Bellarmine · De Controversiis · On the Loss of Grace · Book III: On the Sin of the First Man
Chapter 1: On the temptation which preceded the sin of the first parents, and that the first parents truly sinned
Our translation, from the Latin of the Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1870–74), vol. V, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, Book III. The Latin source text is public domain; this English rendering is released with the site. Scripture quotations follow Bellarmine's Vulgate citations, rendered in Douay-Rheims wording where he quotes exactly. Click “Show the Latin” for the original (raw OCR of the scan; scanning errors remain — the scan itself is the authority).
Concerning the temptation of the first parents it can first be asked whether those first men could at all be tempted to sinning. For there have not been wanting, in this our age — in which no error can be thought so absurd as not straightway to find patrons — those who asserted that the first parents neither sinned, nor could sin, nor were even in any way liable to a temptation that would lead to sinning. For, as Luther relates in his commentary on the first chapter of Genesis, there were found those who said that the precept given by God to the first men, that they should not eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, was not a law, but only an admonition — such as are the precepts of physicians when they forbid something harmful. Which indeed they confirmed by an argument deduced aptly enough from Lutheran principles: because, namely, the law is not made for the just man, but for the sinner, as the Apostle writes, 1 Timothy 1; but the first men, dwelling in paradise, were just by the consent of all. And since where there is no law, neither can there be transgression, as the same Apostle teaches, Romans 4, they gathered that the first men, when they tasted the forbidden fruit, did not fall, nor could fall, into transgression, and thereby into sin — since sin is ἀνομία, that is, the transgression of law, John witnessing in his first epistle, chapter 3. But this error is so gross and absurd that it scarcely needs refutation.
For first, that that precept about the forbidden fruit was a true law, and that the first parents, that fruit being tasted, truly and gravely sinned, the punishment which followed the eating of the fruit is witness. For why were they expelled from paradise, shut out from the tree of life, bound with the necessity of death, and condemned to seek their food with sorrow and labor, if they sinned nothing? But if perchance they answer that the necessity of death and the other hardships flowed from the nature of that pestilent food, not from the desert of sin or the sentence of a just judge, the divine Scripture will meet them, refuting that response. Ecclesiasticus 25: From the woman came the beginning of sin, and by her we all die. Romans 5: By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death. Romans 6: The wages of sin is death. Romans 8: The body indeed is dead because of sin. Thou seest, then, that death was born not from the nature of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, but from sin.
Next, the tree of knowledge was without doubt good, for God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good, Genesis 1. Not from the nature of that tree, then, could such great evils be born — by which, above all, the innocent would be overwhelmed.
Moreover, the immortality of the first men in paradise (as we demonstrated in the book On the State of Innocence) was not natural to man, but depended on grace and the divine friendship; not, then, could the nature of any tree corrupt it, but only fault, and turning away from the friendship and grace of God.
But if perchance the adversaries despise the Scriptures — though they have wished to abuse their testimonies for assailing the truth — their error will be conquered by a manifest reason drawn from the sins which are committed by men at the present. For from this which they teach — that the first men did not sin because they had no law, since they were just — it follows that no men sin, nay, that it cannot come to pass that any men sin. For if sin prerequires law, since sin is the transgression of law, and law prerequires sin, since law is not made for the just man but for the sinner, then sin always prerequires sin; therefore there was no first sin. And if there was no first, whence did the rest arise? Wherefore it is necessary either that there was law before sin, and the opinion of the adversaries is false; or certainly that there are not, nor ever were, sins in the world — which is the error of the Libertines, whose impudence (as we said in the preceding book) should be restrained not with arguments, but only with torments and punishments. For to what purpose should one deal by reasons with those who deny reason itself, and overturn together religion and the commonwealth, all faith and all rights? And indeed it is credible that they who, with Luther as author, deny the sin of the first men are of the flock of the Libertines, whom Luther himself and Calvin unwittingly begot. And let them see with what equity they assail those whom they cannot deny to have come forth from their own school, and whose arguments, unless they be willing to fight against themselves, they cannot refute. For certainly that argument — the law is not made for the just man; the first men were just; therefore the law was not made for them — Luther, in the place cited, labors much to solve, and, many words being spent in vain, does not truly solve. The sum of his solution is that the Apostle in 1 Timothy 1 speaks of the law given after sin, and of it truly said that the law is not made for the just man, but for sinners; but that there is another law, given before sin, and that it pertains to the just.
