Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book II: That God Is Not the Author of Sin
Chapter 17: The objections drawn from reason are solved
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book II. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
It remains that we briefly respond to the reasons which they bring forward.
The first reason of Calvin, book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 23, §7: If God did not decree from eternity that the first man with his whole posterity should fall, it follows that God founded the noblest creature with an ambiguous end. For he did not found him that he should stand, as is plain from this, that he did not stand; either, then, he founded him that he should fall, and so the way of the divine mercy and justice be opened; or he founded him for an ambiguous and uncertain end, so that what God was afterwards to do should hang upon the event — which certainly seems very absurd.
I answer that God founded man for a good and certain end, namely for manifesting in him the glory of his mercy and justice. For although God neither decreed nor willed that the first man should sin, nor founded him for this end, that he should sin, yet he foreknew that he would sin if he were founded such as he was founded; and at the same time he foreknew that he could apply such a remedy to his sin that thence his justice and mercy would be wondrously laid open. Just as if someone, while he thinks of building a house, observe that, if the house be built in such a place, it will lie open to the pestilent blasts of the winds, and at the same time see that he can apply the best remedy, which not only wards off the blasts of the winds, but is even an adornment to the whole building: he assuredly, if he build the house in such a place, can neither be said to have desired that the house lie open to the blasts of pestilent winds, nor will it truly be said that this befell with him improvident; but that he, as a wise architect, foresaw what could happen, and nonetheless willed to raise the house in that place, because he saw that by his art he could easily remedy every inconvenience.
But Calvin will say: God foreknew that man would fall because he had already decreed and predestinated his fall. Predestination, then, was prior to foreknowledge; hence, when God decreed to found man, either he willed to found him for an ambiguous end, or certainly for this end, that he should fall, and through his fall the way be opened for manifesting the mercy and justice of God. I answer that God, by the knowledge of simple intelligence, knew that man would fall if he were founded — not only before he founded him, but even before he decreed to found him. And so (according to our manner of understanding) the knowledge of that conditional proposition — namely, if man be created, he will sin — is prior to the absolute decree of founding man. For those things are prior in God which are necessary, before those which are free, since the latter can not-be in God, the former cannot. Now it is necessary that God know absolutely all things which can be known, whether they be future absolutely, or upon hypothesis; otherwise he would not be of infinite knowledge, and thereby would not be God. But it was not necessary, but free, that God should decree to found man.
Further, that not only those things which are future absolutely can be known by God, but also those which would be if such or such causes were posited, though in very fact they will never be, is plain from the divine writings. For in 1 Kings 23, the Lord, asked by David whether, if he himself remained in the city of Ceila, he would be betrayed by the citizens of that city into the hands of Saul, answered: They will deliver thee up. God knew, then, that it would come to pass that David would be betrayed if he remained in Ceila; and yet, because he did not remain, he was not betrayed, and absolutely it was not future that he should be betrayed. And Matthew 11 the Lord says: If in Tyre and Sidon had been wrought the mighty works that have been wrought in you, they had long ago done penance in sackcloth and ashes. The Lord knew, therefore, that it would come to pass that the Tyrians and Sidonians would be converted to penance if he had shown them the miracles which he had done at Bethsaida — which nevertheless was not absolutely future.
St. Augustine also, in epistle 49, question 2, teaches that Christ did not come in the ancient times because he foreknew that the men of those times, even upon seeing the greatest miracles, would by no means believe. The same also, when he so often repeats that God calls the elect as he sees to be apt for them, that they may follow him calling, but does not so call the reprobate, takes for certain that God knows that, such a calling being offered, he who is called will follow, but that, another being likewise offered, he will not follow. See book 1 to Simplician, question 2, and the book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 14 [al. 44]. Hence the same St. Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 10, writes that God created man and Angel that he might first show in them what free choice could do, then what the benefit of his grace and the judgment of his justice could do. Which end was not uncertain or ambiguous, because God knew that the Angels through free choice would partly fall, partly not fall; but that man with all his posterity would fall; and that therefore both in the Angels and in men he could demonstrate mercy and judgment. And in the same book, chapter 12, he openly teaches that God foreknew that the first man would fall, but did not compel him to this: “God foreknowing,” says he, “what he would unjustly do — foreknowing, however, not compelling to this, but at the same time knowing what he himself would justly do concerning him.”
