Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book II: That God Is Not the Author of Sin
Chapter 16: Some places of St. Augustine are explained, which in appearance seem to favor the adversaries
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book II. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
After the places of the Scriptures, Calvin and Beza object certain testimonies of St. Augustine, from book 5 against Julian, from the Enchiridion, and from the book On Grace and Free Choice. Those, then, and others which meanwhile occur to us, we shall briefly explain.
Let us begin from the first tome of his works. Book 9 of the Confessions, chapter 8, St. Augustine speaks thus of holy Monica, who in girlhood was cured, through the reviling of a maidservant, of the wine-bibbing to which she had begun to be given: “What didst thou, O my God? Whence didst thou cure? Whence heal? Didst thou not bring forth a hard and sharp reviling from another soul, as a healing knife, out of thy hidden provisions, and with one stroke cut away that rottenness?” Here now Calvin, had he fallen upon this place, would not hesitate to say that that maidservant was incited and compelled by God to revile her mistress, and that this is signified by those words: Didst thou not bring forth a hard and sharp reviling from another soul? But that St. Augustine's mind was altogether other will be understood from his words set at the end of the chapter: “Thou, Lord, ruler of things heavenly and earthly, wresting to thy uses the depths of the torrent, ordering the turbulent flux of the ages, even from the madness of one soul didst heal another — lest anyone, when he observes this, attribute it to his own power, if by his word another be corrected whom he wills to be corrected.” For from these words we understand that that maidservant was not incited or compelled by God to the reviling; but that that reviling, already conceived in her mind and bursting outward in words, was ordered by the providence of God to the healing of Monica's vice. For God is not the fountain whence the turbulent torrents of crimes flow, but he is the wondrous artificer who wrests to his own use those torrents flowing of themselves, and orders them to the accomplishing of some good. And so God is said to have brought forth that reviling from the soul of that maidservant, as a healing knife, out of his hidden provisions, because the maid could not conceive or utter the reviling at another time, in another place, against another person, than God had permitted; and God did not permit the reviling to be conceived or uttered by her, save as it was useful for curing Monica, and permitted it only at that time and place at which he foresaw it would be useful for Monica's health.
Another testimony stands in the Enchiridion, chapter 100, which is cited more than once by Calvin and Beza. St. Augustine speaks thus: “For to this end are the works of the Lord great, sought out in all his wills: that, in a wondrous and ineffable manner, that is not done beside his will which is done even against his will — because it would not be done unless he suffered it; nor assuredly does he suffer it unwilling, but willing; nor would he, being good, suffer evils to be done, unless, being almighty, he could even from evil do well.” Two things the adversaries gather from this place. First, that evils, or sins, are not done beside the will of God, and hence that God wills that they be done; and that it was rightly said by them that Adam fell by the decree and will of God. Second, that God permits evils not unwilling, nor idly looking on, but willing; and thereby that the distinction of the Catholics is empty who say that evils are done not with God willing, but with God permitting — as though permission did not include will. But it will not be difficult to answer, if we first briefly explain how the will of God stands toward sins. I say, then, that God toward sins has not, positively, either a willing or a nilling, but, negatively, a not-willing. God has not a positive willing of sins, because he is good and just; nor would he be good and just if he willed sins (that is, evils) and iniquities. Nor has he a positive nilling, because he is almighty; nor would he be almighty if anything were done with him unwilling — and something would be done with him unwilling if something were done which he willed not to be done. He has not, then, a willing or a nilling, but a not-willing, according to that of Psalm 5: thou art not a God that willest iniquity. But Beza meets us, in the response to the acts of the Colloquy of Montbéliard, page 183, and says that if God with respect to sins has not a willing or a nilling, but only a not-willing, it follows that of the things which are carried on in the world by far the greatest part is done with God either improvident or careless — of which the one is utterly foreign to his providence, the other to his power. I answer: neither follows. For even if God wills not that sins be done, yet he knows they will be, and could hinder them if he willed; hence they are not done with him improvident. Moreover, he wills not to hinder, wills to permit, wills to order, wills to punish; hence they are not done with him careless, and as it were idly looking on. Nor do we say what the same Beza reprehends on the preceding page — that the divine providence extends only to the ordering of evils, and as it were bounding them with limits, so that Satan can set on foot against the Church whatever he pleases, though he cannot accomplish whatever he pleases. Not this alone, I say, do we grant to the providence of God; but we add too that nothing can be done save with God permitting; and thereby Satan not only will not accomplish against the Church whatever he pleases, but will not even set on foot whatever he pleases, but whatever it shall have pleased God to permit him. It is to be observed moreover that what we said — that God with respect to sin has not a positive nilling — must be understood of the will of good pleasure, which is absolute. For God has a nilling of the doing of sins by the will of sign, which is not absolute, but conditioned. For the will of sign is called the precept, or the prohibition; and that will can be called conditioned for this reason: that when God commands that something be not done, he at the same time adds a punishment if it be done. Hence, when he forbids something, he does not absolutely will that it be not done, but wills either that it be not done, or that he who does it be punished. Wherefore the divine will remains ever unconquered, nor can it in any way be resisted; for even if some transgress his law, and do what he forbade to be done, yet they escape not the torment which the same threatens to transgressors. From these things the testimony of St. Augustine can most easily be explained. For he says that that is not done beside his will which is done against his will — not because he himself wills that thing to be done (for so he would fight with himself), but for two other causes, which the same author set down in the same place. The first cause is that (as we said), when God forbids sins, he does not simply will them not to be done, but either not to be done, or him who does them to be punished. The other cause is that, although God wills not that sins be done, yet he wills to permit that they be done, being about to order them, by his infinite power and wisdom, unto good. The former cause Augustine sets in the preceding words, when he speaks thus: “These are the great works of the Lord, sought out in all his wills, and so wisely sought out that, when the angelic and human creature had sinned — that is, had done not what he willed, but what itself willed — even through that same will of the creature, by which was done what the Creator willed not, he himself fulfilled what he willed; using well even the evil, as supremely good, unto the damnation of those whom he justly predestinated unto punishment, and unto the salvation of those whom he benignly predestinated unto grace. For so far as pertains to themselves, they did what God willed not (by the will of sign); but so far as pertains to the omnipotence of God, they were in no way able to effect it. For by this very thing, that they acted against the will of God, the will of God was done concerning them.” Behold by what reasoning it is not done beside the will of God: because, namely, he himself does with the sinners what he wills, when he sentences them to the eternal damnation which he had threatened to sinners. The latter cause he sets in the words following, speaking thus: “For to this end are all the works of the Lord sought out in all his wills, that in a wondrous and ineffable manner that is not done beside his will which is done against his will — because it would not be done, unless he suffered it.” For this reason, then, sins are not done beside the will of God: because they would not be done if he did not suffer them; and thereby, though God has not a willing that they be done, he has yet a willing to permit.