But the adversary will concede that the Apostle speaks of the law given after sin, and will weave the argument again in this way: After sin, the law was given on account of sinners, and therefore was made for sinners alone, not for the just; therefore, when there were no sinners, but all were just, as in the state of innocence, no law was to be given. Or certainly in this way: the law after sin does not pertain to the just for this reason, that they are just — for if they were sinners, it would without doubt pertain to them; but Adam and Eve in paradise were just; therefore the law by no means pertained to them.
Add that that distinction, of a law given before sin or after sin, is altogether empty. For we find a law given after sin which was given to the just: for the law of circumcision was given, after sin, to Abraham, a just man, and to his posterity, that it might be a seal of the justice of faith, Romans 4. We find also a law given before sin which pertains no less to sinners than to the just: for the law which is called natural began from the very creation of man, seeing it is written in the heart of every man using reason; and it without doubt binds the just as well as sinners. In vain, therefore, does Luther write that the law given after sin pertains to sinners, the law given before sin to the just. But let us take the explication of the Pauline place, Luther being dismissed, from the holy Fathers, Ambrose and Augustine.
St. Ambrose, in the exposition of Psalm 36, treating that little verse — The law of his God is in his heart — teaches that the words of the Apostle (the law is not made for the just man, but for the unjust and sinners) ought to be understood of the renewal of the law, which happens when it is written on tables or in books. For the law is not set on tables on account of the just, who keep the law and faithfully retain it in the heart, according to the words of the Psalm, the law of his God is in his heart; but on account of sinners, who forget the law and so live as if they had no law. Whence the same Apostle, when he says “but for the unjust,” put in the Greek ἀνόμοις — that is, the lawless, or transgressors of the law. By which he openly signified that the law is not set for the unjust because they were not held by law even before, but because they had forgotten the law; nor is it not set for the just because the just ought to lack law, but because they testify by good works that they have the law in the heart. There could, then, be given to the first men in the state of innocence a law both natural and also positive; but there was no need of renewal, or of writing it out on tables of stone — which was done afterwards on account of the wicked, that sin might be known, as the Apostle disputes, Romans 7.
St. Augustine, book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 10 [al. 40], will have this same place of the Apostle from chapter 1 of the first to Timothy — the law is not made for the just man, but for the unjust — to be like those places of the same Apostle: You are not under the law, but under grace, Romans 6; and: If you are led by the spirit, you are not under the law, Galatians 5. Which places do not signify that the just are not held by laws, or do not sin if they keep not the law; but that they have not the law above them, as it were hanging over their necks and threatening with the scourge and terrifying, as the unjust have, who work good from fear of punishment. For the just work good from love of justice and with a willing mind, and would work it even if there were no law, or it threatened no punishment. Wherefore they are rather in the law than under the law, as the Apostle speaks of himself, 1 Corinthians 9, where he says that he is not under the law, and yet is not without the law of God, but is in the law of Christ. So then the first men in paradise, as long as they preserved innocence, were not under the law, nor was the law made for them — that is, imposed as a yoke on the unwilling; though they were not without law, but were in the law of the Creator.