I add moreover that, even if we granted that God did not foresee, before he decreed to create man, what man would do if he were created, still not for that reason was the noblest nature created by God for an ambiguous end. For God works all things for his own sake — that is, for declaring his glory; and this end could in no way be hindered, whatever at length man should do by the liberty of his choice. For if he sinned, he would not escape the justice of God; if he did not sin, he would win to himself the grace of God more and more. But always the glory of God would shine forth, whether man was to be crowned through excellent grace, or punished through just judgment. Whether, however, man was to experience the mercy or the justice of God would in some manner have been ambiguous — but without any detriment to the glory of God; for even that ambiguity would have flowed from the decree of God, who had willed to leave man in the hand of his own counsel; and (as we have said) the glory of God, whether in crowning or in punishing, would always have had its place.
The second reason of the same Calvin, in the same place, is of this sort: It was not brought about naturally that all should fall from salvation by the fault of one parent. Since, then, this cannot be ascribed to nature, it is by no means obscure that it proceeded from the wonderful counsel of God. What, then, hinders confessing of the first man (namely, that he fell by the decree of God) what they unwillingly concede of the whole human race? I answer that we deny what Calvin assumes us to concede unwillingly. For we assert that it was brought about altogether naturally that, the first man falling, the universal human race fell. For the first man vitiated nature in himself when he lost that original justice which God had given him for himself and for the whole human race. Wherefore they who through natural propagation are made sons of Adam are born naturally unjust and sinners — which the Apostle teaches when he says, Ephesians 2: We also were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest. The same St. Augustine everywhere teaches, who also, tractate 44 on John, writes that all men are by nature children of wrath, because, the first man sinning, vice grew in as nature. And (what is more to be wondered at) that very same Calvin so expounds the words of the Apostle in his commentary on that place as to prove original sin from this, that this sin is naturally in all, since the same nature is common to all: “The place,” says he, “is notable against the Pelagians, and whoever denies original sin. For what is naturally in all, that assuredly is original. But Paul teaches that we are all naturally liable to damnation.” Thus he. Although, then, Adam sinned not naturally, but voluntarily, yet, the sin of Adam being posited, and the corruption of nature which followed from that sin, without any other decree of God, through natural propagation itself we are all born sinners and children of wrath.
The third reason of Calvin and Beza: Man could not fall with God unwilling, or ignorant, or idly looking on, because the first is repugnant to the power of God, the second to the wisdom of God, the third to the providence of God; therefore he fell with God willing and decreeing. I answer that the conclusion is not well gathered. For man fell with God permitting, and drawing out of that fall, through his power, wisdom, and providence, an immense good. And man did not fall with God willing or decreeing — but neither with him unwilling, or ignorant, or idly looking on. Just as no one would be said idly to watch a river running of its own accord, if he turned aside its course to irrigate some field, though he himself had not given the river that impetus.
The fourth reason: Often one sin is the punishment of another sin, as St. Augustine manifestly proves from the Scriptures, book 5 against Julian, chapter 3. But God is the author of punishment; therefore also of the sin which is the punishment of another sin. I answer that sin can be considered in two ways. First, as it goes out from the will, and is a certain action. Second, as it is received in the will itself, and is a passion. As sin goes out from the will, then, it is not punishment, but fault; for punishment signifies not action, but passion. But as it is received in the will, and deprives it of the good of rectitude, so it is punishment — though not altogether properly and in rigor, but in a broad way; because punishment properly so called ought to be simply involuntary, as fault simply voluntary. Now, then, God is not the author of sin as it is fault — which belongs to sin properly and simply — but only as it has the character of punishment, which (as we said) belongs to sin not simply, but only according to something. But moreover it is to be observed that God is not the author of sin, as it is punishment, by impelling to sin, but by deserting, permitting, not pitying (as we explained above) — so that not so much the sin itself as the desertion of God ought to be called the punishment inflicted by the just judgment of God. For so speaks St. Augustine, book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 23: “When you hear: I the Lord have deceived that prophet, and: he hardens whom he will, think of his desert, whom God permitted so to be seduced or hardened.”