But (say the adversaries) to will to permit includes to will to be done. For here Augustine subjoins: “Nor assuredly does he suffer it unwilling, but willing.” And a little before, chapter 95: “Nothing therefore is done, unless the Almighty will it to be done — whether by suffering it to be done, or by himself doing it.” Where St. Augustine openly says that God wills to be done that which he suffers to be done. And chapter 96 he says it is good that evils be: “Although the things which are evil, insofar as they are evil, are not good, yet that there be not only goods, but also evils, is good.” But what is good, God wills; therefore God wills evils to be, or to be done. Peter Martyr adds, on chapter 9 of the epistle to the Romans, that the word permission in the Scriptures signifies also the will and operation of God, not the mere negation; and he alleges that of 1 Corinthians 16: I hope that I shall abide some time with you, if the Lord permit; and that of Hebrews 6: And this will we do, if God permit. I answer: properly to permit does not include to will, but not to nill — that is, not to hinder; and the doctrine of the Catholic theologians is most true, who say that God wills goods, but evils he wills not, but permits; and that it is a far other thing to will evils to be done, and to will to permit that evils be done. For to will evils to be done belongs to an evil will, which either is delighted with evils, or wills to use them for goods — against that rule: “Evils are not to be done, that goods may come.” But to will to permit evils can belong to a good will — and above all in the highest governor of all things, to whom it belongs not to hinder the course of things, however defectible, that hence he may show first what free choice can do of itself, then what the benefit of his grace and the judgment of his justice can do, as St. Augustine speaks, book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 12 [al. 10]. When therefore the same Augustine says that God permits evils not nilling, but willing, we understand that God permits not unwilling, but willing to permit — not, however, properly willing that they be done. And when he says that nothing can be done unless God will it to be done, whether by suffering it to be done or by himself doing it, he explains himself. For he would not say “either by suffering, or by doing,” if God properly willed evils as well as goods to be done. For God acts by will; and therefore whatever he wills to be done is done, and is done for this reason, that he himself by willing does it. And so, if God willed evils to be done, he would not permit, but would do, the evils. To what purpose, then, would Augustine distinguish permission from work, saying, either by suffering it to be done, or by himself doing it, if he judged that God properly wills as well what he permits as what he does — since he was not ignorant that God does by willing? The sentence of that place, then, is this: nothing can be done unless God will it to be done, at least by accident — that is, unless he will to permit it to be done by others, or even will himself to procure and do it. Further, what he adjoins — that it is good that evils be — is to be explained in the same way: namely, that it is good that they be with God permitting, not with God acting and willing; which is to be good by accident, because it is joined with something good of itself. For evils of themselves bring no adornment to the other things; yet, ordered by God and set in their own place, they make good things stand out the more, as the same Augustine teaches in the same book, chapter 11 [al. 96]; who also on the same matter speaks thus in book 3 On Free Choice, chapter 9 [al. 11]: “How does he justly punish sins, which, if they had been wanting, his creation would not be full and perfect? Here it is answered that not the sins themselves, nor the misery itself, are necessary to the perfection of the universe, but souls insofar as they are souls — which, if they will, sin; if they have sinned, become wretched.” Thus he. Wherefore it is not so much good that sins be, as that they be ordered, after that, God permitting, they exist. Wherefore St. Augustine, from his saying that it is good that evils be, does not gather that God wills evils, but only that he permits them. For these are his words: “Nor is it to be doubted that God does well even in suffering to be done whatever is done ill. For he suffers this only by a just judgment; and assuredly what is just is good. Although, then, the things which are evil, insofar as they are evil, are not good, yet that there be not only goods, but also evils, is good. For unless this were good, that there be evils also, they would in no way be suffered to be by the almighty Good — for whom assuredly it is as easy not to suffer to be what he wills not, as it is easy to do what he wills.” Nor is there in the Scriptures any place where the word permit cannot rightly be expounded of permission properly so called, which signifies not to will, but not to hinder. For what is said in 1 Corinthians 16 — I hope that I shall stay with you some little time, if the Lord permit — is most rightly understood as said for this: if the Lord shall not hinder. For often the Apostle thought to go somewhere, and the Lord destined him elsewhere. Acts 16: And when they had passed through Phrygia, and the country of Galatia, they were forbidden by the Holy Ghost to preach the word of God in Asia. And when they were come into Mysia, they attempted to go into Bithynia, and the Spirit of Jesus suffered them not. And Romans 1: And I would not have you ignorant, brethren, that I have often purposed to come unto you, (and have been hindered hitherto.) And what is said in Hebrews 6 — And this will we do, if God permit — has the same sense. For the Apostle writes that he will discourse no more of the rudiments of the faith — of penance from dead works, of Baptism, the imposition of hands, and the like — but of those things which pertain to the perfection of the Christian life. And he adds: if God permit, because, namely, he knew not whether God would permit him to do it, or would call him to other works; for by these words he shows that he depends altogether on the providence of God, and that the things he undertakes with God assenting, the same he will finish with God willing, or lay aside with him hindering.
Another testimony Calvin and Beza object again, in the same Enchiridion, chapter 101, where St. Augustine speaks thus: “Sometimes a man with a good will wills something which God wills not; and again it can come to pass that a man with an evil will wills that which God wills with a good one. So much does it matter what willing befits man, what God, and to what end each refers his will, that it be either approved or disapproved.” For by these words Augustine seems to admit that God wills that very thing which evil men will while they work evils; but that the will of God is therefore good, because God wills with a good intention what the impious will with an evil intention. But this is most easily solved. For in those things which are of themselves evil, and in no case can be done well, God never wills that which evil men will. But in things which are evil by reason of a positive precept forbidding them, or of some circumstance, it can easily come to pass that God with a good will wills what evil men will with an evil will, and what good men refuse with a good will — so that they agree more with the good will of God who refuse than they who will what he himself wills. The examples are in the same place of St. Augustine. God wills some man to die, because his sins deserve it; this will of God is just, and thereby good; perchance also God wills this because he foresees that that man, if he live longer, will sin more gravely and be more atrociously punished in the lower world — whence the will of God which wills him to be taken out of the way is not only just, but even merciful. But it happens that his son — not because he knows his father deserves death, or will sin more gravely if he live, but because he hates him, or desires quickly to possess the paternal inheritance — wills the same man to die: without doubt this will of the son, though he will what God also wills, is most iniquitous; for the son is bound to love and help his parents, and much more not to hate them. Hence the will of this son would agree more with the good will of God if he refused what God wills than it now agrees, when he wills what God wills. But it can in no way be gathered from these things that God is the author of sins, or wills sins to be done. For even if God wills at times what the sinner wills, yet God does not will that he will this — nay, he wills the contrary, at least by the will of sign, by which he forbade him to will it. But if God commanded the son to slay his parent, as he commanded Abraham to slay his son, then not with an evil will would the son will his parent to die, while he willed it not from hatred of his father, but that he might comply with God commanding. But if the son have not a command of God about slaying the parent, and yet perchance have come to know that it pleases God that he die, he ought indeed not to murmur against God, but rather contrariwise to praise him and acquiesce in his will, prepared to bear his father's death with an even mind, when it shall have happened; but meanwhile he ought not to fail him, because he has the commandment of honoring his parents, and of helping and sustaining them; and the son's zeal in preserving his parent will without doubt please God, though he himself, by another way known to himself, have decreed that that parent be slain.
There follows another testimony, which they object from book 6 On Genesis to the Letter, chapter 15, where we read that the will of God is the necessity of things, and that that will necessarily be which God shall have willed. Calvin uses this testimony, book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 23, §8, to prove that God decreed from eternity, and willed, that the first man should sin, and with his whole posterity run into the guilt of damnation. But the answer is easy. For we confess that all that God wills is infallibly fulfilled, for no one can resist the will of God; but Calvin had to prove that God, by the judgment of blessed Augustine, willed that the first man should sin. For in the place cited St. Augustine writes not this, but discourses of the creation of man, and says that man was formed from mud because God so willed, and that this is not repugnant to the natural causes of human generation, because God gave to those causes that man could be generated from them, but did not bind his own power to those causes.
