Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book II: That God Is Not the Author of Sin
Chapter 18: An objection is solved which is wont to be proposed by the theologians for the sake of explaining the truth
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book II. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
One objection remains, which the Catholic theologians are wont to propose for the sake of explaining the truth. It is of this sort: God is the cause of the whole entity which is discerned in an evil action, since, according to the Scriptures, through him all things were made, and without him was made nothing; therefore he seems also to be the cause of the deformity which is in that action, which is properly called sin.
The consequence is proved. First: he who is the cause of the cause is also the cause of the thing caused; but God is the cause of the action whence the deformity results; therefore he is also the cause of the deformity which results from that action.
Second: he is truly and properly said to sin who knowingly and willingly is the cause of an action with which a deformity is annexed, though perchance he will not the deformity itself; but God knowingly and willingly is the cause of an action with which a deformity is annexed; therefore he must be said to sin, though he nill that deformity.
Third: he who knowingly and willingly concurs with another to an evil action is partaker of the crime which that other commits. But God knowingly and willingly concurs with all who sin to their evil actions; therefore he seems to be partaker of the crimes which are perpetrated by all who sin.
Fourth: certain actions are so of themselves and intrinsically evil that the deformity is altogether inseparable from them, and they are forbidden because evil, not evil because forbidden, and finally can in no way be done well — such as to lie, to hate God, and others of that kind. But God concurs to actions of this sort no less than to all others; therefore it seems impossible that God be altogether freed from fault.
Fifth: there is no reason why man should be said to sin while he lies or blasphemes, if God sins not while he concurs with man to produce that lie or blasphemy. For each works freely; each does a work intrinsically evil; each effects that whole action. But man truly sins, in the judgment of all; therefore God too.
This argument is not solved by all in the same way. For first, there have not been wanting those who judged that God is not the cause of the actions which are effected by created things, save mediately — insofar, namely, as God gave to things their operative powers, and preserves them. So Durandus, on 2 Sentences, distinction 1, question 5, and distinction 37, question 1. But this opinion is deservedly refuted everywhere by all, as being contrary to the divine Scripture and the holy Fathers. Of which matter we shall say more in book 4 On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 1, where is the proper place of this question.
Another is the solution of others, who say that God is the cause of all actions, and works with all second causes, but does not sin for this reason: that he is held by no laws, whereas men sin because they are held by laws. This opinion is that of the heresiarch Zwingli, as we related above and refuted in chapter 4; it is also that of certain others who, although they do not agree with Zwingli in what he teaches — that God impels men to sins — yet strive to show in no other way how God does not sin when he produces with man that action which for man is sin, save that God is held by no law, and nothing is sin except the transgression of a law. But this is not a solid defense of the truth, for two causes. First, because there are many actions so of themselves and intrinsically evil that they always fight with the eternal law and right reason, and cannot by any added circumstance be rendered licit; and because God, although he is properly subject to no law, yet cannot do anything which is repugnant to his own wisdom, which is the eternal law — therefore he cannot effect those actions, or concur to them, since he cannot deny himself. Next, because although God can do many things which are not of themselves and intrinsically evil, which are forbidden to men — such as to slay men, even innocent ones, and to give to another what belongs to one, even against the will of him whose it had before been — yet these, and others if there be any of the same kind, God indeed, as Lord of all things, can do by himself or by others as he shall have willed; but he cannot help men when in doing these very works they sin, because it is of itself and intrinsically evil to help someone that he may sin, or (which is the same) to be partaker and associate of one sinning.
Let Abraham and David be our example. God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son. Without doubt God could concur with Abraham for slaying the guiltless Isaac, because that slaying was neither sin for God, who as Lord of all can use his own things as he shall have willed, nor for Abraham, who slew his son not by his own authority, but by the divine command. David gave the innocent Urias to death by the sword of the children of Ammon. God could not concur with David to that slaying, because David in that matter violated the law of the Lord; nor could God help David to do what he himself had forbidden to be done — although otherwise God could have commanded Urias, no less than Isaac, to be taken out of the way. Which same thing we discern in human affairs. A king can condone life to a guilty man; yet he cannot cooperate with a judge that he by his own sentence pronounce innocent him whom he knows guilty. Someone can take a wife, possess monies, feed on flesh; yet he cannot lend his aid that one should do these things to whom, by a vow whereby he has bound himself to God, these things are not lawful. Not yet, then, is the knot of that objection loosed, by which it was made out that God cannot be freed from fault if he cooperate with those doing iniquity.
The true solution, therefore, is that which we indicated in chapter 5; and that it may be explained more openly and at greater length, a few things are to be observed.
The first is that of sin — which is not so much action as defection — there is not to be sought an efficient cause, but a deficient one. For so speaks St. Augustine, book 12 of the City of God, chapter 7: “Let no one seek the efficient cause of an evil will. For it is not efficient, but deficient; because that also is not an effecting, but a defecting.” Wherefore, if to some one effect many causes concur, and some fail, some fail not, those alone are to be called the true causes of the sin which is discerned in the effect which failed in acting. For example: a monster is begotten — a man, namely, far shorter than right, or lacking some member. To the generation of that man concur God, the sun, the father and the mother, moreover the seminal power as instrument, the menstruum as matter; but because nothing fails except the matter, to it alone is attributed the cause of the monster. A lame man walks with a deformed gait; but because neither God fails, nor the motive power which is in the man, but only the shin, which, on account of its crookedness, is not fully subjected to the motive power, to the shin alone is attributed the cause of the limping. Which example is brought by St. Augustine in the book On the Perfection of Justice, response 4.