The fifth reason can be that which Zwingli uses in the sermon On Providence, chapters 5 and 6: It behooved that man should know the truth and justice of God (for he was created for contemplating this); but truth and justice can plainly not be known save from their contrary — namely, lying and injustice; therefore God had to procure lying and injustice. But he could not furnish in himself an example of lying or injustice; he had, therefore, to bring it about that some creature should supply it. A like reason Beza adduces in the response to Castellio often cited. For he writes that God from eternity decreed to manifest his justice and mercy; and because he could not effect this unless man fell into fault — since otherwise there would be no one who could justly be punished, or who could mercifully be delivered — therefore God from eternity decreed and willed the fall of the first man and of his universal posterity.
I answer that this reason can be solved in many ways. For first, it is false that truth and justice cannot be known save from their contrary, namely lying and injustice. For truth and justice are knowable of themselves, nor do they depend on lying or injustice, since they can be without them, and were in God from eternity, and in the Angel and in man, before lying and injustice existed. It is indeed true that lying and injustice — like death, blindness, and the rest which signify the privation of some good — can neither be nor be understood without the contrary good. But the reasoning is not the same concerning form and privation, since privation depends on form, form does not depend on privation. Next, granted that truth and justice could not plainly be known without knowledge of lying and injustice, still it was not for that reason necessary that lying and injustice should exist in very fact. For the nature of both evils could be known even if it had never existed; otherwise not only man, but even God would have needed lying and injustice for knowing lying and injustice themselves, and through them truth and justice. And what is commonly wont to be said — that good health is not known by those who have not fallen into sickness, nor the goods of peace by those who have not experienced the evils of war — is to be referred not so much to knowledge as to estimation. For he values, desires, seeks, preserves the good of health much more who has been compelled to endure the contrary evil, than he who has never been sick. Nor yet for that reason must one lie, or commit injustice, that truth and justice may be dearer; nor is one's neighbor to be wounded, that good health may afterwards be more pleasant to him — because evils are not to be done that goods may come, according to the word of the Apostle, Romans 3.
To the reason of Beza I answer with equal ease: first, that it was not absolutely necessary that God should lay open his mercy and justice to the world. For God did not create the world necessarily, but freely, and could have not created it, since he, blessed in himself, needs nothing whatever. Next we add that God could have shown his mercy and justice even if sin had never existed. For neither without immense mercy did God produce created things from nothing, sustain them, move them, heap them daily with new benefits, and perfect them; nor without justice does he crown the well-deserving and fulfill his promises.