Another testimony they object from book 5 against Julian, chapter 3, where, treating that, He delivered them up to shameful affections, etc.: “There follows,” says he, “for this cause God delivered them up to shameful affections. Thou hearest ‘for this cause’; and thou askest in vain how God's delivering is to be understood, laboring much to show that he delivers by deserting.” By which words St. Augustine seems not to admit that explication which we followed above — that God delivers by deserting. I answer: Julian is not reprehended by St. Augustine for having said that God delivers by deserting, but because he said that one sin is not the punishment of another sin, and judged that this was well proved if he showed that God delivers by deserting. And so St. Augustine himself demonstrates that one sin is the punishment of another sin, whether God deliver a man to his own desires by deserting, or in another manner; and that thereby Julian labored in vain to show that God delivers by deserting: “Thou hearest ‘for this cause,’ and askest in vain how God's delivering is to be understood, laboring much to show that he delivers by deserting. But in whatever manner he deliver, for this cause he delivered, for this cause he deserted. For the Apostle took care to say how great a punishment it is to be delivered to shameful passions — whether by deserting, or by another manner, explicable or inexplicable, in which he does these things who is supremely good and ineffably just.” Moreover, Augustine reprehends Julian because by “desert” he understood not the abandoning, or not helping, of one falling, but the suffering one to stick in the desires in which he already was; and Augustine demonstrates that to be delivered to one's desires is not for there to be permitted evil desires in someone, but to desert, and by deserting to suffer that he consent to the evil desires. For thus speaks Augustine, setting down and reprehending Julian's words: “They were already seething, sayest thou, with the desires of outrages. And thou addest and sayest: how then are they to be thought to have fallen into such deeds through the power of God delivering them? What more, then, was done, I beseech thee — or what would ‘God delivered them to the desires of their heart’ mean — if they were already in a manner possessed by the evil desires of their heart? Is it, however, a consequence that, if one have evil desires of the heart, he now also consents to them for the committing of those same evils? And thereby it is one thing to have evil desires of the heart, another to be delivered to them — namely, so that by consenting to them he is possessed by them; which comes to pass when by the divine judgment he is delivered to them.” And that St. Augustine does not reprehend, but approves, that God delivers by deserting is evident from the words following: “When therefore a man is said to be delivered to his own desires, thence he becomes guilty: that, deserted by God, he yields to them and consents; is conquered, dragged, captured, possessed. For by whom one has been overcome, to him also he is bound as slave; and the consequent sin becomes for him the punishment of the preceding sin.” But they object again those words from the same chapter: “But what is it that thou sayest — when they are said to be delivered to their own desires, they are to be understood as left through the divine patience, not compelled into sins through the power? As though the same Apostle had not set down both together, both the patience and the power, where he says: But if God, willing to show his wrath and to demonstrate his power, endured in much patience the vessels of wrath, which are perfected unto perdition.” Where St. Augustine seems to concede that some are compelled by God, through the power, into sins. I answer: St. Augustine rightly teaches against Julian that God's delivering some to their own desires is not a deserting through mere patience — as though God were said to deliver some to their own desires only because he patiently tolerates them and leaves them for a time unpunished. For otherwise, as the same Augustine gathers in the following chapter, he who asks of God that he deliver him not to his own desires would be asking that his goodness be not patient toward him. Wherefore from this place we clearly understand that Julian took the desertion of God not for the abandonment of the divine help, as we with Augustine take it, but for simple permission and tolerance — in which manner we confess that God does not deliver some to their own desires by desertion alone. Further, that not the patience only, but also the power, of God is discerned in the hardening of sinners can be understood in two ways, according to the mind of St. Augustine. First, because the end of the hardening is that in the punishing of the hardened sinner — which without doubt will be wonderful and horrible — the justice and power of God may appear; and this the words of the Apostle adduced by Augustine hold: “But if God, willing to show his wrath and demonstrate his power,” etc.; and again: “To this very purpose have I raised thee up, that I may show my power in thee.” Nor can it be doubted that God showed his power more in the scourges and drowning of the hardened Pharao than in the very hardening of the same Pharao. Second, because God not only deserts sinners when he delivers them to the desires of their heart, but also so wondrously twists, rules, and orders their evil wills — which he himself did not make, but was not ignorant would be — that he draws and makes good out of them; so that even unwilling and refusing they serve him, and by this very thing which they do gladly are, by the just judgment of God, most gravely punished. Wherefore it can most rightly be said that God through his power delivers some to their own desires, and through his power blinds and hardens them — not indeed that to desert, not to illuminate, not to soften pertains to power, or that God positively compels or impels to evil; but because (as we said, and explained more fully in chapter 13) by a wondrous power he rules the hearts even of the impious, and hinders them from accomplishing, endeavoring, willing, thinking anything other than what he himself permits, and turns their very fault into punishment for them, and uses their evil wills, himself supremely powerful and supremely good, for many goods. And this is what the same Augustine writes in this same book 5 against Julian, chapter 1 [al. 4], when he says: “He does these things in wondrous and ineffable ways, who knows how to work his just judgments not only in the bodies of men, but even in their very hearts — who makes not evil wills, but uses them as he wills, since he cannot will anything unjustly.” But although we admit, according to the mind of St. Augustine, that God through his power delivers the impious to their own desires, and blinds and hardens them, yet we do not admit that the impious are compelled by God, through the power, into sins. For neither does St. Augustine anywhere say this in this place, and in the other places cited by us above he often says the contrary. It will suffice to note one place here, tractate 53 on John: “The Jews did the sin; he did not compel them to do it, to whom sin is not pleasing, but he foresaw that they would do it, from whom nothing is hidden.”
Other testimonies they bring forward from the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapters 20 and 21. For in chapter 20 we read thus: “Divine Scripture, if it be diligently looked into, shows that not only the good wills of men, which he himself makes from evil ones… but also those which preserve the creature of the age, are so in the power of God that he makes them be inclined whither he will, when he will — whether for punishments to be brought upon certain men, or for benefits to be bestowed on certain men — as he himself judges, by a judgment most hidden indeed, but without any doubt most just.” And below: “A will evil by its own vice he inclined, by his just and hidden judgment, to this sin.” And chapter 21: “God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills whithersoever he wills: whether to goods, according to his mercy, or to evils, according to their deserts — by his judgment, assuredly, sometimes open, sometimes hidden, but always just.” I answer: these places have already been explained above, namely in chapter 13; for in that place we showed from Hugh of St. Victor, who followed Augustine, that God works in hearts by inclining to one evil rather than to another — not indeed by implanting malice, or by perverting hearts inclined to good, but by hindering hearts inclined by their own vice to evil from being borne to the one, and by not hindering them from being borne to the other. Which same Augustine indicates in this book, when he says, chapter 20, that God inclines a will evil by its own vice; and when more openly, chapter 21 [al. 23], he concludes, saying: “When therefore you hear, I the Lord have seduced that prophet, and, he hardens whom he will, think of his deserts, whom he permitted so to be hardened, or seduced.” Where thou seest that he attributes the very permission of the seduction and hardening to the divine judgment: because, namely, unless the sins of men deserved it, God would not suffer them so to be seduced or hardened.
Another testimony is wont to be objected from the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 7, where St. Augustine speaks thus: “When we hear, Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil, we ought to understand that the former were elected through mercy, the latter through judgment; the former, then, he elected for obtaining his kingdom, the latter for shedding his blood.” But if Christ elected Judas for the work of the betrayal, whence followed the shedding of his blood, certainly he seems altogether to have willed, and from eternity decreed, that Judas should perpetrate that monstrous crime. I answer: Christ foreknew from eternity that Judas, if he were permitted, would be greedy of money, and from that greed the most wicked betrayer of his Master and Lord; and at the same time he foresaw how much good he himself could draw from that crime, if he permitted it, and therefore decreed altogether to permit it. And this decree of permission, from which the shedding of his blood infallibly followed, Augustine calls the election of Judas for the shedding of his blood. For a little before he says that Judas was elected for a work to which he was congruous — by which words he signifies that Judas of himself was congruous to that work, and that therefore it was enough that God permit him to do what he desired. And a little after he explains the same more openly in these words: “For he was elected by him who knows how to use well even the evil, that through his damnable work that venerable work might be completed for whose sake he himself had come.” And so, that Christ elected Judas for the shedding of his blood is nothing else than that Christ decreed to use the evil will of Judas — which he had foreknown would, himself permitting, be in him — for carrying through his own passion and the redemption of the world.