Second, it is to be observed that sin, which is moral evil, consists formally in the privation of the rectitude which ought to have been in the act of the will — namely, of conformity to the rule of right reason, or of the divine law; and that the cause of this privation cannot of itself be anything positive, but another privation, or defect, as St. Thomas shows, book 3 against the Gentiles, chapter 10, and in question 1 On Evil, article 3. Now a threefold defect can be assigned, to which the cause of sin is to be referred. The first, and indeed the proximate and immediate, defect is not to attend to the rule of reason. For thence it arises that the will produces an act not conformed to reason, which (as we have said) is sin, because it does not regard the rule of reason while it works. Now this defect, though it is not some positive act, but a certain negation, is nevertheless voluntary — for otherwise it would not be the cause of sin; nor yet is it voluntary because it is an act elicited by the will, but because it is in the power of the will to attend or not to attend to the rule. For the will works no less freely than it works not. Nor is this defect, insofar as it precedes the act of sin, some natural or voluntary evil, but a simple negation. It is not, I say, a natural evil, because then the sin also which is born thence would be natural, and man could not but always sin, and hence would not properly sin. Nor is it a voluntary evil, because then it would be sin, and one would have to seek a preceding defect, and so a progress to infinity would be given. That defect, then, as it precedes the sin in time or nature, is the cause of the evil; but as it accompanies the act, it puts on the character of evil. For it is evil not to attend to the rule while one works, or to work not attending to the rule.
The second, but remote, defect is that the created will is not the highest good: for thence it comes to pass that the will does not always attend to the rule, and is capable of defect, because it is not the highest good. For so writes St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter 12: “All natures, since the founder of all natures is supremely good, are good; and because they are not, like their founder, supremely and unchangeably good, therefore in them good can both be diminished and increased.”
The third and most remote defect is that the human will was created from nothing. For thence it is not the highest and infinite good, into which defect cannot fall, because it was made from nothing. Augustine, book 2 On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 28: “Nor for this reason,” says he, “could an evil will arise from a good thing — because the good thing was made by the good God — but because it was made from nothing, not from God.” The same he has also in book 12 of the City of God, chapter 1.
From these things we shall understand that it is not necessary that God concur to the sin, and that it can in no way come to pass that God sin. For it is not necessary that God concur to the sin, because sin itself is properly not some thing, but a privation; and the cause, or rather the root and origin, of sin is likewise a negation, not a thing. Further, God can in no way sin, because he cannot be a deficient cause, since he is the highest and infinite good, and his will cannot but always regard the rule of his wisdom, since in God wisdom and will are the same — and thereby the will of God is itself the rule of every good action.
Third, it is to be observed that in the act of sin three things are necessarily required, one of which failing, it ceases to be sin. The first is that it agree not with its rule; for that declining from the law (as we have often said) is the formal element of sin. The second, that it be produced by free choice. For an act is not moral of itself unless elicited by a free will — since the acts of the other powers are not moral according to substance, but only insofar as they are commanded by a free will, and in that manner participate the character of the moral; wherefore cattle, and madmen, or infants, or those asleep, have no moral act, nor can they sin, because sin is a moral evil. The third is that it be a particular, or rather singular, act — determinate, constituted in a certain species. Nor can there be any doubt of this. For moral acts cannot be but certain and singular; nor can a particular cause, such as the human will, produce others. These three things, which we have said are required for constituting sin, can be brought back to the first: for there cannot be an act not conformed to the rule — that is, to the law — unless it be particular and produced by free choice. For law is only about particular and certain acts; nor is anything capable of law save a free power, such as the will.
And so sin could not be more rightly and briefly defined than as it was defined by St. John in those words: Sin is iniquity; or (as it is had more clearly in the Greek) ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία, 1 John 3. From these things the reason will be most plain why God does not sin, nor can rightly be called the cause of sin, although he concurs to effecting that action which for man is sin. For the reason is that God does not effect that action as a particular cause, but as a universal cause, furnishing a certain force and influx indifferent and common to that action and to its contrary — so that that action is not such in species because it is done by God, but only because it is done by its particular cause, which is the human will. For it is this which, by its own vice not attending to the rule, abuses the general help of God for this action, when with the same help it could and ought to have used it well for another action.
This reason St. Thomas renders (whose testimony Beza makes much of in this controversy) in 1-2, question 80, article 1, ad 3, where he speaks thus: “It must be said that God is the universal principle of every interior human motion; but that the human will is determined to an evil counsel — this indeed is directly from the human will, and from the devil by way of persuading and proposing objects of appetite.” And in the same part, question 10, article 4, he says that the divine motion is received in second causes according to their disposition. And he explains this more at length in question 3 On Evil, article 2: “It is to be attended,” says he, “that the motion of the first mover is not received uniformly in all movable things, but in each according to its proper manner.” And in the same question, article 7, ad 13, he says that God acts with all second causes, but with free ones acts so that he does not determine them to one, but leaves the determination in the power of free choice. Finally, in book 3 against the Gentiles, chapter 66, he says that second causes particularize and determine the action of the first agent. St. Thomas wills, then, that God moves the will to work, but that his motion and influx is general, and is determined by the will itself to this or that particular action — so that the particular action is from God, but is not therefore such because it is from God, but because it is from the will.