Show the Latin (Vives edition, OCR)
CAPUT PRIMUM. De tentatione , quae peccatum primorum paren¬ tum praecessit, quodque primi parentes vere peccaverint. De tentatione primorum parentum primo quaeri potest, an omnino tentari potuerint primi illi homines ad peccandum. Non enim defuerunt hoc nostro saeculo, in quo nullus cogitari potest tam absurdus error, qui non continuo patronos inveniat, qui asseruerint, primos parentes neque peccasse, neque pec¬ care potuisse, ac ne tentationi quidem, quae ad peccandum inducat, obnoxios ulla ratione fuisse. Nam ut Lutherus refert in comment. 1. cap. Genes, inventi sunt, qui dicerent, praeceptum datum a Deo primis hominibus, ut de ligno scientiae boni, et mali non ederent non fuisse legem, sed admonitionem tan¬ tum, qualia sunt praecepta medicorum, cum aliquid noxium prohibent. Quod quidem con¬ firmabant argumento, ex principiis Luthe- ranis satis apte deducto, quia videlicet lex justo non est posita, sed peccatori, ut Apo¬ stolus scribit 1 Timoth. i. primi autem ho¬ mines in paradiso degentes justi erant om¬ nium consensu. Et quoniam ubi non est lex, nec praevaricatio esse potest, ut idem Apo¬ stolus docet Rom. iv, colligebant, primos ho¬ mines, cum pomum vetitum gustaverunt, non incidisse , neque incidere potuisse in praevaricationem, ac per boo in peccatum, cum peccatum sit «votxta id est, praevari¬ catio legis, teste Joanne in I epist. cap. m. Sed hic error adeo crassus, et absurdus est, ut vix refutatione indigeat. Primum enim, praeceptum illud de pomo vetito veram fuisse legem, et primos parentes pomo illo degustato vere, graviterque pec¬ casse, testis est pcena, quae pomi esum con¬ secuta est. Cur enim de paradiso expulsi, a ligno vitae exclusi, mortis necessitate con¬ stricti, atque ad victum cum dolore, et labore quaerendum damnati sunt, si nihil peccarunt? Quod si forte respondeant, mortis necessi¬ tatem, et aerumnas caeteras ex natura pesti¬ feri illius cibi, non ex peccati merito, aut ex sententia justi judicis manasse, occurret Scriptura divina, quae responsionem istam CAPUT I. 303 refellat. Eccles. xxv : A muliere initium pec¬ cati. , et per illam morimur omnes. Rom. v : Per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit , et per peccatum mors. Rom. vi : Sti¬ pendium peccati mors. Rom. vm : Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum (1). Vi¬ des igitur, mortem non ex natura ligni scien¬ tiae boni et mali, sed ex peccato natam. Deinde lignum scientiae sine dubio bonum erat, nam vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat , et erant valde bona , Genes, i (2). Non igitur ex natura ligni illius tanta mala nasci poterant, quibus praesertim obruerentur innocentes. Adhaec immortalitas primorum hominum in paradiso (utin lib. de statu innocentiae de¬ monstravimus) non erat homini naturalis, sed ex gratia, et amicitia divina pendebat : non igitur eam natura ligni alicujus, sed sola culpa, et aversio ab amicitia, et gratia Dei corrumpere poterat. Quod si forte adversarii Scripturas con¬ temnant, quamvis ad veritatem oppugnan¬ dam earum testimoniis abuti voluerint, ex peccatis, quae in praesenti ab hominibus com¬ mittuntur, eorum error manifesta ratione vincetur. Si quidem ex eo quod ipsi docent, primos homines non peccasse, quia legem non habuerunt, cum essent justi, sequitur, nullos homines peccare, quin etiam fieri non posse, ut ulli homines peccent. Nam si pec¬ catum praerequirit legem, cum peccatum sit praevaricatio legis, et lex praerequirit pecca¬ tum, cum lex justo non ponatur, sed pecca¬ tori, ergo peccatum semper praerequirit pec¬ catum, nullum igitur luit primum peccatum. Et si primum non fuit, unde caetera extite- runt? Quare necesse est, ut vel fuerit lex ante peccatum, et falsa sit adversariorum opinio; vel certe nulla sint, nec fuerint unquam in mundo peccata, qui est error Libertinorum, quorum impudentia (ut diximus libro supe¬ riore) non argumentis, sed tormentis, et sup¬ pliciis tantum coercenda esset. Quorsum enim rationibus cum iis agatur, qui rationem ipsam negant, et religionem, acrempublicam, omnem fidem, etomnia jura simul evertunt ? et sane credibile est, eos, qui Luthero auctore, peccatum primorum hominum negant, de grege esse Libertino¬ rum, quos Lutherus ipse, et Calvinus impru¬ dentes genuerunt. Et