Last, Calvin, in book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 23, §7, and Theodore Beza, in the response to the acts of the Colloquy of Montbéliard, page 133, add a testimony of St. Augustine, from the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 10, to prove that evils are not only foreknown but also decreed by God, and that the fall of Adam was not only foreknown by God, but also willed and defined. “Now let us hear,” says he, “Augustine speaking in the book On Rebuke and Grace: We most wholesomely confess, what we most rightly believe, that God, the Lord of all things, who created all things very good, both foreknew that evils would arise out of goods (and Augustine never severs foreknowledge from the purpose of God), and knew that it pertained more to his most almighty goodness even to do well from evils than not to suffer evils to be; and that he so ordered the life of Angels and men, that in it he should first show what free choice could do, then what the benefit of his grace and the judgment of his justice could do.” This testimony, if that parenthesis of Beza be removed (“and Augustine never severs foreknowledge from the purpose of God”), proves nothing at all. For St. Augustine does not say that God decreed that evils should arise from goods; but he says it pertained to his most almighty goodness rather to do well from evils than not to suffer evils to be. Nor does he say that God so ordered the life of Angels and men that they should first necessarily sin, then be punished for the sins; but he says that God so ordered the life of Angels and men that it should first be shown what free choice could do, then what the benefit of grace and the judgment of justice could do — that is, that it should first be shown that the Angels could through free choice fall and not fall; and then that God could justly punish the Angels who from free choice had fallen, and endow those who through free choice had stood with so great a fullness of grace that they could now no more fall; and likewise that men, established in the state of innocence, could through free choice fall and not fall; and if indeed they had not fallen, that God could lead them through to perfect beatitude; but if they had fallen, that he could justly punish, or mercifully deliver, as in what follows Augustine fully explains. Wherefore all things are most true, and in no part help Beza's judgment. Further, that parenthesis — “and Augustine never severs foreknowledge from the purpose of God” — first begs the question, for that is what he had undertaken at the beginning to prove, which he now assumes as certain and conceded; and then it is false, if sins be treated of, as they are treated of in this place. For St. Augustine, book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10, says that predestination (which is the same as the decree) cannot be separated from foreknowledge, yet that foreknowledge can be separated from predestination, or the decree: for God decrees and defines nothing without foreknowing that he will do it; but he foreknows many things future which he himself neither decrees nor defines. “Predestination,” says he, “cannot be without foreknowledge; but foreknowledge can be without predestination. For by predestination God foreknew the things which he himself was going to do; but he is able to foreknow even the things which he does not do — as all sins whatever.” The same can be known from the response of St. Prosper to the Vincentian objections, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16. For when certain men suspected that from the doctrine of St. Augustine followed that which now Calvin and Beza defend — that evils are done with God not only foreknowing, but also predestinating and decreeing — Prosper answers that those sentences are blasphemous, and utterly foreign to the doctrine of St. Augustine. Among other things he speaks thus, in the response to the eleventh objection: “Objection: that when fathers commit incest with daughters, and mothers with sons, or when slaves slay their masters, it therefore comes to pass because God predestinated it to be so. Response: If it were objected to the devil that he is himself the author, himself the kindler, of such crimes, I think he could by some reasoning unload himself of this odium, and would prove that the perpetrator of such wickednesses acted of his own will; for though he was delighted with the fury of the sinners, he would yet prove that he did not bring in the force of the crimes. With what folly, then, or with what madness is it laid down that that is to be referred to the counsel of God which cannot even be wholly ascribed to the devil, who in the outrages of sinners is to be believed the helper of the enticements, not the begetter of the wills? Nothing, then, of such doings did God predestinate to be done; nor did he prepare that soul which was to live wickedly and basely, to the end that it should so live; but he was not ignorant that it would be such, and he foreknew that he would judge justly concerning such a one. And so to his predestination nothing else can be referred save what pertains either to the owed retribution of justice or to the unowed largess of grace.” Here certainly we see how lucidly St. Prosper, answering for Augustine, severs foreknowledge from the counsel, definition, and predestination of God, when evils are treated of; and contrariwise how falsely Beza wrote that the foreknowledge of God is never severed by Augustine from his decree or purpose.
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CAPUT XVI. Explicantur loca aliquot S. Augustini , quae in speciem favere videntur adversarius. Post loca Scripturarum objiciunt Calvinus, et Beza testimonia qusedam S. Augustini ex lib. v contra Julianum, ex Enchiridio, et ex lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio. Illa igitur, et alia , quse nobis interim occurrunt, brevi¬ ter explicabimus. Incipiamus a primo tomo operum ejus. Lib. ix confess. cap. 8. sic loquitur S. Augu¬ stinus de sancta Monica, qua; in pueritia per convicium famula; curata est a vinolentia , cui dedita esse coeperat : « Quid , inquit , egisti Deus meus ? unde curasti ? unde sa¬ nasti ? nonne protulisti durum , et acutum (I) Rom. IX, 33. - (2) Isaie. XXVIII, 10. - (3) Eph. I, 11. CAPUT XVJ. 237 ex altera anima convicium , tamquam medi¬ cinale ferrum, ex occultis provisionibus tuis, et uno ictu putredinem illam praecidisti. » Hic jam Calvinus , si in hunc locum incidis¬ set , dicere non dubitaret famulam illam a Deo incitatam , et compulsam fuisse , ut Dominae suae conviciaretur, idque significari illis verbis : Nonne protulisti durum , et acu¬ tum ex altera anima conviciam. Sed aliam omnino fuisse mentem S. Augustini , ex ver¬ bis ejusdem in extremo capite positis intelli- getur. « Tu, Domine, inquit, rector cceli- tum et terrenorum , ad usus tuos contor¬ quens profunda torrentis , fluxum saeculorum ordinans turbulentum , etiam de alterius animae insania sanasti alteram , ne quisquam cum hoc advertit, potentiae suae tribuat, si verbo ejus alter corrigatur, quem vult corrigi. » Ex his enim verbis intelligimus, non fuisse a Deo incitatam , vel compulsam fa¬ mulam illam ad convicium, sed convicium illud jam animo conceptum , et foras per voces erumpens a Dei providentia ordina¬ tum fuisse ad vitium Monicae sanandum. Ne¬ que enim Deus fons est, unde turbulenti scelerum torrentes manant, sed artifex est mirabilis , qui ad usum suum torrentes illos per se fluentes contorquet , et ordinat ad bonum aliquod perficiendum. Itaque dicitur Deus protulisse convicium illud ex anima famulae illius tamquam fer¬ rum