Nor does it much matter in this place whether with St. Thomas we say that God concurs to the actions of second causes by moving the second causes themselves, or rather hold with others that God concurs by working immediately upon the effect itself — provided we hold this: that the concourse of God is general, and is limited by the concourse of the second cause. Which can easily be shown by the example of the sun. For as to the production of a man the sun concurs with the man, but he who is born is not a man because he is produced by the sun, but because he is produced by a man — for through the same concourse of the sun an ox or a horse could have been produced, if such had been the second cause; and if perchance a defect be found in that newly born man, no one will refer the cause of that defect to the sun, but to the man — not so much because the sun is a necessary cause, as because through the sun's concourse a perfect man could have been procreated, if there had been no defect in the proximate cause: so also to the action of the human will God concurs with free choice; but because God is present only with a general concourse, the action is not such because it is produced by God, but because by free choice; and if perchance the action is evil, the defect in no way pertains to God, since through his concourse the contrary action could have been produced as well as that which was produced.
Someone will perhaps say: He who furnishes a sword to one whom he knows will use it ill, without doubt sins, even though that man could have used the sword well if he had willed; why, then, does not God sin in joining his concourse to him whom he knows will abuse it for sinning? I answer that the man who furnishes a sword to one whom he knows will use it ill sins for this reason only: that he was bound to hinder the evil which he knew would come to pass, since he could so easily; but that God is not bound to hinder the evils which he certainly knows will come to pass — both because he is the supreme provider; and because he can draw goods out of evils; and because it is equitable that he preserve natures, and not deny them the help without which they cannot work; and finally because, if God willed to hinder all evils, very many goods would be wanting to the world, since there is almost nothing in created things which some do not abuse. What? Even in human affairs a magistrate does not sin if he assign to harlots a certain quarter of the city to dwell in, though he certainly knows they will not use that place well. For he can permit a lesser evil, that greater ones may be hindered.
Again someone will object: The concourse of God with the will to one action differs in species from the concourse of God with the will to the contrary action; it is not, then, one and the same concourse, common and indifferent. I answer that those concourses of God, as limited by the human will, differ in species, as the actions themselves differ; yet of themselves they are one and the same concourse, common and indifferent.
Likewise you will object: A human action, not only as a certain thing, but also as an action such in species, is something; therefore, as such in species, it is from God. I answer that a human action is plainly wholly from God, and has from him not only its generic being, but also its specific and singular being; but that it has this through the concourse of God determined to such an action by the human will. Hence it has not its specific being from God's manner of acting, but from the human will's manner of acting.
You will object lastly: If God is not the cause of sin because he concurs as a general cause, then neither will he be the cause of a morally good action, because to that action he concurs as a general cause. I answer that there is a great difference between good and evil actions. For good actions, if they are supernatural, are done by God through special help, and have it from him that they be such — that is, supernatural; but if they are good only morally, they are indeed from God through general help, yet for two causes they are most rightly attributed to God, even as they are such in species. First, because they are intended by God; for God therefore gave us free choice and general help that we might use them well for leading a life according to reason, though he permits that we do otherwise also, if we please, as St. Augustine teaches, book 3 On Free Choice, chapters 1 and 6. Next, because God counsels good actions, commands them, praises them, and exhorts and invites to them; but by the same reasoning an evil action cannot be attributed to God, because he neither intends nor commands it, but rather contrariwise forbids, disapproves, dissuades, and deters and turns away from it. And so not only the turpitude of sin, but even that which the theologians call its material element, if it be considered as such in species, is not to be attributed to God — since God (as we have said) turns away from, and by his law forbids, not only the turpitude, but even the base actions themselves. From these things it will be easy to respond to the five arguments proposed at the beginning of the chapter.
The first argument was: He who is the cause of the cause is also the cause of the thing caused; but God is the cause of the cause — that is, of the action from which the deformity of sin arises; therefore he is the cause of the deformity itself. I answer that that proposition — what is the cause of the cause is also the cause of the thing caused — for the most part has no place in a universal cause, which applies a certain influx common and indifferent to many things. For it often happens that the second cause departs from the order of the first; or that the defect is in the second cause and not in the first; or that the defect arises from the thing as it is such in species, which it has from the second cause and not from the first; and thereby in many ways it can come to pass that the universal cause is the cause of the cause, and yet is not the cause of the thing caused. Hence St. Thomas, in 1-2, question 79, article 1, teaches that it is not rightly concluded that God is the cause of sin because he is the cause of the human will which does the sin. For the human will does not do the sin insofar as it was made by God, but insofar as it declines from the order of God; and we have demonstrated above that the deformity of sin cannot be attributed to God — both because the defect is in the second cause alone, and because that deformity follows the action as it is such in species, which it has from the second cause. For which reason also monsters, which are the sins of nature, are attributed not to the universal causes, but only to the proper and particular ones.