viderint ipsi qua aequi¬ tate oppugnent, quos ex schola sua prodiisse negare non possunt, et quorum argumenta, si sibi ipsi repugnare nolint, refutare non queerunt. Nam certe argumentum illud, lex justo non est posita, primi homines justi erant, igitur lex illis non fuit posita, Lutherus loco citato multum laborat, ut solvat, et multis frustra consumptis verbis vere non solvit. Summa solutionis ejus est, quod Apo¬ stolus 1 Timoth. i. loquatur de lege lata post peccatum, ac de ea vere dixerit, legem justo non esse positam, sed peccatoribus : esse au¬ tem aliam legem ante peccatum latam, et eam ad justos pertinere. At concedet adversarius, Apostolum loqui de lege post peccatum lata, sed argumentum iterum texet hoc modo : Post peccatum lex lata est propter peccatores, et ideo solis pec¬ catoribus, non autem justis posita est; igitur quando nulli erant peccatores, sed justi om¬ nes, ut in statu innocentiae, nulla lex ferenda fuit. Vel certe hoc modo, lex post peccatum ideo ad justos non pertinet, quia justi sunt, nam si peccatores essent, ad eos sine dubio pertineret ; atqui Adam et Eva in paradiso justi erant : igitur lex ad eos minime perti¬ nebat. Adde quod distinctio illa de lege ante pec¬ catum, vel post peccatum lata, omnino inanis est. Nam invenimus legem post peccatum la¬ tam, quae justis data est ; lex enim circum¬ cisionis post peccatum, data est Abrahamo viro justo, et ejus posteritati, ut esset signa¬ culum justitiae fidei, Rom. iv. Invenimus etiam legem ante peccatum latam, quae non minus ad peccatores, quam ad justos perti¬ neat ; lex enim, quae naturalis dicitur, ab ipsa hominis creatione coepit, quippe quae in corde omnis hominis ratione utentis scripta est; et ea sine dubio tam justos, quam pec¬ catores obligat. Frustra igitur scribit Luthe¬ rus, legem datam post peccatum ad pecca¬ tores, legem datam ante peccatum ad justos pertinere. Sed loci Paulini explicationem, Luthero dimisso, a sanctis Patribus, Am¬ brosio et Augustino sumamus. S. Ambrosius in expositione Psal. xxxvi. tractans versiculum illum : Lex Dei ejus in corde ipsius, docet verba Apostoli (justo non est lex posita, sed injustis et peccatoribus) debere intelligi de renovatione legis, quae fit quando scribitur in tabulis, aut libris. Lex enim non ponitur in tabulis propter justos, qui legem servant, et eam in corde fideliter retinent, juxta verba Psalmi, lex Dei ejus in (1) Eccl. XXV, 23; Rom. V, 42; ibid. VI, 23; ibid. VIII, 10. — (2) Gen I, 31. LIBER III. 304 corde ipsius ; sed propter peccatores, qui legis obliviscuntur, et ita vjvunt, ac si legem non haberent. <Jnde idem Apostolus cum ait : sed injustis, grtecc posuit, avdaoi? id est, exlegibus, sive legis praevaricatoribus. Ex quo aperte significavit, legem non ideo poni injustis, quia non tenerentur etiam antea lege, sed quia obliti erant legis, nec ideo non poni justis, quia justi carere debeant lege, sed quia legem in corde se habere per opera bona testantur. Potuit igitur primis homini¬ bus in statu innocentia; dari lex tum naturalis tum etiam positiva, sed non fuit opus reno¬ vatione, aut descriptione in tabulis lapideis. Quod propter iniquos postea factum est, ut peccatum cognosceretur, ut Apostolus dis¬ putat Rora. vii. S. Augustinus lib. de spiritu et littera cap. 40. hunc cumdcm locum Apostoli ex cap. i, prioris ad Tim. Justo non est lex posita , sed injustis, vult similem esse locis illis ejusdem Apostoli, Non estis sub lege, sed sub gratia, Rom. vi. et, Si spiritu ducimini, non estis sub lege (4), Galat. v. Qua; loca non significant, justos non teneri legibus, vel non peccare, si legem non servent, sed non habei*e legem supra se, quasi cervicibus imminentem, et flagello minantem, ac terrentem, ut habent injusti, qui timore poena bonum operantur. Operantur enim justi bonum amore justitiae, ac libenti animo, operatuid etiam si lex non esset, vel poenam nullam minaretur. Quo¬ circa in lege potius sunt, quam sub lege, ut Apostolus de se loquitur I. Corint. ix. ubi dicit, se sublege non esse, et tamen sine lege Dei non esse, sed in lege esse Christi. Sic igitur primi homines in paradiso, quamdiu innocentiam conservarunt, sub lege non erant neque lex eis posita, id est, quasi jugum no¬ lentibus imposita erat : cum tamen sine lege non essent, sed in lege creatoris essent.