But, you say, vindicative justice does not appear unless there be impious men who may deservedly be punished. I answer that it is not necessary that all the parts of justice become known to men. For what if it had pleased God mercifully to condone the injury to all sinners — was it not lawful for him to do what he willed? And so it was congruent and equitable, after the Angel and man had sinned, that God should show what the benefit of his grace and the judgment of his justice could do; yet if something else had pleased the Lord, that too would without doubt have been congruent and equitable. For that is equitable and congruent which pleases the Lord. But if the Angel or man had refused to sin — which truly and properly was in their power — God could not impel them to sinning, that he might lay open his justice and mercy; because (as we have often said), by the sentence of the Apostle, evils are not to be done that goods may come. And it is evil, and plainly abhorrent to the eternal law, which is the very wisdom and reason of God, to impel anyone to sin; and God would be contrary to himself, and would deny himself, if he compelled men to sin — that is, to do those things which he by the eternal law forbade to be done.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XVII. Solvuntur objectiones ductae ex ratione. Superest ut ad rationes, quas proferunt, breviter respondeamus. Prima ratio Calvini lib. iii Institut. cap. 23. §. 7. Si Deus non decrevit ab aeterno, ut primus homo cum tota posteritate laberetur, sequitur Deum ambiguo fine condidisse no-. 294 LIBER II. bilissimam creaturam. Non enim condidit, ut staret, ut perspicuum est ex eo quod non stetit ; vel igitur condidit, ut laberetur, et sic aperiretur via misericordia} et justitia} divina}, vel condidit in finem ambiguum, at¬ que incertum, ut ex eventu penderet id, quod Deus postea facturus esset, quod certe val¬ de absurdum esse videtur. Respondeo, Deum condidisse hominem in finem bonum et certum, videlicet ad gloriam misericordiae, justitiaeque in eo manifestan¬ dam. Licet enim Deus non decreverit, ne¬ que voluferit, ut primus homo peccaret, ne¬ que, ad hunc finem eum condiderit, ut pecca¬ ret tamen praescivit eum peccaturum, si con¬ deretur, qualis conditus est ; et simul praesci- vit, se posse tade remedium ejus peccato ad¬ hibere, ut inde justitia, et misericordia sua mirifice patefieret, quemadmodum si quis dum cogitat domum aedificare, animadvertat, si domus in tali loco aedificetur, fore, ut pa¬ teat pestilentibus ventorum flatibus, et simul videat, se posse optimum remedium adhi¬ bere, quod non solum flatus ventorum arceat, sed etiam ornamento sit toti aedificio ; is pro¬ fecto si domum tali loco aedificet, nec dici poterit cupivisse domum patere flatibus pe¬ stilentium ventorum, neque vere dicetur eo imprudente id accidisse, sed eum ut sapien¬ tem architectum providisse quod accidere poterat, et nihilominus voluisse in eo loco domum extruere, quia viderit se posse arte sua omni incommodo facile mederi. At dicet Calvinus, Deus praescivit homi¬ nem casurum, quia jam decreverat, ct prae¬ destinaverat ejus lapsum. Prior ergo fuit praedestinatio, quam praescientia ; proinde quando decrevit Deus hominem condere, vel in ambiguum finem condere voluit, vel certe in eum finem, ut laberetui’, et per ejus la¬ psum aperiretur via misericordiae, ac justi¬ tiae Dei manifestandae. Respondeo, Deum cognitione simplicis in- telligentiae cognovisse hominem casurum, si conderetur, non solum antequam eum conderet, sed etiam antequam condere de¬ cerneret. Itaque prior est (secundum mo¬ dum nostrum intelligendi) cognitio illa con- ditionalis propositionis, nimirum si homo creetur, peccabit, quam decretum absolu¬ tum hominis condendi. Priora enim sunt in Deo, quae necessaria sunt, quam quae libe¬ ra, cum ista in Deo possint non esse, illa non possint. Necessarium autem est Deum cog¬ noscere omnia omnino, quae cognosci pos¬ sunt, sive ea sint absolute futura, sive ex hypothesi, alioqui non esset infinitae scien¬ tiae, ac per hoc nec esset Deus. Non fuit au¬ tem necessarium, sed liberum, ut Deus de¬ cerneret hominem condere. Porro cognosci posse a Deo nonsolum illa, quae futura sunt absolute, sed etiam ea, quae essent, si tales, vel