The second argument was: He who knowingly and willingly is the cause of an action with which a deformity is annexed truly and properly sins; God knowingly and willingly is the cause of an action with which a deformity is annexed; therefore God truly and properly sins. I answer that the proposition is true of the particular cause of an action, not of the universal, such as God is. Since the universal cause is the cause of the action through a certain general and indifferent influx, from which a deformed action cannot follow unless the second cause, abusing that good influx, twist it to evil. And so God knowingly and willingly is the cause of an action which, so far as concerns his own influx, is good, and would be simply good unless it were corrupted through the influx of the second cause.
The third argument was: He who knowingly and willingly concurs with someone to an evil action seems to be partaker of the crime; but God knowingly and willingly concurs with all who sin to their evil actions; therefore God seems to be partaker of all the crimes which are perpetrated by men. I answer that the proposition is true of those who concur as particular causes; for they truly concur to the evil action. But God, and the other universal causes, do not properly concur to the evil action, but to an action of itself indifferent, as we have sufficiently explained above.
The fourth argument was: God concurs to intrinsically evil actions, from which the deformity can in no way be separated; therefore God, as he is the cause of the action, so is the cause of the deformity. I answer that no actions are intrinsically evil except as they are determinate and such in species; for the very entity of the hatred of God, if it be considered by itself, is not evil, but only as it is such an entity; but God (as we have often said) is not the cause specifying the action, since he is a universal cause, and of himself indifferent to one action and to its contrary.
The fifth argument was: There is no reason why man should be said to sin and not God, since each does the same action knowingly and willingly. I answer that the reason has already been brought: namely, that to that action God concurs as universal cause, man as particular cause.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT XVIII. Solvitur objectio , qux a Theologis proponi so¬ let veritatis explicandae gratia. Una restat objectio, quam Catholici Theo¬ logi veritatis explicanda; causa proponere solent. Ea est hujusmodi : Deus est causa to¬ tius entitatis, quae in mala actione cernitur, cum, secundum Scripturas, per ipsum omnia facta sint, et sine ipso factum sit nihil ; igi¬ tur videtur etiam esse causa deformitatis, quae in actione illa inest, quae proprie pec¬ catum dicitur. Probatur consecutio. Primo, is qui est causa causae, est etiam causa causati, at Deus est causa actionis, unde resultat defor¬ mitas ; igitur etiam causa est deformitatis, quae ex actione illa resultat. Secundo, is vere ac proprie peccare dici¬ tur, qui sciens, et volens est causa actionis, cum qua est annexa deformitas, licet ipsam deformitatem forte non velit; Deus autem sciens, et volens est causa actionis, cum qua est annexa deformitas, igitur peccare dicen¬ dus est, licet deformitatem illam nolit. Tertio, qui sciens, et volens concurrit cum alio ad actionem malam, particeps est cri¬ minis quod ille committit. Deus autem sciens, et volens concurrit cum omnibus, qui pec¬ cant, ad eorum malas actiones, igitur parti¬ ceps esse videtur criminum, qua; ab omnibus iis perpetrantur, qui peccant. (Juarto, actiones quadam ita sunt per se atque intrinsece mala;, ut deformitas abxeis sit omnino inseparabilis, et prohibitae sint, quia inahe, non malae quia prohibita;, ac de¬ nique nullo modo bene fieri possint, quales sunt mentiri, odisse Deum, et alia id genus : Deus autem ad ejusmodi actiones, non minus quam ad alias omnes, concurrit, igitur fieri non posse videtur, ut Deus omnino liberetur u culpa. Toji. V. Quinto, nulla est ratio cur homo dicatur peccare, dum mentitur, aut blasphemat, si non peccat Deus dum cum homine concurrit ad mendacium, vel blasphemiam illam pro¬ ducendam. Uterque enim libere operatur, uterque facit opus intrinsece malum : uter¬ que totam actionem illam efficit. At homo vere peccat omnium judicio, igitur et Deus. Hoc argumentum non ab omnibus eodem modo solvitur. Primum enim non defuerunt qui existimarent, Deum non esse causam actionum, qua; a rebus creatis efficiuntur, nisi mediate, quatenus videlicet Deus dedit rebus virtutes operativas, et ipsas conser¬ vat. Ita Durandus in 2. sent. distint. 1. quast. o. et distint. 37. qusest. 