medicinale ex occultis provisionibus suis, quia non poterat famula illa convicium concipere, vel proferre, nec alio tempore, alio loco, in aliam personam, quam Deus permisisset, Deus autem non permisit ab illa convicium concipi, aut proferri, nisi quod utile esset ad Monicam curandam, et illo tempore et loco solum permisit, quo tempore et loco praevidit utile fore ad Monicae sani¬ tatem. Aliud testimonium exstat in Enchiridio, cap. 100. quod a Calvino et Beza non*semel cita¬ tur. Sic igiturloquitur S. Augustinus : « Pro- pterea namque magna opera Domini exquisita in omnes voluntates ejus, ut miro, et ineffabili modo, non fiat praeter ejus voluntatem, quod etiam contra ejus fit voluntatem, quia non fieret, si non sineret : neque utique nolens sinit, sed volens, nec sineret bonus fieri ma¬ la, nisi omnipotens, etiam de malo, facere posset bene. » Duo quaedam ex hoc loco adversarii colligunt. Primo, mala seu pec¬ cata non fleri praeter Dei voluntatem, proin¬ de velle Deum ut fiant ; recteque ab ipsis dictum esse decreto, et voluntate Dei, Ada- mum lapsum esse. Secundo, Deum per¬ mittere mala non invitum, nec otiose spe¬ ctantem, sed volentem, ac per hoc inanem esse Catholicorum distinctionem, qui dicunt mala fieri non Deo volente, sed Deo permit¬ tente, quasi permissio non includat volun¬ tatem. Sed non erit difficile respondere, si prius breviter explicemus, quemadmodum se habeat voluntas Dei erga peccata. Dico igitur, Deum erga peccata non ha¬ bere positive velle, aut nolle, sed negative non velle : non habet Deus positive velle peccata, quia bonus et justus est. Nec esset bonus et justus, si peccata (id est, mala) et iniquitates vellet. Non habet etiam positive nolle, quia omnipotens est, neque esset omnipotens, si aliquid fieret ipso invito. Fieret autem aliquid ipso invito, si fieret aliquid, quod ipse fieri nollet. Non igitur ha¬ bet velle, aut nolle, sed non velle, juxta illud Psal. v : Non Deus volens iniquitatem tu es(l). Sed occurrit Beza in responsione ad acta^ Colloquii Mompelgardensis, pagina cente¬ sima octuagesima tertia, ac dicit, si Deus respectu peccatorum non habeat velle, aut nolle, sed tantum non velle, sequi ut eorum, quai in mundo geruntur, longe maxima pars fiat Deo vel imprudente, vel non curante, quorum illud ab ejus providentia, istud ab ejus potentia penitus est alienum. Respon¬ deo neutrum sequi, nam etiamsi Deus non velit peccata fieri, tamen novit ea futura, et posset impedire, si vellet : proinde non fiunt eo imprudente ; preeterea vult non impedire, vult permittere, vult ordinare, vult punire : proinde non fiunt eo non cu¬ rante, et quasi otiose spectante. Necquenos dicimus, quod in superiore pagina idem Beza reprehendit, divinam providentiam non se extendere nisi ad mala ordinanda, et quasi limitibus definienda, ita ut moliri possit Satan contra Ecclesiam quidquid ei libuerit, quamvis non quiquid libuerit perficere queat. Non inquam, hoc solum damus pro- videntise Dei, sed etiam addimus, nihil fieri posse, nisi Deo permittente, ac per hoc, non solum non perficiet Satan contra Eccle¬ siam, quidquid ei libuerit, sed nec molietur quidquid ei libuerit, sed quidquid ei permit¬ tere Deo placuerit. (1) Psal. V, 5. 288 LIBER II. \ Observandum est praiterca id, quod dixi¬ mus, Deum respectu peccati non habere positive nolle, debere intelligi de voluntate beneplaciti, quae absoluta est. Nam habet Deus nolle fieri peccata, voluntate signi, quae non absoluta, sed conditionata est. Volun¬ tas enim signi, dicitur praeceptum, sive pro¬ hibitio, quae voluntas ideo conditionata dici potest, quia cum Deus praecipit, ut aliquid non fiat, simul addit poenam si fiat. Proin¬ de cum aliquid prohibet, non absolute vult illud non fieri sed vult aut non fieri, aut puniri eum, qui facit. Quare semper invicta manet voluntas divina, neque ei ullo modo resisti potest. Nam etiamsi aliqui legem ejus praevaricentur , et faciant quod ipse fieri prohibuit, non tamen evadunt supplicium, quod ipse idem praevaricatoribus commi¬ natur. Ex his testimonium S. Augustini facillime poterit explicari. Dicit enim non fierit prae¬ ter ejus voluntatem, quod fit contra ejus voluntatem, non quia ipse velit illud fieri, sic enim secum ipse pugnaret, sed propter alias duas causas, quas ibidem idem auctor posuit. Prima causa est, quia (ut diximus) cum Deus peccata prohibet, non simpliciter vult non fieri, sed aut non fieri, aut puniri eum, qui facit. Altera causa est, quia licet Deus non velit peccata fieri, tamen vult per¬ mittere ut fiant, ordinaturus illa pro sua infinita potentia, et sapientia in bonum. Priorem causam ponit Augustinus in praece- dentibus verbis, dum sic ait : « Haec sunt ma¬ gna opera Domini exquisita, in omnes volun¬ tates ejus, et tam sapienter exquisita ut cum angelica et humana creatura peccasset, id est, non quod ille, sed quod voluit ipsa, fecisset, etiam per eamdem creaturae voluntatem, qua factum est quod creator noluit, impleret ipse quod voluit, bene utens et malis, tam¬ quam summe bonus ad eorum damnatio¬ nem, quos juste praedestinavit ad poenam, et ad eorum salutem, quos benigne praede¬ stinavit ad gratiam. Quantum enim ad ipsos pertinet, quod Deus noluit (voluntate signi) fecerunt, quantum vero ad omnipotentiam Dei, nullo modo efficere valuerunt. Hoc quippe ipso, quod contra voluntatem Dei fecerunt, de ipsis facta est voluntas Dei. » Ecce qua ratione non fiat praeter Dei volun¬ tatem, quia videlicet facit ipse de peccanti¬ bus quod vult, dum eos alternae damnationi, quam peccantibus fuerat comminatus, ad¬ dicit. Posteriorem causam ponit in verbis se¬ quentibus, sic loquens : « Propterea nam¬ que omnia opera Domini exquisita irfomnes voluntates ejus, ut miro, et ineffabili modo non fiat praeter ejus voluntatem, quod con¬ tra ejus fit voluntatem, quia non fieret, si non sineret. » Ideo igitur non fiunt peccata praeter Dei voluntatem, quia non fierent si non sineret, ac per hoc licet non habeat Deus velle fieri, habet tamen velle permit¬ tere. Sed (inquiunt adversarii) velle permittere includit velle fieri. Nam hic subjicit Augu¬ stinus. «Non utique sinit nolens, sed volens. » Et paulo ante cap. 93 : « Non ergo, inquit, fit aliquid, nisi omnipotens fieri velit,- vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo. » Ubi S. Augustinus aperte dicit, Deum velle fieri id, quod sinit fieri. Et cap. 96. dicit, bonum esse ut mala sint. « Quamvis, inquit, quae mala sunt, in quantum mala sunt, non sint bona ; tamen, ut non solum bona, sed etiam sint et mala, bonum est. » Quod autem bo¬ num est, Deus vult, igitur mala esse, seu fieri Deus vult. Addit Petrus Martyr in cap. 9. epist. ad Roman. vocem permissionis in Scripturis significare etiam voluntatem, et operationem Dei, non solam negationem. Et allegat illud ad Corinth. xvi : Spero me aliquantulum temporis manere apud vos , si Dominus permiserit ; et illud ad Hebr. vi : Et hoc faciemus , siquidem permiserit Deus (I). Respondeo, proprie permittere non inclu¬ dere velle, sed non nolle, sive non impedire, et verissimam esse theologorum Catholico¬ rum doctrinam, qui dicunt Deum velle bo¬ na, mala autem non velle, sed permittere ; et longe aliud esse velle fieri mala, et velle permittere, ut fiant mala. Siquidem velle fieri mala, est malae voluntatis, quae vel delectaturmalis, vel uti vult eis ad bona, contra illam regulam. « Non sunt facienda mala, ut eveniant bona. » At velle permit¬ tere mala potest esse bonae voluntatis, ac praesertim in summo rerum omnium mode¬ ratore, ad quem spectat non impedire cur¬ sum rerum quamvis defectibilium, ut hinc ostendat primum, quid per se possit libe¬ rum arbitrium. Deinde quid ejus gratiae beneficium, justitiaeque judicium, ut