causa super alium veniat misericordia ejus, super alium maneat ira ejus. Qui enim sunt isti, qui re¬ spondeant Deo? » Et ibidem : « Cur autem istum potius, quam illum liberet, aut non li¬ beret, scrutetur qui potest judiciorum ejus tara magnum profundum, veruntamen caveat praecipitium. » 27 it Tertium argumentum. Ad primi hominis creationem proculdubio respexit Apostolus cum figuli, et luti meminit. Respondeo, id non esse necessarium, nec verisimile, cum exstet locus apertissimus in Isaia, cap. 45. ad quem Apostolus, Calvino etiam, et Petro Martyre testibus, quos Beza pneceptores agnoscit, allusit : «Numquid dicit lutum figulo suo, quid facis etc. » ubi Propheta non tractat de prima hominis formatione, sed dicit, non minus posse Deum de hominibus pro arbitrio dispo¬ nere, quam figulum de vasibus. Praeterea si proprie loqui velimus, ex luto, unde formavit Deus primum hominem, non sunt facta multa vasa, sed unum tantum, idque in honorem. Caeteros enim homines non ex luto Deus fin¬ git, sed ex aliis hominibus , per carnalem generationem quotidie ' propagat. Proinde massa, ex qua fiunt vasa alia in honorem, alia in contumeliam, non est lutum illud, ex quo primus homo solus, et extraordinario quodam modo formatus est, sed homines ipsi sunt, ex quibus per naturalem generationis viam alii homines procreantur. Restat ultimus locus ex cap. ix. Exodi, et cap. ix. ad Rom. In hoc ipsum posui, sive excitavi, te, ut ostendam in te potentiam meam etc. (1). Videtur enim his verbis colligi Pha- raonem, ideo fuisse a Deo creatum, ut pec¬ caret, et ob peccata punitus, Dei potentiam demonstraret. Sed facile est iis, quae antea dicta sunt, hunc locum explicare, sive enim illud, posui , aut excitavi te, significet, creavi te, sive ad regnum promovi, sive conservavi, cum jamdudum mori debuisses (omnia enim haec patitur vox Hebraea *7*TH13!Pn qua; ad verbum sonat, stare feci te) semper intelli- gendum est, praevisum peccatum, quod Deus non facit, sed ordinat in bonum. Itaque sensus est, cum praeviderim lore te mihi contrarium ; et obstinata mente prae¬ ceptis meis repugnaturum ; et cum potuerim impedire, ne nascereris, aut ne ad regnum conscenderes, vel etiam statiin te de medio tollere, cum primum peccare coepisti, ideo tamen vitam, et regnum tribui tibi, idque ad non breve tempus, ut malitia tua uterer ad exercitium populi mei, et justitiam, ac potentiam meam in tuo supplicio demonstra¬ rem. S. Augustinus quaest. 32. in Exodum, ita hunc locum exponit ; «Et propter hoc ipsum conservatus es, ut ostendam in te potentiam (t Exod. IX, 16. 276 LIBEH II. meam, et ut annuntietur nomen meum in universa terra. Haec Scripturae verba et Apo¬ stolus posuit, cum in eodem loco perdifficili versaretur. Ibi autem et hoc ait, si autem volens Deus ostendere iram, et demonstrare potentiam suam, sustinuit in multa patientia vasa irae, parcendo utique iis, quos malos futuros esse praescierat, quae vasa dicit per¬ fecta in perditionem. » Et infra : « Novit ergo Deus uti malis, in quibus tamen humanam naturam non ad malitiam creat, sed eos per¬ fert patienter, quo usque scit oportere, non inaniter, sed utendo eis ad admonitionem, vel exercitationem bonorum. Ecce enim ut annuntiaretur nomen Dei in universa terra, vasis misericordiae utique prodest. Ad eorum itaque utilitatem Pharao servatus est, sicut et Scriptura testatur, et exitus docet. » Porro Rupertus Tuitiensis hunc eumdom locum explanans, ita ait : « Nam idcirco po¬ tius Deus Pharaonem excitavit, subauditur in regnum, et idcirco summam illi pote¬ statem contulit, quia vas irae fuit, et quia jaindudum aptus erat in interitum, idcirco corripiendis superpositus est misericordiae filiis, ut esset virga furoris, et baculus in manu Domini super cos, quos per tribula¬ tionem ingloriam transferre praeparavit. Igi¬ tur cura dicit, idcirco excitavi te, subau¬ diendum est, in regnum, permittendo vide¬ licet, non agendo ut in summum ascenderes imperium, ut haberes potestatem secundum nequitiam, vel duritiem cordis tui saeviendi in populum meum. » Haec ille. Calvinus et Petrus Martyr in comment. cap. ix. ad Romanos referunt illud : Excitavi te , ad inobedientiam Pharaonis, ut sensus sit. In hoc ipsum incitavi te, ut populum meum affligeres, et mihi resisteres, quo in te demonstretur potentia mea. Et si quidem vellent, Pharaonem excitatum, ut ejus ino- bedientia praevisa Deus uteretur ad populi justam castigationem, et potentiae suae osten¬ sionem, idem dicerent, quod nos cumS. Au¬ gustino paulo ante diximus. Sed si velint, quod sane velle videntur, Deum ante omnem peccati Pharaonis praevisionem absolute Pha¬ raonem excitasse, ut sibi resisteret, aper¬ tissime Deum auctorem peccati faciunt, et S. Augustino repugnant, quia in loco, paulo ante citato, dixit, Deum non creare homines ad malitiam, sed iis, quos malos scit futuros, bene uti. Neque ex verbis Mosis, aut Pauli» aliud colligi potest, quam Pharaonem, a Deo fuisse creatum, vel conservatum, vel ad re¬ gnum promotum, quamvis eum inobedientem, et obstinatum futurum sciret, ut justitiam, et potentiam suam manifestaret.