1. Sed hac sententia merito passim ab omnibus refuta¬ tur, ut qua; Scriptura; divina;, ct sanctis Pa¬ tribus contraria sit. De qua re plura dice¬ mus in iv. lib. de Gratia et de libero arbi¬ trio, cap. i. ubi quastionis hujus proprius locus est. Alia est aliorum solutio, qui dicunt Deum esse causam actionum omnium, et cum om¬ nibus secundis causis operari, sed ideo non peccare, quod non teneatur ullis legibus, ho¬ mines autem peccare, quia legibus tenean¬ tur. Hac sententia Zwinglii haeresiarcha* est, ut supra retulimus, et refutavimus cap. 4 ; est etiam aliorum quorumdam, qui tametsi cum Zwinglio non conveniant in eo, quod ille docet, Deum impellere homines ad peccata, tamen non aliter nituntur ostendere, quem¬ admodum Deus non peccet, cum actionem illam cum homine producit, qua; homini peccatum est, nisi quia Deus nulla lege tene¬ tur; ct nihil est peccatum, nisi pravaricatio legis. Gaeterum non est hac solida defensio ve¬ ritatis, propter duas causas. Primum, quia multa; sunt actiones ita per se, et intrinsece mala;, ut semper pugnent cum lege aterna, et ratione recta, et non possint ulla addita circumstantia reddi licita; : et quia Deus, quamvis nulli legi proprie subjectus sit, ta¬ men non potest aliquid agere, quod repug¬ net sapientia; suae, qua; est lex adorna, ideo non potest actiones illas efficere, aut ad eas concurrere, cum sc ipse negare non possit. Deinde quia tametsi Deus multa, qua; non sunt per se, et intrinsece mala, facere possit, qua hominibus sunt prohibita, qualia sunt occidere homines, etiam innocentes, et quod est unius, alteri donare etiam illo invito cu- 20 UBER It. £9R jus antea fuerat ; tamen ista, et alia, si qua sunt ejusdem generis, potest quidem Deus, ut Dominus rerum omnium, facere per se, vel alios, ut voluerit; cteterum non potest homines juvare, cum ista ipsa opera facien¬ do peccant, quia per se, et intrinsece malum est, juvare aliquem ut peccet, sive (quod idem) participem, et socium esse peccantis. Exemplo nobis sint Abraham et David : imperavit Deus Abrabamo, ut filium inno¬ centem occideret. Potuit sine dubio Deus cum Abrabamo concurrere ad Isaacum innoxium occidendum, quia caedes illa, nec Deo pec¬ catum erat, qui ut Dominus omnium potest rebus suis, ut voluerit, uti ; neque Abraha- mo, qui non propria auctoritate, sed impe¬ rio divino filium occidebat. David Uriam in¬ nocentem gladio filiorum Amnion neci de¬ dit. Non potuit Deus cum Davide ad cajdem illam concurrere, quia David in ea re legem Domini violavit, nec potuit Deus Davidem juvare, ut id faceret, quod ipse fieri prohi¬ buerat ; quamvis alioqui potuisset Deus Uriam, non minus quam Isaacum jubere de medio tolli. Quod idem in rebus humanis cernimus. Potest rex condonare vitam reo, non tamen potest judici cooperari, ut ipse sententia sua, cum, quem scit reum, innoxium pronuntiet. Potest aliquis uxorem ducere, pecunias pos¬ sidere, carnibus vesci, non tamen potest operam suam accommodare, ut ista faciat, cui ex voto, quo se ipse Deo obligavit, ista non licent. Nondum ergo solutus est nodus objectionis illius, qua efficiebatur, Deum non posse a culpa liberari, si iniqua agentibus cooperetur. Vera igitur solutio illa est, quam indica¬ vimus cap. 5, qua; ut apertius, ac fusius ex¬ plicetur, pauca quaedam observanda sunt. Primum est, peccati, quod non tam actio, quam defectio est, non esse qua;rendam cau¬ sam efficientem, sed deficientem. Sic enim loquitur S. Augustinus, lib. xn. de Civit. Dei, cap. 7 : « Nemo quaerat efficientem causam malae voluntatis. Non enim est effi¬ ciens, sed deficiens : quia nec illa effectio est, sed defectio. » Quare si ad unum ali¬ quem effectum multae causae concurrant, et aliquae deficiant, aliqatce non deficiant, illae solae verae causae dicendae erunt peccati, quod in effectu cernitur, quae in agendo de¬ fecerint. Exempli causa, gignitur monstrum, homo videlicet longe brevior justo, aut ali¬ quo membro carens, ad generationem ho¬ minis illius concurrit Deus, sol, pater et ma¬ ter, praeterea virtus seminalis ut instrumen¬ tum, menstruum ut materia ; sed quia non deficit, nisi materia, ei soli tribuitur causa monstri. Ambulat claudus deformi incessu, sed quia non deficit Deus, neque virtus mo- trix, quae in homine est, sed sola tibia quae, ob curvitatem, non plene subjicitur virtuti motrici, soli tibiae tribuitur causa claudica¬ tionis. Quod exemplum affertur a S. Augu¬ stino in lib. de perfect. justitiae, resp. 4. Secundo observandum est, peccatum, quod est malum morale, formaliter consistere in privatione rectitudinis, quae in actu volunta¬ tis debuit inesse, videlicet conformitatis ad regulam rectae rationis, sive legis divinae, causam autem hujus privationis per se non posse esse aliquid positivum, sed aliam pri¬ vationem, seu delectum, ut ostendit S. Tho- mas lib. m. contra Gent. cap. 10. et in quaest. 