loqui¬ tur S. Augustinus lib. de correptione et gra- (1)1 Corin. XVI, 7; Heb. VI, 3. CAPUT XVI. 289 tia, cap. 12. Cum igitur idem Augustinus dicit, Deum permittere mala non nolentem, sed volentem, intelligimus Deum permit¬ tere non invitum, sed volentem permittere. Non autem proprie volentem illa fieri. Cum vero dicit, nihil posse fieri, nisi Deus velit fieri, aut sinendo ut fiat, aut ipse faciendo, ipse se explicat. Non enim diceret, aut si¬ nendo, aut faciendo, si proprie Deus vellet fieri tam bona, quam mala. Nam Deus vo¬ luntate agit. Et ideo quidquid vult fieri, fit, ct ideo fit, quia ipse volendo facit. Iraque si Deus vellet fieri mala, non per¬ mitteret, sed faceret mala. Quorsum ergo Augustinus distingueret permissionem ab opere, dicens, aut sinendo ut fiat, aut ipse faciendo, si existimaret Deum proprie velle tam qua; facit, quam qua; permittit, cum non ignoraret Deum volendo facere ? Sen¬ tentia igitur ejus loci talis est : Nihil potest fieri, nisi Deus velit fieri, saltem per accidens, id est, nisi velit permittere ut fiat ab aliis, aut etiam velit ipse illud procurare, et facere. Porro quod adjungit, bonum esse, ut sint mala, eodem modo explicandum est, videli¬ cet bonum esse, ut sint Deo permittente, non Deo agente ct volente : quod est per acci¬ dens esse bonum, quia conjunctum est cum aliquo per se bono. Mala enim per se nihil ornamenti afferunt rebus caderis, tamen ordinata a Deo, et suo loco posita, faciunt, ut res bona; magis emineant, ut idem Augu¬ stinus docet in eodem lib. c. II. qui etiam de eadem re sic loquitur in lib. iii. de libero arbitrio, cap. 91 : « Quomodo, inquit, juste peccata punit, qua; si defuissent, creatura ejus plena et perfecta non esset ? Hic re¬ spondetur, non ipsa peccata, vel ipsam mise¬ riam perfectioni universitatis esse necessa¬ ria, sed animas, in quantum anima; sunt, quje si velint, peccant, si peccaverint, mise¬ ra; fiunt. » Ha;c ille. Quare non tam est bo¬ num, ut peccata sint, quam ut ordinentur, posteaquam Deo permittente existunt. Quocirca S. Augustinus ex eo quod dixit bonum est, ut mala sint, non colligit, Deum velle mala, sed tantum permittere. Haec j enim sunt verba ejus : « Nec dubitandum est, Deum facere bene etiam sinendo fieri, quaecumque fiunt male. Non enim hoc nisi justo judicio sinit, ct profecto bonum est, quod justum est. Quamvis ergo quae mala sunt, in quantum mala sunt, non sint bona: tamen ut non solum bona, sed etiam sint et mala, bonum est. Nam nisi esset hoc bo¬ num, ut essent et mala, nullo modo esse si¬ nerentur ab omnipotente bono. Cui profecto quam facile est, quod vult facere, tam facile est, quod non vult esse non sinere, » Neque in Scripturis ullus est locus, ubi vox 'permittere non possit recte exponi de propriete dicta permissione, quae non signi¬ ficat velle, sed non impedire. Nam quod dicitur I. Corinth. xvi, Spero me apud vos aliquantulum temporis permansurum, si Do¬ minus penniserit (i), rectissime intelligitur dictum esse pro eo, quod est, si Dominus non impedierit. Saepe enim Apostolus cogi¬ tabat aliquo ire, et Dominus alio eum desti¬ nabat. Actor, xvi : Transeuntes autem Phrygiam ei Gallicis: regionem vetati sunt a Spiritu sancto loqui verbum Dei in Asia. Cum venissent autem in Mistam, tentabant ire in Bythiniam , et non permisit eos Spiritus Jesu. Et ad Roman i : Nolo autem vos ignorare, fratres, quia saepe proposui venire ad vos, et prohibitus sum usque adhuc. Quod etiam di¬ citur Hebr. vi : Et hoc faciemus, siqui¬ dem permiserit Dominus (2), eumdem sensum habet. Scribit enim Apostolus nolle se am¬ plius de rudimentis fidei disserere, de poeni¬ tentia ab operibus mortuis, de Baptismo, im¬ positione manuum, et similibus, sed de iis, quae ad perfectionem vitae Christianae perti¬ nent. Addit autem : Siquidem permiserit Dominus, quia videlicet ignorabat, an Deus permissurus esset eum facere, an ad alia opera vocaturus. Ostendit enim his verbis, se omnino pendere a providentia Dei, et quae Deo annuente aggreditur, eadem Deo volen¬ te perficere, aut eo impediente dimittere. Aliud testimonium rursus objiciunt Calvi¬ nus, et Beza in eodem Enchiridio, cap. 101, ubi sic loquitur S. Augustinus : « Aliquando bona voluntate homo vult aliquid, quod Deus non vult; et rursus fieri potest, ut hoc velit homo voluntate mala, quod Deus vult bona. Tantum interest quid velle homini, quid Deo congruat, et ad quem finem suam quisque referat voluntatem, ut aut appro¬ betur, aut improbetur. » Videtur enim his verbis Augustinus admittere, Deum velle id ipsum, quod volunt homines mali, dum mala operantur ; sed ideo bonam esse Dei volun¬ tatem, quia bona intentione Deus vult, quod impii mala intentione volunt. (1) Corin. XVI, 7. — (2) Act. XVI, 6; Rom. 1, 13, Heb. VI, 3; 290 LIBER II. Sed facillime id solvitur. Nam in his rebus, quae sunt per se malae, et in nullo casu pos¬ sunt fieri bene, nunquam Deus vult id, quod volunt homines mali. In rebus autem, quaj sunt malae ratione praecepti positivi eas pro¬ hibentis, aut alicujus circumstantiae, facile fieri potest, ut Deus bona voluntate velit, quod mala voluntate volunt homines mali, et quod noluntbona voluntate homines boni : ita ut magis congruant cum bona voluntate Dei illi qui nolunt, quam illi qui volunt, quod ipse vult. Exempla sunt in eodem loco S. Au¬ gustini, vult Deus aliqutm hominem mori, quia id merentur ejus peccata; voluntas haec Dei justa est, ac per hoc bona : forte etiam vult hoc Deus, quia praevidet illum, si diu¬ tius vivat gravius peccaturum, et atrocius apud inferos puniendum, ex quo non solum justa, sed etiam misericors est voluntas Dei, quae vult illum de medio tolli. Contingit autem, ut filius ejus, non quia scit patrem mereri mortem, aut gravius peccaturum, si vixerit, sed quia eum odit, aut cupit cito possidere paternam haereditatem, velit eum- dem mori ; sine dubio haec filii voluntas, quamvis id velit, quod vult et Deus, iniquis¬ sima est. Tenetur enim filius parentes dili¬ gere, et juvare, ac multo magis non odisse. Proinde magis congrueret cum bona Dei vo¬ luntate voluntas hujus filii, si nollet quod vult Deus, quam nunc congruat, quando vult quod Deus vult. Sed non potest ullo modo ex his colligi, Deum esse auctorem peccatorum, aut velle peccata fieri. Nam etiamsi Deus vultaliquaodo id, quod peccator vult, non tamen vult Deus, ut ille hoc velit, imo contrarium vult, sal¬ tem voluntate signi, qua prohibuit illi ne id vellet. Quod si Deus filio imperaret, ut pa¬ rentem occideret, sicut imperavit Ahrahae ut occideret filium, tunc non mala voluntate filius vellet mori parentem suum, dum id non odio patris, sed ut obsequeretur Deo jubenti id vellet. Sin autem filius non habeat Dei mandatum de parente occidendo, et tamen forte noverit, Deo placere ut is moriatur, non debet quidem obmurmurare Deo, sed contra potius eum laudare, et acquiescere in ejus voluntate, paratus sequo animo ferre mortem patris, cum acciderit : sed interim ei deesse non debet, quia mandatum habet honorandi parentes, eosque juvandi, ac sus¬ tentandi ; et placebit sine dubio Deo studium filii in parente conservando, licet ipse alia via sibi nota, parentem illum occidi decreverit. Sequitur aliud testimonium, quod obji¬ ciunt ex lib. vi. de Genesi litteram cap. 15. ubi legimus, voluntatem Dei esse rerum ne¬ cessitatem, atque id necessario futurum, quod Deus voluerit. Utitur hoc testimonio Calvi¬ nus lib. hi. Instit. cap. 23. §. 