tales causae ponerentur, licet re ipsa nunquam futura sint, perspi¬ cuum est ex divinis litteris. NamI Reg. xxm interrogatus Dominus a Davide, an si ipse maneret in urbe Ceilam, proderetur a civi¬ bus illius urbis in manus Saulis, respondit : tradent. Sciebat ergo Deus futurum, ut Da- vid proderetur, si maneret in Ceilam, et ta¬ men quia non mansit, non fuit proditus, et absolute non erat futurum, ut proderetur. Et Matth. xi. Dominus. ait : Si in Tyro et Sidone factae fuissent virtutes , quae factae sunt in te, olirn in cinere et cilicio poenitentiam egissent (1). Sciebat igitur Dominus, fore ut Tyrii et Sidonii converterentur ad poeniten¬ tiam, si miracula illis ostendisset, quae Beth- saidae fecerat, quod tamen absolute futu¬ rum non erat. Sanctus etiam Augustinus in epist. 49. quaest. 2. docet, Christum antiquis tempo¬ ribus non venisse, quia praesciebat homines illorum temporum, etiam visis miraculis maximis minime credituros. Idem etiam cum tam sa}pe repetit, Deum vocare electos, sicut videt eis aptum esse, ut sequantur vo¬ cantem : reprobos autem non ita vocare, pro certo sumit, Deum nosse, tali vocatione oblata, eum qui vocatur, secuturum, alia vero similiter oblata, non secuturum. Yido lib. i. ad Simplician. quaest. 2. et librum de bono persevei’antiae cap. 44. Hinc idem S. Augustinus libro de corrept. et gratia cap. 10. scribit, Deum creasse hominem et Ange¬ lum, ut primum in eis ostenderet, quid pos- set^liberum arbitrium, deinde quid posset suae gratiae benificium justitiacque judicium. Qui finis non erat incertus, aut ambiguus, quia noverat Deus, Angelos per liberum ar¬ bitrium partim casuros, partim non casuros; hominem autem cum omni posteritate lapsu¬ rum, atque ideo tum in Angelis, tum in ho¬ minibus demonstrare se posse misericor¬ diam, et judicium. Et in eodem lib. cap. 12. aperte docet, Deum praescivisse primum (1) Matth. XI, 21. CAPUT XVII. 29S hominem lapsurum, sed eum ad hoc non coegisse : « Praesciente, inquit, Deo quid ille esse facturus injuste, praesciente tamen, non ad hoc cogente, sed simul sciente, quid ipse de eo facturus esset juste. » Addo praeterea quod etiam si daremus, Deum non praevidisse, antequam decerneret hominem creare, quid homo facturus esset, si crearetur, tamen non proptereain ambi¬ guum finem creatam a Deo fuisse nobilissi¬ mam naturam. Deus enim omnia propter semetipsum, id est, ad gloriam suam decla¬ randam operatur; hic autem finis impediri non poterat ullo modo, quidquid tandem homo pro arbitrii sui libertate faceret. Nam si peccaret, non effugeret Dei justitiam ; si non peccaret, Dei gratiam magis ac magis sibi conciliaret. Semper autem Dei gloria eluceret, sive per excellentem gratiam homo coronandus esset, sive per justum judicium puniendus. An autem homo misericordiam, an justitiam Dei experturus esset, ambiguum aliquo modo fuisset, sed absque ullo detri¬ mento gloriae Dei, nam et ambiguitas ista ex Dei decreto manasset, qui hominem in manu consilii sui relinquere voluisset, et (ut dixi¬ mus) semper Dei gloria sive coronando, sive puniendo locum suum habuisset. Altera ratio ejusdem Calvini ibidem ejus¬ modi est. Non est factum naturaliter, ut a salute exciderent omnes unius parentis cul¬ pa. Cum igitur hoc naturas adseribi nequeat, ab admirabili consilio Dei profectum esse minime obscurum est. Quid ergo prohibet fateri de primo homine (quod videlicet de¬ creto Dei lapsus sit) quod inviti de toto hu¬ mano genere concedunt ? Respondeo, negare nos, quod invitos con¬ cedere Calvinus assumit. Factum enim asse¬ rimus omnino naturaliter, ut primo homine cadente genus humanum universum caderet. Naturam enim in se primus homo vitiavit, cum justitiam illam orriginalem amisit, quam Deus ille pro se, et pro toto genere humano donaverat. Quare qui per naturalem propa¬ gationem filii Adami efficiuntur, naturaliter injusti, et peccatores nascuntur, quod Apo¬ stolus docet, cum ait Ephes. ii : Eramus et nos natura filii irae, sicut ete (1). Idem passim docet sanctus Augustinus, qui etiam tract. 