1. de malo, art. 3. Triplex autem de¬ fectus assignari potest, in quem referenda est causa peccati. Primus, atque adeo proxi¬ mus, et immediatus defectus est, non atten¬ dere ad regulam rationis. Inde enim oritur, ut voluntas producat actum non conformem rationi, qui (ut diximus) peccatum est, quia non respicit regulam rationis, dum operatur. Hic autem defectus, licet non sit actus ali¬ quis positivus, sed negatio quajdam, tamen est voluntarius, quia alioqui non esset causa peccati ; nec tamen est voluntaiuus, quia sit actus elicitus a voluntate, sed quia est in po¬ testate voluntatis attendere, vel non atten¬ dere ad regulam. Non minus enim libere vo¬ luntas operatur, quam non operatur. Neque est hic defectus, quatenus praecedit actum peccati malum aliquod naturale, aut volun¬ tarium, sed simplex negatio. Non est, in¬ quam, malum naturale, quia tunc peccatura etiam, quod inde nascitur, esset naturale, nec posset homo non semper peccare, proin¬ de nec proprie peccaret : neque est malum voluntarium, quia essfet peccatum, et oporte¬ ret quaerere defectum praecedentem, et sic daretur progressus in infinitum. Est igitur defectus ille, ut praecedit peccatum, tempo¬ re, aut natura, causa mali, ut autem comi¬ tatur actum, induit rationem mali. Malum est enim non attendere ad regulam, dum quis operatur, sive operari non attendendo ad regulam. Alter defectus, sed remotus est, quod vo¬ luntas creata non sit summum bonum : inde enim fit, ut voluntas non semper ad regu- CAPUT XA III. lam attendat, et defectus sit capax, quia non est bonum summum. Sic enim scribit S. Au¬ gustinus in Enchiridio, cap. 12 : «Natura) omnes, quoniam naturarum omnium condi¬ tor summe bonus est, bona) sunt : et quia non sicut earum conditor, summe, atque in- commutabiliter bona) sunt, ideo in eis et minui, et augeri bonum potest. » Tertius defectus, ac remotissimus est, quod voluntas humana, ex nihilo sit creata. lndc#cnim non est summum, et infinitum bonum, in quod defectus cadere non potest, quia ex nihilo facta est. Augustinus lib. ii. de nuptiis et concupiscentia, cap. 28 : « Nec ideo, inquit, potuit ex bono oriri voluntas mala, quia bonum factum est a Deo bono, sed quia de nihilo factum est, non de Deo. » Idem etiam habet lib. xii. de Civit. Dei, cap. 1. Ex his intelligemus, non esse necessarium, ut Deus ad peccatum concurrat, et nullo modo fieri posse, ut Deus peccet. Non est enim necessarium, ut Deus ad peccatum con¬ currat, quia et ipsum peccatum proprie non res aliqua, sed privatio est : et causa, sive dix, et origo peccati, similiter negatio est, ra- non res. Porro Deus nullo modo peccare po¬ test, quia non potest esse causa deficiens, cum sit bonum summum et infinitum, et non possit ejus voluntas non semper ad regulam sapientia) sua) respicere, cum in Deo sapien¬ tia et voluntas idem sint, ac per hoc vo¬ luntas Dei sit ipsa regula omnis bonae actio¬ nis. Tertio observandum est, in actu peccati tria necessario requiri, quorum uno defi¬ ciente desinit esse peccatum. Primum est, ut non congruat cum sua regula ; ista enim declinatio a lege (ut saepe diximus) est for¬ male peccati. Alterum, ut producatur a li¬ bero arbitrio. Actus enim non est moralis per se, nisi elicitus a libera voluntate, siqui¬ dem actus aliarum potentiarum non sunt morales secundum substantiam, sed solum quatenus imperantur a libera voluntate , et eo modo participant rationem moralis, quo¬ circa pecudes, et homines furiosi, vel infan¬ tes, aut dormientes nullum habent actum moralem, nec peccare possunt, quia pecca¬ tum est malum morale. Tertium est, ut sit actus particularis, vel potius singularis, de¬ terminatus, in certa specie constitutus. Ne¬ que de hoc ulla dubitatio esse potest. Non enim actus morales nisi certi et singulares esse queunt, neque alios producere potest 299 causa particularis, qualis est humana volun¬ tas. Ha)c tria qusp ad peccatum constituendum requiri diximus, ad primum revocari pos¬ sunt, non enim esse potest actus non con¬ formis regulae, id est, legi, nisi sit particula¬ ris, et a libero arbitrio productus. Lex enim non est nisi de actibus particularibus, et certis ; neque legis capax est, nisi potentia libera, qualis est voluntas. Itaque non potuit rectius, et brevius defi¬ niri peccatum, quam ut a S. Joanne fuit de¬ finitum illis verbis : Peccatum est iniquitas, vel (ut clarius habetur graece) agaptia ia-: iv avopla, I Joan. iii. Ex his apertissima erit ratio cur Deus non peccet, neque peccati causa jure dici possit , quamvis concurrat ad actionem illam efficiendam , quae homini est peccatum. Ratio enim est, quia Deus non efficit actionem illam, ut causa particularis, sed ut causa universalis, praebens vim, et influxum quemdam indifferentem , et com¬ munem ad illam actionem et ad contrariam, ita ut actio illa non sit talis in specie, quia a Deo fit , sed solum quia fit a sua particulari causa, quae est humana voluntas. Haec enim «st, quae vitio suo non attendens ad regulam, abutitur auxilio Dei generali ad hanc actio¬ nem, cum eodem auxilio ad aliam actionem bene uti potuisset et debuisset. Hanc rationem reddit sanctus Thomas (cujus testimonium Beza in hac controversia magni facit) in 1.2. quaest. 