8. ut probet, Deum decrevisse ab seterno, ac voluisse, ut primus homo peccaret, et cum tota potesta- ritate in damnationis reatum incurreret. Sed facilis est responsio. Fatemur enim, id omne, quod Deus vult, infallibiter im¬ pleri, Dei enim voluntati nemo resistere po¬ test. Sed probandum erat Calvino, Deum ex Sententia B. Augustini voluisse, ut primus homo peccaret. Nam in loco citato, non hoc scribitS. Augustinus, sed disserit de creatione hominis, ac dicit, hominem formatum ex limo, quia Deus ita voluit, neque id repugna¬ re causis naturalibus generationis humanae , quia Deus dedit illis causis ut inde pos¬ sit homo generari, non autem suam potesta¬ tem illis causis alligavit. Alliud testimonium objiciunt ex lib. v. contra Julianum cap. 3. ubi tractans illud : Tradidit eos in passionem ignominiae etc. : « Sequitur, inquit, propter hoc tradidit illos Deus in passiones ignominiaj. Audis propter hoc ; et quaeris inaniter qnomodo intelligen- dus sit tradere Deus, multum laborans, ut ostendas eum tradere deserendo. » Quibus verbis videtur S. Augustinus, non admittere explicationem illam, quam nos supra secuti sumus, quod Deus deserendo tradat. Respondeo a S. Augustino non reprehendi Julianum, quod dixerit, Deum tradere dese¬ rendo, sed quia dixerit, unum peccatum non esse poenam alterius peccati, et existimave¬ rit, id bene probari, si ostendisset, Deum tradere deserendo. Itaque ipse S. Augustinus demonstrat, unum peccatum esse poenam alterius peccati, sive Deus tradat homine desideriis suis deserendo, sive alio modo, ac per hoc inaniter laborasse Julianum, ut os¬ tenderet, Deum tradere deserendo: « Audis, inquit, Propter hoc, et qumris inaniter quo¬ modo intelligendus sit tradere Deus, multum laborans, ut ostendas eum tradere deserendo. Sed quomodolibet tradat, propter hoc tradi-l dit, propter hoc deseruit. Curavit enim apo- stolusdicere quanta poenasit tradi passionibus ignominiae, sive' deserendo, sive alio vel ex¬ plicabili, vel inexplicabili modo, quo facit haec summe bonus, et ineffabiliter justus. » Adhaec reprehendit Augustinus Julianum, quod per « deserere » non intellexerit, desti- CAPUT XVI. tuere, scu non juvare cadentem, sed perti¬ nere, ut quis in desideriis, in quibus jam erat haereat ; ac demonstrat Augustinus, tradi in desideria, non esse permittere, ut in aliquo sint desideria mala, sed deserere, ac dese¬ rendo sinere, ut desideriis malis consentiat. Sic enim loquitur Augustinus ponens, et re¬ prehendens verba Juliani: «Jam flagitiorum, inquis, desideriis aestuabant. Et adjungis, ac dicis, quomodo ergo per potentiam tradentis Dei putandi sunt in talia facta cecidisse ? Quid ergo plus factum est, obsecro te, aut quid diceret, tradidit illos Deus in desideria cordis eorum, sijam erant possessi quodam modo malis desideriis cordis sui? Numquid autem consequens est, ut si habet aliquis cor¬ dis desideria mala, jam etiam consentiat eis ad committenda eadem mala? ac per hoc aliud est habere mala desideria cordis, aliud tradi eis : utique ut consentiendo eis possi¬ deatur ab eis, quod fit cum divino judicio traditur eis. » Quod autem S. Augustinus non reprehen¬ dat, sed approbet, Deum tradere deserendo, patet ex sequentibus verbis : « Cum ergo, iuquit, dicitur homo tradi desideriis suis, inde fit reus, quia desertus a Deo cedit eis, atque consentit, vincitur, trahitur, capitur, possidetur, a quo enim quis devictus est, huic et servus addictus est ; et fit ei pecca¬ tum consequens pnecedentis poena peccati.» Sed objiciunt rursus ex eodem capite illa verba: Quid est autem quod dicis, cum deside¬ riis suis traditi dicuntur, relicti per divinam patientiam intelligendi sunt, non per poten¬ tiam in peccata compulsi ? Quasi non simul posuerit haec duo idem Apostolus, et patien¬ tiam et potentiam, ubi ait, si autem volens Deus ostendere iram, et demonstrare poten¬ tiam suam, attulit in multa patientia vasa irae, quae perfecta sunt in perditione. » Ubi videtur S. Augustinus concedere, aliquos a Deo per potentiam in peccata compelli. Respondeo, recte S. Augustinum docere contra Julianum, Deum tradere aliquos suis desideriis, non esse per solam patientiam deserere, quasi ideo solum dicatur Deus tra¬ dere aliquos suis desideriis quiaeos patienter tolerat, et impunitos ad tempus relinquit. Nam alioqui, ut cap. seq. idem Augustinus colligit, qui a Deo petit, ne tradat desideriis suis id peteret, ne sit patiens erga se bonitas ejus. Quare ex hoc loco perspicue intelligi- mus, Julianum non accepisse desertionem Dei pro destitutione auxilii divini, ut nos ->9l cum Augustino accipimus, sed pro simplici permissione et tolerantia, quomodo fatemur non sola desertione Deum tradere aliquos desideriis suis. Porro non solam patientiam, sed etiam potentiam Dei cerni in obduratione peccato¬ rum, duobus modis intelligi potest, juxta mentem S. Augustini. Primo, quia finis ob¬ durationis est, ut punitione peccatoris obdu¬ rati, quae sine dubio mirabilis, et horribilis erit, appareat justitia et potentia Dei. Et hoc habent verba Apostoli ab Augustino adducta: « Si autem Deus volens ostendere iram, et demonstrare potentiam suam, etc. » Et rur¬ sus : « In hoc ipsum excitavi te, ut ostendam in te potentiam meam. » Neque dubitari po¬ test, quin Deus potentiam suam magis osten¬ derit in flagellis, et submersione Pharaonis obdurati, quam in ipsa ejusdem Pharaonis obduratione. Secundo, quia Deus non solum deserit peccatores, cum eos tradit desideriis cordis eorum, sed etiam cum eorum malas voluntates, quas ipse non fecit, sed futuras non ignoravit, ita mirabiliter torquet, regit, ordinat, ut ex eis bonum eliciat et faciat, ut etiam invitse, ac nolentes sibi serviant, et hoc ipso quod libenter faciunt, justo Dei ju¬ dicio gravissime puniantur. Quare potest rectissime dici, Deum per potentiam tradere aliquos desideriis suis, eosque per potentiam excrecare et obdurare, non quidem quod deserere, non illuminare , non emollire, ad potentiam pertineat, aut quod Deus positive ad malum compellat, aut impellat, sed quia (ut diximus, et expli¬ cuimus fusius cap. 13.) mirabili potentia re¬ gat corda etiam impiorum, et impediat, ne aliud perficiant, conentur, velint, cogitent, quam quod ipse permittit, ipsamque culpam eis vertat in poenam, et ad multa bona ma¬ lis eorum voluntatibus ipse summe potens, summeque bonus utatur. Atque hoc est , quod scribit idem Augustinus, in hoc ipso lib. v. contra Julianum cap. i. cum ait : « Facit haec miris, et ineffabilibus modis, qui novit justa judicia sua non solum in cor¬ poribus hominum, sed et in ipsis cordibus operari, qui non facit voluntates malas, sed utitur eis ut voluerit, cum aliquid inique velle non possit. » Quamvis autem admittamus juxta mentem sancti Augustini, Deum per potentiam tra¬ dere impios desideriis suis, eosque exese- care et obdurare, non tamen admittimus impios a Deo per potentiam in peccata com- LIBER II. 21*2 pelli. Nam neque hoc loco S. Augustinus id usquam dicit, et in aliis locis a nobis supra citatis, saepe contraxium dicit. Unum locum hic notare sufficiet, tract. 