44. in Joannem, scribit, omnes homines na¬ tura esse filios irae, quia peccante primo ho¬ mine vitium pro natura inolevit. Et (quod magis est admirandum) ipse idem Calvinus ita exponit verba Apostoli in commentario ejus loci, ut probetpeccatum originale, quia in omnibus naturaliter hoc peccatum inest, cum sit omnibus eadem natura communis : « Locus, inquit, est insignis contra Pelagia- nos, et quicumque peccatum originale ne¬ gat. Nam quod naturaliter inest omnibus, id certe est originale. Naturaliter vero nos omnes damnationi obnoxios Paulus docet. » Ha;c ille. Quamvis igitur Adamus non natu¬ raliter, sed voluntarie peccaverit, tamen po¬ sito peccato Adami, et naturae corruptione, quae ex eo peccato consecuta est, sine alio Dei decreto, per ipsam naturalem propaga¬ tionem nascimur omnes peccatores, atque irae filii. Tertia ratio Calvini et Bezae : Homo non potuit labi Deo invito, vel ignorante, vel otiose spectante, quia primum repugnat Dei potentiae, secundum Dei sapentiae, tertium Dei providentiae ; igitur Deo volente, et de¬ cernente lapsus est. Respondeo, non bene colligi conclusionem. Nam lapsus est homo Deo permittente ; et ex lapsu illo per suam potentiam, sapientiam et providentiam ingens bonum eliciente. At¬ que non est homo lapsus, Deo volente, aut decernente, sed neque eo invito, aut igno¬ rante, aut otiose spectante. Quemadmodum non diceretur aliquis otiose spectare fluvium sponte currentem, si cursum illius detorque ret ad agrum aliquem irrigandum, quamvis non ipse fluvio impetum illum dedisset. Quarta ratio. Saepe unum peccatum est poena alterius peccati, ut ex Scripturis ma¬ nifeste probat S. Augustinus lib. v. contra Julianum cap. 3. At poenae auctor est Deus, igitur et peccati, quodpoena est alterius pec¬ cati. Respondeo, peccatum bifariam conside¬ rari posse. Primo, ut egreditur a voluntate, et actio quaedam est. Secundo, ut recipitur in ipsa voluntate, et passio est. Ut igitur peccatum a voluntate egreditur, non est poe¬ na, sed culpa; poena enim non actionem, sed passionem significat : ut autem recipitur in voluntate, eamque bono rectitudinis pri¬ vat, sic poena est, quamvis non omnino proprie, et in rigore, sed largo modo, quia poena proprie dicta simpliciter involuntaria esse debet, ut culpa simpliciter voluntaria. Jam igitur Deus non est auctor peccati, ut (1) Euh. II, 3 296 LIBER II. culpa est, quod peccato proprie et simplici¬ ter convenit, sed solum ut habet rationem poenae, quod (ut diximus) non simpliciter, sed secundum aliquid tantum peccato conve¬ nit. Sed prajterea observandum est, Deum non esse auctorem peccati, ut poena est, impel¬ lendo ad peccatum, sed deserendo, permit¬ tendo, non miserendo (utsupra explicuimus) ita ut non tam ipsum peccatum, quam de¬ sertio Dei poena justo Dei judicio inflicta dici debeat. Sic enim loquitur S. Augusti¬ nus lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio, cap. 23 : « Cum auditis : ego Dominus decepi prophe¬ tam illum, et quem vult obdurat, ejus me¬ rito cogitate, quem Deus ita seduci, vel ob¬ durari permisit. » Quinta ratio esse potest (qua utitur Zwin- glius in serm. de providentia, cap. 5. et 6). Oportebat, ut homo cognosceret veritatem, et justitiam Dei (ad hanc enim contemplan¬ dam creatus est) at veritas, et justitia plane cognosci nequeunt, nisi ex contrario, men¬ dacio videlicet, et injustitia; ergo Deus pro¬ curare debuit mendacium, et injustitiam. Non autem potuit in seipso exemplum men¬ dacii, vel injustitia? praebere ; debuit igitur efficere ut creatura aliqua id praestaret. Si¬ milem rationem adducit Bcza in responsione ad Castalionem saepe citata. Scribit enim Deum ab aeterno