80. art. 1 ad 3. ubi sic loquitur : « Dicendum quod Deus est universale principium omnis interioris motus humani : sed quod determinatur ad malum consilium voluntas humana, hoc directe quidem est ex voluntate humana, et a dia¬ bolo per modum persuadentis, et appetibilia proponentis. » Et in eadem parte, quaest. 10. art. -4. dicit, divinam motionem recipi in causis secundis juxta earum dispositio¬ nem. Et fusius hoc explicat in quaest. 3. de malo, art. 2 : « Attendendum, inquit, est, quod motus primi moventis non recipitur uniformiter in omnibus mobilibus, sed in unoquoque secundum proprium modum. » Et in quaest. eadem art. 7. ad. 13. dicit, Deum agere cum omnibus secundis causis, sed cum liberis ita agere, ut eas non deter¬ minet ad unum, sed relinquat determinatio¬ nem in potestate liberi arbitrii. Denique in lib. iii. contra Gentes cap. 66. dicit, causas secundas esse particulantes, et determinan¬ tes actionem primi agentis. Vult igitur 300 UBER II. S. Thomas, Deum movere voluntatem ad operaudum, sed ejus motum, atque influxum generalem esse , et ab ipsa voluntate deter¬ minari ad hanc, aut illam actionem particu¬ larem, ita ut actio particularis sit a Deo, sed non ideo sit talis, quia est a Deo, sed quia est a voluntate. Neque multum refert hoc loco, utrum cum sancto Thoma dicamus, Deum concurrere ad actiones secundarum causarum, movendo ipsas causas secundas, an vero cum aliis sentiamus, Deum concurrere operando im¬ mediate in ipsum effectum, modo illud te¬ neamus, concursum Dei esse generalem, et a concursu secunda; causa; limitari. Quod exemplo solis facile potest ostendi ; quemad¬ modum enim ad productionem hominis con¬ currit sol cum homine, sed non ideo qui nascitur est homo , quia producitur a sole, sed quia producitur ab homine ; potuisset enim per eumdem solis concursum produci bos, aut equus , si talis fuisset causa secun¬ da : et si forte defectus reperiatur in homine illo recens nato, nemo referet causam defe¬ ctus illius in solem, sed in hominem, non tam quia sol sit causa necessaria, quam quia per solis concursum potuisset homo perfe¬ ctus procreari, si defectus in causa proxima nullus fuisset : ita quoque ad actionem vo¬ luntatis humana; concurrit Deus cum libero arbitrio, sed quia Deus generali tantum con¬ cursu adest, non est talis actio , quia a Deo, sed quia a libero arbitrio producitur : et si forte actio mala est, defectus ad Deum nullo modo pertinet, cum per ejus concursum potuisset contraria actio reque produci , at¬ que ea, quae producta est. Dicet fortassis aliquis : Qui gladium pra;- bet ei, quem scit illo male usurum, sine du¬ bitatione peccat , etiamsi potuerit ille gladio bene uti, si voluisset : cur igitur non peccat Deus concursum suum illi adjungens, quem scit eo ad peccandum abusurum? Respon¬ deo, hominem qui praebet gladium ei, quem scit male usurum, ideo solum peccare, quia tenebatur impedire malum , quod sciebat eventurum, cum tam facile potuisset : Deum autem non teneri ad mala impedienda, qua; certo novit eventura, tum quia summus provisor est, tum quia potest ex malis eli¬ cere bona, tum quia aequum est ut natu¬ ras conservet neque eis deneget auxilium, sine quo operari non possunt, tum denique quia si Deus omnia mala impedire vellet, plurima bona mundo deessent . cum nihil fere sit in rebus creatis, quo non aliqui abu¬ tantur. Quid ? quod etiam in rebus humanis non peccat magistratus, si meretricibus cer¬ tum locum urbis incolendum attribuat, quamvis certo sciat co loco ipsas non bene usuras. Potest enim permittere minus ma¬ lum, ut majora impediantur. Rursus objiciet aliquis , concursus Dei cum voluntate ad actionem unam , differt specie a concursu Dei cum voluntate ad a- ctionem contrariam : non est igituwunus, atque idem concursus, communis, atque indifferens. Respondeo, concursus illos Dei, ut limitatos a voluntate humana, differre specie, ut ipsa; actiones differunt, tamen ex se unum et eumdem concursum esse com¬ munem, atque indifferentem. Item objicies : Actio humana non solum ut res qumdam, sed etiam ut actio talis in specie, est aliquid, igitur ut talis in specie, est a Deo. Respondeo, actionem humanam plane totam esse a Deo, et ab ipso habere, non solum esse genericum, sed etiam speci¬ ficum, et singulare : ca;terum id habere per concursum Dei determinatum ad actionem talem a voluntate humana. Proinde non ha¬ bere esse specificum ex modo agendi Dei, sed ex modo agendi voluntatis humana;. Objicies postremo : Si Deus non est causa peccati, quia concurrit ut causa generalis, igitur non erit etiam causa actionis bona; moraliter, quia ad illam actionem concurrit ut causa generalis. Respondeo , magnum esse discrimen inter bonas et malas actiones. Nam actiones bona;, si sunt supernaturalcs, fiunt a Deo per auxilium speciale, et habent ab ipso ut sint tales, id est, supernaturalcs : si vero sint bona; tantum moraliter, sunt quidem a Deo per auxilium generale, tamen duas ob causas rectissime tribuuntur Deo, etiam ut tales sunt in specie. Primum, quia sunt a Deo intenta;, Deus enim ideo nobis dedit liberum arbitrium, et auxilium gene¬ rale, ut iis bene uteremur ad vitam secun¬ dum rationem traducendam, quamvis per¬ mittat, ut secus etiam, si libuerit, faciamus, ut S. Augustinus docet lib. m. de libero ar¬ bitrio, cap. 1. et 6. Deinde, quia Deus actio¬ nes bonas suadet, imperat, laudat, atque ad eas hortatur et invitat : eadem vero ratione non potest actio mala Deo tribui, quia neque eam intendit, neque imperat, sed contra po¬ tius vetat, improbat, dissuadet, atque ab ea deterret, et avertit. Itaque non solum turpi¬ tudo peccati, sed ipsum etiam, quod mate- CAPUT XY1II. ::ui liale theologi vocant; si ut tale est in specie consideretur, Deo tribuendum non est, cum Deus (ut diximus) non solum turpitudinem, sed etiam actiones ipsas turpes aversctur, et lege sua prohibeat. Ex his facile erit ad quinque argumenta initio capitis proposita i'espondcrc. Primum argumentum erat : Qui est causa caussc, est etiam causa causati ; Deus autem est causa causa?, id est, actionis, ex qua de¬ formitas peccati exoritur, igitur est causa ipsius deformitatis. Respondeo, propositio¬ nem illam : Quod est causa causa?, est etiam causa causati, ut plurimum non habere lo¬ cum in causa universali, quse adhibet in¬ fluxum quemdam communem, et indifferen¬ tem ad multa. Nam sa?pe accidit, ut causa secunda egrediatur ab ordine prima?, vel ut defectus sit in secunda causa, et non in pri¬ ma, vel ut defectus oriatur ex re, ut est talis in specie, quod habet a secunda causa, et non a prima ; ac per hoc multis modis fieri potest, ut causa universalis sit causa causa?, et tamen non sit causa causati. Hinc S. Thomas in 1. 2. q. 79. art. 1. do¬ cet, non recte concludi, Deum esse causam peccati , quia sit causa voluntatis humana? , qua? peccatum facit. Non enim voluntas hu¬ mana peccatum facit , quatenus a Deo facta est, sed quatenus declinat ab ordine Dei, et nos supra demonstravimus , deformitatem peccati non posse tribui Deo , tum quia de¬ fectus est in sola causa secunda, tum quia deformitas illa sequitur actionem, ut est talis in specie, quam habet a secunda causa : qua etiam ratione monstra, qua? sunt peccata naturae, non tribuuntur causis universalibus, sed solum propriis, et particularibus. Alterum argumentum erat : Qui sciens et volens est causa actionis, cum qua est an¬ nexa deformitas, vere ac proprie peccat; Deus sciens, ac volens est causa actionis, cum qua est annexa deformitas ; igitur Deus vere, ac proprie peccat. Respondeo, propo¬ sitionem esse veram de causa particulari actionis, non de universali, qualis est Deus. Quoniam causa universalis est causa actionis per influxum quemdam generalem, et indif¬ ferentem, ex quo non potest sequi actio de¬ formis, nisi causa secunda, abutens influxu illo bono, eum detorqueat ad malum. Itaque Deus sciens, et volens causa est actionis, qua?, quod attinet ad influxum ipsius , bona est, et simpliciter bona esset, nisi per in¬ fluxum secunda; causa? corrumperetur. Tertium argumentum erat : Qui sciens, et volens cum aliquo ad actionem malam con¬ currit, is particeps criminis esse videtur : Deus autem sciens, et volens concurrit cum omnibus, qui peccant, ad eorum malas actio¬ nes : Deus igitur particeps esse videtur om¬ nium criminum , qua? ab hominibus per¬ petrantur. Respondeo, propositionem esse veram de iis. qui concurrunt ut causa? parti¬ culares, ii siquidem vere concurrunt ad actionem malam. Deus autem, et creterae causa; universales non concurrunt proprie ad actionem malam, sed ad actionem indiffe¬ rentem ex se, ut supra satis explicuimus. Quartum argumentum erat : Deus con¬ currit ad actiones intrinsece malas, a quibus deformitas nullo modo separari potest, igi¬ tur Deus, ut est causa actionis, ita est causa deformitatis. Respondeo, actiones intrinsece malas nullas esse, nisi ut sunt determinata?, et tales in specie ; nam entitas ipsa odii Dei, si per se consideretur, non est mala, sed solum ut est talis entitas ; Deus autem (ut sa?pc diximus) non est causa specificans actionem, cum sit causa universalis, et ex se indifferens ad unam actionem, et ad con¬ trariam. Quintum argumentum erat : Nulla est ra¬ tio, cur homo dicatur peccare, et non Deus, cum camdem actionem uterque sciens, et volens faciat. Respondeo, jam rationem esse allatam, quia videlicet ad actionem illam Deus concurrit ut causa universalis, homo ut causa particularis. CONTROVERSIARUM DE AMISSIONE GRATLE SIVE DE STATU PECCATI