53.inJoan. : «Fe¬ cerunt, inquit, Judaei peccatum, quod eos non compulit facere, cui peccatum non pla¬ cet, sed facturos esse praevidit, quem nihil latet. » Alia testimonia proferunt ex lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio cap. 20. et 21. Nam cap. 20. sic legimus : « Scriptura divina, si dili¬ genter inspiciatur, ostendit, non solum bonas hominum voluntates, quas ipse facit ex ma¬ lis, sed etiam illas , quae conservant saeculi creaturam, ita esse in Dei potestate, ut eas quo voluerit, quando voluerit, faciat inclinari, vel ad poenas quibusdam ingerendas, vel ad beneficia quibusdam praestanda, sicut ipse judicat, occultissimo quidem judicio, sed sine ulla dubitatione justissimo. » Et infra : « Voluntatem proprio vitio malam in hoc peccatum judicio suo justo et occulto incli¬ navit. » Et cap. 21 : « Operatur Deus in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocumque voluerit, sive ad bona pro sua misei-icordia, sive ad mala pro me¬ ritis eorum, judicio utique suo aliquando aperto , aliquando occulto, semper autem justo. » Respondeo, haxe loca jam esse explicata superius, videlicet cap. 13, siquidem eo loco ostendimus ex Hugonc Yictorino, qui Au¬ gustinum secutus est, Deum operari in cor¬ dibus inclinando ad unum malum potius, quam ad aliud, non quidem malitiam inse¬ rendo, aut inclinata coi'da ad bonum pei-- vei'tendo, sed inclinata vitio proprio ad ma¬ lum impediendo ne ferantur in aliud, et non impediendo utfei’antur in hoc. Id quod idem Augustinus in hoc libro indicat, cum ait cap. 20, Deum inclinare voluntatem pro¬ prio vitio malam. Et cum apertius, cap. 23. concludit, dicens : « Cum ergo auditis, ego Dominus seduxi px-ophetam illum, et quem vult indurat, ejus merita cogitate, quem sic obdurari, vel seduci permisit. » Ubi vides, ipsam permissionem seductionis et obdura¬ tionis judicio divino tribuit, quia videlicet, nisi mererentur hominum peccata, Deus eos non ita seduci, neque obdui'ari sineret. Aliud testimonium objici solet ex lib. de coi'rept. et gratia cap. 7. ubi sic loquitur S. Augustinus : « Cum. inquit, audimus, nonne ego vos duodecim elegi, et unus ex vobis diabolus est, illos debemus intelligere ele¬ ctos per misericordiam, illum per judicium. Illos ergo elegit ad obtinendum regnum suum; illum ad effundendum sanguinem suum, » Quod si Christus elegit Judam ad opus proditionis, unde sanguinis effusio se¬ cuta est, certe videtur omnino voluisse, et ab aeterno decrevisse, ut Judas illud imma¬ ne scelus perpetraret. Respondeo, Christum praxscivissc ab aeter- no Judam si permitteretur, fore pecuniarum cupidum, et ex ea cupiditate Magistri sui ac Domini scelestissimum proditorem, et simul praevidisse quantum boni ex illo sce¬ lere ipse elicere posset, si illud permitteret, et ideo decrevisse omnino permittere. Hoc autem permissionis decretum, ex quo infalli- biliter sequebatur sanguinis sui effusio, vo¬ cat Augustinus electionem Judae ad effun¬ dendum sanguinem suum. Nam paulo ante dicit, Judam fuisse electum ad opus, cui congruebat. Quibus vei'bis significat, Judam per se illi operi congruisse, et ideo satis fuisse, ut Deus illum permitteret facere, quod cupiebat. Et paulo post idem explicat apertius his verbis : « Ad illo quippe electus est, qui novit bene uti etiam malis, ut per ejus opus damnabile, illud, propter quod ip¬ se venerat, opus venerabile compleretur. » Itaque Christum elegisse Judam ad effun¬ dendum sanguinem suum, nihil est aliud, nisi Christum decrevisse uti mala voluntate Judae, quam se permittente in eo futuram praenoverat, ad passionem suam, et mundi redemptionem peragendam. Postremo addunt Calvinus in lib. iij. In- stit. cap. 23. §. 7. et Theodorus Beza in responsione ad acta Colloquii Mompelgar- densis, pag. 133. testimonium sancti Au¬ gustini ex lib. de corrcpt. et gratia, cap. 10. ad probandum, mala non solum prae¬ sciri, sed etiam decerni a Deo et lapsum Adami non solum a Deo praecognitum, sed etiam volitum et definitum. « Nunc audia¬ mus, inquit, Augustinum loquentem libro de coireptione et gratia : Saluberrime con¬ fitemur, quod rectissime credimus, Deum, Dominumque rerum omnium, qui creavit omnia bona valde, et mala ex bonis exoritu- ra pi’aescivit (praescientiam autem Augustinus numquam a proposito Dei sejungit) et scivit magis ad suam omnipotentissimam bonita¬ tem pertinex-e, etiam de malis benefacere, quam mala esse non sinere ; sic ordinasse Angelorum et hominum vitam, ut in ea prius ostenderet, quid posset liberum arbi- CAPUT XVII. 293 trium, deinde quid posset gratiae suce*bene- ficium, justitiaeque judicium. » Hoc testimonium si removeatur illa paren¬ thesis Bezae (praescientiam autem Augusti- mus numquam a proposito Dei sejungit) nihil omnino probat. Non enim dicit S. Au¬ gustinus, Deum decrevisse, ut mala ex bonis orirentur, sed dicit pertinuisse ad ejus om- nipotentissimam bonitatem, potius de malis benefacere, quam mala esse non sinere. Nec dicit, Deum sic ordinasse Angelorum et ho¬ minum vitam, ut prius necessario peccarent, deinde propter peccata punirentur. Sed di¬ cit, Deum sic ordinasse Angelorum et ho¬ minum vitam, ut prius ostenderetur, quid posset liberum arbitrium, deinde quid pos¬ set gratiae beneficium justitiaeque judicium, id est, prius ostenderetur, potuisse Angelos per liberum arbitrium cadere, et non cadere, et deinde potuisse Deum Angelos, qui ex libero arbitrio ceciderant, juste punire qui vero per liberum arbitrium steterant, tanta gratiae plenitudine donare, ut jam amplius cadere non possent. Homines similiter in statu innocentiae constitutos, potuisse per li¬ berum arbitrium cadere, et non cadere, et si quidem non cecidissent, potuisse Deum ad perfectam beatitudinem cos perducere ; sin autem cecidissent, potuisse juste punire, vel misericorditer liberare, ut in sequentibus Augustinus fuse explicat. Quare omnia ve¬ rissima sunt, nec ulla ex parte Bezae senten¬ tiam juvant. Porro illa parenthesis « pracscentiam au¬ tem numquam Augustinus a proposito Dei sejungit », primum petit principium; id enim probandum susceperat initio, quod nunc tamquam certum, et concessum assumit : Deinde falsum est, si de peccatis agatur, ut hoc loco agitur : sanctus enim Augustinus lib. de praedestinatione Sanctor, cap. 10. di¬ cit, praedestinationem (quae idem est cum de¬ creto) non posse separari a praescientia, ta¬ men praescientiam posse separari apraed%|ti- natione, sive decreto; Deus enim nihil de¬ cernit, ac definit, quin praesciat se facturum ; multa autem praescit futura, quae ipse non decernit, nec definit. « Praedestinatio, in¬ quit, sine prajscientia esse non potest. Po¬ test autem esse sine praedestinatione prae¬ scientia. Praedestinatione quippe Deus prae¬ scivit quae fuerat ipse facturus. Praescire autem potest etiam ea, quae ipse non facit, sicut quaecumque peccata. » Idem cognosci potest ex responsione S. Prosperi ad objectiones Vincentianas 10. 11. 12. 13. 11. 13. et 16. Nam cum quidam su¬ spicarentur ex doctrina S. Augustini sequj id, quod nunc Calvinus et Beza defendunt- mala fieri non solum praesciente, sed etiam praedestinante et decernente Deo, respon¬ det Prosper, istas sententias blasphemas esse, et a S. Augustini doctrina prorsus alienas. Inter caetera sic loquitur in responsione ad objectionem undecimam : « Objectio, quod quando incestant patres filias, et matres fi¬ lios, vel quando servi dominos occidunt, ideo fiat, quia Deus praedestinavit ut fieret. Responsio : Si diabolo objiceretur, quod ta¬ lium facinorum ipse auctor, ipse esset in¬ centor, puto quod aliqua ratione exonerare se hac posset invidia, et talium scelerum patra¬ torem , de ipsorum voluntate vinceret : quia etsi delectatus est furore peccantium, pro¬ bare tamen se non intulisse vim criminum. Qua ergo insipientia, quave dementia defini¬ tur ad Dei referendum esse consilium, quod nec diabolo in totum adscribl potest, qui in peccantium flagitiis illecebrarum adjutor, non voluntatum credendus est esse genera¬ tor? nihil ergo talium negotiorum Deus prae¬ destinavit ut fieret; nec illam animam nequi¬ ter, turpiterque victuram, ad hoc ut taliter viveret, praeparavit : sed talem futuram non ignoravit, et de tali juste se judicaturum esse praescivit. Atque ita ad pranlestinationem ejus nihil aliud referri potest, nisi quod aut ad debitam justitiae retributionem, aut ad indebitam pertinet gratiae largitatem » . Hic certe videmus, quam luculenter S. Prosper pro Augustino respondens, separet praescien¬ tiam a consilio, definitione, et praedestina¬ tione Dei, cum de malis agitur : et contra quam falso scripserit Beza, Dei praescientiam a decreto, seu proposito numquam ab.Augu- stino sejungi.