decrevisse justitiam, et mi¬ sericordiam suam manifestare : et quia non poterat id efficere, nisi homo laberetur in culpam, cum alioqui non esset qui juste pu¬ niri, vel qui misericorditer liberari posset, ideo Deum ab aeterno decrevisse, et voluisse primi hominis, et universae ejus posteritatis lapsum. Respondeo, hanc rationem multis modis solvi posse. Primum enim falsum est, non posse cognosci veritatem, et justitiam, nisi ex contrario, mendacio videlicet, et injusti¬ tia. Nam veritas et justitia per se cognosci¬ biles sunt, neque a mendacio, aut injustitia, pendent, cum sine illis esse possint, et fue¬ rint in Deo ab aeterno, et in Angelo et homi¬ ne, antequam mendacium, et injustitia exi- sterent. Verum quidem est, mendacium et injustitiam, ut mortem, caecitatem, et reli- 'qua, quae boni alicujus privationem signifi¬ cant, neque esse, neque intelligi posse sine contrario bono. Sed non est eadem ratio de forma et privatione, cum privatio pendeat a forma, forma non pendeat a privatione. Deinde esto, non possent veritas, et justi¬ tia sine notitia mendacii, et injustitiae plane cognosci, non tamen ideo necessarium erat, ut mendacium, et injustitia re ipsa existc- rent. Potuit enimutriusque mali natura cog¬ nosci, etiamsi numquam extitisset, alioqui non solum homo, sed etiam Deus eguisset mendacio, et injustitia ad ipsum mendacium, et injustitiam, et per ea ad veritatem et ju¬ stitiam cognoscendam. Quod vero vulgo dici solet, non cognosci bonam valetudinem ab iis, qui in morbum non inciderunt, neque pacis bona ab iis, qui belli mala experti non sunt, non tam ad cognitionem, quam ad sestimationem referendum est. Multo e- nim pluris a?stimat, apetit, quaerit, conservat sanitatis nonum, qui contrarium malum to¬ lerare coactus est, quam qui numquam ac- grotavit. Nec tamen ideo mentiendum est, aut injustitia committenda, ut charior sit ve¬ ritas, et justitia, nec vulnerandus est proxi¬ mus, ut sit ei postea bona valetudo jucun¬ dior, quia non sunt facienda mala, ut eve¬ niant bona, juxta verbum Apostoli Rom. ili. Ad rationem Bezae pari facilitate respon¬ deo, primo, non fuisse necessarium absolute, ut Deus misericordiam, et justitiam suam mundo patefaceret. Neque enim mundum necessario Deus creavit, sed libere, et po¬ tuisset non creare, cum ipse se ipso beatus nulla re prorsus indigeat. Deinde addimus, potuisse Deum misericordiam, et justitiam suam ostendere, etiamsi peccatum numquam extitisset. Neque enim absque misericordia ingenti Deus res creatas e nihilo produxit, sustentat, movet, novis quotidie beneficiis cumulat, ac perficit, neque sine justitia co¬ ronat bene merentes, et promissiones suas adimplet. At, inquis, non apparet justitia vindicati- va, nisi sint impii, qui merito puniantur. Respondeo, non esse necessarium, ut omnes justitia) partes hominibus innotescant. Quid enim, si placuisset Deo, peccatoribus omni¬ bus injuriam misericorditer condonare, an non licebat ei quod volebat facere? Itaque congruens, et mquum fuit, posteaquam An¬ gelus, et homo peccaverant, ut Deus osten¬ deret, quid posset sua) gratia) beneficium, justi tia)que judicium; tamen si aliquid aliud Domino placuisset, id quoque sine dubio congruens, aiquumque fuisset. Id enim est aiquum, et congruens, quod Domino placet : sed si Angelus, aut homo peccare noluissent, quod vere et proprie in eorum potestate fuit, non potuit Deus eos impellere ad peccan- CAPIT XVIII. 297 dum, ut justitiam, ct misericordiam patefa¬ ceret, quia (ut sa*pe diximus) ex Apostoli sententia, non sunt facienda mala, ut ve¬ niant bona. Malum est autem, et a lege ie- terna, qua; est ipsa Dei sapientia et ratio, plane abhorrens, impellere aliquem ad pec¬ candum et Deus, sibi ipse contrarius esset, seque ipse negaret, si homines ad peccan¬ dum, id est, ad ea facienda compelleret, qua; fieri aderna lege prohibuit.